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Summary
The issue of race and racism in contemporary America is a widely debated 
subject. Many scholars argue that race remains a significant barrier to socio­
economic equality between African Americans and whites. Yet, many other 
scholars disagree. This dissertation explores the way in which racism is maintained 
in American society in coded form. The election of Richard Nixon in 1968 heralded 
the beginning of the conservative ascendancy in American politics and society and 
also a new political realignment in which race was a definitive factor. One of the 
principal ways in which this was achieved was through the use of coded racial 
politics. Yet, the use of coded words, symbols and phrases to refer to racial issues, 
helped legitimise and maintain racism in post-Civil Rights America. The 
dissertation, through the method of discourse analysis, provides an analytical 
history of the codification of racism between the Nixon and Clinton 
administrations. Through an analysis of presidential and public discourses 
surrounding eight pivotal events, the dissertation examines the reproduction of 
coded racism in American society.
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Introduction
The issue of race and racism in post-Civil Rights America, particularly its 
significance, is a much-debated subject. Numerous scholars have argued that race 
remains significant in the post-Civil Rights era. Alphonso Pinkney’s The Myth o f  
Black Progress argues that race continues to be an ever-present aspect in American 
life despite the Civil Rights legislation of the 1960s.1 Andrew Hacker’s bestseller, 
Two Nations: Black and White, Separate, Hostile and Unequal, also argues that 
race remains the defining feature of America, as it has for the past 400 years. 
Scholars such as Robert C. Smith in Racism in the Post-Civil Rights Era: Now You 
See it, Now You Don't have argued that racism is the fundamental cause of the 
plight of the black urban poor. Furthermore, Ellis Cose’s The Rage o f  a Privileged 
Class and Joe R. Feagin and Melvin P. Sikes’ Living With Racism: The Black 
Middle-Class Experience, demonstrate how race continues to be a salient factor in 
the lives of the black middle-class and assert that racism continues to hinder those 
who have supposedly ‘made it’ in American society.4
Yet, since the mid-1960s some scholars have argued that racism is no longer 
a significant barrier to socio-economic equality between whites and African 
Americans. Congruent with the belief in the declining significance of race and
1 Alphonso Pinkney, The Myth o f  Black Progress (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984).
2 Andrew Hacker, Two Nations: Black and White, Separate, Hostile and Unequal (New York: 
Ballantine Books, 1995).
3 Robert C. Smith, Racism in the Post-Civil Rights Era: Now You See it, Now You D on ’t (New York: 
SUNY, 1995).
4 Ellis Cose, The Rage o f  a Privileged Class (New York: Harper Collins, 1993); Joe R. Feagin and 
Melvin P. Sikes, Living With Racism: The Black Middle-Class Experience (Boston: Beacon Press,
1994).
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racism in determining the life chances of African Americans has been antipathy 
towards race specific measures by government, from social welfare programs to 
policies such as affirmative action in education and employment. While a number 
of scholars have claimed that from the early 1970s the socio-economic gulf 
between African Americans and whites has narrowed considerably, for example, 
Ben J. Wattenberg and Richard M. Scammon, “Black Progress and Liberal 
Rhetoric”, Nathan Glazer Affirmative Discrimination: Ethnic Inequality and Public 
Policy, George Gilder, Wealth and Poverty, and Abigail Themstrom and Stephan 
Themstrom, America in Black and White: One Nation, Indivisible, others who share 
a less positive view of the progress of African Americans, particularly when 
considering the growth of the black ‘underclass’, nonetheless agree that the 
significance of race as a barrier to progress has declined.5 Many scholars have 
advanced the notion that since the Civil Rights movement ended legally sanctioned 
racial discrimination the greatest barrier for African Americans, like whites, is 
class. Arguably the most prominent exponent of this idea was William Julius 
Wilson. In his seminal work, The Declining Significance o f Race: Race and 
Changing American Institutions, Wilson argued that following the civil rights 
legislation of the 1960s, African-American life chances were no longer determined 
by race, but by class.6
5 George Gilder, Wealth and Poverty (New York: Basic Books, 1981); Nathan Glazer, Affirmative 
Discrimination: Ethnic Inequality and Public Policy (New York: Basic Books, 1975); Abigail 
Themstrom and Stephan Themstrom, America in Black and White: One Nation, Indivisible (New 
York: Simon & Schuster, 1997); Ben J. Wattenberg and Richard M. Scammon, “Black Progress and 
Liberal Rhetoric”, Commentary 55.4 (1973): 35-44.
6 William Julius Wilson, The Declining Significance o f  Race: Race and Changing American 
Institutions (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1978).
2
While structuralists like Wilson argued against government intervention 
and/or social welfare programs to solve the problem of the black poor due to their 
ineffectiveness - the point Wilson elaborated upon in The Truly Disadvantaged: 
The Inner-City, The Underclass, and Public Policy - other scholars argued that such
n
intervention itself was the greatest barrier to socio-economic advancement. Charles 
Murray’s study of national welfare policy, Losing Ground: American Social Policy, 
1950-1980, determined that government welfare programs were not only
Q
ineffective, but actually perpetuated poverty and a culture of dependence. This 
argument was also expressed by Shelby Steele in The Content o f Our Character: A 
New Vision o f Race in America.9 Steele argued that the principal barrier to black 
progress was the identity of black victimisation. Similarly Dinesh D’Souza in The 
End o f Racism: Principles For a Multiracial Society argued that the welfare state 
reinforces the deviant behaviour of ghetto culture, that is, excessive reliance on 
government, conspiratorial paranoia about racism, a resistance to academic 
achievement and a normalisation of illegitimacy and dependency.10 As well as 
opposing government intervention on the grounds that it perpetuated and/or 
encouraged the violation of traditional American values of hard-work and self­
 . The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner-City, The Underclass, and Public Policy (Chicago:
University o f Chicago Press, 1987).
8 Charles Murray, Losing Ground: American Social Policy, 1950-1980 (New York: Basic Books, 
1984). While Wilson believed that a culture of poverty existed, he did not believe it was caused by 
government programs. Murray also appeared to move away from this view when he co-wrote The 
Bell Curve: Intelligence and Class Structure in American Life (New York: Free Press, 1994) with 
Richard Hermstein, in which he suggested that genetic differences between blacks and whites 
accounted for the socio-economic disparity.
9 Shelby Steele, The Content o f  Our Character: A New Vision o f  Race in America (New York: St. 
Martin Press, 1990).
10 Dinesh D ’Souza, The End o f  Racism: Principles For a Multiracial Society (London: Free Press,
1995).
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reliance, arguments against social welfare programs have also been made on the 
grounds that programs aimed at helping African Americans as a group resulted in 
discrimination against whites.
The scholarly debates surrounding the significance of race and the 
effectiveness and/or legitimacy of racial policies reflect, or indeed are reflected in, 
public opinion. Throughout the post-Civil Rights period popular white opinion on 
the subject of race has largely been characterised by a strong commitment to the 
principle of racial equality but resistance to the means employed to ensure 
equality.11 Numerous explanations have been advanced which seek to uncover the 
causes of and reasons behind opposition to racial policies in the post-Civil Rights 
period. These explanations can be generally organised into three categories: social 
structural theories; socio-psychological/socio-cultural theories; political theories.
Social structural theories emphasise that resistance to racial polices are
1 9rooted in group self-interest. Herbert Blumer asserted that opposition by whites to
11 Howard Schuman, Charlotte Steeh, and Lawrence Bobo, Racial Attitudes in America 
(Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1985).
12 In addition to works cited see also Lawrence Bobo, “Whites’ Opposition to Busing: Symbolic 
Racism or Realistic Group Conflict Theory”, Journal o f  Personality and Social Psychology 45 
(1983): 1195-1210; Lawrence Bobo, “Group Conflict, Prejudice, and the Paradox o f Contemporary 
Racial Attitudes” in Phyllis A. Katz and Dalmas A. Taylor (eds.), Eliminating Racism: Profiles in 
Controversy (New York: Pullman, 1988); Lawrence Bobo, “The Color Line, the Dilemma, and the 
Dream: Race Relations at the Close o f the Twentieth Century” in John Highman (ed.), Civil Rights 
and Social Wrongs: Black-White Relations Since World War //(University Park: Pennsylvania State 
University Press, 1997); Lawrence Bobo, “Race and Beliefs about Affirmative Action: Assessing the 
Effects o f  Interests, Group Threat, Ideology and Racism” in David O. Sears et al, Racialized 
Politics: The Debate About Racism in America (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2000);
Lawrence Bobo and James Kluegel, “Opposition to Race-Targeting: Self-Interest, Stratification 
Ideology, or Racial Attitudes?”, American Sociological Review 61 (1993): 951-72; Lawrence Bobo 
and James R. Kluegel, “Status, Ideology, and Dimensions o f Whites’ Racial Beliefs and Attitudes: 
Progress and Stagnation” in Steven A. Tuch and Jack K. Martin (eds.), Racial Attitudes in the 
1990s: Continuity and Change (Connecticut: Praeger, 1997); Lawrence Bobo, James R. Kluegel and 
Ryan A. Smith, “Laissez-Faire Racism: The Crystallization o f a Kinder, Gentler, Anti-black 
Ideology” in Steven A. Tuch and Jack K. Martin (eds.), Racial Attitudes in the 1990s: Continuity 
and Change (Connecticut: Praeger, 1997); Donald T. Campbell, “Ethnocentric and Other Altruistic 
Motives” in Robert Levine (ed.), Nebraska Symposium on Motivation (Lincoln: University of
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racial policies aimed at ensuring equality resulted from a perception of blacks as 
competitive threats for valued social resources, status, and privileges.13 Similarly, 
Robert A. Levine and Donald T. Cambell contend that social attitudes reflected 
private interests, as such, whites oppose changes to the racial status quo which, they 
feel, threaten their private interests. According to Levine and Cambell, what they 
term Realistic Group Conflict theory explains why Northern whites began to resist 
the changes of the Civil Rights movement as it became less of a Southern problem 
and as the changes began more directly to affect the North.14 Jim Sidanius et al 
locate opposition to racial change by whites within Social Dominance theory. 
According to Social Dominance theory, society is based upon a hierarchy of 
dominant and subordinate groups with one group’s dominance legitimised by the 
dominant ideology within society. Politics involves the interaction between these 
groups and the competition between them for resources. Sidanius et al are adamant 
that racial animus is not at the root of opposition to racial polices. They state:
The simple fact of the matter is that the desire for group-based social 
hierarchy rather than mere racial animus lies at the heart of white 
opposition to redistributive social programs in general -  and to race- 
targeted policies in particular.15
Nebraska Press, 1965); V. O. Key Jr., Southern Politics in State and Nation (New York: Knopf, 
1949); Jim Sidanius, Erik Devereux, Felicia Pratto, “A Comparison o f Symbolic Racism Theory and 
Social Dominance Theory as Explanations for Racial Policy Attitudes”, Journal o f  Social 
Psychology 132 (1992):377-95; Jim Sidanius and James Liu, “Racism, Support for the Persian Gulf 
War, and the Police Beating of Rodney King: A Social Dominance Perspective”, Journal o f  Social 
Psychology 132 (1992): 685-700.
13 Herbert Blumer, “Race Prejudice as a Sense of Group Position”, Pacific Sociological Review 1 
(1958): 3-7.
14 Robert A. Levine and Donald T. Cambell, Ethnocentrism (New York: Wiley, 1972).
15 Jim Sidanius, Pam Singh, John J. Hetts, Chris Federico, “It’s Not Affirmative Action It’s the 
Blacks?” in David O. Sears et al, Racialized Politics, 231.
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Socio-psychological/socio-cultural theorists reject the claim that racial 
animus does not lie at the root of opposition to racial policies.16 They emphasise 
that racism was and is a continuing force in American society. They suggest, 
however, that the old-fashioned racism of the pre-Civil Rights era, which was 
generally characterised by overt bigotry and support of segregation, has been 
replaced by a new, more subtle form of racism. Unlike old-fashioned racism, the 
new racism - dubbed Symbolic Racism - does not express itself in overt anti­
egalitarian terms; the notion of formal equality has largely been accepted. Symbolic 
Racism suggests, however, that African Americans are demanding more than their 
fair share and at the same time are displaying values and behaviour, which violate 
traditional American values. As articulated by John B. McConahay and James C. 
Hough:
Attitudinally, symbolic racism is a set of ‘abstract moral assertions 
about blacks’ behaviour as a group, concerning what blacks deserve,
16 In addition to works cited see also Donald R. Kinder and David O. Sears, “Prejudice and Politics:
Symbolic Racism Versus Racial Threats to the Good Life”, Journal o f  Personality and Social 
Psychology 40.3 (1981): 414-431; Donald R. Kinder and Tali Mendelberg, “Individualism
Reconsidered: Principles and Prejudice in Contemporary American Opinion” in David O. Sears et
al, Racialized Politics; Donald R. Kinder and Lynn M. Sanders, Divided By Color: Racial Politics 
and Democratic Ideals (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1996); John B. McConahay, “Self 
Interest Versus Racial Attitudes as Correlates o f Anti-Busing Attitudes in Louisville: Is It the Buses
or the Blacks?”, The Journal o f  Politics 44 (1982): 692-720; John B. McConahay, “Modem Racism, 
Ambivalence, and the Modem Racism Scale” in John F. Dovidio and Samuel L. Gaertner (eds.), 
Prejudice, Discrimination, and Racism (Orlando: Academic Press, 1986); David O. Sears,
“Symbolic Racism” in Phyllis A. Katz and Dalmas A. Taylor (eds.), Eliminating Racism: Profiles in
Controversy (New York: Plenum Press, 1988); David O. Sears and Donald R. Kinder, “Racial 
Tensions and Voting in Los Angeles” in Werner Z. Hirsch (ed.), Los Angeles: Viability and 
Prospects fo r  Metropolitan Leadership (New York: Praeger, 1971); David O. Sears, Carl P. Hensler
and Leslie K. Speer, “Whites’ Opposition to ‘Busing’: Self-Interest or Symbolic Politics?”, 
American Political Science Review 73 (1979): 369-384; David O. Sears and Carolyn L. Funk, “The 
Role o f Self-Interest in Social and Political Attitudes”, Advances in Experimental Social Psychology
24 (1991): 1-91; David O. Sears, Colette van Laar, Mary Carrillo and Rick Kosterman, “Is It Really 
Racism? The Origins o f White Americans’ Opposition to Race-Targeted Policies?”, Public Opinion 
Quarterly 61 (1997): 16-53; David O. Sears, P. J. Henry, Rick Kosterman, “Egalitarian Values and 
Contemporary Racial Policies” in David O. Sears et al, Racialized Politics.
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how they ought to act, whether or not they are treated equitably, and 
so on’. . . . Behaviourally, it is a set of acts (voting against black 
candidates, opposing affirmative action programs, opposing 
desegregation in housing and education) that are justified (or 
rationalised) on a non-racial basis but that operate to maintain the 
racial status quo with its attendant discrimination against the welfare,17status, and symbolic needs of blacks.
According to proponents of the theory, Symbolic Racism originates in the pre-adult 
acquisition of traditional values (particularly individualism and self-reliance), and 
of racial fears and stereotypes. As Donald R. Kinder states:
Symbolic racism is rooted in early-learned racial stereotypes and in 
deep-seated feelings of social morality. It thus represents a form of 
resistance to change in the racial status quo based on racial prejudice 
and on traditional American values that are not in themselves racist.18
Political theorists, like social structuralists, reject the notion that opposition 
to racial policies is primarily driven by racism.19 Political theorists do not deny that 
prejudice still exists, but they argue that it is not at the root of political conservatism 
in relation to racial issues.20 As Paul M. Sniderman and Thomas Piazza argue in 
The Scar o f  Race:
17 John B. McConahay and Joseph C. Hough, “Symbolic Racism”, Journal o f  Social Issues 32.2 
(1976): 24.
18 Donald R. Kinder, “The Continuing American Dilemma: White Resistance to Racial Change 40 
Years After Myrdal”, Journal o f  Social Issues 42.2 (1986): 152.
19 Unlike social structuralists, political theorists do not assert that racism has never been at the root 
o f  opposition to policies designed to change the racial status quo.
20 In addition to works cited see also D ’Souza, The End o f  Racism-, Byron M. Roth, Prescription for  
Failure: Race Relations in the Age o f  Social Science (New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 1994); 
Paul M. Sniderman and Michael Hagen, Race and Inequality: A Study in American Values (New  
Jersey: Chatham House, 1985); Paul M. Sniderman and Philip E. Tetlock, “Symbolic Racism: 
Problems o f Motive Attribution in Political Analysis”, Journal o f  Social Issues 42.2 (1986): 129- 
150; Paul M. Sniderman and Edward G. Carmines, Reaching Beyond Race (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1997); Paul M. Sniderman and Philip E. Tetlock, “Reflections on American 
Racism”, Journal o f  Social Issues 42.2 (1986): 173-87.
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Prejudice has not disappeared, and in particular circumstances and 
segments of society it still has a major impact. But race prejudice no 
longer organizes and dominates the reaction of whites; it no longer 
leads large numbers of them to oppose public policies to assist blacks 
across the board.21
Political theorists argue that opposition to racial policies is based upon non-racial 
ideology. As Sniderman and Piazza state: “At the deepest level . . . racial politics 
owes its shape . . .  to the broader set of convictions about fairness and fair play that
99make up the American creed.” Moreover, they stress that espousal of these values 
is not evidence of racial prejudice. Political theorists charge that the Symbolic 
Racism theory ignores the complexities of racial conservatism and by suggesting 
that racism and racial conservatism are intertwined wrongly labels all racial 
conservatives as racist. As Jon Hurwitz and Mark Peffley state:
. . . taken to an extreme, the new racism thesis obscures important 
individual differences between racial conservatives. Even if the 
prejudicial underpinning of some racial conservatives is 
acknowledged, there are no doubt countless others whose concerns 
about more liberal policies stem from their philosophical beliefs 
about the proper role of government than from their antipathy toward 
African Americans.23
Yet, the complexities of racial conservatism notwithstanding, it is in the ambiguity 
of coded racism that its success lies. The difficulty of Symbolic Racism lies in
21 Paul M. Sniderman and Thomas Piazza, The Scar o f  Race (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1993), 5.
22 Sniderman and Piazza, The Scar o f  Race, 176.
23 Jon Hurwitz and Mark Peffley, Perception and Politics: Race and Politics in the United States 
(Massachusetts: Yale University Press, 1998) 4.
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distinguishing between genuinely moral opposition to racial policies and opposition 
based upon underlying racial prejudice. Political theorists themselves argue that the 
most successful way for politicians to win support in opposing racial policies is if 
sound moral arguments are made. As such, the difficulty lies in distinguishing 
between genuine moral arguments and those designed to covertly appeal to the 
racial sensitivities of whites through the use of coded racial politics.
Coded racial politics have played an integral part in the political 
developments of the post-Civil Rights period, and congruent with this, have played 
a central role in the maintenance of racism in American society. Allen J. Matusow’s 
The Unravelling o f America: A History o f Liberalism in the 1960s provided one of 
the definitive analyses of the way in which the social upheavals of the 1960s 
ultimately led to the demise of liberalism and the resurgence of the right.24 Kenneth 
O’Reilly’s Nixon’s Piano: Presidents and Racial Politics From Washington to 
Clinton and Dan T. Carter’s From George Wallace to Newt Gingrich: Race in the 
Conservative Counterrevolution, 1963-1994, show that the success of the new right 
- beginning with the election of Nixon in 1968 - was in manipulating the growing 
reactionary public opinion through coded racial appeals, that is, non-racial rhetoric 
used to disguise racial issues. Nixon’s electoral strategy - his Southern Strategy - 
secured white votes, particularly from the South, by identifying the Democratic
24 Allen J. Matusow, The Unravelling o f  America: A History o f  Liberalism in the 1960s (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1984).
25 Dan T. Carter, From George Wallace to Newt Gingrich: Race in the Conservative 
Counterrevolution, 1963-1994 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1996); Kenneth 
O’Reilly, Nixon’s Piano: Presidents and Racial Politics From Washington to Clinton (New York: 
Free Press, 1995). Carter traces the origins o f the new right’s use o f code words to George Wallace.
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Party with liberal and essentially ‘black’ ideals.26 This had to be done in a subtle 
and covert way so as not to appear to challenge the egalitarian ethos established 
through the Civil Rights movement. Nixon’s election heralded the beginning of a 
conservative ascendancy in American politics and society and a new political 
realignment in which race was a definitive factor. Increasingly throughout the post-
Civil Rights era the Republican Party would be identified as the party of white
01Americans and the Democratic Party with African Americans. The use of coded 
racial politics was one of the principal ways in which this political shift was 
achieved. Yet the use of coded words, phrases and symbols helped legitimise and 
maintain racism in the post-Civil Rights era.
Michael Omi and Howard Winant in their work Racial Formation in the 
United States: From the 1960s to the 1990s, assert that the use of coded racial 
politics by the new right signified part of the rearticulation of racial ideology and 
discourse on race. The nature of racial ideology insists that in order to survive, it 
must be continually remade in tune with societal changes. Following the success of 
the Civil Rights movement, America’s racial ideology and discourse on race was 
reformulated so that it did not appear to challenge the egalitarian ethos that had 
been established. As such opposition to policies like affirmative action and social 
welfare programs were made on the grounds that they resulted in reverse
26 Kevin P. Philips, The Emerging Republican Majority (New York: Anchor Books, 1970).
27 Earl Black and Merle Black, Politics and Society in the South (Massachusetts: Harvard University 
Press, 1987); Earl Black and Merle Black, The Vital South: How Presidents are Elected 
(Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1992); Edward Carmines and James Stimson, Issue 
Evolution: Race and the Transformation o f  American Politics (New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 1989); Thomas B. Edsall and Mary D. Edsall, Chain Reaction: The Impact o f  Race, Rights 
and Taxes on the American Politics (New York: Norton, 1991); Robert Huckfeldt and Carol 
Kohfeld, Race and the Decline o f  Class in American Politics (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 
1989).
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discrimination and/or preferential treatment and thus defied such ideals as 
individualism and egalitarianism.
Omi and Winant further argue that the election of Bill Clinton witnessed the 
emergence of a neo-liberal philosophy that sought to further rearticulate the racial 
politics of the post-Civil Rights era. Aware of the impossibility of reviving the 
liberalism of the pre-Civil Rights era, reflecting - superficially at least - the new 
right’s emphasis on colour-blind politics, Clinton stressed universalistic rather than 
group-specific reforms. The hidden agenda - as Wilson called it - behind this was 
that any effort to reduce overall inequality would disproportionately benefit those 
concentrated at the bottom of the socio-economic ladder, that is, African 
Americans. An integral aspect of Clinton’s neo-liberal philosophy, however, was 
the attempt to move away from identity politics and to alter the image of the 
Democratic Party as the party of black and minority interests with a more centrist 
position. In this endeavour Clinton, too, made use of coded racial messages.
The power of discourse, particularly elite discourse, in society is central to 
the operation and success of coded racial politics. Discourse assumes an almost 
immeasurable position within society. Myra Macdonald defines discourse as a “. . . 
system of communicative practices that are integrally related to wider social and 
cultural practices, and that help to construct specific frameworks of thinking.” 
The words, phrases and symbols used to discuss phenomena frame the terms in
28 Michael Omi and Howard Winant, Racial Formation in the United States: From the 1960s to the 
1990s (New York: Routledge, 1994). See also Leslie G. Carr, ‘Color-Blind’ Racism (London: Sage, 
1997).
29 Omi and Winant, Racial Formation in the United States, 147-149.
30 Myra MacDonald, Exploring Media Discourse (London: Arnold, 2003), 10.
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which such issues and events are thought about, which in turn can influence 
political attitudes. Furthermore, the meaning attributed to words, phrases or 
symbols both depends upon and perpetuates existing cultural assumptions.31 For 
instance, the discussion of affirmative action programs in terms of preferential 
treatment taps into and perpetuates existing feelings that racial policies have gone 
beyond addressing racial inequality and are discriminating against whites, which 
can lead to white opposition to affirmative action policies.
Norman Fairclough stresses the significance of language in the production, 
maintenance and change of social relations of power. Furthermore, he regards the 
possession of the dominant language as an important aspect of political struggles. 
As he states: “Political differences have always been constituted as differences in 
language, political struggles have always been partly struggles over the dominant 
language, and both the theory and practice of political rhetoric go back to ancient
^9times.” Teun A. Van Dijk also argues that discourse is central to holding power in 
society and in particular is central to white dominance in society. Van Dijk argues 
that while the majority of mainstream political elites are not racist, political elites 
are involved in the reproduction of a system of ethnic/racial dominance.33 
According to Geneva Smitherman-Donaldson and Van Dijk, racism is reproduced 
by the enactment or legitimisation of all majority power at the micro level of 
everyday interaction and communication. As they state: “. . . discourse is not just a 
symptom or a signal of the problem of racism. It essentially reproduces and helps
31 Myra MacDonald, Exploring Media Discourse, 9.
32 Norman Fairclough, New Labour, New Language? (London: Routledge, 2000), 3. See also  ,
Language and Power (Essex: Longman, 2001).
33 Teun A.Van Dijk, Elite Discourse and Racism (California: Sage, 1993).
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produce the racist cognitions and actions of and among the white majority.”34 Van 
Dijk also points out, however, that the power of discourse does not operate 
exclusively in a top-down motion. Popular or public discourse can influence, 
bottom-up, the social cognitions and actions of elites.
This dissertation asserts that race is indeed significant in post-Civil Rights 
America and that racism persists, but in a coded form.35 The election of Nixon in 
1968 heralded the beginning of the conservative ascendancy in American politics 
and society and a new political realignment in which race was a definitive factor. 
Increasingly in the post-Civil Rights era the Republican Party became associated 
with white Americans and the Democrat Party with African Americans. One of the 
primary means in which this was achieved was the use of coded racial politics. The 
use of coded words, symbols and phrases, such as law and order and preferential 
treatment, to refer to racial issues, however, helped legitimise and maintain racism 
in contemporary America. The election of Nixon was symbolic of the transition in 
America’s racial ideology and discourse on race. In the post-Civil Rights era, 
racism exists in a far more covert way, hidden in coded language.
Although the dissertation marks 1968 as a culminative moment in American 
political, social and racial history, it is in no way intended to suggest that 1968 
marked an historical watershed. It is important to stress that the election of Nixon, 
the fracturing of the New Deal consensus, the growth of conservatism, and the 
changes in racial attitudes were part of a multi-faceted and complex process which
34 Geneva Smitherman-Donaldson and Teun A. Van Dijk, “Words That Hurt” in Geneva 
Smitherman-Donaldson and Teun A. Van Dijk (eds.), Discourse and Discrimination (Detroit:
Wayne State University Press, 1988), 17.
35 It is not denied, however, that old-fashioned racism continues to exist in the post-Civil Rights era.
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developed over time and which continued to evolve post-1968. Additionally, it is 
equally important to stress that racial conservatism was not all encompassing. 
Public opinion, as numerous studies have suggested, is a highly complex, fluid and 
at times contradictory entity and as such it is important not to over-simplify or 
overstate the shift to the right in the post-Civil Rights era. As Justin Lewis argues, 
the American right were more successful in winning support for abstract political 
ideas, such as opposition to ‘big government’, ‘welfare’ and the ‘liberal elite’ than
q  z :
in winning popular support for specific right-wing policies. In this respect it is 
also important to remember that the House of Representatives remained in 
Democratic control from 1964-1994. Moreover, it is imperative to stress that not all 
expressions of, or support of racial conservatism were, or indeed are, evidence of 
coded racism. Yet, as previously suggested, the difficulty with symbolic racism is 
its ambiguity. Because of its very nature, consciously non-racist whites could 
become the unconscious or unwitting proponents of new, coded racism through 
their support of racial conservatism.
The dissertation, through the method of discourse analysis, will provide an 
analytical history of the codification of racism between the Nixon and Clinton 
administrations. The dissertation does not provide a comprehensive account of 
political history or indeed racial history throughout the post-Civil Rights era. (It
36 Justin Lewis, Constructing Public Opinion: How Political Elites Do What They Like and Why We 
Seem to Go Along With It (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 97. See also Thomas 
Ferguson and Joel Rogers, Right Turn: The Decline o f  the Democrats and the Future o f  American 
Politics (New York: Hill and Wang, 1986); William G. Mayer, The Changing American Mind: How 
and Why American Public Opinion Changed Between 1960 and 1988 (Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan, 1993); Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro, The Rational Public: Fifty Years o f  
Trends in American Policy Preferences (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1992).
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does, however, draw upon the vast number of seminal works from within these 
subjects.) Rather, the dissertation’s aim, through the method of discourse analysis, 
is to analyse the use of a specific coded racial issue under each elected president. 
Then, through an analysis of public discourse surrounding a pivotal contemporary 
event, to explore the reproduction of this in American society. The dissertation will 
seek to reveal why the specific coded issue was used, how and why it worked, and 
the implications of this for race relations. The aim is to examine the role that coded 
racial politics, used as part of the realignment of politics in the post-Civil Rights 
era, has played in the maintenance of racism in a coded form in contemporary 
America.
Discourse analysis can be regarded as almost an umbrella term given to a 
variety of different and multidisciplinary approaches to the study of texts. This 
dissertation uses the approach of critical discourse analysis which follows a socio­
political agenda, and that can be defined as: “. . . a concern to discover and bear 
witness to unequal relations of power which underlie ways of talking in society, and 
in particular to reveal the role of discourse in reproducing or challenging
'xnsociopolitical dominance.” The application of textual theories can play an 
important role in the analysis and deconstruction of historical events. At the same 
time, however, it is important, particularly when seeking to analyse public opinion, 
that textual theories do not substitute or overshadow empirical research. As James
37 Peter Garrett and Allan Bell (eds.), Approaches to Media Discourse (Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishers, 1998). See also Norman Fairclough, Discourse and Social Change (Cambridge: Polity
Press, 1992);_____ , New Labour, New Language?', , Language and Power, Smitherman-
Donaldson and Van Dijk (eds.), Discourse and Discrimination', Van Dijk, Elite Discourse and 
Racism.
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Thomas asserts: “Theory, used pragmatically is clearly important in explaining 
popular reactions, but ideally it should complement rather than substitute for 
rigorous, reflexive, empirical research, and still less be treated as a superior 
explanatory tool that renders such a process redundant.”
Discourse analysis employed in the dissertation will examine what messages 
are being conveyed by presidents in their text, that is, speeches, statements and 
remarks; what racial sensitivities are being expressed or manipulated; what social 
issues are being inferred or referred to and in what way; what views and beliefs are 
being reproduced and/or legitmised; and to reveal generic themes or patterns. 
Discourse analysis will also be employed to examine public discourse on events 
and the issues represented by them in order to explore the links between political 
and public discourse, that is, the reproduction of coded racial politics in society.
The dissertation will also consider the role of the media in the framing of 
events and issues. As Roger Fowler states: “. . . the world of the press is not the real 
world, but a world skewed and judged.” There is, of course, an inherent 
contradiction in using the media as a source of public discourse while at the same 
time acknowledging - and analysing -  its representation of historical events. There 
is no easy answer to this problem, suffice to accept the ultimate impossibility of 
ever knowing or obtaining a completely accurate account or measure of public
38 James Thomas, D iana’s Mourning: A P eople’s History (Cardiff: University of Wales Press,
2002), 28. See also Nick Couldry, Inside Culture: Re-imagining the Method o f  Cultural Studies 
(London: Sage, 2000).
39 Roger Fowler, Language in the News: Discourse and Ideology in the Press (London: Routledge, 
1991), 11. See also Lewis, Constructing Public Opinion; G. Philo (ed.), Message Received (London:
Longman, 1999); and D. Miller (eds.), Market Killing: What the Free Market Does and What
Social Scientist Can Do About It (London: Longman, 2000).
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opinion. Moreover, provided that the complexities of using media sources are fully 
acknowledged they remain a valuable source of public discourse and opinion, 
particularly when such qualitative evidence is balanced with both quantitative 
evidence and the wider body of documented evidence.40
Eight pivotal events were chosen for analysis in the dissertation. These are: 
the Attica Prison Riot, 1971; the Miami Riot, 1980; the Bernhard Goetz Subway 
Shootings, 1984; the death of Michael Griffith in Howard Beach, 1986; the Central 
Park Jogger attack, 1989; the Carol Stuart murder, 1989; the Rodney King beating 
and the Los Angeles Riots, 1991-1992; and the O.J. Simpson case, 1994-1995. 
There were, of course, numerous pivotal events during the large time period under 
consideration, which could have been analysed. The decision to use the eight events 
resulted from an analysis of available primary sources. As such they were chosen 
principally for practical purposes. Yet, it could be argued that the availability of the 
primary sources for these events lends itself well to the argument that these were 
indeed pivotal events. Because the events were part of the national debate during 
the time-period under analysis they have received considerable attention 
contemporaneously by journalists and scholars and in varying degrees in later 
academic writings. The events analysed, however, were chosen principally because 
they were high profile (although some, for example, the Rodney King, Los Angeles 
riots, and O J. Simpson cases, received more attention than others). Moreover, 
because the importance of the events for the purpose of the dissertation is for what 
they can reveal about coded racism, contemporary work by journalists will act as
40 Thomas, Diana's Mourning.
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source material. Furthermore, none of the events have previously been 
deconstructed through the method of discourse analysis with the aim of analysing 
the use of coded racial politics and their reproduction in American society.
The most comprehensive account of the Attica prison riot, 1971, is provided 
by Robert Mckay’s Attica: The Official Report o f the New York State Special 
Commission on Attica.41 The report, published in paperback form, provides a 
comprehensive account of the situation at Attica prior to the riot, the riot itself, and 
the retaking and its aftermath. It is a largely sympathetic account of the conditions 
endured by prisoners at Attica, including racial tensions, and is especially critical of 
Governor Russell G. Oswald’s role during the riot’s negotiations. In Attica: My 
Story, Oswald provides an autobiographical account of the riot at Attica and a 
personal perspective on his role in the event.42
Roger Starr in “Prisons, Politics & the Attica Report”, provides a critique of 
the Mckay Report.43 Starr criticises both the factual findings presented in the 
Mckay Report and the methodology used in the structure and format of the report. 
Starr’s article is perhaps the most critical account of the Attica riot, with the other 
three major works on Attica generally lending their sympathy with the rioters. 
Herman Badillo and Milton Haynes’ A Bill o f No Rights: Attica and the American 
Prison System provides an account of the Attica riot from the standpoint of one of 
the observers of the negotiations.44 It provides a highly critical account of the
41 Robert Mckay, Attica: The Official Report o f  the New York State Special Commission on Attica 
(New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972).
42 Russell G. Oswald, Attica: My Story (New York: Doubleday, 1972).
43 Roger Starr, “Prisons, Politics & the Attica Report”, Commentary 55.3 (1973): 31-37.
44 Herman Badillo and Milton Haynes, A Bill o f  No Rights: Attica and the American Prison System 
(New York: Outerbridge & Lazard Inc, 1972).
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American prison system, detailing the issues of race and racism within the prison 
system and in the riot itself. Tom Wicker’s A Time To Die also provides a first-hand 
account of the riot from the standpoint of a reporter who was also among the 
observers at the negotiations.45 It too is a highly critical account of the American 
prison system and is especially critical of the decision to retake the prison by force. 
Malcolm Bell’s The Turkey Shoot offers a critique of the investigation into crimes 
committed at Attica during the riot and its aftermath, claiming that crimes 
committed by officers against inmates during and in the aftermath of the retaking 
were deliberately ignored.46 Stephen C. Light in “The Attica Litigation” provides an 
account of the litigation arising out of the Attica riot.47
Louis D. Mitchell in “Attica: A Microcosm of the Ghetto”, presents the 
Attica riot as a product of the same system of exploitation and oppression 
responsible for the creation of ghettos in urban America.48 The Attica prison riot 
receives some brief attention in Robert Abrams (ed.), Prison riots in Britain and the 
USA as part of a wider analysis of prison riots within the USA and Britain.49 
Attention is focused primarily on placing the Attica riot within a context of prison 
unrest in the USA and Britain. Gerald Benjamin and Stephen P. Rappaport’s 
“Attica and Prison Reform”, provides a brief overview of the causes of the Attica 
riot, the riot itself and of the retaking.50 It focuses on prison reform, both in the
45 Tom Wicker, A Time To Die (New York: Quadrangle/New York Times Books co., 1975).
46 Malcolm Bell, The Turkey Shoot: Tracking the Attica Cover-Up (New York: Grove Press, 1985).
47 Stephen C. Light, “The Attica Litigation”, Crime, Law and Social Change 23.2 (1995): 215-234.
48 Louis D. Mitchell, “Attica: A Microcosm o f the Ghetto”, Crisis (August/September 1972): 226- 
228.
49 Robert Abrams (ed.), Prison Riots in Britain and the USA (London: Macmillan, 1994).
50 Gerald Benjamin and Stephen P. Rappaport, “Attica and Prison Reform”, Proceedings o f  the 
Academy o f  Political Science 31.3 (1974): 200-213.
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months preceding the riot and afterwards. The article chronicles the impetus for 
reform of the prison system in the wake of Attica and the decline of support for 
reform as the decade advanced. Social Justice dedicated an edition to the Attica riot 
in 1991.51 The edition featured articles on litigation arising from the retaking, the 
stereotyping of inmates at Attica and interviews with Frank Smith and Akil Al- 
Jundi, former inmates of Attica and central participants in the riot.
The existing historiography, collectively, provides a comprehensive 
narrative of the Attica riot, offers analyses of the causes of the riot and places the 
riot within the wider context of prison riots and prison reform. The dissertation, 
however, provides a far more comprehensive account of contemporary reactions to 
the riot. Moreover, the dissertation focuses on analysing the discourse surrounding 
Attica -  public, political and media - in order to examine the reproduction of the 
coded racial political issue of law and order.
The most comprehensive account of the Miami riot, 1980, is provided by
52Bruce Porter and Marvin Dunn in The Miami Riot 1980: Crossing the Bounds. 
Porter and Dunn consider the riot in the context of Miami’s racial history. They 
explore key events leading up to the riot, the riot itself - including an analysis of 
rioters, the police reaction and the damage caused -  and the aftermath of the riot in 
terms of the Federal response. Dunn in Black Miami in the Twentieth Century again 
provides a chronology of events leading up to the Miami riot and provides an 
account of the riot itself but also explores its aftermath in terms of the political
51 Social Justice 18.3 (1991).
52 Bruce Porter and Marvin Dunn, The Miami Riot o f  1980: Crossing the Bounds (Massachusetts: 
D.C. Heath & Co., 1984).
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response to the riot.53 As part of this, Dunn also details the socio-economic situation 
in Dade County, Miami before and after the riot. Raymond A. Mohl in “On the 
Edge: Blacks and Hispanics in Metropolitan Miami since 1959”, considers the 
effect of Cuban immigration on the socio-economic status of African Americans in 
Miami as a cause of unrest.54
Daryl B. Harris’s The Logic o f Black Urban Rebellions: Challenging the 
Dynamics o f  White Domination in Miami considers the Miami riot in the context of 
an American tradition of racial violence.55 Harris argues that the Miami riot was a 
rebellion against racial oppression within white-dominated capitalist America. 
Manning Marable in “The Fire This Time: The Miami Rebellion”, also presents the 
Miami riot as a black uprising against oppression from the white capitalist power 
structure.56
Like Attica, the existing historiography on Miami, collectively, provides a 
comprehensive account of the riot -  its causes, the riot itself, the aftermath of the 
riot, and it places it within the wider context of the history of black Miami and the 
history of racial violence in America. It also considers the impact of Cuban 
immigration on Miami’s African-American population. The dissertation builds 
upon this historiography, but more specifically, it analyses the Miami riot in terms
53 Marvin Dunn, Black Miami in the Twentieth Century (Florida: University Press o f Florida, 1997).
54 Raymond A. Mohl, “On the Edge: Blacks and Hispanics in Metropolitan Miami since 1959”, 
Florida Historical Quarterly 63.3 (1990): 37-56.
55 Daryl B. Harris, The Logic o f  Black Urban Rebellions: Challenging the Dynamics o f  White 
Domination in Miami (Connecticut: Praeger, 1999).
56 Manning Marable, “The Fire This Time: The Miami Rebellion”, Black Scholar (July/August 
1980): 2-18.
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of the public and political discourse surrounding it as part of an examination of the 
reproduction of the coded racial political issue of preferential treatment.
Lilian B. Rubin’s Bernhard Goetz in a Time o f Madness provides a largely 
narrative account of the Bernhard Goetz case, 1984, which includes a biography of 
Goetz.57 George P. Fletcher’s A Crime o f Self Defense focuses on the process of the
C O
law in relation to the case of Goetz and includes a detailed account of the trial. 
Mark Lesley’s Subway Gunman: A Juror’s Account o f the Bernhard Goetz Trial, as 
its title suggests, is a narrative account of the Goetz trial from the perspective of 
one of the jurors on the case.59 The Goetz case, and specifically reactions to it, 
receives a brief overview in Alphonso Pinkney’s Lest We Forget White Hate 
Crimes: Howard Beach and Other Racial Atrocities.60 Pinkney presents the Goetz 
shooting as one of a series of white hate crimes perpetuated by the atmosphere of 
racial intolerance in Mayor Edward Koch’s New York and President Reagan’s 
America.
Pinkney’s Lest We Forget also presents an overview of the Howard Beach 
case, 1986. Pinkney presents Howard Beach as another incident in the series of 
white hate crimes in New York in the early-to-mid 1980s, which arose out of an 
atmosphere of racial intolerance perpetuated by the conservative administration of 
Mayor Koch in New York and the administrations of President Reagan. Charles J.
57 Lilian B. Rubin, Bernhard Goetz in a Time o f  Madness (Boston: Faber & Faber, 1986).
58 George P. Fletcher, A Crime o f  Self Defense: Bernhard Goetz and the Law on Trial (New York: 
Free Press, 1986).
59 Mark Lesley, Subway Gunman: A Juror’s Account o f  the Bernhard Goetz Trial (British American 
Publishers, 1988).
60 Alphonso Pinkney, Lest We Forget White Hate Crimes: Howard Beach and Other Racial 
Atrocities (Chicago: Third World Press, 1994).
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Hynes and Bob Drury’s Incident at Howard Beach provides a first-hand account of 
the Howard Beach case by the Special Prosecutor in the case.61 It provides a 
detailed narrative of the case, the investigation and the ensuing trials. In “Howard 
Beach: Black Leaders, White Liberals”, Jim Sleeper considers the need for 
interracial partnership to tackle racism in wake of Howard Beach.62 Nicolaus Mills’ 
“Howard Beach: Anatomy of a Lynching” provides an account of the case and the 
specific efforts by the defence to obtain justice for African-American victims of 
crime in an era of racial intolerance bred by the Reagan and Koch administrations.
While building upon the existing historiography, this dissertation provides a 
far more detailed account of societal reactions to the Goetz and Howard Beach 
cases than is currently provided. More specifically, it examines the political, public 
and media discourse surrounding the cases to analyse the reproduction of the coded 
racial political issue of fear of crime.
The two major works on the case of the Central Park jogger, 1989, are 
Timothy Sullivan’s Unequal Verdicts: the Central Park Jogger Trials and Trisha 
Meili’s I  Am The Central Park Jogger: A Story o f Hope and Possibility.64 
Sullivan’s Unequal Verdicts is a comprehensive, though largely narrative account 
of the arrest and trial of the youths in the Central Park jogger case. Similarly,
61 Charles J. Hynes and Bob Drury, Incident at Howard Beach: The Case For Murder (New York: 
GP. Putman & Sons, 1990).
62 Jim Sleeper, “Howard Beach: Black Leaders, White Liberals”, Dissent 34.2 (1987): 479-483.
63 Nicolaus Mills, “Howard Beach: Anatomy o f a Lynching: New York Racism in the 1980s”, 
Dissent 34.4 (1987): 470-484.
64 Timothy Sullivan, Unequal Verdicts: The Central Park Jogger Trials (New York: Simon & 
Schuster, 1992); Trisha Meili, I  Am The Central Park Jogger: A Story o f  Hope and Possibility (New 
York: Scribner, 2003)
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Meili’s I  Am The Central Park Jogger presents a detailed narrative of the case, but 
places it within a broader autobiographical context.
The Carol Stuart case, 1989, receives brief attention in Joe R. Feagin and 
Heman Vera’s White Racism: The Basics, which argues that the case is evidence of 
personal and structural racism within the police and judicial system.65 Feagin and 
Vera also provide a critique of the media’s role in the case. A very brief overview 
of the case is provided in Terry Morris’s No Justice No Peace: From Emmett Till to 
Rodney King, as part of a general documentation of race and crime in twentieth 
century America.66
The dissertation adds to the existing historiography of the Central Park 
jogger and Carol Stuart cases, and provides a more comprehensive analysis of the 
two events, particularly in terms of political, public and media reaction to the cases. 
It provides an analysis of these discourses in order to examine the reproduction of 
the coded racial political issue of soft on crime.
There has been a mass of literature from numerous disciplines produced on 
the Rodney King case, 1991-1992, and the Los Angeles riots, 1992. Jewelle Taylor 
Gibbs in Race and Justice: Rodney King and O.J. Simpson in a House Divided 
offers and examination of the King beating and its aftermath within the wider
• f t l  •context of police brutality and racial inequality in urban America. The issue of 
police brutality is also addressed in Charles J. Ogletree Jr. et al, Beyond Rodney
65 Joe R. Feagin and Heman Vera, White Racism: The Basics (New York: Routledge, 1994).
66 Terry Morris, No Justice No Peace: From Emmett Till to Rodney King (New York: Afficentric 
Production, 1993).
67 Jewelle Taylor Gibbs, Race and Justice: Rodney King and O.J. Simpson in a House Divided (San 
Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1996).
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King: An Investigation Into Police Misconduct in Minority Communities, which 
analyses of African-American perceptions of the police in America’s urban areas.68 
A massively critical account of the LAPD is given in Mike Davis’ City o f Quartz: 
Excavating the Future in Los Angeles.69 Tom Owens and Rod Browning’s Lying 
Eyes: The Truth Behind the Corruption and Brutality o f the LAPD and the Beating 
o f Rodney King gives an account of the brutality and corruption that exists within
70the LAPD from the perspective a former officer.
Lou Cannon’s Official Negligence: How Rodney King and the Riots 
Changed Los Angeles and the LAPD is a critical analysis of the King case and the 
ensuing riots.71 Cannon is critical of both the police force and local government in 
California, charging that police are given insufficient training specifically in 
relation to the use of metal batons -  a weapon he is highly critical of. He is also 
critical of the decision by TV stations to air an edited copy of the video of King’s 
arrest and argues that King can be seen charging at officers at the beginning of the 
tape. In his autobiography Presumed Guilty: The Tragedy o f the Rodney King 
Affair, Stacey C. Koon defends his actions in the King arrest and provides a
77narrative account of the aftermath of the event upon his life. Koon and the other 
officers charged in relation to the King arrest receive support in Robert Deitz’s
68 Charles J. Ogletree Jr. et al, Beyond Rodney King: An Investigation into Police Misconduct in 
Minority Communities (Boston: NorthEastem University Press, 1995).
69 Mike Davis, City o f  Quartz: Excavating the Future in Los Angeles (New York: Vintage Books, 
1992).
70 Tom Owens and Rod Browning, Lying Eyes: The Truth Behind the Corruption and Brutality o f  
the LAPD and the Beating o f  Rodney King (New York: Thunder’s Mouth Press, 1994).
71 Lou Cannon, Official Negligence: How Rodney King and the Riots Changed Los Angeles and the 
LAPD (New York: Random House, 1997).
72 Stacey C. Koon with Robert Deitz, Presumed Guilty: The Tragedy o f  the Rodney King Affair 
(Washington D.C.: Regnery Gateway, 1992).
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Wilful Injustice: A post-0. J. Look at Rodney King, American Justice and Trial by 
Race,73 Deitz is critical of the way in which race was interjected into the King case 
and claims that the acquittal of O.J. Simpson is evidence of the damage done to the 
system of justice in America by subordinating truth to racial expediency.
A brief overview of the Los Angeles riots and the damage caused is given in 
Gerald Home’s The Fire This Time: The Watts Uprising and the 1960s.14 In 
Official Negligence, Cannon also details the rioting and argues that the City of Los 
Angeles was grossly unprepared for the rioting. Gibbs in Race and Justice provides 
a sympathetic analysis of the riots, detailing the many instances of looters stealing 
food and clothing out of necessity rather than sheer recklessness. Denis E. Gale’s 
Understanding Urban Unrest From Reverend King to Rodney King considers the 
Los Angeles riots as part of a tradition of urban rioting during the twentieth 
century.75 It focuses on federal government response to urban rioting and argues 
that the policy of alleviating poverty in enclaves where rioting has empted is not the 
best way of dealing with poverty or rioting. Haki R. Madhubuti’s (ed.) Why L.A. 
Happened: Implications o f the ’92 Los Angeles Rebellion presents the Los Angeles 
riots as an insurrection by a multi-cultural band of oppressed people devoid of
7 f \political representation or leadership. It contains a collection of opinions and
73 Robert Deitz, Wilful Injustice: A p o s t-0  J. Look at Rodney King, American Justice and Trial by 
Race (Washington D.C.: Regnery, 1996).
74 Gerald Home, Fire This Time: The Watts Uprising and the 1960s (New York: Da Capo Press, 
1997).
75 Denis E. Gale, Understanding Urban Unrest From Reverend King to Rodney King (California: 
Sage Publications, 1996).
76 Haki R. Madhubuti (ed.), Why L.A .Happened: Implications o f  the ’92 Los Angeles Rebellion 
(Chicago: Third World Press, 1993).
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analyses of the Los Angeles riots from a selection of African-American and Asian 
writers.
Robert Gooding Williams’ (ed.) Reading Rodney King, Reading Urban 
Uprising contains 17 essays by scholars from a variety of disciplines which 
collectively attest to the continuing significance of race in contemporary America.77 
The essays examine the Rodney King case and the Los Angeles riots, 1991-1992, 
around six themes: the King beating as the product of a violent racism that is a 
characteristic feature of ordinary American life; the trial of the LAPD officers; the 
King beating within the context of the political economy of America; the social 
forces at work in Los Angles both before and after the uprising; the role of racial 
ideology; the gulf between the promise of American democracy and the social 
reality.
Two works offer detailed analyses of the King case and the Los Angeles 
riots within the realm of media theory. Ronald N. Jacobs’ Race, Media and the 
Crisis o f Civil Society From Watts to Rodney King compares African-American and 
white media coverage of the King case.78 Darnell M. Hunt, Jeffrey C. Alexander, 
Steve Seidman’s (eds.), Screening the Los Angeles R io ts’: Race, Seeing, and 
Resistance, explores the meaning one news organisation found in the King event as
7Qwell as the meaning found by 15 groups of viewers of the event’s aftermath. It
77 Robert Gooding Williams (ed.), Reading Rodney King, Reading Urban Uprising (London: 
Routlegde, 1993).
78 Ronald N. Jacobs, Race, Media and the Crisis o f  Civil Society From Watts to Rodney King 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
79 Darnell M. Hunt, Jeffrey C. Alexander, Steve Seidman (eds.), Screening the Los Angeles ‘Riots 
Race, Seeing, and Resistance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
27
explores how race shapes both the construction of TV news and viewers’ 
understanding of it.
The O.J. Simpson case has also received a great deal of literary attention. 
An analytical narrative of the case is provided by Jeffrey Toobin’s The Run o f His 
Life: The People vs. O.J. Simpson, which gives a behind the scenes look at the 
crime and the proceedings of the case.80 Similarly, Frank Schmalleger’s Trial o f the 
Century: People o f the State o f California vs. O.J. Simpson provides an account of 
the trial with details from the court transcripts.81 Alan M. Dershowitz’s Reasonable 
Doubts: O.J. Simpson and the Criminal Justice System offers a critique of the legal 
system in his discussion of the Simpson case.82 V. Bugliosi’s Outrage: Five 
Reasons O.J. Got Away With Murder analyses the flaws in the prosecution’s 
strategy.83 Similarly, Joseph Bosco and William Morrow in^4 Problem o f Evidence: 
How the prosecution Freed O.J. Simpson also claim the prosecution’s mistakes and 
failures resulted in the wrongful acquittal of Simpson.84
Prosecution lawyers Marcia Clark and Christopher Darden offer their 
perspectives on the case in their respective autobiographies Without a Doubt and In
Of
Contempt. Mark Fuhrman also defends his role in the Simpson case and his role 
as an LAPD detective in Murder in Brentwood.
80 Jeffrey Toobin, The Run o f  His Life: The People vs. O.J. Simpson (New York: Random, 1997).
81 Frank Schmalleger, Trial o f  the Century: People o f  the State o f California vs. O.J. Simpson (New 
Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1996).
82 Alan M. Dershowitz, Reasonable Doubts: O.J. Simpson and the Criminal Justice System (New  
York: Pocket Books, 1997).
83 V. Bugliosi, Outrage: Five Reasons O.J. Got Away With Murder (New York: Norton, 1996).
84 Joseph Bosco and William Morrow, A Problem o f  Evidence: How the Prosecution Freed O.J. 
Simpson (New York: W. Morrow & Co., 1996).
85 Marcia Clark and Teresa Carpenter, Without a Doubt (New York: Penguin, 1998); Christopher 
Darden, In Contempt (New York: Harper Collins, 1995).
86 Mark Fuhrman, Murder in Brentwood (California: Regnery, 1997).
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Gibbs in Race and Justice provides a sympathetic analysis of the Simpson 
case. It analyses the way in which the media transformed Simpson from an aracial 
hero into a black criminal. It examines African-American and white opinion on the 
case and considers why the notion of conspiracy is so prevalent within African- 
American communities. These themes are also analysed as part of a collection of 13 
essays exploring the historical, cultural, psychological, racial and linguistic aspect 
of the Simpson case in Toni Morrison and Claudia Brodsky Lacour’s (eds.) Birth o f  
a Nation 'hood: Gaze, Script and Spectacle in the O.J. Simpson Case}1
The Simpson case is also considered within the realm of media theory in 
Janice Schuetz and Lin S. Lilley’s (eds.) The O.J. Simpson Trials: Rhetoric, Media 
and the Law collection of essays providing a critical analysis of the criminal and
• • Q Ocivil trials. It focuses on telelitigation -  the media’s transforming of sensational 
crimes with celebrity defendants and victims, into telemediated forms. Paul 
Thaler’s The Spectacle: Media and the Making o f the O.J. Simpson Story considers 
the instrumental role of the media in the Simpson case.89 Darnell M. Hunt in O.J. 
Simpson Facts and Fictions: New Rituals in the Construction o f Reality scrutinises 
the discourse of television and viewers in order to explain why people were so 
interested in the case.90 Janet Cotterill’s Language and Power in the Court: A
87 Toni Morrison and Claudia Brodsky Lacour (eds.), Birth o f  a Nation ’hood: Gaze, Script and 
Soectacle in the O.J. Simpson Case (New York: Vintage, 1997).
8 Janice Schuetz and Lin S. Lilley (eds.), The O.J. Simpson Trials: Rhetoric, Media and the Law 
(Chicago: Southern Illinois University Press, 1999).
89 Paul Thaler, The Spectacle: Media and the Making o f the O.J. Simpson Story (London: Praeger, 
1997).
90 Darnell M. Hunt, O.J. Simpson Facts and Fictions: New Rituals in the Construction o f  Reality 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
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Linguistic Analysis o f the O.J. Simpson Trial also considers discourse in the case 
and provides an analysis of the language employed in the Simpson trial.91
The dissertation draws upon many of the arguments and analyses contained 
within the existing historiography on King, the Los Angeles riots and Simpson. 
Where it differs and where it adds to the historiography is in its focus on analysing 
the public discourse surrounding the events in order to examine the coded racial 
political issue of reverse racism.
In terms of sources, in addition to building upon existing literature in the 
field, the dissertation uses extensive newspaper and magazine material. In total 25 
newspapers and magazines are used which consist of the most popular daily and 
weekly newspapers and magazines from across the United States, including the 
South. Local newspapers for each event are used in addition to the more popular 
papers from across the country, for example the New York Times and the Los 
Angeles Times. This enables an analysis of discourse on both a local and national 
level. Numerous African-American newspapers and magazines are also used.
The fewer number of African-American sources used in comparison to 
white sources results from the lack of African-American media sources in 
comparison to white sources and more specifically the lack of accessibility to the 
African-American material that exists. In addition, African-American newspapers, 
on the whole, and certainly the ones consulted in this dissertation, are weekly, 
which quite often leads to less total coverage of events and hence less source
91 Janet Cotterill, Language and Power in the Court: A Linguistic Analysis o f  the O.J. Simpson Trial 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003).
92 Newspaper websites are increasingly adding searchable archives, however, even then the archives 
do not always go back that far.
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material to analyse. Also, because they are more localised, African-American 
newspapers tend not to cover national events, the exception being the Los Angeles 
riots 1992 and the O.J. Simpson case 1994-1995.
Similarly, only one newspaper from the South is used in the dissertation -  
the Atlanta Journal and Constitution. Moreover, it is only used in relation to the 
Rodney King beating, the Los Angeles riot and the O.J. SimpSon case. Obviously, 
the use of a greater number of southern newspapers covering the entire time period 
of the dissertation would have been desirable. Unfortunately, however, a lack of 
availability of newspaper sources from the South prevented this.
In order to analyse political discourse, with specific regard to presidential 
discourse, the dissertation makes extensive use of the Public Papers o f the 
Presidents o f the United States Series. Generally speaking, most research involving 
American political history would make extensive use of the great volume of 
primary materials available from presidential administrations. Certainly there is a 
wealth of material which could be used to examine numerous areas of American 
political history in the post-Civil Rights era. Yet, the focus of this dissertation is the 
connection between political and public discourse, in particular between public 
political discourse and the discourse of the American public. As such, the Public 
Papers o f the Presidents o f  the United States Series is an extremely valuable and 
legitimate resource, providing a comprehensive collection of presidential addresses, 
remarks and speeches.
93 The Atlanta Journal and Constitution is the only southern newspaper held at the British Library’s 
Newspaper Archive.
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Relatedly, there are valuable archives which could be utilised to research 
numerous areas of race relations in the post-Civil Rights period, such as the 
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) or the 
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). However, in the same way that the 
purpose of the dissertation is not to provide a new detailed account or examination 
of presidential politics or political developments since the Civil Rights era, neither 
is its purpose to provide a comprehensive examination or analysis of the broader 
subject of race relations during the period. Rather, the purpose of the dissertation is 
to provide a new analytical history of the codification of racism in the post-Civil 
Rights era through an analysis of presidential and public discourse. In addition to 
the extensive use of newspapers and magazines and the Public Papers o f the 
Presidents o f the United States Series, the dissertation also uses official reports, 
government publications, census data and opinion polls and surveys.
Many of the events covered in the dissertation did not exclusively involve
African Americans and whites. Indeed the events were often multiracial, involving
Hispanics, Puerto Ricans, Cubans, Asians and white-ethnic groups, namely Italian
Americans. As such it is important that the events are not perceived purely in terms
of blacks and whites. Indeed, much can be gleaned from these events of the wider
racial situation within American society, which extends beyond black and white.
Certainly in terms of the connection between race and crime -  which is a central
theme of the dissertation -  Hispanics are implicated in this as much as African
Americans. Furthermore, in terms of racial tensions between groups, this is no
longer a distinctly black and white affair as both the Miami and Los Angeles riots
32
attest to. In Miami, the large influx of Cuban refugees had a significant impact upon 
African Americans and many -  though not the majority -  identified the competition 
for resources with Cubans as a contributory factor in the socio-economic malaise 
which underlay much of the rioting. In Los Angeles, Koreans were the targets of 
much of the violence of the riot. Additionally, Hispanics and Asians are no less 
immune to racial discrimination by whites than African Americans. At the same 
time, however, African Americans and whites remained the main protagonists in 
each event - with the exception of the Los Angeles riots -  and the dissertation 
focuses on African-American and white reactions to the events. The overriding 
reason for this is that the focus of the dissertation is to examine the extent to which 
racial conservatism amongst whites in the post-Civil Rights era is based on racial 
prejudice and discrimination against African Americans. In doing this, the 
dissertation explores the use of coded racial politics by elected presidents as part of 
an electoral strategy to win white voters by covertly appealing to white racial 
sensitivities principally about African Americans. As Robert M. Entman and 
Andrew Rojecki state:
Blacks are the most consistently visible subjects of political 
discourse about non-Whites in the United States. Other groups are 
more geographically concentrated and that makes them less 
universally potent as political symbols. The importance of anti-Black 
sentiments to American politics throughout the country, even in 
places where few live, has been documented repeatedly.94
94 Robert M. Entman and Andrew Rojecki, The Black Image in the White Mind: Media and Race in 
America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), xi.
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That analysis of the events focuses on African-American and white reactions and 
responses does not negate the importance of the reaction and responses of other 
racial and/or ethnic groups involved in the events or indeed the responses of whites 
and African Americans to the these participants. Indeed, although not in the remit 
of this dissertation, this additional and/or alternative analysis would undeniably be 
of great value and interest to the study of race in America.
The first two chapters provide a crucial foundation for the dissertation. The 
first chapter will detail the paradox in contemporary American society between 
socio-economic data and African-American testimony, which illustrates the 
significance of race, and white testimony which testifies the opposite. It will then 
offer an explanation to this paradox: in the post-Civil Rights era racism, particularly 
as an ideology and as a discourse, has been transformed - it has become codified. 
Due to this transformation in racism a significant proportion of consciously non­
racist whites unconsciously support it. The second chapter will then demonstrate 
the way in which this transition occurred during the late 1960s and early 1970s 
through an analysis of African-American urban riots. The rioting contributed to the 
growth of a reactionary public opinion, which Nixon was able to manipulate and 
capitalise upon - through coded racial appeals to white voters - to return the 
Republican Party to the White House. The 1968 election marked the beginning of a 
political realignment in post-Civil Rights America, whereby the Republican Party 
became associated with whites and the Democratic Party with blacks. Furthermore,
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the use of coded racial politics in the post-Civil Rights era helped legitimise and 
maintain racism in American society.
Chapters three to seven, through the method of discourse analysis, examines 
the use of coded racial politics between the Nixon and Clinton administrations. 
Then through an analysis of public discourse surrounding a pivotal contemporary 
event, it examines the reproduction of the coded racial political issue in American 
society. The dissertation will seek to reveal why specific coded issues were used, 
how and why they worked, and the implication for race relations. The aim is to 
explore the role that coded racial politics, used as part of the realignment of politics 
in the post-Civil Rights era, has played in the maintenance of racism in coded form 
in contemporary America.
Chapter three explores law and order as a coded racial political issue. The
chapter analyses Nixon’s discourse in relation to law and order and illustrates that
throughout his presidency law and order was presented as a serious social and
political issue, and an issue which Nixon declared a commitment to tackle in the
most aggressive manner. In doing this, Nixon presented the Republican Party as the
party that was tough on law an order. Moreover, there was a racial message implicit
within Nixon’s law and order discourse and hence Nixon also presented the
Republican Party as the party for white voters. In contrast to the way the
Republican Party was presented, the Democratic Party was presented as the
perpetrator of permissiveness and lawlessness, and by association as the party for
African Americans. An analysis of public discourse surrounding the Attica prison
riot, 1971, illustrates how the coded racial political issue of law and order is
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reproduced in American society. Public discourse in relation to law and order 
surrounding the Attica riot demonstrates the importance of the law and order issue 
for a significant proportion of Americans, and the feelings, beliefs and attitudes that 
Nixon’s law and order discourse tapped into. Furthermore, while the majority of 
Americans interpreted law and order aracially, with only a significant few 
perceiving law and order in overt racial terms, Attica served not only to reaffirm the 
connection between the Republican Party and law and order, but also aided both the 
conscious and unconscious identification of law and order in racial terms.
Chapter four explores preferential treatment as a coded racial issue. An 
analysis of Carter’s discourse in relation to affirmative action reveals that 
throughout his presidency Carter continually expressed his support of the 
controversial policy. Carter maintained that racial inequality continued to blight the 
lives of African Americans, and without affirmative action programs, past and 
present discrimination would persist. In doing this, Carter aligned himself with 
African American voters, and he presented the Democratic Party as the party for 
African Americans. Carter’s affirmative action discourse, however, was out of 
synch with those, that is, whites, who felt that government intervention to aid 
African Americans had gone too far; that the legislation of the Civil Rights era had 
done enough. Carter’s discourse was at odds with those who felt that continued 
government intervention, particularly through affirmative action programs, was 
now discriminating against whites and in effect awarding African Americans 
preferential treatment. For these Americans, it was the Republican Party -  the party, 
which Carter’s discourse identified as anti-black - and Reagan’s discourse which
held the appeal. An analysis of public discourse surrounding the Miami riot, 1980, 
demonstrates the way in which Carter’s affirmative action discourse, while in touch 
with African Americans, was out of touch with a significant proportion of white 
voters. Despite socio-economic evidence and African-American testimony 
revealing that racial discrimination continued to blight the lives of urban African 
Americans, rather than endearing white sympathy, the Miami riot served to harden 
white opposition to affirmative action amongst a significant proportion of whites. 
Many whites were angered by Carter’s response to Miami, claiming that he was 
bowing to mob rule and awarding blacks preferential treatment.
Chapter five explores crime and fear of crime as a coded racial issue. The
chapter analyses Reagan’s discourse in relation to crime and reveals that throughout
his presidency, Reagan presented crime as an enormous issue of concern for
American society. In doing this, Reagan helped both to fuel and legitimise the fear
of crime in American society. Reagan championed the need for a reversal of the
liberal attitudes and policies towards crime and advocated a get-tough philosophy.
In doing this, Reagan built upon the achievements of Nixon and presented the
Republican Party as the party of law and order, whereas the Democratic Party was
presented as its undoing. More importantly, however, again building upon the work
of Nixon, contained within Reagan’s discourse were implicit racial elements which
not only helped increase the racial interpretation of crime, but it also helped create
an atmosphere where coded racial messages could be more easily heard. An
analysis of public discourse surrounding the Bernhard Goetz subway shootings,
1984, demonstrates the feelings and beliefs that Reagan tapped into with his crime
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discourse. Despite evidence which cast significant doubt on Goetz’s claim of self- 
defence, the majority of Americans continued to support him. To them, Goetz was 
an everyman, symbolising the fears and frustrations of ordinary Americans in 
relation to crime. For the most part, responses to the shootings were seemingly 
aracial, with only a minority interpreting the incident in overtly racial terms. Yet, a 
counter discourse existed, especially amongst African Americans, which questioned 
the role of race in both the incident and in public support of Goetz. For these 
Americans, there was concern that fear of crime translated into a fear of blacks. An 
analysis of public discourse surrounding the death of Michael Griffith in Howard 
Beach, New York, 1986, demonstrates how the issue of crime was interpreted in 
overtly racial terms by some Americans, whereby fear of crime was indeed 
translated into fear of blacks. Moreover, the incident illustrates the way in which 
fear of crime was used by some to justify a racial attack. The public reaction to the 
ensuing trials further demonstrated the negative racial prism through which a 
significant proportion of whites viewed crime.
Chapter 6 explores soft on crime as a coded racial issue. Beginning with an
analysis of Bush’s use of the Willie Horton narrative in the 1988 presidential
election, the chapter examines Bush’s discourse in relation to crime and
demonstrates that throughout his presidency, Bush presented the Republican Party
as the party that was tough on law and order. Bush advocated the need for a
continued reversal of liberal policies in relation to crime -  a process first instigated
by Nixon -  which wrongly placed the rights and needs of criminals above the rights
and needs of ordinary Americans. Through his discourse, Bush also sent the
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message that one of the biggest challenges in the fight against crime was the 
continued soft approach towards crime by the Democratic Party. Moreover, through 
his crime discourse and his soft on crime charge against the Democrats, Bush was 
able to capitalise upon the racialisation of the crime issue in the public mind and 
use it as coded appeal to white voters. An analysis of public discourse surrounding 
two incidents of interracial crimes against women during the late 1980s 
demonstrates Bush’s soft on crime discourse with its inherent racial message, 
employed during the 1988 presidential election campaign through the Willie Horton 
narrative, and throughout his presidency, was a successful appeal to white voters. 
The Central Park jogger case in 1989 and the Carol Stuart murder in 1989, 
demonstrate not only the level of concern regarding crime that Bush’s soft on crime 
discourse tapped into, but also the enormous symbolic weight interracial crimes 
against women carried in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and hence the racial 
feelings Bush’s discourse manipulated and capitalised upon.
Chapter 7 explores reverse racism as a coded racial issue. The chapter
begins by analysing the way in which Clinton as a neo-liberal sough to broaden the
appeal of the Democratic Party in order to win white -  Reagan Democrat -  votes.
While Clinton campaigned for the black vote he also sent a series of coded racial
messages to white voters, one of which was an attack on reverse racism in response
to an incident involving rap artist Sister Souljah. Reverse racism is largely a
reaction to pervasive racism, the existence of which African Americans and whites,
generally speaking, perceive very differently. Yet, whether interpreted in this way
or not, reverse racism causes resentment in many whites and helps fuel the
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argument prevalent in the post-Civil Rights era that too much emphasis is unduly 
placed upon race. The issue of reverse racism remained an important political topic 
during Clinton’s first administration, and Clinton spoke out ardently against it. In 
particular, the issue of reverse racism surrounded the affirmative action debate. 
Like his Democratic predecessor, Carter, Clinton had to deal with considerable 
opposition to affirmative action programs. The chapter then analyses Clinton’s 
discourse in relation to affirmative action and illustrates that while he continued to 
support the policy of affirmative action due to the existence of pervasive racism, he 
also acknowledged and addressed those who were concerned by and opposed 
affirmative action by denouncing reverse racism. In many ways, as a new 
Democrat, Clinton’s discourse was double edged. On the one had, in traditional 
Democrat style, he stressed the continued existence of racism and the need for race- 
based policies such as affirmative action. On the other hand, he aligned himself 
with those, that is, whites, who opposed race-based polices and the perceived over­
emphasis on race and spoke out against reverse racism. The divergent feelings and 
beliefs that Clinton tapped into with his double-edged discourse are illustrated 
through an analysis of public discourse surrounding the Rodney King case and the 
Los Angeles riots, 1991-1992, and the O.J. Simpson case, 1994-1995. Although 
occurring before the election of Clinton to the presidency, the King case and the 
Los Angeles riots, provide a central backdrop to the reaction of both African 
Americans and whites in the Simpson case. As well as having a direct impact on 
African-American opinion of the Simpson case, they also go some way to
explaining the racial divergence of opinion on the verdict in the trial. African-
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American approval of the Simpson verdict was largely a reaction to the perception 
of the existence of pervasive racism, which had been revealed in reactions to the 
King case and the Los Angeles riots. Whites, not sharing the same perception of 
pervasive racism, which had also been revealed in reactions to the King case and 
Los Angeles riots, regarded the verdict and African-American support of it as an 
expression of reverse racism. For many whites it served as further evidence that too 
much focus, wrongly placed upon race since the civil rights era, had resulted in 
black racism against whites. Thus, while Clinton was out of touch with whites with 
his pervasive racism discourse, his reverse racism discourse was very much in 
synch with many white Americans.
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CHAPTER 1
The Significance of Race:
The Socio-economic Status of African Americans
1968-1997
A great paradox exists in contemporary America. Although African 
Americans have made significant gains since the Civil Rights movement, socio­
economic data for the period 1968-1997 shows a continuing disparity between 
African Americans and whites in matters of employment, income, educational 
attainment, homeownership and other measures of social and economic well being. 
African Americans also frequently testify that race remains a salient factor in their 
life experiences. Yet a majority of whites do not regard race as a significant factor 
in contemporary American life, particularly as a cause of racial inequality. This 
chapter will detail the socio-economic divergence between African Americans and 
whites between 1968 and 1997 and consider African-American testimony on the 
significance of race in comparison to popular white opinion.
A crucial factor in determining socio-economic status is employment. Yet
since the Civil Rights era a gulf continues to exist between African-American and
white experiences in the job market. The most blatant contrast is in the level of
unemployment suffered by African Americans compared to whites. Throughout the
post-Civil Rights era the African-American unemployment rate has been on
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average more than twice that of whites. In 1968 the unemployment rate for whites 
aged 16 years and over stood at 3.2%, but for African Americans it was 6.7%.1 By 
1997 the unemployment rate for whites aged 16 years and over was 0.7% less than 
the national average at 4.2% whilst for African Americans it stood at 10%.2
Fig. 1 Percentage of Black/White Unemployment, 1968-1997
1968 1970 1980 1990 1997
BLACK 6.7 8.3 14.3 11.4 10
WHITE 3.2 4.5 6.3 4.8 4.2
Source: Statistical Abstract o f  the United States.3
1 U.S. Bureau o f the Census, Table No.310 “Unemployed, Part-Time Employed, and Unemployment 
Insurance Summary: 1955-1969”, Statistical Abstract o f  the United States: 1969. Figures for blacks 
before 1972 included other non-whites.
2 U.S. Bureau o f the Census, Table No.646 “Employment Status o f the Civilian Population: 1970- 
1997”, Statistical Abstract o f  the United States: 1998. The contrast between African-American and 
white unemployment levels in the post-Civil Rights era has been explained in a number o f ways. For 
an analysis o f the hypothesis that the suburbanisation o f white-collar jobs and low skilled jobs has 
resulted in a spatial mismatch between job opportunities and African Americans see William Julius 
Wilson, The Declining Significance o f  Race: Blacks and Changing American Institutions (Chicago:
University o f Chicago Press, 1978);_____ , The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, The
Underclass, and Public Policy (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1987); Keith R. Ihlanfeldt 
and David L. Sjouquist, “Job Accessibility and Racial Differences in Youth Employment Rates”, 
American Economic Review 80 (1990): 268-276. For the effects o f social network segregation see 
also James Henry Braddock II and James M. McPortland, “How Minorities Continue to be Excluded 
From Equal Employment Opportunities: Research on Labor Market and Institutional Barriers”, 
Journal o f  Social Issues 43.1 (1987): 5-39. For the classic account of the hypothesis that social 
welfare programs created a culture of dependency and perpetuated unemployment see Charles 
Murray, Losing Ground: American Social Policy, 1950-1980 (New York: Basic Books, 1984). For 
an analysis o f the over-riding role of discrimination in causing the unemployment gap see Alphonso 
Pinkney, The Myth o f  Black Progress (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984); Andrew 
Hacker, Two Nations: Black and White, Separate, Hostile and Unequal (New York: Ballantine 
Books, 1995); Robert C. Smith, Racism in the Post-Civil Rights Era: Now You See It, Now You 
D on ’t (New York: SUNY Press, 1995).
3 Compiled from data from the 1969, 1998 and 2000 editions of the Statistical Abstract o f  the United 
States.
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Throughout the post-Civil Rights era the areas of employment occupied by 
African Americans and whites has also differed to a significant degree. In 1968, 
49.5% of employed whites held white-collar positions compared with only 24.2% 
of African Americans. A further 35.5% of whites held blue-collar positions 
compared with 42.4% of African Americans. Service industry positions were held 
by only 10.4% of whites but by 28.3% of African Americans.4 By the 1990s the 
number of African Americans in white-collar occupations had increased 
considerably. In 1997, 48% of African Americans were employed in white-collar 
positions. African Americans, however, still trailed behind whites, 61% of whom 
held white-collar positions in 1997. White employees were also more likely than 
African Americans to work in professional and managerial occupations: nearly 30% 
of whites compared to less than 20% of African Americans. The number of African 
Americans employed in blue-collar occupations declined during the post-Civil 
Rights period, largely due to the decline in the blue-collar industry. African 
Americans, however, remained more likely than whites to work in blue-collar 
positions: 30% compared to 24%. Moreover, African Americans were particularly 
more likely to work in the lower-skilled, lower-paid occupations of operators, 
fabricators and labourers - approximately 20% of African Americans and 13% of 
whites held these positions. African Americans in 1997 also continued to be
4 U.S. Bureau o f the Census, Table No.323 “Employed Persons, By Occupation and Color: 1957- 
1968”, Statistical Abstract o f  the United States: 1969. Figures for blacks before 1972 included other 
non-whites.
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employed in the service industry at a higher rate than whites: 22% compared to 
15%.5
The level of unemployment and the differences in occupational status has 
naturally affected the incomes of African Americans and whites. While the 
distribution of income among African Americans changed significantly during the 
post-Civil Rights era as the black middle-class increased - between 1970 and 1997 
the proportion of black households with incomes over $50,000 virtually doubled - a 
gulf persisted between the median incomes of African-American and white 
individuals and families.6 In 1968 the median income of African-American 
individuals was $1,999 - two-thirds of the median income of whites, which was 
$2,952. For African-American families, the median income was $5,590 - 62% of
n
the median income of white families, which was $8,936. In the same year, the 
proportion of white families living below the poverty line stood at one-in-ten
o m
compared to over one-in-three of African-American families. In 1997, while
5 Council o f Economic Advisers, “Occupations o f Employed Persons 1997”, Changing America: 
Indicators o f  Social and Economic Well-Being by Race and Hispanic Origin (Washington D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1998), 32. For a discussion o f the changes in the occupational status o f  
African Americans see Hacker, Two Nations, Chapter 7. For an analysis o f the barriers facing the 
black middle-class in the workforce see Joe R. Feagin and Melvin P. Sikes, Living With Racism: The 
Black Middle-Class Experience (Boston: Beacon Press, 1994) and for an analysis o f the dual barrier 
o f race and gender see Yanick St. Jean and Joe R. Feagin, Double Burden: Black Women and 
Everyday Racism (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1998).
6 U.S. Bureau o f the Census, Table No.661 “Money Income of Households - Percent Distribution By 
Income Level, Race and Hispanic Origin in Constant (1999) dollars: 1970-1999", Statistical 
Abstract o f  the United States: 2001. For an analysis o f the black middle-class see Bart Landry, The 
New Black Middle Class (Berkeley: University o f California Press, 1987); Feagin and Sikes Living 
With Racism; Pinkney, The Myth o f  Black Progress. For a discussion o f the role o f the War on 
Poverty in the increase in the black middle-class see Edward D. Berkowitz, America's Welfare 
State: From Roosevelt to Reagan (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991); Michel B. 
Katz, In The Shadow o f  The Poorhouse (New York: Basic Books, 1986).
7 U.S. Bureau o f the Census, Table No.487 “Money Income - Percent Distribution of Families and 
Unrelated Individuals, By Income Level and Race, in Constant (1968) Dollars: 1950-1968”, 
Statistical Abstract o f  the United States: 1970.
8 U.S. Bureau o f the Census, Table No.499 “Poor Persons - Number and Percent Below Poverty 
Level, By Family Status and Race: 1959-1968”, Statistical Abstract o f  the United States: 1970.
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improvements had been made, the gulf in income persisted. The median income of 
African-American individuals was $15,572 - 78% the median income of white 
individuals, which was $19,954.9 The median income of African-American 
families was $28,602 - 61.2% the median income of white families, which was 
$46,754.10 In that year also, the percentage of African-American families who lived 
below the poverty level stood at 23.6% whilst the proportion for whites was 8.4%.11
The relative low income of African-American families was exacerbated by 
the high number of female-headed families within the African-American 
population. In 1968 the percentage of white families that was female headed was 
8.9%. The figure for African-American families was 26.4%.12 In 1997 the 
percentage of white female-headed families stood at 14%, whilst for African 
Americans it had risen to 47%.13 While, quite obviously, the income of families 
headed by an individual is more often than not considerably lower than that headed 
by a couple, African-American female-headed households have a significantly 
lower income than their white counterparts. In 1997 the median income for African- 
American female-headed households was $17,962 whilst for white female-headed
9 U.S. Bureau o f the Census, Table No. 756 “Money Income o f Persons - Selected Characteristics 
By Income Level: 1997”, Statistical Abstract o f  the United States: 1999.
10 U.S. Bureau o f the Census, Table No. 744 “Money Income o f Families - Median Income By Race 
and Hispanic Origin In Current and Constant (1998) Dollars: 1970-1998”, Statistical Abstract o f  the 
United States: 1998.
11 U.S. Bureau o f the Census, Table No. 760 “Families Below Poverty Level and Below 125% of 
Poverty Level: 1970-1998”, Statistical Abstract o f  the United States: 2000. Poverty rates for African 
Americans, like whites, fell over the 1960s and early 1970s but improved little until the early 1990s. 
The differences in income levels and occupation can be partially, though not fully, attributed to the 
differences in the educational attainment of African Americans and whites. This will be discussed 
later.
12 U.S. Bureau o f the Census, Table No.43 “Households and Families, By Type o f Head: 1960- 
1968”, Statistical Abstract o f  the United States: 1969.
13 U.S. Bureau o f the Census, Table No.77 “Family and Non-family Households, By Race and 
Hispanic Origin and Type: 1980-1997”, Statistical Abstract o f  the United States: 1998.
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households it was $25,670.14 Even if African Americans were to emulate the two- 
parent family structure it would only close about half the income gap between white 
and African-American families since white families headed by a married couple 
have a substantially higher median income than their African-American 
counterparts.15 In 1997 the median income for family households headed by a 
married couple was $52,199 for whites and $45,372 for African Americans.16
Education is an important means of socio-economic success and during the 
post-Civil Rights era African Americans have been gaining parity with whites in 
terms of the levels of education received. In 1970 the median years of school 
completed for whites aged 25 years and over was 12.2 years, compared with 9.9 
years for African Americans.17 In 1980 African Americans were only slightly 
below the national average of school years completed, 12 years compared with the 
national figure of 1214 years.18 By the 1990s, the median school years completed by 
African Americans was, again, only slightly below the national average of 12 years 
seven months at 12 years three months.19 African Americans also closed the gap 
with whites with regards to high school completion rates. In 1970 31.4% of African 
Americans had completed four or more years of high school compared to 54.5% of
14 U.S. Bureau o f the Census, Table No.747 “Money Income of Households - Median Income and 
Income Level, By Household Type: 1997”, Statistical Abstract o f  the United States: 1999.
15 Hacker, Two Nations, 101.
16 U.S. Bureau o f the Census, Table No.747 “Money Income of Households - Median Income and 
Income Level, By Household Type: 1997”, Statistical Abstract o f  the United States: 1999.
17 U.S. Bureau o f the Census, Table No. 168 “Years o f School Completed By Race and Sex: 1960 & 
1970”, Statistical Abstract o f  the United States: 1972.
18 U.S. Bureau o f the Census, Table No.229 “Years of School Completed By Age and Race: 1940- 
1980”, Statistical Abstract o f  the United States: 1981.
19 U.S. Bureau o f the Census, Table No.219 “Years o f School Completed By Age and Race: 1950- 
1991”, Statistical Abstract o f  the United States: 1992.
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whites. By 1997 the number of African Americans who had completed four or more
20years of high school had increased to 74.9% compared with 83% of whites.
The advances made by African Americans at the school level can be 
regarded as a reflection of the success of the Brown v. Board o f Education (1954) 
Supreme Court decision. Brown ended segregation in public schools due to its 
failure to provide African Americans with an equal education. Despite Brown, 
however, de facto segregation has remained a significant feature of the public 
school system. While the proportion of African Americans who attend integrated
schools doubled between 1968 and 1992, studies by the National School Boards
21Association found that 63.2% of African Americans attended segregated schools. 
Moreover, despite the increase in the number of African Americans attending 
integrated schools, the use of ‘tracking’ (streaming in Britain) has effectively 
ensured that African-American pupils remain considerably segregated. For 
example, the integration of Central High School in Little Rock, Arkansas in 1957 
was a pivotal moment in history of civil rights and in one way the school stands as a 
model of desegregation’s success. In 1997 the school’s once all-white student body
99was just over 50% black. Central High also produces many of the state’s brightest 
students, both black and white, who go on to attend some of the nation’s best 
universities. However, whilst Central High School is integrated on the outside, it is 
deeply segregated within. In a pattern repeated throughout America, white students
20 U.S. Bureau o f the Census, Table No.269 “Educational Attainment By Race and Hispanic Origin: 
1960-1997”, Statistical Abstract o f  the United States: 1998.
21 Hacker, Two Nations, 167. To a large degree this is caused by the residential demographics of 
communities from which schools draw their students.
22 Julian E. Bames, “Segregation Now”, U.S. News & World Report, September 22, 1997, 23.
48
dominate its Honour classes, while African Americans are concentrated in
mainstream classes. Although the benefits of tracking have been documented, that it 
has resulted in segregation to such a significant degree undermines many of the
0 “3objectives and principles behind school integration.
Higher levels of education also, generally, did not bring the same socio­
economic rewards for African Americans that it did whites. On average the income 
of white high school graduates has remained considerably higher than the income 
of African-American high school graduates. In 1997 the average income of an 
African-American high school graduate was $18,722 - 82.2% of the average 
income of a white high-school graduate, which was $22,782. The income gap was 
especially true for men. In 1997 the average income of African-American male high 
school graduates was $22,267 - 77.9% of the average income of white male high 
school graduates, which was $28,591.24 Furthermore, African Americans with four 
years of high school have been consistently more likely to be unemployed than 
whites with the same level of education. In 1970 the unemployment rate for African 
Americans with four years of high school was 5.2%, whilst for whites it was 2.7%.
23 The racial make-up of classes reinforces self-segregation in other parts o f school life. Also, 
according to some civil rights activists, tracking perpetuates negative stereotypes amongst whites 
about the intellectual ability o f African Americans. Furthermore, a number o f African Americans 
charge that the system is often discriminatory against them, claiming that African-American children 
are steered away from Honor classes. Barnes, “Segregation, Now”, 22-28; Feagin and Sikes, Living 
With Racism, 84-96. Much has been made o f the use o f standardised tests, such as IQ tests, - with 
their cultural bias towards white middle-class students - to stream children. In particular, the use of 
IQ tests has been blamed for the unnecessary assignment o f a large number o f African-American 
children to special education. An analysis o f Department o f Education data by the U.S. News & 
World Report found that socio-economic factors could not fully account for the disproportionately 
high numbers o f African-Americans in special education. Joseph P. Shapiro et al, “Separate and 
Unequal”, U.S. News & World Report, December 13, 1993, 46-60. For a discussion o f the use of 
standardised tests and the racial gap in results see Christopher Jencks and Meredith Phillips (eds.), 
The Black-White Test Score Gap (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1998).
24 U.S. Bureau o f the Census, Table No. 263 “Earnings, By Highest Degree Earned: 1997”, 
Statistical Abstract o f  the United States: 1998.
49
In 1980 the unemployment rate for African Americans with four years of high 
school was 9.5% compared with a rate of 4.6% for whites.25 In 1997 8.2% of 
African Americans with four years of high school education were unemployed 
compared with 4.6% of whites.26
While African Americans have closed the gap with whites in terms of the 
number of school years completed and high-school graduation rates, a gulf has 
persisted within higher education. Despite an increase in the number of African 
Americans attending college, whites are still twice as likely as African Americans
77to attend and complete college. In 1970 11.3% of whites had completed four or 
more years of college compared with 4.4% of African Americans. In 1980 17.1% of 
whites had completed four or more years of college, compared with 8.4% of 
African Americans. By 1997 while 13.3% of African Americans had completed 
four or more years of college, 24.6% of whites had done so.28 Also, just as at the 
school level, a college education, generally, does not bring the same socio­
25 U.S. Bureau o f the Census, Table No.662 “Unemployment Rates, By Educational Attainment, Sex 
and Race: 1970-1991”, Statistical Abstract o f  the United States: 1995.
26 U.S. Bureau o f the Census, Table No.681 “Unemployment and Unemployment Rates, By 
Educational Attainment, Sex, Race and Hispanic Origin: 1992-1997”, Statistical Abstract o f  the 
United States: 1998.
27 Standardised tests for college admittance, that is, SAT’s, have been criticised for discriminating 
against African Americans. The disparity o f results between African Americans and whites on these 
tests also help to explain why African Americans on the whole tend to attend less prestigious 
colleges. For a discussion o f racial differences in SAT results see Hacker, Two Nations, Chapter 8; 
Jencks and Phillips (eds.), The Black-White Test Score Gap-, News and Views, “Why Has There 
Been No Progress in Closing the Black-White SAT Gap?”, Journal o f  Blacks in Higher Education 
22 (1998-9): 6-10. For a discussion o f racial discrimination in Higher Education see Joe R. Feagin, 
Heman Vera, Nikitah Imani, The Agony o f  Education: Black Students in White Colleges and 
Universities (New York: Routledge, 1996).
28 U.S. Bureau of the Census, Table No.260 “Educational Attainment By Race and Hispanic Origin: 
1960-1997”, Statistical Abstract o f  the United States: 1998. The decisions by the University of 
California and the University o f Texas in 1996 to suspend affirmative action policies had an 
immediate negative impact on African-American enrolments, which would be repeated elsewhere if 
other institutions chose to follow suit. In June 1997 the University o f California’s Boat Hall School 
o f Law announced that only one African American planned to enroll in the incoming class of 270 
students.
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economic rewards for African Americans that it does for whites. In the post-Civil 
Rights era African-American graduates have been up to twice as likely to be 
unemployed than white graduates. In 1970, the unemployment rate for African 
Americans with four years or more of college was lower than the white rate of 1.3% 
at 0.9%. By 1975, however, the African-American rate of 3.9% had surpassed the 
white rate of 2.4%.29 In 1997 the unemployment rate for white college graduates 
was 1.8%, while for African Americans it was 4.4%.30 Also, those who are 
employed, on average, have lower salaries than white graduates. In 1997, the 
average income of whites holding a Bachelors degree was $38,936. For African 
Americans with Bachelor degrees it was $31,955.31 The racial gulf in graduate 
incomes was particularly true for men. In 1997, white males holding Bachelors 
degrees earned on average $48,014, whilst African-American males holding 
Bachelors degrees earned $35,558.32
A close connection exists between social and spatial mobility. Yet, to a 
significant degree, residential segregation persists in America, which has excluded 
many African Americans from the benefits and resources that are distributed 
through housing markets. The segregation of African Americans from other
29 U.S. Bureau o f the Census, Table No.648 “Unemployment Rates, By Educational Attainment, Sex 
and Race: 1970-1991”, Statistical Abstract o f  the United States: 1996.
30 U.S. Bureau o f the Census, Table No.681 “Unemployed and Unemployment Rates, By 
Educational Attainment, Sex, Race and Hispanic Origin: 1992-1997”, Statistical Abstract o f  the 
United States: 1998.
31 U.S. Bureau o f the Census, Table No. 263 “Earnings, By Highest Degree Earned: 1997”, 
Statistical Abstract o f  the United States: 1998.
32 U.S. Bureau o f the Census, Table No. 263 “Earnings, By Highest Degree Earned: 1997”, 
Statistical Abstract o f  the United States: 1998. Hacker argues that the greater equity among women 
results from the fact that like African-American men, women of both races are given fewer 
opportunities to rise to better-paid positions than their white male counterparts. Hacker, Two 
Nations, 102-3.
33 Neighborhood quality and the quality o f associated services vary considerably depending on the 
racial and ethnic composition o f the population.
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groups did decline between 1970 and 1990. By the 1990s, however, members of
each racial and ethnic group in the United States continued to live 
disproportionately with members of the same group.34
The majority of the urban black poor are segregated in low-income 
neighbourhoods in inner cities. And according to some theorists, most notably 
Douglas Massey and Nancy Denton, the principle cause of the socio-economic 
plight of the black urban poor is the extreme residential segregation of African 
Americans in the nation’s ghettos.35 Residential segregation also impacts upon the 
lives of African Americans with the means and desire to live in more affluent 
residential areas. African Americans frequently state that they would like to live in 
racially integrated areas. According to The Gallup Poll Social Audit on Black/White 
Relations in the United States 1997, 83% of African Americans would rather live in 
a mixed neighbourhood.36 However, the majority of middle-class African 
Americans live in substantially black or resegregating residential areas. Some
34 Council o f Economic Advisers, Changing America, 67; Reynolds Farley and Walter R. Allen, The 
Color Line and the Quality o f  Life in America (New York: Sage, 1987); Gerald Jaynes and Robin 
Williams (eds.), A Common Destiny: Blacks and American Society (Washington D.C.: National 
Academy Press, 1989); Douglas S. Massey and Nancy A. Denton, An American Apartheid: 
Segregation and the Making o f the Underclass (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1993). For 
a discussion o f how the geographical nature o f segregation changed during the twentieth century see 
also Douglas S. Massey and Zolton L. Hajnal, “The Changing Geographic Structure of Black-White 
Segregation in the U.S.”, Social Science Quarterly 76.3 (1995): 527-42.
35 Massey and Denton, An American Apartheid. For a discussion o f the negative effect o f residential 
racial isolation on racial attitudes and beliefs see Donald R. Kinder and Tali Mendelberg, “Cracks in 
American Apartheid”, Journal o f  Politics 57 (1995): 402-424.
36 Gallup Organization, The Gallup Poll Social Audit on Black/White Relations 1997 (Princeton: The 
Gallup Organization, 1997), 68; Hacker, Two Nations, 40.
37 Once-integrated neighborhoods become resegregated as the number of African Americans moving 
into the area increase and the number o f white residents move out. Studies have demonstrated that, 
in general, whites are willing to accept a black population o f approximately 8%. Once this 
proportion has been breached, whites begin to leave. Hacker, Two Nations, 41; Jaynes and Williams 
(eds.), A Common Destiny, 141. For most whites the reasons are socio-economic, for example, they 
fear a fall in property value. The process of resegregating is quite often the result o f blockbusting by 
estate agents: the practice of actively working to shift an area from white to black for economic gain. 
Feagin and Sikes, Living With Racism, 243-244. Despite this documented trend, however, according
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African Americans choose black communities out of a concern for preserving black 
institutions, others out of fear of their reception by a white community. Segregation 
is forced upon a great many, however, through the racial discrimination of white 
landlords, homeowners and real estate agents.38
Residential location has a considerable effect upon the quality of life of all 
Americans. Another factor affecting the general quality of neighbourhoods is the 
level of homeownership. Homeownership is also a valuable indicator of socio­
economic well-being. Although the homeownership rate for African Americans has 
gradually increased throughout the post-Civil Rights period, a wide gulf has existed 
with the homeownership rates of whites. In 1970, just 42.1% of African Americans 
owned their own homes, compared to 65.4% of whites. By 1980 the figure for
• O QAfrican Americans had increased to 44.2% and for whites to 67.8%. In 1997 the 
homeownership rate for all Americans was at its highest, yet while over 70% of 
whites were homeowners, less than 50% of African Americans were.40
to opinion polls, the number o f whites who stated they would move if  blacks moved into their 
neighborhood in large numbers has systematically decreased from 70% in 1968 to 18% in 1997. 
Gallup, Black/White Relations, 71.
38 African Americans frequently encounter obstacles when attempting to secure housing in white 
areas. According to the 1981 Boston Audits, white house-seekers were invited to inspect 57% more 
housing units than African Americans. John Yinger, “Measuring Racial Discrimination With Fair 
Housing Audits”, American Economic Review 76 (1986): 885. A similar study in housing 
discrimination in 1990 found that the incidence o f unfavourable treatment in the housing market was 
23% - 30% higher for African Americans than their white counterparts. Margery Austin Turner, 
Raymond J. Struyk and John Yinger Housing Discrimination Study: Synthesis (Washington D.C.: 
US Department o f Housing and Urban Renewal, 1991), 134.Yinger concluded in “Measuring Racial 
Discrimination With Fair Housing Audits”, that discrimination by estate agents was primarily 
caused by the economic interests o f agents: agents discriminate primarily to retain the business of  
actual or potential white customers. While this may apparently shift the blame onto white customers, 
it by no means vindicates real estate agents, at least to the extent that non-racists, if  such they are, 
collaborate with racism.
39 U.S. Bureau o f the Census, Table No. 1190 “Occupied Housing Units - Tenure, By Race of  
Householders: 1920 to 1993”, Statistical Abstract o f  the United States: 1996.
40 Council o f Economic Advisers, “Black and Hispanic Female Earnings as a Percentage of White 
Female Earnings”, Changing America, 62. Along with facing discrimination in attempting to secure 
housing in white areas, African Americans also face discrimination in the pursuit o f home-
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It can be seen then that while, in many respects, great advances have been 
made by African Americans in the post-Civil Rights era, a gulf continues to exist 
between the socio-economic status of African Americans and whites.41 Despite this 
evidence, however, many white Americans do not perceive race or more 
specifically racism, to be a significant problem in contemporary America, 
particularly as a cause of inequality.42 This general belief is in direct contrast to the 
testimony of a large number of African Americans.
The post-Civil Rights era has witnessed a continuation of the general 
progressive trend in white racial attitudes, which began in the 1940s.43 A report on
ownership by financial institutions. A study by the Atlanta Journal and Constitution o f loan 
rejection rates between 1983-1986 found that black applications for mortgage loans were rejected 
nationwide twice as often as whites. Smith, Racism in the post-Civil Rights Era, 65-6. A similar 
study on the loan approval rates in New Jersey in 1990 also found that African-American loan 
applications were more than twice as likely to be denied as white applications. The study concluded 
that 70% of the racial gap in loan denial rates in New Jersey could be accounted for by racially 
discriminatory lending practices with differences in bad credit risk accounting for only about 8% of 
the racial gap in lending. Samuel L. Myers ad Tsze Chan, “Racial Discrimination in Housing 
Markets: Accounting For Credit Risk”, Social Science Quarterly 76.3 (1995): 543-59.
41 As well as those works already cited, for an analysis o f the socio-economic status of African 
Americans since the 1960s see also Reynolds Farley, Black and Whites: Narrowing the Gap? 
(Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1984); Bob Blauner, Black Lives, White Lives: Three 
Decades o f  Race Relations in America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989).
42 Since 1977, data from the General Social Survey conducted by the National Opinion Resource 
Center, has demonstrated that the majority o f whites disagree that differences in housing, income 
and jobs between African Americans and whites is due to discrimination. Floris W. Wood (ed.), An 
American Profile - Opinions and Behaviour, 1972-1989 (Gale Research Inc., 1990), 469. See also 
Gallup, Black/White Relations; Jeannye Thornton et al, “Whites’ Myths About Blacks”, U.S. News 
& World Report, November 9, 1992, 41-44.
43 Paul B. Sheatsley, “White Attitudes Toward the Negro”, Daedalus 95 (1966): 217-238; Howard 
Schuman, Charlotte Steeh, Lawrence Bobo, Racial attitudes in America: Trends and Interpretations 
(Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1985); Garth D. Taylor, Paul B. Sheatsley and Andrew 
M. Greenley, “Attitudes Towards Racial Integration”, Scientific American 238 (1978): 42-51; David 
T. Wellman, Portraits o f  White Racism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). Other 
analysts argue that despite the appearance of a progressive trend in white racial attitudes, underlying 
racism persists but that it is expressed differently to old-fashioned racism. New racism is expressed 
through support of American values such as individualism and egalitarianism. Donald R. Kinder and 
David O. Sears, “Prejudice and Politics: Symbolic Racism Versus Racial Threats to the Good Life”, 
Journal o f  Personality and Social Psychology 40 (1981): 414-31; Donald R. Kinder, “The 
Continuing American Dilemma: White Resistance to Racial Change 40 Years After Myrdal”, 
Journal o f  Social Issues 42.2 (1986): 152, Donald R. Kinder and Tali Mendelberg, “Individualism 
Reconsidered: Principles and Prejudice in Contemporary American Opinion” in David O. Sears et 
al, Racialized Politics: The Debate About Racism in America (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 
2000); Donald R. Kinder and Lynn M. Sanders, Divided By Color: Racial Politics and Democratic
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race relations conducted for the National Conference of Christians and Jews in
Ideals (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1996); John B. McConahay, “Self Interest Versus 
Racial Attitudes as Correlates o f Anti-Busing Attitudes in Louisville: Is It the Buses or the Blacks?”, 
The Journal o f  Politics 44 (1982): 692-720; JohnB. McConahay, “Modern Racism, Ambivalence, 
and the Modem Racism Scale” in John F. Dovidio and Samuel L. Gaertner (eds.), Prejudice, 
Discrimination, and Racism (Orlando: Academic Press, 1986); John B. McConahay and Joseph C. 
Hough, “Symbolic Racism”, Journal o f  Social Issues 32.2 (1976): 23-45; David O. Sears, “Symbolic 
Racism” in Phyllis A. Katz and Dalmas A. Taylor (eds.), Eliminating Racism: Profiles in 
Controversy (New York: Plenum Press, 1988); David O. Sears and Donald R. Kinder, “Racial 
Tensions and Voting in Los Angeles” in Wemer Z. Hirsch (ed.), Los Angeles: Viability and 
Prospects fo r Metropolitan Leadership (New York: Praeger, 1971); David O. Sears, Carl P. Hensler 
and Leslie K. Speer, “Whites’ Opposition to ‘Busing’: Self-Interest or Symbolic Politics?”,
American Political Science Review 73 (1979): 369-384; David O. Sears and Carolyn L. Funk, “The 
Role o f Self-Interest in Social and Political Attitudes”, Advances in Experimental Social Psychology 
24 (1991): 1-91; David O. Sears, Colette van Laar, Mary Carrillo and Rick Kosterman, “Is It Really 
Racism? The Origins o f White Americans’ Opposition to Race-Targeted Policies?”, Public Opinion 
Quarterly 61 (1997): 16-53; David O. Sears, P. J. Henry, Rick Kosterman, “Egalitarian Values and 
Contemporary Racial Policies” in David O. Sears et al, Racialized Politics. Others disagree with this 
view of symbolic racism. For social-structural theories see Herbert Blumer, “Race Prejudice as a 
Sense o f Group Position”, Pacific Sociological Review  1 (1958): 3-7; Lawrence Bobo, “Whites’ 
Opposition to Busing: Symbolic Racism or Realistic Group Conflict Theory”, Journal o f  Personality 
and Social Psychology 45 (1983): 1195-1210; Lawrence Bobo, “Group Conflict, Prejudice, and the 
Paradox o f Contemporary Racial Attitudes” in Phyllis A. Katz and Dalmas A. Taylor (eds.), 
Eliminating Racism: Profiles in Controversy (New York: Pullman, 1988); Lawrence Bobo, “The 
Color Line, the Dilemma, and the Dream: Race Relations at the Close o f the Twentieth Century” in 
John Highman (ed.), Civil Rights and Social Wrongs: Black-White Relations Since World War II 
(University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997); Lawrence Bobo, “Race and Beliefs 
about Affirmative Action: Assessing the Effects o f Interests, Group Threat, Ideology and Racism” in 
David O. Sears et al, Racialized Politics', Lawrence Bobo and James Kluegel, “Opposition to Race- 
Targeting: Self-Interest, Stratification Ideology, or Racial Attitudes?”, American Sociological 
Review 61 (1993): 951-72; Lawrence Bobo and James R. Kluegel, “Status, Ideology, and 
Dimensions of Whites’ Racial Beliefs and Attitudes: Progress and Stagnation” in Steven A. Tuch 
and Jack K. Martin (eds.), Racial Attitudes in the 1990s: Continuity and Change (Connecticut: 
Praeger, 1997); Lawrence Bobo, James R. Kluegel and Ryan A. Smith, “Laissez-Faire Racism: The 
Crystallization o f a Kinder, Gentler, Anti-black Ideology” in Tuch and Martin (eds.), Racial 
Attitudes in the 1990s; Donald T. Campbell, “Ethnocentric and Other Altruistic Motives” in Robert 
Levine (ed.), Nebraska Symposium on Motivation (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1965); V. 
O. Key Jr., Southern Politics in State and Nation (New York: Knopf, 1949); Robert A. Levine and 
Donald T. Cambell, Ethnocentrism (New York: Wiley, 1972); Jim Sidanius, Erik Devereux, Felicia 
Pratto, “A Comparison of Symbolic Racism Theory and Social Dominance Theory as Explanations 
for Racial Policy Attitudes”, Journal o f  Social Psychology 132 (1992):377-95; Jim Sidanius and 
James Liu, “Racism, Support for the Persian Gulf War, and the Police Beating o f Rodney King: A 
Social Dominance Perspective”, Journal o f  Social Psychology 132 (1992): 685-700; Jim Sidanius, 
Pam Singh, John J. Hetts, Chris Federico, “It’s Not Affirmative Action It’s the Blacks?” in David 
O. Sears et al, Racialized Politics. For policial theories see D ’Souza, The End o f  Racism-, Jon 
Hurwitz and Mark Peffley, Perception and Politics: Race and Politics in the United States 
(Massachusetts: Yale University Press, 1998); Byron M. Roth, Prescription fo r  Failure: Race 
Relations in the Age o f  Social Science (New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 1994); Paul M. 
Sniderman and Michael Hagen, Race and Inequality: A Study in American Values (New Jersey: 
Chatham House, 1985); Paul M. Sniderman and Philip E. Tetlock, “Symbolic Racism: Problems of 
Motive Attribution in Political Analysis”, Journal o f  Social Issues 42.2 (1986): 129-150; Paul M. 
Sniderman and Edward G. Carmines, Reaching Beyond Race (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1997); Paul M. Sniderman and Thomas Piazza, The Scar o f  Race (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1993); Paul M. Sniderman and Philip E. Tetlock, “Reflections on American Racism”, Journal 
o f  Social Issues 42.2 (1986):173-87.
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1979 found that whites expressed increasing tolerance towards and acceptance of 
integration and a decrease in negative racial attitudes. The report stated:
White attitudes towards blacks and toward real progress for blacks in 
this country are not more hardened than ever before. Indeed, the 
conditions appear to be ripe for blacks to sound the trumpets that 
have been muted since the days of Martin Luther King Jr. and to 
strike out for an acceleration of progress on many fronts.44
According to the survey, 35% of whites supported full integration including 
interracial marriage and dating, and 42% favoured integration in some areas. Only 
14% of whites stated they would be upset if a lot of blacks moved into their 
neighbourhood, compared to 33% in 1963, with 54% stating they would not mind. 
In the work place, 50% of whites came into regular contact with African-American 
co-workers and 25% had African-American employees or supervisors. The survey 
also found that a number of whites with a black personal friend had doubled since 
1970 to 40%. Overall, according to the survey over 90% of whites were happy with 
the increased contact with African Americans.45 Sixty-percent of respondents stated 
that they would be concerned if a close friend or relative married an African 
American, which is still an alarming majority but nevertheless 24 points lower than 
in 1963.46 Only 20% would be concerned if a child brought home an African-
44 “A New Racial Poll”, Newsweek, February 26, 1979, 37.
45 “A New Racial Poll”, 37.
46 ‘Concerned’ could be taken to indicate that the respondents themselves hold no objections, but are
aware o f the difficulties inter-racial marriages can face. As such, whilst it might appear to absolve
the respondents of any personal prejudices, it nonetheless reflects the reality that such prejudices are 
held by others.
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American friend for dinner, down 22 points since 1963.47 With regards to racial
48stereotyping by whites, the report also demonstrated a progressive trend.
Fig. 2 Percentage of Whites Holding Racial Stereotypes, 1963-1978
Percentage of whites who agreed.. 1963 1966 1967 1971 1976 1978
Blacks tend to be less ambitious 66 65 70 52 50 49
Blacks want to live off handouts 41 43 52 39 37 36
Blacks are more violent - - 42 36 35 34
Blacks breed crime 35 33 32 27 31 29
Blacks have less native intelligence 39 36 46 37 28 25
Blacks care less for the family 31 33 34 26 22 18
Blacks are inferior 31 26 29 22 15 15
Source: Newsweek, February 26, 1979.49
The positive trend in white racial attitudes and beliefs continued throughout 
the post-Civil Rights period. The Gallup Poll Social Audit found that whites in 
1997 were increasingly likely than in previous decades to support integration in 
numerous areas. For example, only 24% of whites would prefer to live in an all- 
white neighbourhood, with 61% preferring a mixed neighbourhood.50 Only 18% of
47 “A New Racial Poll”, 37.
48 For a discussion o f the extent to which consistent, negative stereotypes o f African Americans 
persist see P. G. Devine and A. J. Elliot, “Are Racial Stereotypes Fading?”, Personality and Social 
Psychology Bulletin 21 (1995): 1139-1150.
49 It is worth noting that indicators rose in 1967 following what is regarded as the worst period of 
inner-city riots.
50 Gallup, Black/White Relations, 68.
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whites stated that they would move if blacks moved into their neighbourhood in 
great numbers.51 In the workplace, 82% of whites expressed a preference for a 
mixed-race work setting as opposed to an all-white setting.52 In terms of schooling, 
just 3% of whites would object to their child going to school with a few blacks and 
12% to a school with a half-black student body. A larger proportion, however, - 
41% - would object to their child attending a school with more than a half-black 
student population.53 The Gallup Poll Social Audit also documented an increase in 
progressive white racial attitudes. Sixty-two percent of whites rated their personal 
prejudice at 2 or lower on a ten-point prejudice scale, with only 15% rating 
themselves at 5 or higher.54
Combined with the increasingly progressive racial attitudes and beliefs 
among the majority of whites throughout the post-Civil Rights period, was a 
generally positive perception of the status of African Americans. The Gallup Poll 
Social Audit reported that 73% of whites in 1968 believed that African Americans 
were treated the same as whites in their community. This figure decreased slightly 
to 71% in 1978 and to 64% in 1987 before increasing to 76% in 1997.55 By 1997 
most whites expressed the belief that African Americans had equal opportunities for
51 Gallup, Black/White Relations, 71.
52 Gallup, Black/White Relations, 72.
53 Gallup, Black/White Relations, 74. Urban whites are more likely to object and it is usually out of  
concern for standards in predominantly black schools.
54 Gallup, Black/White Relations, 76-77. Of course, how honest the responses were is debatable 
given the reluctance of most people to label themselves as prejudiced. Whites are more likely to 
label other whites as prejudiced. According to the poll the average rating given by whites to other 
whites’ prejudice is 4.2. See Shirley Hatchett and Howard Schuman, “White Respondents and Race 
of Interviewer Effects”, Public Opinion Quarterly 39 (1975): 523-528; Maria Kryson, “Privacy and 
the Expression o f White Racial Attitudes: A Comparison Across Three Contexts”, Public Opinion 
Quarterly 62 (1998): 506-544; John B. McConahay, Betty D. Hardie and Valarie Batts, “Has 
Racism Declined in America? It Depends Who is Asking and What is Asked”, Journal o f  Conflict 
Resolution 25.4 (1981): 563-579.
55 Gallup, Black/White Relations, 35.
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jobs, education and housing. According to the Gallup Poll Social Audit, 79% of 
whites thought that African Americans had as good a chance as whites to get a job 
in their community, 79% to get an education, and 86% to get housing.56 The 
majority of whites also disagreed that African Americans faced discrimination in a 
variety of everyday interactions and settings. According to the poll, only 14% of 
whites believed that African Americans faced discrimination at work, 12% on 
public transport, 18% in neighbourhood shops, 19% at the shopping mall and 16% 
at restaurants.57
However, despite the expression of positive racial attitudes and beliefs 
among whites a great many African Americans testify that racial discrimination 
persists in the post-Civil Rights era. The report accompanying the survey for the 
National Conference of Christians and Jews acknowledged that for the most part 
African Americans felt that they faced as much discrimination as they did a decade 
previously. The Gallup Poll Social Audit also demonstrated that African Americans 
held a far more negative portrait of race relations in the post-Civil Rights era. 
According to the poll, between 1968 and 1978 only 26% of African Americans felt 
that they were treated the same as whites in their community. Despite an increase to 
44% in 1987 and to 49% in 1997 the gap with white perceptions was just under 
30%.58 In 1997, despite an increasing trend, African Americans were less likely 
than whites to believe they had equal access to employment, education and housing 
in their community. According to the poll, 46% of African Americans felt they had
56 Gallup, Black/White Relations, 37-41.
57 Gallup, Black/White Relations, 42-46.
58 Gallup, Black/White Relations, 35.
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as good a chance as whites to get a job, 63% to get an education, and 58% to get 
housing.59 Many African Americans also testified that they faced discrimination in 
a variety of everyday interactions and settings. Forty-five percent of African 
Americans stated that they were treated less fairly than whites at work, 25% on 
public transport 42% in neighbourhood shops, 46% in shopping malls, and 42% in 
restaurants.60
It can be seen then that there has been progress in white racial attitudes in 
the post-Civil Rights era and during the period of study of this dissertation: 1968- 
1997. The vast majority of white Americans emphatically endorse racial equality. 
Yet, despite what whites believe and report, discrimination persists - African 
Americans frequently report this and it is upheld with socio-economic data and 
testimony. An explanation for the continuing divergence between African 
Americans and whites in socio-economic terms and for the disparity between the 
evidence and white perceptions can be found by analysing the way racial issues 
changed at the end of the Civil Rights era, during the late 1960s and early 1970s. 
During this time when America seemed to be fulfilling its democratic and 
egalitarian ideals, racism as an ideology and as a discourse was transformed: it 
became codified. In this way, many white Americans have become the unwitting 
supporters of racism in post-Civil Rights America.
59 Gallup, Black/White Relations, 36-41.
60 Gallup, Black/White Relations, 42-46.
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CHAPTER 2
African-American Urban Riots:
The Transition of Racism in the
Late 1960s and Early 1970s
During the late 1960s and early 1970s a transition occurred in America’s 
racial ideology and discourse on race, which gave rise to a new and far more covert 
form of racism. The African-American urban riots of the 1960s played an important 
role in this transition. The riots were a reaction to the racism in America that 
alienated urban African Americans in deplorable conditions in the nation’s ghettos.1 
However, while the majority of white Americans by the 1960s were in agreement 
that the time to alleviate racial inequality had arrived few regarded rioting as a 
justified reaction. As rioting continued and white racial attitudes hardened, many 
white Americans called on government to take a firmer approach with regard to the 
urban situation. In the 1968 presidential election Richard Nixon manipulated the
1 Joe R. Feagin and Harlan Hahn, Ghetto Revolts: The Politics o f  Violence in American Cities (New 
York: Macmillan, 1973); Robert M. Fogelson, Violence as Protest: A Study o f  Ghettos and Riots 
(Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1971); Report o f  the National Advisory Commission on Civil 
Disorders (New York: Bantam Books, 1968).
2 Although the riots were integral in permitting the transition in American racial ideology and 
discourse on race, they were only one aspect contributing to the broader shift to the right in 
American politics and society at the end o f the 1960s. They do, however, serve as a worthy case 
study to illustrate the transformation in the way racism operates. For a comprehensive analysis o f the 
social and political changes of the 1960s see M. J. Heale, The Sixties in America: History, Politics 
and Protest (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2001); Allen J. Matusow, The Unraveling o f
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growing reactionary public opinion through the use of coded racial messages to 
return the Republican Party to the White House. Although part of a long and 
complex process of transition, the 1968 election marked the beginning of the 
conservative ascendancy in America and also a new political realignment in which 
race was a definitive factor.3 Moreover, the election of Nixon was a crucial 
component in the transformation of racism in post-Civil Rights America into coded 
form.4
The chapter will begin by looking at the causes and meanings of the riots in 
urban America and then at how the riots affected the way in which the general 
public regarded the African-American urban dilemma, illustrating the move to the 
right by a significant proportion of whites. The chapter will then demonstrate the 
way in which Nixon covertly manipulated the racial fears of a reactionary 
American public for political gain, and in doing so, helped legitimise and transform 
racism in post-Civil Rights America into coded form.
2.1 African Americans and Urban Riots
The eruption of Harlem, an African-American ghetto of New York City, on 
the 18th of July 1964 following a rally protesting police brutality after a white
America: A History o f  Liberalism in the 1960s (New York: Harper & Row, 1986); Douglas Miller, 
On Our Own: America in the 1960s (Massachusetts: D.C. Heath & Co., 1996).
3 Dan T. Carter, From George Wallace to Newt Gingrich: Race in the Conservative 
Counterrevolution, 1963-1994 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana University Press, 1996); Kenneth O’Reilly, 
Nixon’s Piano: Presidents and Racial Politics From Washington to Clinton (New York: Free Press, 
1995).
4 Michael Omi and Howard Winant, Racial Formation in the United States: From the 1960s to the 
1990s (New York: Routledge, 1994).
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policeman shot and killed an African-American youth, marked the advent of 
African-American urban rioting which was to plague the American nation every 
summer until the end of the decade.5 By the end of the 1960s hundreds of cities had 
witnessed the phenomenon of urban rioting.6 African-American urban rioting was 
caused by myriad social, economic and political factors but had at its root racism. 
The riots were a reaction to the racism within America, which alienated African 
Americans in a state of socio-economic deprivation and political powerlessness in 
the ghetto. The ghetto symbolised to African Americans that they were inferior, 
unacceptable and therefore kept apart. As the novelist and polemicist James 
Baldwin wrote:
You were bom where you were bom and faced the future that you 
faced because you were black and for no other reason. You were 
bom into a society which spelled out with brutal clarity, and in as 
many ways as possible that you were a worthless human being.7
For all their destruction and violence the riots symbolised the African-American 
quest for entry into American life on an equal basis with whites. As Robert M. 
Fogelson stated: “For the great majority of blacks, the American dream, tarnished 
though it has been for centuries, is still the ultimate aspiration.”8 Yet, ultimately and
5 Rioting has a long tradition in American history and there had been race riots during and following 
both the First and Second World Wars. However, the urban riots of the 1960s marked a distinct new 
pattern in rioting. See Fogelson, Violence as Protest-, Morris Janowitz, “Collective Racial Violence: 
A Contemporary History” in Hugh Davis Graham and Ted Robert Gurr (eds.), Violence in America: 
Historical and Comparative Perspectives (California: Sage, 1989); M. Wallace, “The Uses of 
Violence in American History” in Roger Lane and John J. Turner Jr. (eds.), Riot, Rout and Tumult: 
Readings in American Social and Political Violence (Connecticut: Greenwood, 1978).
6 For a discussion o f the number o f riots see Feagin and Hahn, Ghetto Revolts, Chapter 3.
7 James Baldwin, The Fire Next Time (London: Penguin, 1963), 16.
8 Fogelson, Violence as Protest, 13.
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inadvertently they would play a crucial role in the transition of racial ideology and 
discourse on race that would ensure the maintenance of racism in America.
On the surface, the conditions for African Americans in the early to mid- 
1960s looked hopeful. By the middle of the decade two monumental acts of law had 
been passed: the Civil Rights Act (1964) and the Voting Rights Act (1965), which, 
theoretically at least, granted the entry of African Americans into the American 
mainstream on an equal basis with whites. African Americans in general appeared 
optimistic about the changes being made to ensure their entry into mainstream 
American life. A Louis Harris poll in 1964 illustrated the optimism among African 
Americans. The accompanying report stated: " . . .  negroes do feel more certain than 
ever that they will indeed overcome - and that the 'someday' of the song is tangibly 
nearer at hand."9 African-American optimism was, however, coupled with a deep 
sense of vigilance. While the majority of African Americans were inclined to 
believe that white America would honour its Civil Rights pledges, they were 
nonetheless relentless in their pursuit of racial equality. As Newsweek stated: " . . .  
black America has no illusion that the millennium has arrived - and no intention of 
relaxing its fight for full equality."10 African Americans, particularly those of the 
urban North and West, were fully aware that the struggle was not at an end.11
9 “The Negro in America -1965”, Newsweek, February 15, 1965, 18. The report refers to the song 
‘We Shall Overcome’, which became synonymous with the Civil Rights movement, especially the 
1963 March on Washington.
10 “The Negro in America”, 18.
11 For a discussion of the Civil Rights movement including its limited effect upon the issues facing 
African Americans in the urban North and West see Rhoda Lois Blumberg, Civil Rights: The 1960s 
Freedom Struggle (Massachusetts: Twayne Publishers, 1984); Claybom Carson et al, The Eyes on 
the Prize: Civil Rights Reader (New York: Penguin, 1991); Sean Dennis Cashman, African 
Americans and the Quest For Civil Rights 1900-1990 (New York: New York University Press, 
1991); Robert Cook, Sweet Land o f  Liberty? The African American Struggle For Civil Rights in the 
Twentieth Century (London: Longman, 1998); Peter B. Levy, The Civil Rights Movement
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Despite the great advances that had been made in Civil Rights, a gulf 
continued to exist between African Americans and whites. In a number of ways the 
1960s witnessed an unprecedented improvement in the socio-economic status of 
many African Americans as employment levels and incomes increased and poverty 
levels declined. African-American unemployment levels declined from a post-war 
high of 12.6% in 1959 to 8.2% in 1967.12 Between 1964 and 1969 the average
African-American family income increased from $5,921 to $8,074, increasing the
1 ^ratio between the average black and white family incomes from 54% to 61%. The 
proportion of African-American families living below the poverty level also 
declined from 48.1% in 1959 to 27.9% in 1969.14 Yet, despite these improvements, 
African Americans still trailed significantly behind whites.
Critical to the economic status of African Americans was employment. It 
determined not only purchasing power but also social status and was the ultimate 
test of participation in American society. As Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan 
stated: ". . . in America what you do is what you are: to do nothing is to be nothing; 
to do little is to be little.”15 In 1960s America the unemployment rate of African 
Americans was double that of whites. For those between 16 and 21 years it was
(Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1998); Harvard Sitkoff, The Struggle For Black Equality 1954- 
1992 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1993).
12 National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, 253.
13 Manning Marable, Race, Reform and Rebellion: The Second Reconstruction in Black America, 
1945-1990 (Mississippi: University Press o f Mississippi, 1991), 93.
14 Marable, Race, Reform and Rebellion, 93. The decline in poverty was a result o f the War on 
Poverty. For a discussion see Edward D. Berkowitz, America's Welfare State: From Roosevelt to 
Reagan (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991); David M. Chalmers, And The Crooked 
Places Made Straight: The Struggle fo r  Social Change in the 1960s (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1991); Michael B. Katz, In the Shadow o f  the Poorhouse: A Social History o f  
Welfare in America (New York: Basic Books, 1986); Matusow, The Unraveling o f  America.
15 Quoted in National Advisory Commission, 252.
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triple.16 Furthermore, African-American employment was heavily concentrated in 
low status and low paying occupations. In 1966, just 18% of African Americans 
compared with 33% of whites, were employed in white-collar occupations. Of 
these, only 9% of African Americans compared with 27% of whites were employed 
in professional, technical or managerial roles. African Americans were employed in 
blue-collar occupations at almost the same rate as whites - 39% and 40%. African 
Americans, however, were more likely to be employed in lower-level sectors, 27% 
compared with 20%. Furthermore, African Americans were three times more likely
1 7than whites to work in the service industry.
The disparity in the employment experiences of African Americans and 
whites contributed to the persistent racial gap in income and poverty levels. While 
the incomes of African Americans had been rising, they did not reach parity with 
whites. Similarly, although poverty levels had declined, the African-American 
poverty rate remained high and was significantly higher than it was for whites. In 
1966 40% of African Americans lived below the poverty level compared with 
11.9% of whites. Greater levels of education did not secure a more salient economic 
status for African Americans either. In 1966, among those who had completed high 
school, the average income of African Americans was only 73% that of whites.18 
The average income for African-American college graduates was $5,928 compared 
to the white college graduates' median income of $9,023. Education for African 
Americans was not the stepping-stone to social and economic advancement to the
16 National Advisory Commission, 253.
17 National Advisory Commission, 254.
18 National Advisory Commission, 256.
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same degree that it was for many whites. As Newsweek stated of the educated 
African American: "His reward is the final mockery."19
The continuing gap between African Americans and whites was particularly 
pronounced in the cities of the North and West. Two-thirds of African Americans 
below the poverty line made no specific economic gains during the 1960s and half
90of these lived in the central cities of the North and West. For southern African 
Americans, the urban North and West was considered to be the ‘Promised Land’. 
Since the early part of the century they had migrated in their hundreds of thousands 
to the North and West in search of a share in the promise of America. Yet, their 
destiny, as native urbanites were painfully aware, was a life alienated in socio-
• • 91economic deprivation in the ghetto. As Newsweek stated: "The rainbow ends in
99the ghetto hopelessly mired in the culture of poverty." In the North and West, 
African Americans did not suffer the oppression of the South, but they were 
repressed nonetheless. In the cities of the North and West, African Americans faced 
discrimination in housing so that segregated neighbourhoods were formed. Based 
on this geographical segregation African Americans suffered neglect and 
discrimination in the areas of public education, police protection, parks and public 
recreational facilities, water and sewage disposal, garbage collection, public health, 
and public transportation.23 The conditions of life in Northern and Western cities
19 “What Must be Done: The Cold Fact is That the Negro in America is Not Really in America”, 
Newsweek, November 20, 1967”, 28.
20 National Advisory Commission, 252.
21 See Nicholas Lemann, The Promised Land: The Great Black Migration and How it Changed 
America (London: Pan Books, 1995).
22 “What Must be Done”, 24.
23 For a discussion o f the effects o f residential segregation on the socio-economic well-being of 
African Americans see Douglas S. Massey and Nancy A. Denton, An American Apartheid: 
Segregation and the Making o f  the Underclass (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1993).
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for African Americans were heinous. In city centers over 30% of non-white 
families of two or more people lived in poverty. Over 40% of African Americans 
were officially classed as poor, yet only one-third received minimal aid. In the 
cities 29% of African Americans had substandard housing, 15% had no hot water, 
15% had to share bathrooms, and 21% had no access to a bathroom or shower.24
The deplorable socio-economic conditions of urban life, which left the 
African-American inhabitants alienated in a state of poverty, decay and desolation
25  *were a major cause of African-American urban rioting in the 1960s. While 
African Americans had long since suffered from discrimination the Civil Rights 
movement affected the way in which many responded to this. The Civil Rights 
movement instigated a revolutionary change in the psychology of African 
Americans. Both its successes and shortcomings inspired urban African Americans 
into defying the status and conditions of life imposed upon them. The revolutionary 
change in the psychology of African Americans, fuelled by the frustration and 
anger toward their situation, manifested itself in rioting. As one African American
24 “What Must be Done”, 27.
25 There is some debate concerning the exact role o f socio-economic deprivation in rioting. Some 
analysts have argued that black deprivation relative to whites was a major cause o f rioting especially 
after a reversal or slow-down in gains. See James C. Davies, “The J-Curve and Rising and Declining 
Satisfactions as a Cause o f Some Great Revolutions and a Contained Rebellion” in Graham and Gurr 
(eds.), Violence in America. Others have emphasized the failure o f socio-economic gains to 
accumulate as rapidly as rising expectations. See Thomas F. Pettigrew, Racially Separate o f  
Together? (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1971). Gurr argued that the disparity between rising 
expectations and the perceived capabilities o f African Americans was a major cause o f rioting. Tedd 
Gurr, “Urban Disorder: Perspectives From the Comparative Study o f Civil Strife” in Louis H. 
Masotti and Don R. Bowen (eds.), Riots and Rebellion (California: Sage, 1968). Other analysts 
disagreed with these relative deprivation theories. See Seymour Spilerman, “The Causes o f Racial 
Disturbances: A Comparison of Alternative Explanations”, American Sociological Review  35
(1970): 627-649;_____ , “The Causes o f Racial Disturbances: Test o f an Explanation”, American
Sociological Review 36 (1971): 427-442.
26 T. M. Tomilson, “The Development o f a Riot Ideology Among Urban Negroes”, American 
Behavioral Scientist 11.4 (1968): 27-31; Nathan Caplan, “The New Ghetto Man: A Review of 
Recent Empirical Studies”, Journal o f  Social Issues 26.1 (1970): 59-73; David O. Sears and John B.
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stated: "Done lost - been lost. Gonna be lost some more. I'm sayin' to the man: 'You 
includin' me in this game or not?' And I know his answer, so I'm gettin' ready to get 
basic."27
In addition to socio-economic conditions a major source of grievance 
among African Americans in the ghetto and a significant factor in causing a riot 
was the police force. Police-community relations were notoriously poor in the 
ghetto. To many African Americans the police force represented extensions of a 
state designed to oppress them, and incidents of police brutality were a major cause
90of hostility. The report of the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention 
of Violence stated that " . . .  for the black citizens, the policeman has long since 
ceased to be - if indeed he ever was - a neutral symbol of law and order. . . . Studies 
show that blacks perceive the police as hostile, prejudiced, and corrupt." In the 
majority of cases, the precipitating incident to a riot was an incident involving the 
police. An arrest deemed unlawful or the unnecessary use of force during an arrest 
were common incidents which served as a trigger to ignite the highly flammable
McConahay, “Racial Socialization, Comparison Levels, and the Watts Riot”, Journal o f  Social 
Issues 26.1 (1970): 121-140.
27 Quoted in “What Must be Done”, 27.
28 National Advisory Commission', Feagin and Hahn, Ghetto Revolts', Fogelson, Violence as Protest', 
Jerome H. Skolnick, The Politics o f  Protest: Task Force on Violent Aspects o f  Protest and 
Confrontation o f  the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention o f  Violence (New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 1969). In contrast, Donald L. Horowitz argues that police precipitants do not 
provide the best clue to the aetiology o f riots. Donald L. Horowitz, “Racial Violence in the United 
States” in Nathan Glazer and Ken Youngs (eds.), Ethnic Pluralism and Public Policy: Achieving 
Equality in the United States and Britain (Aldershot: Gower, 1986).
29 The Black Panther Party was originally formed as a patrol group in response to police brutality in 
Oakland, California in 1966. See Philip S. Foner (ed.), The Black Panthers Speak (New York: Da 
Capo Press, 1995).
30 Skolnick, The Politics o f  Protest, 152.
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conditions of the ghetto.31 To African Americans, such incidents with the police 
were symbolic of their oppression in America. The riot in Harlem was triggered by 
such an event. An African-American youth was shot dead because, in the words of 
one Harlem resident: ". . . he was black". For many African Americans the 
shooting reiterated how wretched their status was in American society.
Harlem contained all of the qualities of a ghetto waiting to revolt. One- 
quarter of African-American males were unemployed. The average family income 
was $3,480 per annum compared with a city average of $5,103. An essay in 
Newsweek illustrated the deplorable conditions of life for Harlem residents:
His house is old, and crumbling, rat-ridden, so desperately 
overcrowded that - at the density rate of parts of Harlem - the entire 
U.S. population could be squeezed into three of New York City's five 
boroughs. Garbage festers uncollected on the sidewalks; building 
codes go unenforced; the streets are not paved in parts of Harlem's 
black quarter.34
For inhabitants of Harlem, it was brutally plain how little the African American was 
valued in American society. African Americans were painfully aware of the 
disparity between African-American and white life experiences. The limited contact 
with mainstream America reiterated to African Americans how inferior their 
condition was in American life and served to fuel the sense of frustration and anger. 
As Newsweek stated: "Harlem's people grow full of anger at the only white men
31 The integral role of immediate precipitants to riots was first comprehensively examined in Stanley 
Lieberson and Arnold R. Silverman, “The Precipitants and Underlying Conditions o f Race Riots”, 
American Sociological Review 30 (1965): 887-898.
32 Quoted in “What Must be Done”, 28.
33 “Harlem: Hatred in the Street”, Newsweek, August 3, 1964, 12.
34 “What Must be Done”, 25.
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they see: the shopkeepers, the rent collectors, the salesmen, the racketeers, and most 
of all, the cops - who seem, to Harlem, less a protective force than an occupying
•7 c
army." It was to white life experiences that African Americans compared their 
own. As Sondra Silverman articulated:
It is no excuse to argue that, relative to the conditions of the poor in 
other countries, the American poor (Negroes as well as whites) are 
well off. American Negroes orient themselves to white groups who 
they regard as affluent, not to the poverty stricken groups in Nigeria,
O/T
India or Costa Rica.
The Harlem riot left one dead, 141 seriously injured and property losses went into 
hundreds of thousands of dollars.
If there was any doubt that Harlem marked the beginning of a nationwide 
phenomenon, the riot in the African-American district of Watts, Los Angeles in 
1965 removed it. On appearances Watts, with its lawns, trees and single-family 
houses, seemed a world apart from the deteriorating, overcrowded tenements of 
Harlem. Yet, the same underlying conditions of poverty, decay and alienation were 
present. As Newsweek reported: "The neighbourhood's roomy look conceals all the 
festering discontents of the classic black casbah." One-quarter of homes in Watts 
were officially dilapidated, unemployment stood at 34% and those who were 
employed were in menial and low-paid work, and nearly one-quarter lived below 
the poverty line. As in other ghettos, the youth were hardest hit. Watts, like any
35 “Harlem: Hatred in the Street”, 15.
36 Sondra Silverman, “The Point of America’s Riots”, New Society, July 20, 1967, 92.
37 Denis E. Gale, Understanding Urban Unrest: From Reverend King to Rodney King (California: 
Sage, 1996), 17.
38 “Los Angeles: The Fire This Time”, Newsweek, August 23, 1965, 15.
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other ghetto, was a world of seemingly doomed youth. One-third came from 
broken homes, half did not have a completed high school education and 
unemployment was high.39 As in Harlem, the Watts riot was precipitated by an 
incident involving the police. The arrest of an African-American youth and two 
members of his family triggered the worst riot the nation had witnessed in decades. 
The riot left 34 dead and over 1,000 injured.40
The phenomenon of urban rioting continued year after year and culminated 
in what was regarded as the worst summer of violent protest in 1967.41 Of all the 
riots that year, and indeed previous years, that of Detroit was the most destructive. 
Detroit in fact was probably the bloodiest uprising in half a century. The riot left 43 
dead and over 1,000 injured.42 It was also the most costly of riots in U.S. history. 
Five thousand were left homeless, 2,700 businesses were sacked and damage 
estimates reached $500 million. Time also pointed out that Detroit surpassed other 
riots in a more fundamental way: " . . .  for here was the most sensational expression 
of an ugly mood of nihilism and anarchy that has ever gripped a small but 
significant segment of America's Negro minority."43 Throughout the 1960s African 
Americans had grown increasingly frustrated and impatient with the pace of change
39 “After the Blood Bath”, Newsweek, August 30, 1965, 14-15.
40 Violence in the City - An End or a Beginning? A Report By The Governor’s Commission on the 
Los Angeles Riots (Los Angeles: Jeffries Banknote Co., 1965), 1. Hereafter cited as McCone Report. 
Comprehensive accounts o f the Watts riot are provided by Jerry Cohen and William S. Murphy, 
Burn, Baby, Burn!: The Los Angeles Race Riot August 1965 (New York: Dutton, 1966); Robert 
Conot, Rivers o f  Blood, Years o f  Darkness (New York: William Morrow and Co., 1968); Gerald 
Home, Fire This Time: The Watts Uprising and the 1960s (New York: Da Capo Press, 1997).
41 The rioting o f 1967 prompted President Lyndon Johnson in July o f that year to appoint the 
National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, headed by Illinois Governor, Otto Kemer.
42 Fogelson, Violence as Protest, 4. For a discussion of the Detroit riot see Sidney Fine, Violence in 
the Model City: The Cavanagh Administration, Race Relations, and the Detroit Riot o f 1967 (Ann 
Arbor: University o f Michigan Press, 1989).
43 “Cities: The Fire This Time”, Time, August 5, 1967, 13.
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in America. They were increasingly pessimistic about white Americans' capacity to 
change and solve the racial dilemma. Time stated of Detroit: ". . . it is fed by a deep 
sense of nihilism that many Negroes have begun to tap. They have despaired finally 
. . .  of hope in white America."44
While most African Americans remained generally optimistic, as the decade 
advanced, high expectations were increasingly unrealised and African Americans 
became increasingly impatient with the pace of change. By 1969, 59% of African 
Americans thought the pace of progress was too slow, compared with 43% in
1966.45 The realities of the continuing gulf between whites and African Americans 
took its toll in other ways also. A Gallup poll in 1969 disclosed small but real 
increases in nearly every index of bitterness and despair. According to the poll, one- 
fifth of African Americans regarded the situation of race relations and the disparity 
between whites and African Americans so beyond hope that they favoured the 
establishment of a separate African-American nation within America. Sixty-nine 
percent of African Americans, up 15% since 1966, regarded whites in general to be 
either hostile or indifferent to the racial situation. Only 25% of African Americans 
believed that federal government was helpful to Civil Rights, compared to 74% in
1966.46
44 “Cities: The Fire This Time”, 18.
45 “Report From Black America”, Newsweek, June 30, 1969, 13.
46 “Report From Black America”, 13, 16. The dramatic decline in belief in the federal government 
was probably a reflection o f African-American opinion o f Nixon. The increasing pessimism  
amongst African Americans and the continuing urban violence paralleled the growing militancy 
within the Civil Rights movement and the increased rejection o f the strategy o f non-violence and the 
increased appeal of Black Power. See Thomas L. Blair, Retreat to the Ghetto: The End o f  a Dream 
(London: Wildwood House, 1977); Stokely Carmichael and Charles V. Hamilton, Black Power: The 
Politics o f  Liberation in Urban America (London: Cape, 1968); George M. Fredrickson, Black 
Liberation: A Comparative History o f  Black Ideologies in the United States and South Africa 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); Vincent Harding, “Black Radicalism: The Road From
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As the years passed, a significant proportion of African Americans 
increasingly regarded rioting as the best means of achieving complete racial 
equality in America. A survey of residents of Bedford-Stuyvesant, where rioting 
had spread from Harlem in 1964, found that 27% of African Americans believed 
that the rioting had been good for Civil Rights.47 A similar study of residents in 
Watts in 1965 found that 38% of African Americans believed that the violence
AQ
there had advanced the cause of Civil Rights. According to a national survey of 
attitudes towards rioting in 1966, 34% of African Americans believed that rioting 
had helped Civil Rights.49 A survey of national opinion in 1969 found the 
proportion had increased to 40%.50
Despite the perception held by many whites, and that portrayed by much of 
the media, the riots were not mindless acts of destruction and violence, instigated 
by frustrated and unemployed youths, criminals, or outside agitators.51 As Fogelson 
stated in his study of the 1960s riots:
Montgommery” in Alfred F. Young (ed.), Dissent: Explorations in the History o f  American 
Radicalism (Dekalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1968); Julius Lester, Look Out Whitey! 
Black Power Gon ’ Get Your Mama! (New York: Allison and Busby, 1968); Nathan Wright Jr.,
Black Power and Urban Unrest: Creative Possibilities (New York: Hawthorne Books, 1967).
47 Joe R. Feagin and Paul B. Sheatsley, “Ghetto Resident Appraisals o f a Riot”, Public Opinion 
Quarterly 38 (1968): 358. Sixty-one percent said the rioting had been harmful to Civil Rights.
48 David O. Sears and T. M. Tomilson, “Riot Ideology in Los Angeles: A Study o f  Negro Attitudes”, 
Social Science Quarterly 49.3 (1968): 490. Twenty percent said the violence had been harmful and 
30% said it made no difference either way.
49 William Brink and Louis Harris, Black and White: A Study o f  U.S. Racial Attitudes Today (New 
York: Simon and Schuster, 1967), 264-5. Twenty-percent thought that rioting had not been helpful 
to the cause and 46% were undecided or did not know.
50 “Report From Black America”, 17. Twenty-nine percent thought the rioting had been harmful.
51 Numerous public officials, including the Mayor of New York following the Harlem riot, 1964, 
and many members of the public attributed the rioting to outside agitators such as Communists or 
other radicals. The ‘riffraff and ‘wild youngster’ theories were first given prominence by an FBI 
report to Johnson in 1964, which gained national newspaper attention. Feagin and Hahn, Ghetto 
Violence, Chapter 1; “Harlem: Hatred in the Street”, 15. The McCone Report also claimed that the 
riot in Watts was a meaningless outburst by marginal people. The report was widely criticized. See 
Robert M. Fogelson (ed.), Mass Violence in America: The Los Angeles Riots (New York: Amo Press 
and the New York Times, 1969). E.C. Banfield in The Unheavenly City Revisited (Boston: Little,
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The black rioters were not primarily the unemployed, ill-educated, 
uprooted, and criminal. They were rather a substantial and 
representative minority of the young adults which was widely 
supported in the ghettos.. .  . The riots were articulate protests against 
genuine grievances in the black ghettos. The riots were protests 
because they were attempts to call the attention of white society to 
the blacks’ widespread dissatisfaction with racial subordination and 
segregation. The riots were also articulate because they were 
restrained, selective, and no less important, directed at the sources of 
blacks’ most immediate and profound grievances.52
The Civil Rights movement had a considerably limited effect on the lives of 
African Americans of the ghetto. It had, however, instilled a sense of pride and 
determination to break those limits. The African-American urban riots were 
manifestations of an empowered people unwilling to accept their inferior lot in life 
and who increasingly regarded direct and violent action as the only means of protest 
available.
The African-American urban riots of the 1960s were a product of specific 
causal factors which had racism at their roots. Riots were caused by myriad social, 
political and economic shortcomings suffered in the African-American ghettos of 
the nation's cities. These shortcomings were no longer passively accepted by an 
African-American population who had and were undergoing revolutionary changes 
in their self-perception and their comprehension of the American order and their
Brown, 1974) concluded that the rioters in Harlem, Watts and Detroit were primarily propelled by 
excitement and pillage.
52 Fogelson, Violence as Protest, 16, 24. The Kerner Report also documented that a typical rioter in 
1967 was bom in the state and was a life-long resident o f the city in which the riot took place. 
Economically his position was about the same as non-rioters although he was slightly better 
educated and substantially better informed about politics. See also Caplan, “The New Ghetto Man”; 
Nathan S. Caplan and Jeffrey M. Paige, “A Study of Ghetto Rioters”, Scientific American 219 
(1968): 15-21; David O. Sears and John. B. McConahay, The Politics o f  Violence: The New Urban 
Blacks and the Watts Riot (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1973). The Kerner Report also documented 
that the rioting was almost routinely and systematically directed against local symbols o f white 
American society, authority and prosperity in black neighborhoods.
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place within it. However, the position of the African-American urban riots of the 
1960s in the causal network of changing race relations during the late 1960s and 
early 1970s is not as straightforward as to warrant a belief in a simple cause and 
effect relationship between the deplorable African-American situation and rioting. 
As Donald L. Horowitz stated:
Things happen as a result of riots, as a result of efforts to make them 
subside, and as a result of efforts to prevent their occurrence. The 
consequences of the riots have further implications for the future of 
ethnic and racial relations and for the social and political systems in 
which these relations were embedded.
Although riots were a product of the inequalities in American life, riots were also a 
vital component in the transition of America's racial ideology and discourse on race 
during the late 1960s and early 1970s which saw the emergence of a new covert 
racism. Urban rioting forced America to acknowledge the African-American urban 
situation. As one observer of Harlem stated: "Course now, I ain't sayin' I like what 
these kids are doin', but I don't dislike it either. They gettin' more action than the 
politician, the speechmaker on the comers, the social workers, and all the rest of 
them put together."54 Yet the attention received, ultimately, in one sense at least, did 
little to help the problem of racial inequality and division for African Americans.
53 Horowitz, “Racial Violence in the United States”, 88.
54 Quoted in “Harlem: Hatred in the Street”, 16.
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2.2 White America: The Politics of Reaction
White American racial attitudes underwent a revolutionary change between 
the 1940s and 1960s. By the 1960s the situation of race relations in America 
seemed overwhelmingly optimistic.55 However, by the middle of the decade the 
persistence of mass rioting helped produce an important change in white racial 
attitudes. The rioting contributed to the growth of a reactionary public opinion. 
While progressives kept the faith in Civil Rights despite the riots, the larger section 
of white opinion, which had broadly supported Civil Rights, reacted against the 
riots. Nixon was able to manipulate and capitalise upon the conservative shift in 
public opinion, through the use of coded racial appeals to white voters, to return the 
Republican Party to the White House in 1968.
By the 1960s race relations had improved dramatically, with an upward 
trend recorded in white racial attitudes since the 1940s by the major research 
organisations. The National Opinion Research Center (NORC), for example, 
reported a steady decline in the verbal expression of anti-black prejudice, and a 
reduction in support of racial discrimination and segregation, the chief tools in the 
pre-Civil Rights period for the repression of African Americans. According to 
NORC data, in 1942 just 30% of whites polled believed that white and African- 
American students should attend the same schools. This figure had increased to
55 Paul Sheatsley, “White Attitudes Towards the Negro”, Daedalus 95 (1966): 217-238. See also 
Howard Schuman, Charlotte Steeh, Lawrence Bobo, Racial Attitudes in America: Trends and 
Interpretations (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1985); Garth D. Taylor, PaulB. Sheatsley 
and Andrew M. Greenley, “Attitudes Toward Racial Integration”, Scientific American 238 (1978): 
42-51; David T. Wellman, Portraits o f  White Racism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1993).
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61% in 1956 and to 73% in 1963.56 Similarly, in 1942 only 35% of whites stated 
that they would not object to having an African-American neighbor of the same
cn
class. The proportion increased to 51% in 1956 and to 61% in 1963. By the early 
to mid-1960s, most whites were convinced of the injustice of African-American 
subordination. This attitude was expressed in public opinion polls, and in the media. 
A Time essay labeled this period as one in which the larger section of white 
Americans stood on the side of justice and democracy and was committed to 
helping the African-American cause. Time stated of white attitudes: “Now there is 
widespread evidence that the white American conscience is, more intensely than 
ever, asking: 'what can I do?'"58
Generally speaking, most white Americans were perplexed at the emergence 
of black militancy played out in violent rioting in American cities, not least 
President Lyndon Johnson.59 They pointed to the unprecedented progress made by 
African Americans in the past decade. They stressed that African Americans shared 
in the nation's wealth and influenced its decisions more in the 1960s than ever 
before. As urbanologist Denis E. Gale stated: "From the perspective of many
whites, there were signs that the cup was at least half full."60 As has been noted,
however, these advances were not absolute. Generally speaking, most of the gains 
achieved had been made by the black middle-class, which only constituted a small 
proportion of the African-American population as a whole. The larger segment of
56 Sheatsley, “White Attitudes Towards the Negro”, 219.
57 Sheatsley, “White Attitudes Towards the Negro”, 222.
58 “Time Essay: What Can I do?”, Time, May 17, 1968, 28.
59 Fogelson, Violence as Protest, 13.
60 Gale, Understanding Urban Unrest, 20.
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the population were left behind, a significant proportion of whom were left to live 
below the government poverty line, trapped in urban ghettos. Yet, whites were 
quick to assert that most of the government's new anti-poverty programs were 
directed at this particular section of the population, often at the expense of poor 
whites. As one white American stated: "The Negro's needs must be met. But when 
you put the Negro into a special and privileged position, you're not making him 
equal. You're giving him rights that even the whites don't have."61 Many whites also 
pointed to the effort and changes they had made in themselves toward African 
Americans. At no other time was there so strong a commitment to eradicate racial 
subordination as there was in the 1960s.
The mass occurrence of rioting across the country and its seemingly 
uncontrollable escalation sent shock-waves throughout white America. Media 
coverage brought the phenomenon into the living rooms of white America. This 
would prove to have an effect on white opinions of the race issue in the same way 
that the violence upon women and children in the South portrayed by television had 
during the early Civil Rights drive. National opinion polls demonstrated the effect 
continuous rioting had upon white attitudes towards the African-American 
situation. A Harris survey in 1963 reported that 49% of whites felt antagonism
61 Quoted in “The Changing Mood of America”, U.S. News & World Report, July 29, 1963, 38. The 
War on Poverty was not aimed overtly at African Americans. That African Americans benefited 
more than whites was a consequence o f the fact that a greater proportion of African Americans lived 
below the poverty line. James W. Button, Black Violence: Political Impact o f  the 1960s Riots (New  
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1978); Cook, Sweet Land o f  Liberty?', Maurice Isserman and 
Michael Kazin, America Divided: The Civil War o f  the 1960s (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2000).
62 James A. Geschwender, “Civil Rights Protests and Riots: A Disappearing Distinction”, Social 
Science Quarterly 4 9 3  (1968): 474-484.
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toward Civil Rights demonstrations. By June 1966 the figure had risen to 63% and 
by October 1966, it had increased to 85%.63 Harris also reported that the number of 
whites who felt that demonstrations had helped the African-American cause 
declined from 51% in June 1963 to 31% in June 1966 and to 15% in October of that 
year.64 In 1967, 88% of whites polled stated that they felt that rioting had hurt the 
Civil Rights cause.65
A major factor in the dilution of sympathy for the African-American cause 
was the different perception the majority of whites held towards the riots. Only a 
small minority of whites fully empathised with the rioters. While the majority of 
both whites and African Americans disagreed with rioting, the level of white 
disapproval was higher than it was for African Americans.66 Moreover, whites, in 
general, comprehended little of the significance of the rioting as understood by 
many African Americans. Whites were far more likely than African Americans to 
attribute the riots to the work of outside agitators. A Harris poll in 1967 showed that 
45% of whites cited outside agitation as one of the three main causes of riots, 
compared to 10% of African Americans. Whites were much less likely to attribute 
rioting to socio-economic conditions or to prejudice. According to the Harris poll, 
16% of whites cited prejudice or bad treatment as one of the three main causes of 
rioting, compared to 36% of African Americans, 14% cited ghetto conditions
63 Seymour M. Lipset, “The U.S. Backlash at the Polls”, New Society, November 3, 1966, 690-691.
64 Hazel Erskine, “The Polls: Demonstrations and Race Riots”, Public Opinion Quarterly 31 (1967): 
659. The further decline between June and October highlights the effects o f that summer’s rioting on 
white opinion.
65 Erskine, “Demonstrations and Race Riots”, 662.
66 Brink and Harris, Black and White; Feagin and Sheatsley, “Ghetto Resident Appraisals o f a Riot”; 
Sears and Tomilson, “Riot Ideology in Los Angeles”: 485-503.
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compared to 28% of African Americans and 10% cited lack of jobs or unfair 
employment, compared to 29% of African Americans. Whites were also far less
/TO
likely to blame police brutality for the rioting - 8% compared to 49%.
As rioting escalated, in fact, many whites expressed increasing sympathy 
with the police. The number of people who believed that charges of police brutality 
were untrue rose from 58% in 1966 to 68% in 1967.69 Many whites also expressed 
hardline attitudes when questioned about police response to rioters. A Harris Poll in 
August 1967 asked whether, in light of the number of rioters killed by police 
gunfire that summer, looters should be shot or not: 62% of whites stated that they
7 0should. When a Gallup poll asked what could be done to prevent riots from 
developing the top two answers among whites were to institute stronger repressive 
measures and to find and punish outside agitators or groups responsible.71 Perhaps 
the strongest indicator of public feeling in favour of the police came with the 
reaction to the Chicago riot, 1968. Even when the National Commission on the 
Causes and Prevention of Violence concluded that police involved in the riot acted 
without restraint and exerted force beyond that necessary under the circumstances, 
Time reported that public opinion had been with the police: "A majority of
67 Erskine, “Demonstrations and Race Riots”, 665.
68 Erskine, “Demonstrations and Race Riots”, 666. The disparity between African-American and 
white perceptions o f the causes o f the riots was also reflected in the Beford-Stuyvesant survey. 
Feagin and Sheatsley, “Ghetto Resident Appraisals o f a Riot”, 352-362. The disparity was also 
found in a survey of residents o f post-riot Detroit. Feagin and Hahn, Ghetto Revolts, Chapter 6. See 
also Harlan Hahn and Joe R. Feagin, “Rank and File Versus Congressional Perceptions of Ghetto 
Riots”, Social Science Quarterly 51.2 (1970): 361-373. Feagin and Sheatsley explain the white 
tendency to blame outside agitators for the riots as a result o f the need of many white Americans to 
make sense o f events they find difficult to reconcile.
69 Erskine, “Demonstrations and Race Riots”, 667.
70 Erskine, “Demonstrations and Race Riots”, 674. Twenty-seven percent o f African Americans 
agreed.
71 Erskine, “Demonstrations and Race Riots”, 675.
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Americans believed that, given the provocation and the tense situation they
72encountered, Chicago's police had struck a notable blow for law and order."
By the end of the decade, law and order had become one of the most 
important factors for the mass of white Americans regarding urban violence. A 
Gallup survey in February 1968 reported that crime had become the nation’s most
• * H'Xpressing domestic concern for the first time in polling history. Time stated: "Law 
and order now looms as the number one issue of 1968, even overshadowing a war 
that keeps more than 500,000 American servicemen in South East Asia."74 The 
scale of rioting had taken its toll on the patience and attitudes of the mass of whites 
toward race relations and the progress of African Americans. White Americans 
increasingly expressed the opinion that the onus for progress and an alleviation of 
poverty was on African Americans themselves. As a U.S. News and World Report 
stated: "We should not pick out one group and say they have special rights. . . .  No 
special privileges are due to Negroes. We've all had to work our way up. This is the 
American way of doing things."75A survey by Gallup in 1969 showed that 73% of 
whites believed that African Americans could do something about the conditions in 
ghettos themselves.76 By the end of the decade, many white Americans increasingly 
expressed concern that African Americans were receiving preferential treatment at
72 “Chicago Examined: Anatomy o f a Police Riot”, Time, December 6 1968, 20; Skolnik, The 
Politics o f  Protest: Chapter 7; John P. Robinson, “Public Reaction to Political Protest: Chicago”, 
Public Opinion Quarterly 34 (1968): 1-9. For a discussion of the Chicago riot o f 1968 see David 
Faber, Chicago ’68 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988).
73 Richard M. Scammon and Benjamin J. Wattenberg, The Real Majority: An Extraordinary 
Examination o f  the American Electorate (New York: Capricorn, 1971), 94.
74 “The Overshadowing Issue”, Time, August 2, 1968, 10.
75 “The Changing Mood in America”, U.S. News & World Report, May 13, 1965, 43.
76 “The Troubled American: A Special Report on the White Majority”, Newsweek, May 13, 1965,
43.
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the expense of whites. As one white reported in Newsweek'. "I see the Negro
* 7 7  •stepping on my rights. He is asking for more than is justifiably his." According to 
many white Americans, in the same way that African Americans should not be 
subjected to privileged treatment regarding social and economic advancement, so 
too should they be equally accountable to the law. Violent and destructive 
lawlessness should not be tolerated or regarded as justified reaction to the 
conditions of urban life. Charles S. Hyneman, a professor at Indiana University, 
summed up the feelings of many whites when he stated:
We have fallen into a mood of acceptance of 'protest' as being good 
in itself. Because the Negro has a just cause, it is assumed disorders 
he creates should be excused no matter the extent of disruption to a 
city or even a nation. Ordinary duties of citizenship are supposed not
no
to apply to him.
The presidential election of 1968 symbolised the change that was occurring 
in white racial attitudes. The issue of law and order proved to be one of the 
dominant themes, and Richard Nixon proved to be the candidate whom voters saw
70as the strong law and order man who as president would act decisively. Following 
the release of the Kerner Commission report Nixon had criticised its “. . . undue 
emphasis on the role of white racists” and its . . failure to indict the perpetrators
o/\
of the riots themselves”. Nixon had also chosen Spiro Agnew as his running mate. 
The Maryland governor was noted for his advice to shoot urban rioters.
77 Quoted “The Troubled American”, 28.
78 Quoted in “Anarchy: Growing Threat to Big Cities”, U.S. News & World Report, August 7, 1967, 
29.
79 Scammon and Wattenberg, The Real Majority, 167.
80 Richard Nixon quoted in Button, Black Violence, A1.
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Furthermore, reflecting (and capitalising upon) growing dissent towards Great 
Society programs, in a nationwide CBS broadcast in 1968, Nixon advocated the 
termination of federal aid to the ghetto and charged that a return to the age-old 
values of individualism and private enterprise was the best means of alleviating the 
socio-economic deprivation of African Americans. Nixon declared: “The ghettos of 
our cities will be remade when the people in them have the will, the power, the 
resources to and the skills to remake them. They won’t be remade by Government 
billions. We have to get private enterprise into the ghetto.” In this manner, Nixon 
sought to ‘save’ black America from the “. . .  dismal cycle of dependency” and ..
* R 1to bring to the ghetto the light of hope, and pride and self-respect.” The American 
public saw in Nixon the guiding force that would return American society back to 
one based upon equality and individualism where African Americans would not be 
granted 'special privileges' to defy the law and riot, or have preferential treatment
O '}
that discriminated against whites.
The election of Nixon to office by the American public in 1968 heralded the 
massive defection of the white electorate from the liberal politics of the Kennedy-
RTJohnson era. Less than 35% of whites voted for the Democratic presidential
81 Nixon quoted in “Nixon on Racial Accommodation” Time, May 3, 1968, 19. For a discussion of 
political response to the urban riots under Johnson, and how it was affected by public dissent, see 
Button, Black Violence', Feagin and Hahn, Ghetto Revolts', Gale, Understanding Urban Unrest.
82 For a discussion o f the issues of the 1968 presidential election see Kathleen Hall Jamieson, 
Packaging the Presidency: A History and Criticism o f  Presidential Campaign Advertising (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1996); Lewis Chester, Godfrey Hodgson, Bruce Page, An American 
Melodrama: The Presidential Campaign o f 1968 (London: Deutsch, 1969); Joe McGinnis, The 
Selling o f  the President (London: Deutsch, 1969); Theodore H. White, The Making o f  the President 
1968 (London: Cape, 1969).
83 Many issues contributed to the conservative shift amongst American voters, not least the Vietnam 
War. For a discussion o f the social and political changes during the 1960s see William H. Chafe 
(ed.), The Unfinished Journey: America Since World War II (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1991); Heale, The Sixties in America', Matusow, The Unraveling o f  America', Miller, On Our Own;
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8 Acandidate, Hubert Humphrey. Nixon’s success was in aligning himself with the 
‘Forgotten Americans’, winning their vote by covertly exploiting racial divisions 
and tensions. As Kenneth O’Reilly stated: “Echoing Barry Goldwater’s failed 
southern strategy of 1964, Nixon redefined liberalism as an elitist ideology that 
called for the casting out of whites from the middle class to make room for blacks.” 
Nixon also charged that the liberal reforms of the Democrats had created the 
problems of urban rioting, drugs, illegitimate births, welfare fraud, street crime - all 
paid for by white middle class tax dollars.85 Learning from Goldwater’s mistakes in 
1964, however, Nixon avoided moving too far to the right of the Democrats, which 
would alienate moderates.86 The key, therefore, lay in sympathising with and
• 87appealing to the fears of angry whites without appearing extremist. An effective 
method of doing this was the use of coded language. As Nixon aide, John
Ehrlichman, explained, it meant the voter could “avoid admitting to himself that he
• 88 was attracted by a racist appeal.”
Edward P. Morgan, The 60s Experience: Hard Lessons About Modern America (Philadelphia: 
Temple University Press, 1991).
84 In contrast 97% of black voters supported Humphrey. Matusow, The Unraveling o f  America, 438.
85 O’Reilly, Nixon’s Piano, 280. Earl Black and Merle Black, The Vital South: How Presidents Are 
Elected (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1992); Carter, From George Wallace to Newt 
Gingrich-, Bruce H. Kalk, “Wormley’s Hotel Revisited: Richard Nixon’s Southern Strategy and the 
End o f the Second Reconstruction”, North Carolina Historical Review  71.1 (1994): 85-105; John R. 
Murphy and Harold S. Gulliver, The Southern Strategy (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1971); 
Hugh Davis Graham, “Richard Nixon and Civil Rights: Explaining an Enigma”, Presidential Studies 
Quarterly 26.1 (1996): 93-105; Kevin P. Phillips, The Emerging Republican Majority (New York: 
Anchor Books, 1970); Scammon and Wattenberg, The Real Majority.
86 Nixon wanted to avoid running a divisive presidential campaign because, in 1968 at least, he had 
great ambitions for his presidency in domestic as well as foreign affairs and a bitter campaign might 
make this task more difficult. Carter, From George Wallace to Newt Gingrich.
87 At the same time, however, Nixon had to try to offset his greatest threat in the South, George 
Wallace. In this endeavour, he was only partially successful. Wallace polled nearly 10 million votes 
and took five southern states - the best showing by a third-party candidate since Robert M. La 
Follette in 1924. Carter, From George Wallace to Newt Gingrich, 35.
88 Quoted in Carter, From George Wallace to Newt Gingrich, 30. See also O’Reilly, Nixon’s Piano.
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While a significant few were consciously attracted to the racial messages in 
Nixon’s rhetoric, for the majority of Nixon’s followers there was no overt racist 
appeal. The election of Nixon, however, marked a massive backlash in the racial 
attitudes of many white Americans. The Nixon soundbites - like all soundbites - 
keyed into deeper values which at this time were inimical to black needs. The calls 
for Taw and order’, ‘equality’ and ‘individualism’ thus became, in the words of one 
African American, "another way to shout Nigger."
The report of the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of 
Violence stated that, despite rioting, there had not been an overall white backlash in 
the sense of a total reversal of attitudes on the part of whites. Those whites who 
were committed to the goals of equality prior to the escalation of rioting were just 
as committed by the late 1960s. The report also concluded that the trend toward 
greater acceptance of interracial goals by whites had merely slowed by the late 
1960s and that a tentative acceptance of goals coupled with a rejection of the means 
employed had long characterised white attitudes. Similarly, a study by Michael 
Ross at the University of California at Santa Barbara concluded that the case for a 
reversal in attitudes was based upon an increase in opposition to the pace of social 
change, but data demonstrated that reaction to racial issues depended on current 
events and current opinion toward the current administration and was independent 
of racial issues themselves.90 The suggestion seemed to be that despite rioting, a 
reversal or regression in racial attitudes and behaviour did not emerge by the late
89 Quoted in “Politics: The Turning Point”, Time, October 7, 1966, 2.
90 Skolnik, The Politics o f  Protest, Chapter 5.
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1960s and early 1970s.91 Any expression or actions against the African-American 
situation was not an expression of revised racism. Or so some believed.
African-American urban rioting did have a negative effect on white racial 
attitudes. What characterised the backlash in white racial attitudes in the late 1960s 
and early 1970s was its apparent aracial nature. White attitudes toward the African- 
American situation appeared on the surface to remain committed to the Civil Rights 
objectives and values. White opposition was disguised under a moral and 
American tone. The backlash against African Americans deemed itself to be simply 
a reaction against intolerable issues in a democratic society, namely the criminality 
of rioting, the rewarding of rioters and the privileged elevation of African
09 •Americans at the expense of other Americans. For the majority of whites, there
91 See also Taylor, Sheatsley and Greely, “Attitudes Toward Racial Integration”, 42-51; John G. 
Condran, “Changes in White Attitudes Towards Blacks: 1963-1977”, Public Opinion Quarterly 43 
(1979): 463-476. Condran argues that there was no reversal in liberal attitudes before 1972.
92 Donald R. Kinder and David O. Sears, “Prejudice and Politics: Symbolic Racism Versus Racial 
Threats to the Good Life”, Journal o f  Personality and Social Psychology 40 (1981): 414-31; Donald 
R. Kinder, “The Continuing American Dilemma: White Resistance to Racial Change 40 Years After 
Myrdal”, Journal o f  Social Issues 42.2 (1986): 152, Donald R. Kinder and Tali Mendelberg, 
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David O. Sears et al, Racialized Politics', Donald R. Kinder and Lynn M. Sanders, Divided By 
Color: Racial Politics and Democratic Ideals (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1996); John B. 
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Louisville: Is It the Buses or the Blacks?”, The Journal o f  Politics 44 (1982): 692-720; John B. 
McConahay, “Modem Racism, Ambivalence, and the Modem Racism Scale” in John F. Dovidio 
and Samuel L. Gaertner (eds.), Prejudice, Discrimination, and Racism (Orlando: Academic Press, 
1986); John B. McConahay and Joseph C. Hough, “Symbolic Racism”, Journal o f  Social Issues 32.2 
(1976): 23-45; David O. Sears, “Symbolic Racism” in Phyllis A. Katz and Dalmas A. Taylor (eds.), 
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Carolyn L. Funk, “The Role o f Self-Interest in Social and Political Attitudes”, Advances in 
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was no conscious racial animus involved in this reactionary shift in attitudes. Yet, 
many whites became the unwitting supporters of racism through their racial 
conservatism.
White racial attitudes had undergone enormous change by the 1960s, yet it 
is the change that occurred in attitudes in the late 1960s and early 1970s that is of 
greatest importance in African-American and race history. This was a period of 
transition of monumental importance in white racial attitudes and African- 
American urban rioting was a key feature. A large proportion of whites did not 
share the same perception as African Americans of the realities of ghetto life and 
the African-American urban situation, and reacted negatively to urban protest. The 
exploitation of this conservative shift by Nixon through the use of coded racial 
politics was a component in the transition of racial ideology and discourse on race 
which ensured the maintenance of racism in a rearticulated, coded form.
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CHAPTER 3
Nixon and Law and Order:
The Attica Prison Riot, 1971
3.1 The Nixon Presidency: 1969 - 1974
In the 1968 presidential election Richard Nixon successfully manipulated 
the growing reactionary opinion of a significant proportion of white Americans to 
gain political success. 1968 heralded the beginning of a conservative ascendancy in 
American politics and society along with the beginnings of a new political 
realignment in which race was a definitive feature. Moreover, the 1968 election was 
also a component and symbol of the transition of racism into coded form.1 The 
previous chapter illustrated how Nixon used the issue of law and order, as part of
1 Earl Black and Merle Black, Politics and Society in the South (Massachusetts: Harvard University
Press, 1987);_____ , The Vital South: How Presidents are Elected (Massachusetts: Harvard
University Press, 1992); Dan T. Carter, From George Wallace to Newt Gingrich: Race in the 
Conservative Counterrevolution, 1963-1994 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1996); 
Thomas B. Edsall and Mary D. Edsall, Chain Reaction: The Impact o f  Race, Rights and Taxes on 
the American Politics (New York: Norton, 1991); Hugh Davis Graham, “Richard Nixon and Civil 
Rights: Explaining an Enigma”, Presidential Studies Quarterly 26.1 (1996): 93-105; Bruce H. Kalk, 
“Wormley’s Hotel Revisited: Richard Nixon’s Southern Strategy and the End of the Second 
Reconstruction”, North Carolina Historical Review 71.1 (1994): 85-105; Joe McGinniss, The Selling 
o f  the President 1968 (London: Andre Deutsch, 1970); John R. Murphy and Harold S. Gulliver, The 
Southern Strategy (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1971); Kenneth O’Reilly, Nixon’s Piano: 
Presidents and Racial Politics From Washington to Clinton (New York: Free Press, 1995); Kevin P. 
Philips, The Emerging Republican Majority (New York: Anchor Books, 1970); Michael Omi and 
Howard Winant, Racial Formation in the United States: From the 1960s to the 1990s (New York: 
Routledge, 1994); Kenneth O’Reilly, Nixon’s Piano: Presidents and Racial Politics From 
Washington to Clinton (New York: Free Press, 1995); Richard M. Scammon and Ben J. Wattenberg, 
The Real Majority: An Extraordinary Examination o f  the American Electorate (New York: Coward, 
McGann and Geoghegan Inc., 1971).
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his wider electoral strategy, to win white votes. This chapter, through the method of 
discourse analysis, will examine how Nixon used law and order as a coded racial 
political issue throughout his presidency. Then, through an analysis of public 
discourse in relation to law and order surrounding the Attica prison riot, 1971, it 
will examine how law and order is reproduced as a coded racial issue within 
American society. The chapter will illustrate the feelings and beliefs Nixon tapped 
into and legitimised with his law and order discourse, including the racial 
sentiments that his discourse manipulated and capitalised upon.2
The pre-dominant message expressed in Nixon’s public discourse in relation 
to law and order throughout his presidency was that law and order was a grave and 
serious problem in American society and that tackling it was of utmost importance. 
Moreover, Nixon charged that only the Republican Party was truly committed to 
this endeavour. In fact, Nixon presented the Republican Party as the party of law 
and order. Most importantly, however, there were also distinctly racial elements 
implicit within Nixon’s law and order discourse. Continuing the objective of the 
Southern Strategy, Nixon sought to affirm the political realignment based upon race 
which had been formalised in the 1968 presidential election.
Nixon presents the issue of law and order as one of serious concern in his 
Remarks at the Republican Victory Dinner, May 7, 1969. Here law and order is
2 For a more general discussion o f Nixon see also Stephen E. Ambrose, Nixon: The Triumph o f  a 
Politician 1962-1972 (London: Simon & Schuster, 1989); John R. Greene, The Limits o f  Power: The 
Nixon and Ford Administrations (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992); Joan Hoff, Nixon 
Reconsidered (New York: Basic Books, 1994); Herbert S. Parmet, Richard Nixon and His America 
(Boston: Little Brown & Co., 1990); Garry Wills, Nixon Agonistes: The Crisis o f  the Self-Made Man 
(Georgia: Cherokee Publishing Co., 1970).
3 “Remarks at the Republican Victory Dinner, May 7, 1969” The Public Papers o f  the Presidents o f  
the United States: 1969.
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referred to as one of the three inherited, that is, Democrat-caused, great issues 
which brought the Republicans to the White House in the 1968 presidential 
election, and an issue against which Nixon’s administration will be judged. Nixon 
states:
Now there are other issues, of course, local issues and some national. 
But these are the three great issues that seemed to be on the minds of 
most of the people during the campaign, and from my mail and from 
my discussions with Congressmen and Senators, these are the issues 
that the American people are going to judge the new administration 
by.
The greatness of the issue of law and order is also conveyed by linking the problem 
of law and order at home with the war in Vietnam; a recurring theme in Nixon’s 
discourse throughout his administration. Nixon states: “The second goal [law and 
order] is the goal closely related to the problem of peace abroad, and that is the 
problem of peace at home.” Continuing the war theme, Nixon portrays himself as a 
Churchill-type figure in pledging to tackle the problem; a war hero, championing 
good over evil. As he states:
If I could paraphrase Winston Churchill, I cannot tell you tonight that 
in finding a solution to the problem of peace abroad and peace at 
home, and restoring respect for law . . .  that we had reached the point 
where we could say that it was the beginning of the end of those 
problems, but I can say that we have reached the point that it is the 
end of the beginning.
In discussing the problem of law and order in this way, Nixon’s discourse is 
operating on numerous levels. The issue of law and order and Nixon’s perceived
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toughness on the issue was one of the important factors contributing to his success 
over Hubert Humphrey in the 1968 presidential election. Opinion polls in 1968 
showed that a majority of Americans felt that a strong president could make a big 
difference in directly preserving law and order and that the majority of Americans 
regarded Nixon as a stronger character than his Democrat opponent.4 As such, 
Nixon, in referring to public concern with law and order in his remarks, is not only 
legitimising its place on the political agenda, he is also confirming his position with 
regards to law and order and stressing his allegiance with this section of the 
electorate. Furthermore, law and order was not an aracial issue for the majority of 
Americans. A Harris poll in 1968 found that 59% of Americans believed that 
African Americans who started riots were one of the major causes in the breakdown 
of law and order.5 As Richard M. Scammon and Ben J. Wattenberg stated: “There 
was, and is, a clear attitudinal spillover and linkage from the crime issue to the race 
issue.”6 Moreover, Nixon was fully aware of this and used it to his political 
advantage. While Nixon made no overt mention of race publicly, his feelings on the 
matter were revealed during an unguarded moment when he was filming a TV 
advertisement about the decline in law and order. Reflecting on the advertisement, 
Nixon stated: “[it] hits the right note. . . .  It’s all about law and order and the damn 
Negro-Puerto Rican groups out there.”7 According to former White House Special 
Counsel, Harry C. McPherson, Lyndon Johnson certainly believed that law and
4 Scammon and Wattenberg, The Real Majority, 96.
5 Hazel Erskine, “The Causes of Crime”, Public Opinion Quarterly 38 (1974): 292.
6 Scammon and Wattenberg, The Real Majority, 97. The link between race and law and order is also 
made by Carter, From George Wallace to Newt Gingrich and O’Reilly, Nixon’s Piano.
7 Quoted in McGinniss, The Selling o f  the President, 23.
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o
order were “code words for racism.” Thus, when Nixon pledges to tackle and make 
progress on the issue of law and order as he does in his remarks:
Now that is the end of the beginning, I think the American people 
will begin to see the results of that progress. I mean results not in 
terms of a flashy headline, not of a promise that cannot be kept, but 
results in the kind of progress that is solid, that is achievable, and that 
the American people can count on.
Nixon’s message can be perceived to be that he is pledging to answer the desires of 
white Americans and tackle African-American crime, which had soared under 
Democrat control.
The greatness of the problem of law and order is also expressed in Nixon’s 
Remarks at the Graduation Exercises o f the FBI National Academy, May 28, 1969, 
and here too, Nixon makes a direct connection between law and order at home and 
the war in Vietnam.9 According to Nixon, the gravity of the problem of law and 
order is unprecedented in American history. In fact, the situation is so serious that 
the task of restoring law and order domestically is described as more difficult than 
restoring peace abroad. Nixon asserts:
As we consider America at this time in our history, we know we 
have problems. We have the problem of war abroad. We also have 
the problem of a great crisis of respect for law at home. We never 
really had the latter problem, respect for law, certainly not in this 
magnitude in our history before. And difficult as it is to find an 
answer to end the war abroad, and to keep the peace abroad, difficult 
as that problem is, a problem which is my primary responsibility,
8 Quoted in Kenneth O’Reilly, “The FBI and the Politics of the Riots, 1964-1968” Journal o f  
American History 75.1 (1988): 91.
9 “Remarks at the Graduation Exercises o f the FBI National Academy, May 28, 1969” The Public 
Papers o f  the President o f  the United States: 1969.
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perhaps even more difficult is that of establishing and maintaining 
respect for law at the highest level all over the United States.
At the beginning of his remarks Nixon expresses symbolic White House 
support of law enforcement and also infers national support. He proclaims:
I am very privileged and honoured that this graduation ceremony is 
being held here in the White House, which belongs to all of the 
people of America; and I don’t think there could be any more 
appropriate use of this great room, the East Room, where so many 
ceremonies are held, than to have law enforcement at its highest level 
respected in the way that we respect it today.
Nixon then proceeds to explicitly express his administration’s support in terms of 
financial commitment to the FBI through recounting a tale of his own application to 
the FBI, which was rejected, apparently due to a lack of funds from Congress that 
year. Nixon announces: “I just want to say in Mr. Hoover’s presence and in Mr. 
Mitchell’s presence that that will never happen again.” Nixon also explicitly claims 
to speak on behalf of the nation in respect of law enforcement and the issue of law 
and order. He states: “. . . I do think it is appropriate in this room for me to say very 
briefly what I think the nation feels about this class and what you represent.” By 
claiming to be speaking on behalf of the American people on the issue, Nixon is not 
only legitimising his concern and policy position with regards to law and order, he 
is also aligning himself with the American people in their concern with law and 
order.
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According to Nixon, the answer to the problem of law and order is having 
law that deserves respect, and police that deserve respect; another recurring theme 
in Nixon’s discourse throughout his presidency. Nixon declares:
I do have some observations with respect to that problem [law and 
order] that I think are quite appropriate to this occasion. First, if  we 
are going to have respect for law in the United States, we have to 
have law that deserves respect.
In doing this Nixon is making reference to the feeling of dissatisfaction with the 
police that was increasingly expressed during the 1960s, particularly amongst 
African Americans, most dramatically by urban rioting.10 Despite appearing to be 
acknowledging these concerns, however, Nixon’s discourse quite clearly reveals 
with whom his sympathies lay. The fact that Nixon honoured law enforcement in 
his opening comments was telling, and Nixon continues to express his support. 
Nixon states:
And so, our problem at this time is to see to it that all over America 
our laws, the written laws, deserve respect of all Americans, and that 
those who carry out the law, who have that hard, difficult, gruelling, 
sometimes dangerous task of enforcing the law -  that they carry out 
their responsibilities in a way that deserves respect.
10 Report o f  the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (New York: Bantam Books, 
1968); Joe R. Feagin and Harlan Hahn, Ghetto Revolts: The Politics o f  Violence in American Cities 
(New York: Macmillan, 1973); Robert M. Fogelson, Violence as Protest: A Study o f  Ghetto Riots 
(Connecticut: Greenwood, 1971); Jerome H. Skolnick, The Politics o f  Protest: Task Force on 
Violent Aspects o f  Protest and Confrontation o f  the National Commission on the Causes and 
Prevention o f  Violence (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1969).
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Interjecting sympathetic acknowledgement of the hard task faced by police serves 
to negate sympathy with those critical of law enforcement. Not only does Nixon 
offer empathy for the nature of the work police undertake, he also expresses his 
support of adequate pay for police. Nixon asserts:
I would strongly urge that all of the local legislative bodies recognize 
that if we are going to be able to have within our law enforcement 
bodies the kind of men and the kind of women who can meet the 
high standards that we expect, the standards that you men represent, 
it is absolutely essential that they be adequately compensated.
Yet, ultimately, according to Nixon, what police deserve above all else is respect:
That is one part of the problem. But there is another part of the 
problem. And that is something that money can’t buy. No matter how 
well we pay our law enforcement officials, it isn’t going to mean 
much to them unless they also have some respect from the 
community, from the State, from the Nation for the job that they are 
doing.
Nixon then proceeds to make explicit references to African-American 
dissatisfaction and criticism of the police and condemns their arguments as a mere 
social trend, lacking in substance. Nixon proclaims:
It has become quite fashionable in recent years to look upon the man, 
the policeman, the sheriff, the representatives of various law 
enforcement agencies, as a second-class citizen. It has become quite 
fashionable to downgrade him and every time there is a conflict 
involving the law on the one side and those charged with breaking 
the law on the other side, the automatic reaction is to take the side of 
those who may have been charged with breaking the law.
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There is partial acknowledgement that law enforcement is not above criticism, but 
ultimately, Nixon’s message - invoking nationalist sentiment - is that despite this, 
law enforcement must be respected; the country’s freedom depended on it. Nixon 
states:
Now we all know that sometimes one side may be right and 
sometimes the other side may be right. But unless we also know that 
in this country, unless we have not only respect for our laws, but for 
the men and women who are doing their very best to carry them out 
fairly and equitably, we are not going to carry on as a free country.
Thus, advocating law enforcement that deserves respect in order to gain respect 
serves as a tool to racialise the issue of law and order enabling Nixon to align 
himself with white law and order voters.
The greatness of the law and order problem is also expressed in his Annual 
Message to the Congress on the State o f the Union, January 22, 1970.11 
Announcing his intention to cut domestic spending in all areas other than law 
enforcement, Nixon asserts that the Democrat spending programs of the 1960s were 
misdirected; the real area demanding funding was law enforcement. Nixon 
contends:
We have heard a great deal of overblown rhetoric during the sixties 
in which the word ‘war’ has perhaps too often been used -  the war 
on poverty, the war on misery, the war on disease, the war on hunger. 
But if there is one area where the word ‘war’ is appropriate it is in 
the fight against crime. We must declare and win the war against the 
criminal elements which increasingly threaten our cities, our homes, 
and our lives.
11 “Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union, January 22, 1970” The Public Papers
o f the President o f  the United States: 1970.
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War on poverty programs and social spending programs in general were
19 • •increasingly regarded as racial issues during the 1960s. As such Nixon is sending 
the message that he is against spending on minority programs, and is aligning both 
himself and the Republican Party with both white law and order voters and white 
voters who are opposed to group-based social policies. Nixon further racialises the 
law and order issue by using Washington D.C. -  a majority African-American city - 
to illustrate the problem.13 Nixon states: “We have a tragic example of this problem 
in the Nation’s Capital.” Nixon’s discourse throughout the speech conveys the 
message that the Republican Party is committed to acting on law and order. At the 
same time, it presents the Democrat Party as passive towards the issue. Nixon 
declares:
Last year this administration sent to the Congress 13 separate pieces 
of legislation dealing with organized crime, pornography, street 
crime, narcotics, crime in the District of Columbia. None of these 
bills has reached my desk for signature. I am confident that the 
Congress will act now to adopt the legislation I placed before you 
last year. We in the Executive have done everything we can under 
existing law, but new and stronger weapons are needed in that fight. 
While it is true that State and local law enforcement agencies are the 
cutting edge in the effort to eliminate street crime, burglaries, 
murder, my proposals to you have embodied my belief that the 
Federal Government should play a greater role in working in 
partnership with these agencies.
12 James W. Button, Black Violence: Political Impact o f  the 1960s Riots (New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1978); Robert Cook, Sweet Land o f  Liberty? The African American Struggle fo r  
Civil Rights in the Twentieth Century (London: Longman, 1998); Maurice Isserman and Michael 
Kazin, America Divided: The Civil War o f  the 1960s (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).
13 O’Reilly, Nixon’s Piano.
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In addition to a commitment to increase funding of law enforcement and 
enacting legislation in the war against crime, Nixon also advocated another way of 
addressing the problem of law and order. According to Nixon an important aspect 
in ensuring a return to respect for law and order is in ensuring that the law and those 
employed to enforce the law are worthy of the respect of all Americans. This theme 
was repeated in Nixon’s discourse throughout his presidency. It was raised in his 
Remarks at the Graduation Exercises o f the FBI National Academy and again in his 
Remarks to the 5(fh Annual Conference o f the US Jaycees in St. Louis, Missouri, 
June 25, 1970.14 Nixon asserts: “We want to back you up, back you up in your 
actions to restore a respect for law and also to have laws that deserve respect and 
law enforcement that deserves respect.”
Yet, despite appearing to be addressing the concerns and criticisms of 
Americans regarding law enforcement, Nixon is fully on the side of law and order. 
Nixon’s reference to the issue serves as a tool to racialise the debate and allows 
Nixon to send a message to white voters. In Nixon’s Remarks Following a Visit 
With Two Policemen Injured in a Bomb Explosion in Kansas City, Missouri, 
October 20, 1970, repeating the theme of war, Nixon portrays the police as unsung 
war heroes engaged in the frontline of battle in the war against crime, leaving their 
wives on the home front.15 Nixon states:
First they said they were happy they went into police work. That is 
the first question I asked. I said, ‘In view of the fact that this is
14 “Remarks to the 50th Annual Conference o f the US Jaycees in St. Louis, Missouri, June 25, 1970” 
The Public Papers o f  the President o f  the United States: 1970.
15 “Remarks Following a Visit With Two Policemen Injured in a Bomb Explosion in Kansas City, 
Missouri, October 20, 1970” The Public Papers o f  the President o f  the United States: 1970.
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dangerous, that the pay isn’t too good, do you think you should have 
gone in?’ They said, ‘yes.’ They were proud to be in this work. 
Secondly, the wife of one of the policemen -  and this is very 
important -  said that she was very proud of her husband. I said for 
her to tell all the wives, the next time she was at a meeting of the 
police wives auxiliary organization, that I think it is sometimes 
harder for the women at home when their husbands are out on the 
firing line than it is for the men themselves. The men are acting and 
the women have to stay home and worry.
Nixon proceeds to discuss the police officers’ patrol in a model cities 
neighbourhood. Nixon states:
As far as the policemen were concerned, I think the most impressive 
thing for them were the messages received, not only from all over 
Kansas City but particularly from the area in which they worked. . . . 
They worked on the Pinpoint (patrol) program, which as you know is 
a Model Cities program . . .  they had messages from so many people 
in that area.
Despite the fact that the reference is positive, that is, that the officers had received 
support from the African-American community denouncing violence, it still served 
to place the discussion within a racial context. Moreover, Nixon then proceeds with 
a negative racial reference when he admonishes those who are critical of the police. 
Nixon charges: “Here they are underpaid, a dangerous job, protecting us, and 
instead of calling them pigs and spitting on them, and shouting profane slogans at 
them as they go about their job, let’s give them some respect.”
The overriding message in Nixon’s discourse in relation to law and order is 
the need for toughness on the issue, which the Republican Party represented. In 
Nixon’s Remarks in Orma City, Missouri, October 19, 1970, he expresses his
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support of Congressional election candidate Jack Danforth based upon his law and 
order credentials.16 Nixon announces:
What we need in the Senate of the United States, what we need in the 
Congress of the United States -  and listen to me very carefully -  is 
not simply men that are against crime. Everybody is against crime. 
But we need men who are against it and vote against it, and will 
work against it, and talk against it all year round, not just at election 
time. Jack Danforth is that kind of man.
Nixon’s message is that the Democrat-controlled Congress is lacking action on the 
issue of crime and that men of action are needed, that is, Republicans. Nixon makes 
a direct appeal to white voters to respond to the era of lawlessness by voting 
Republican. Nixon declares:
And, my friends, I say that the answer to those that engaged in disruption, to 
those that shout filthy slogans, to those that try to shout down speakers is 
not to answer in kind, but to go to the polls on election day and in the quiet 
of that ballot box stand up and be counted, the great silent majority of 
America.
Civil disobedience of the 1960s was an interracial phenomenon, of course. In 
addition to African-American protests and rioting, white students and anti-war 
campaigners also engaged in protests and demonstrations. Yet, this era of collective 
disobedience and perceived permissiveness was heavily tinged with the issue of 
race.
16 “Remarks in Orma City, Missouri, October 19, 1970” The Public Papers o f  the President o f  the 
United States: 1970.
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In his Remarks at the Ohio State House, Columbus, Ohio, October 19, 1970, 
Nixon refers to the rising tide of lawlessness in America and repeating the war 
theme, makes an explicit link between domestic violence and the war abroad, which
1 7serves to emphasise its seriousness. Nixon states: “All over this country today we 
see a rising tide of terrorism, of crime. . . . My friends, I want to tell you we cannot 
provide the leadership that will keep peace abroad unless we can keep the peace at 
home. And we are going to keep it at home.” Against this backdrop Nixon 
expresses his support of two Congressional election candidates, Bob Taft and Roger 
Cloud. Nixon states: “And, my friends, we need in the House and in the Senate and 
in the Governor’s chair, not men who become strong for law and order at election, 
but strong for it all year round, and that is Bob Taft and Roger Cloud. That is the 
kind of men that we need.” Nixon sends the message that unlike Democrats who are 
passive and/or obstructive on the issue of law and order, the Republican Party is a 
party of action. Nixon charges: “I say it is time to give us men in the House and the 
Senate who will vote for strong laws to deal with law and order rather than against 
them. That is Bob Taft and that is the Member of the House and our Candidates.”
As Nixon’s administration progresses, Nixon presents the Republican Party 
as not only the party of law and order, but also as the party whose toughness on the 
issue has brought results. In his Statement About National Crime Prevention Week, 
1971, February 6, 1971, Nixon reports on how new legislation, increased funding 
and greater coordination between law enforcement agencies has brought tangible
17 “Remarks at the Ohio State House, Columbus, Ohio, October 19, 1970” The Public Papers o f  the
President o f  the United States: 1970s.
102
results in the fight against crime.18 Nixon declares: “This year, National Crime 
Prevention Week has a solid ring. Our nationwide campaign against crime is far 
from won, but the tide is beginning to turn.” In particular, Nixon makes direct 
reference to how the new crime-fighting measures have positively impacted on 
crime in Washington D.C. Nixon states:
In the past decade, Washington, D.C. -  although the supposed model 
city for the nation -  won shameful distinction as a leader in crime 
statistics. Today, new legislation and increases in manpower are 
fostering the reorganization of the whole structure of criminal justice 
in our Nation’s Capital.. . .  The results of these efforts have begun to 
show. . . our Nation’s Capital has . . . shown a significant downward 
trend in crime.
In doing this, Nixon is sending the message that not only has his administration’s 
toughness been successful in tackling crime, but that it has been successful in 
tackling black crime.
In his Remarks at the Graduation Exercises o f the FBI National Academy, 
June 30, 1971, Nixon again uses Washington D.C. as the example to illustrate the 
success so far achieved in fighting crime.19 Nixon announces:
For the first quarter of this year we have seen a downturn in the rate 
of increase of crime. What is, however, even more significant in 
terms of our cities -  we find that in 61 cities of over 100,000 
population, crime was actually reduced in the first quarter of this 
year. And that includes the city of Washington, D.C.
18 “Statement About National Crime Prevention Week, 1971, February 6, 1971” The Public Papers 
o f  the President o f  the United States, 1971.
19 “Remarks at the Graduation Exercises o f the FBI National Academy, June 30, 1971” The Public 
Papers o f  the President o f  the United States: 1971.
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Nixon declares that this success has been achieved by a proactive approach towards 
law and order during his administration:
That progress could not be made, of course, without the laws which 
Congress has enacted -  enacted in cooperation with and at the urging 
of this administration. It could not be done without the national 
support that you receive from the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
and other law enforcement agencies and the Attorney General of the 
United States.
Nixon ultimately concludes that the success against crime is attributable to the work 
of law enforcement officials, thereby once again aligning himself with the 
representatives of law and order: the police. Nixon states: “But more important, this 
progress in the battle against crime couldn’t be made unless it was for the frontline 
soldiers, those who are the law enforcement officials in the cities, in the counties, 
all across this great country of ours.” Nixon builds upon this by proceeding to 
announce his intention of continuing to support law enforcement and specifically to 
continue to move away from the era of Democrat permissiveness. Nixon proclaims:
. . . I want to give a personal message to the 100 graduates of this 
class. It is one that I am really trying to give to all law enforcement 
officials wherever they may be, any place in the United States. When 
you go home, tell your colleagues that the era of permissiveness with 
regard to law enforcement is at an end in the United States of 
America.
In doing this, Nixon is presenting the Republican Party as the party which is tough 
on law and order as opposed to the Democrat Party which is not. Moreover, in
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espousing his support of and to law enforcement, Nixon sends a message to white 
voters. Nixon asserts:
. . . don’t get discouraged by some of the talk to the effect that the 
man who wears the badge or the man who is in law enforcement is 
one who isn’t backed in his community. There are some who do not 
back you. It has become somewhat fashionable, or had become 
somewhat fashionable in recent years, to make attacks on law 
enforcement officials. But let me say that the great majority of the 
American people in this country do provide backing for the men who 
are willing to sacrifice their lives or to risk their lives in order to save 
the lives of others.
Here Nixon presents those who have been critical of the police -  African 
Americans -  as a minority group and marginalises them as non-American, as Other. 
Nixon asserts: “You have our backing. You have the backing of the American 
people. And this particular ceremony provides an opportunity for us to state it 
again, and to state it for all of the American people on this occasion.”
Nixon presents his administration’s achievement in respect of law and order 
in his Annual Message to the Congress on the State o f the Union, January 20, 
1972.20 Repeating the war theme that has been evident throughout his presidency, 
Nixon discusses the issue of crime in the country in conjunction with the war in 
Vietnam. Nixon states: “Our quest for peace abroad over the last 3 years has been 
accompanied by an intensive quest for peace at home. And our success in 
stabilising developments on the international scene has been matched by a growing 
sense of stability in America.” Again, Nixon also makes specific reference to 
Washington D.C. Nixon proclaims: “In one city for which the Federal Government
20 “Annual Message to the Congress on the State o f the Union, January 20, 1972” The Public Papers
o f  the President o f  the United States: 1972.
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has a special responsibility -  Washington D.C. -  the picture is even brighter, for 
here serious crime actually fell by 13 percent in the last year.” Nixon attributes the 
success to toughness by government during his administration. “This encouraging 
beginning is not something that has just happened by itself -  I believe it results 
directly from strong new crime fighting efforts by this administration, by the 
Congress, and by state and local governments.” Nixon also charges that the success 
seen in Washington D.C. can be repeated elsewhere: “. . . by continuing to give 
vigorous support to the principles of order and respect for law, I believe that what 
has been achieved in the Nation’s capital can be achieved in a growing number of 
other communities throughout the Nation.” By using Washington D.C. as the 
reference point in this way, Nixon’s message can be perceived as an appeal to white 
law and order voters that the Republican Party’s toughness on crime can and will 
tackle black crime throughout America.
Throughout his presidency, Nixon presented the Republican Party as the 
party that was tough on law and order and conversely the Democratic Party as the 
party of permissiveness. The representation of the parties in this way was an 
important political strategy. In his Remarks at the Republican National Convention, 
September 3, 1972, Nixon is emphatic in stressing the differences between the 
Republican Party and the Democratic Party, particularly on the issue of law and 
order. Nixon asserts:
21 “Remarks at the Republican National Convention, September 3, 1972”, The Public Papers o f  the 
President o f  the United States: 1972.
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Let me turn now to a second area where my beliefs are totally 
different from those of our opponents. Four years ago crime was 
rising all over America at an unprecedented rate. Even our Nation’s 
Capital was called the crime capital of the world. I pledged to stop 
the rise in crime.
Nixon’s message is clear: the Democrats allowed crime to soar and it was only 
through Nixon’s commitment to toughness on the issue of law and order that 
domestic peace has begun to be restored. Nixon’s message also had a distinctly 
racial element. In addition to the oft-used example of Washington D.C., which 
served to racialise the discussion, Nixon also discusses how he had fulfilled his 
promise to appoint judges to the courts who would put the right of Americans to be 
free from violence as the primary civil right. Nixon affirms: “In order to keep that 
pledge, I promised in the election campaign that I would appoint judges to the 
Federal courts, and particularly to the Supreme Court, who would recognize that the 
first civil right of every American is to be free from domestic violence.” Again, 
Nixon’s message is clear: he is aligning himself with white Americans who had
79become increasingly weary of civil rights demonstrations and urban rioting.
Nixon’s portrayal of the Democratic Party as the party of permissiveness is
7*2 t
expressed in The President’s News Conference o f March 15, 1973. Nixon asserts:
During the sixties, the United States went far down the road of the 
permissive approach to those charged with crime, and we reaped a 
terrible harvest, the greatest increase in crime that this country has
22 James A. Geschwender, “Civil Rights Protests and Riots: A Disappearing Distinction”, Social 
Science Quarterly 49.3 (1968): 474-484; Seymour M. Lipset, “The U.S. Backlash at the Polls”, New 
Society, November 3, 1966, 690-691; Hazel Erskine, “The Polls: Demonstrations and Race Riots”, 
Public Opinion Quarterly 31 (1967): 659.
23 “The President’s News Conference o f March 15, 1973” The Public Papers o f  the President o f  the 
United States: 1973.
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ever had, explosive to the point that law and order, so-called, became 
a great issue in ’68. It was still a great issue in ’72.
Nixon’s message was that under the Democrats’ soft approach to crime and 
criminal behaviour, crime soared to such an extent that it became, and has 
remained, a huge political issue amongst the electorate.
In his Statement About the Federal Bureau o f Investigation’s Uniform 
Crime Reports fo r  1972, March 28, 1973, Nixon reports on how crime has 
decreased during his administration.24 Nixon states: “The crime figures released 
today by the Department of Justice are very heartening. The FBI’s Uniform Crime 
Reports indicate that for the first time in 17 years, America has experienced an 
absolute decrease in serious crime.” Nixon attributes this reduction to the work of 
the nation’s police officers, who once again, are presented as war heroes. Nixon 
states: “These results are a tribute to the men and women in the frontlines of the 
war against crime -  our law enforcement officers.” Nixon also attributes the 
reduction to the transition in public attitude concerning law and order: “Public 
opinion is untying their hands, and they are once again being given the public 
support they deserve in their efforts to insure that we match public support with all 
the financial, legislative, and judicial support out police need.” Nixon then proceeds 
to declare the need to enact more legislation to answer the desires of the American 
public to complete the campaign against crime.
24 “Statement About the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Uniform Crime Reports for 1972, March 
28, 1973” The Public Papers o f  the President o f  the United States: 1972.
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We can turn the tide of crime in America. These statistics 
demonstrate that we are well on our way. Now we must have the 
tools we need to finish the job. I call upon Congress to act quickly on 
this Administration’s proposals for law enforcement legislation so 
that we can advance the work of providing the safe and secure 
country our citizens want and deserve so much.
In doing this Nixon is presenting his administration as being tough and proactive on 
the issue of law and order and is aligned with the American public, working on 
their behalf to continue the battle against crime.
In his Radio Address About a Special Message to the Congress on National 
Legislative Goals, September 9, 1973, Nixon celebrates the reduction in crime 
which has been achieved by his administration and attributes it to new legislation 
enacted under him, the work done by the police and the transition in public opinion 
in support of law and order. Nixon proclaims:
After nearly 20 years of continuous and sometimes shockingly 
dramatic increases in the rate of crime, the figures for 1972 -  
released just last month -  show that we have finally turned the tide in 
our battle for a safer America. For the first time in 17 years, serious 
crime in 1972 was down from the year before. Much of the credit 
goes to the new crime legislation enacted during the past 4 years. 
Much of the credit goes to the local law enforcement officials, and 
much of the credit goes to a changed public attitude toward crime 
and criminals -  away from the era of permissiveness and toward a 
renewed respect for law, order and justice.
Nixon is also highlighting the transition from a Democrat to a Republican era, from 
an era tinged with permissiveness and lawlessness, to one built upon toughness and 
a restoration of order. As well as conveying the message that Republicans have got
25 “Radio Address About a Special Message to the Congress on National Legislative Goals,
September 9, 1973” The Public Papers o f  the President o f  the United States: 1973.
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it right, that toughness is the way to tackle crime, Nixon is also aligning himself 
with law enforcement and the pro-law and order public: the Americans who have 
turned their back on Democrats, that is, whites.
An analysis of Nixon’s pubic discourse in relation to law and order 
throughout his presidency reveals that law and order was presented as a serious 
social and political issue, and an issue which Nixon declared a commitment to 
tackle in the most aggressive manner. In doing this, Nixon presents the Republican 
Party as the party that is tough on law and order. Moreover, implicit within Nixon’s 
law and order discourse is the racial nature of the problem of law and order and 
hence Nixon presents the Republican Party also as the party for white voters. In 
contrast to the way the Republican Party is presented, the Democratic Party is 
presented as the perpetrators of permissiveness and lawlessness, and by association 
as the party for African Americans.
It is, of course, important not to overemphasise the role of Nixon’s law and
order discourse in securing electoral votes. Many issues and factors individually
and collectively contributed to the election of Nixon in 1968 and 1972.
Furthermore, not all law and order voters were consciously attracted to the racial
message inherent within Nixon’s law and order discourse. An analysis of public
discourse surrounding the Attica prison riot, 1971, however, illustrates how the
coded racial political issue of law and order is reproduced in American society.
Public discourse in relation to law and order surrounding the Attica prison riot,
1971, demonstrates the importance of the law and order issue for a significant
proportion of Americans. Furthermore, while the majority of these Americans
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interpreted law and order aracially, with only a significant few perceiving law and 
order in overt racial terms, Attica served not only to reaffirm the connection 
between the Republican Party and law and order, but also aided both the conscious 
and unconscious identification of law and order in racial terms.
3.2 The Attica Prison Riot, 1971
The small town of Attica in New York State was shaken on September 9, 
1971 when prisoners at the town’s maximum security prison took over the 
institution, holding 39 prison guards hostage. Another guard, officer William 
Quinn, received fatal injuries during the outbreak of the riot. The riot at Attica was 
precipitated by the removal of two prisoners to segregation cells on the evening of 
September 8, following a tense confrontation with officers in the exercise yard 
earlier that day. The following morning prisoners from Block A overpowered 
officers on their way back from breakfast and the riot was underway. After 
breaking through ‘Times Square’ - the area where all four blocks of the prison met - 
the riot spread to B, C and D blocks. Approximately 1200 prisoners retained control 
of Blocks B and D for four days.
There had been unrest at Attica for some time prior to the riot. In July 1971, 
five inmates identifying themselves as the Attica Liberation Front, sent Russell G. 
Oswald, Commissioner of the Department of Correctional Services, an eight-page 
document demanding 27 reforms at the institution. A month later a protest was held
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in the mess-hall following the shooting of George Jackson by prison guards at San 
Quentin.26 Such incidents were not confined to Attica as there had been unrest in 
other maximum security prisons. In 1970 there had been riots at Tombs, Auburn, 
Folsom and at branches of the Queen’s house of detention and the Brooklyn house 
of detention. Part of the manifesto issued by riot leaders at Tombs was identical to
7 7the July manifesto at Attica. The Attica riot was in fact part of a broader pattern of
* 7 0unrest within the American prison system, which had been escalating since 1967.
At its opening in January 1930, Attica State prison was hailed as the 
‘ultimate prison’. Built in the style of nineteenth-century prisons, its emphasis was
70meant to be on confinement and reform. Yet, in reality, as was the case 
throughout the state prison system, few prisoners who entered were rehabilitated. 
Seventy percent of inmates at Attica at the time of the riot had previously served 
time in a state, federal or local prison.30 There were no meaningful rehabilitation 
programs at Attica, the prison served only to confine inmates, and they were 
confined in the most calamitous of conditions.31
The riot at Attica was not solely a protest against prison conditions, 
however. There was also a distinctly racial element to the riot. In addition to the 
general conditions within the prison, racism was a major source of grievance.
26 George Jackson, widely regarded as a political prisoner by African Americans, was shot by prison 
guards after allegedly attempting to escape from San Quentin.
27 Robert Abrams (ed.), Prison Riots in Britain and the USA (London: Macmillan, 1994), Chapter 3; 
Herman Badillo and Milton Haynes, A Bill o f  No Rights: Attica and the American Prison System 
(New York: Outerbridge & Lazard Inc., 1972), Chapter 1.
28 Abrams, Prison Riots in Britain and the USA.
29 Robert McKay, Attica: The Official Report o f  the New York State Special Commission on Attica 
(New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972), 4. Hereafter cited as McKay Report.
30 McKay Report, 29.
31 McKay Report, xv.
112
Segregation was officially abandoned by the mid-1960s, but, as in the larger society 
beyond the prison walls, racism still pervaded all of Attica in varying degrees.32 
One area where racial discrimination existed was in inmate job assignments. The 
‘good’ jobs at Attica were almost entirely held by white inmates, while African- 
American and Puerto Rican inmates were consigned to the ‘worst’ jobs. For 
example, in 11 job categories white inmates held more than half of the positions; of 
these 10 were considered highly desirable. White inmates accounted for 37% of the 
inmate population, yet they made up 74% of workers in the powerhouses, 67% of 
clerks, 70% of runners, 62% of helpers in the officers’ mess and 54% of workers in 
the inmates mess. African-American and Puerto Rican inmates, on the other hand, 
accounted for 76% of workers in the metal shop and 80% of workers in the grading 
companies. There was also discouragement by guards in active and non-direct 
ways of black-white friendships. Several white inmates who were friendly with one 
or more African-American inmates were warned that they would be denied certain 
privileges while they persisted with such friendships. White inmates who did so, 
suffered job discrimination and were referred to as “nigger-lovers”.34
In testimony before the McKay Commission, which investigated events at 
Attica before, during and after the riot, the racial attitudes of a number of guards
* 3 cwere clearly evident. Ironically, it was in trying to defend themselves against 
charges of racism that it was displayed. In one instance a guard explained the
32 McKay Report, 80.
33 McKay Report, 39.
34 McKay Report, 81.
35 Robert McKay, Dean o f the New York University Law School, headed the nine-member 
commission. It was appointed by Chief Judge Stanley H. Fuld and the presiding justices o f the Court 
of Appeals, acting at the request of Governor Nelson Rockefeller and the state legislative leaders.
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pattern of self-segregation in the prison mess halls by stating: “How would you like 
to sit between two coloreds while you were eating?” Another guard in explaining 
the disparity between the jobs held by white and African-American inmates 
testified before the commission: “They [African Americans] are better suited for
'i/:
those jobs.” The McKay Commission concluded that many guards at Attica held 
racist feelings of which they were not consciously aware. Whether conscious or not, 
however, institutional racism was clearly present at Attica and was a significant 
component in increasing tensions at the prison. The McKay Commission concluded 
that:
Racist attitudes in the institution were an undeniable factor among 
the tensions leading to the uprising. Aggressive responses to racial 
bias are increasingly common outside prisons, and this trend exists 
inside as well. Inmates today feel that they have the right, even as 
prisoners to rebel against being further put down on the basis of
37race.
The inmate population at Attica had undergone significant changes in recent 
years. The majority of inmates at Attica by the time of the riot were African- 
American. African Americans made up 55% of prisoners, 9% were Puerto Rican 
and 37% were white. In contrast, all of the guards were whites. The racial 
composition of inmates and guards at Attica reflected a nationwide pattern. In 1970 
more than half of inmates in American prisons were African American and they 
made up fewer than 8% of guards. The prison population at Attica had also
36 Quoted in McKay Report, 81.
37 McKay Report, 82.
38 McKay Report, 28.
39 Badillo and Haynes, A Bill o f  No Rights, 9.
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changed in other ways. By 1971 77% of inmates came from urban areas: 43% from 
New York City and 34% from Buffalo, Rochester and Syracuse. Also, 40% of 
inmates at Attica were under the age of thirty.40 Moreover, a new generation of 
African American prisoners had entered Attica and indeed prisons nationwide since 
the mid-1960s. These African Americans, influenced by the societal changes that 
had occurred in the wake of the Civil Right movement, increasingly regarded 
themselves as victims of a racist society. As Wendell Wade, an inmate at 
California’s Tehachapi prison, articulated: “The majority of black prisoners realize 
that they were merely trying to survive in the ways that they were able to when they 
were captured. They don’t feel guilty; indeed, in their minds, they are not guilty.”41 
This new generation also regarded the white prison officer “as the symbol of a 
racist, oppressive system which put him behind bars.”42
The racial element to the Attica riot was also evident during the negotiation 
process. Authorities had initially been able to recapture A and C blocks, but lacked 
the necessary resources to attempt a complete retaking. As it was, Oswald decided 
that the negotiations were the best means of proceeding. The negotiations 
eventually centred on a set of 28 demands. They consisted of points for reform, 
such as better food, minimum wages, freedom to communicate at their own 
expense, effective rehabilitation programs, modernisation of the library, adequate 
legal assistance on request, reduction of cell time and improvements in recreation
40 McKay Report, 28.
41 Wendell Wade quoted in Badillo and Haynes, A Bill o f  No Rights, 12.
42 McKay Report, 4. Roberta Ann Johnson argues in “The Prison Birth o f Black Power”, Journal o f  
Black Studies 5.4 (1975): 394-414 that a basic similarity exists between the ghetto and prison and 
that black political awareness emerges in prisons for the same reasons it emerges in the ghetto.
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facilities, adequate medical treatment, establishment of an inmate grievance 
commission, the right to legal representation at parole-violation hearings, an end to 
approved lists for correspondence and visitors, removal of visitation screens and a 
30-day maximum segregation period for any one offence.
Some of the 28 demands, however, illustrated the racial nature of the riot; 
for instance, the right to religious and political freedom, an end to censorship of all 
reading material except that deemed unsuitable by an ombudsman, the engagement 
of either a Spanish-speaking doctor or interpreters who would accompany Spanish­
speaking inmates to medical interviews, and the institution of a program for the 
recruitment and employment of a significant number of black and Spanish-speaking 
officers.43 Moreover, at the request of inmates, a group of outside observers 
oversaw the negotiations. The group, which grew in number during the course of 
the event, consisted of notable African Americans, leaders from the Civil Rights 
movement, and lawyers and journalists sympathetic to penal reform and the 
situation of African Americans. Examples of these were, David Anderson of the 
Rochester Urban League, New York Assemblyman Arthur O. Eve, Attorney 
William Kunstler, Bobby Seale, Chairman of the Black Panther Party, and Thomas 
Soto of the Prisoners Solidarity Committee.44 This was further indication of the 
racial aspect to the riot.
The racial facet to Attica was also evident in the acts of retribution against 
the inmates by prison guards following the suppression of the riot on September 13.
43 For a complete list o f demands see McKay Report, 251-257.
44 For a comprehensive list o f observers see Tom Wicker, A Time to Die (New York: 
Quadrangle/New York Times Book Co., 1975), 318-319.
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In the aftermath of the retaking of Attica hundreds of inmates were abused by 
officers, troopers and sheriffs deputies.45 In order to move the inmates out of D 
yard and back into cells, they were ordered to strip and to crawl on their stomachs 
back towards the prison. During this procedure they were kicked and beaten with 
clubs. One white inmate described the action:
A trooper said, ‘start crawling, you white nigger-lover. Put your nose 
to the ground. If it comes up, your head comes off.’ So I started 
crawling . . .  I went a little ways, then they told us, ‘stop!’ All this 
time you could hear something hitting a body. All the time you hear 
men groaning low and so much noise 46
Physical assaults were almost uniformly accompanied by racial profanities. A 
National Guard testified that an inmate who had been shot in the groin was hit by 
several troopers, one of whom told him “Fuck you, nigger. You should have gotten 
it in the head.”47 Another National Guard reported that some injured inmates would 
be recognised by officers and would be beaten as they proclaimed, “You fucking 
nigger, see what black power has gotten you.”48 Such assaults upon inmates could 
be regarded as evidence that some officers perceived the riot in racial terms, if not, 
they stand as further testimony of the racist attitudes of some officers at Attica.
45 McKay Report, 338. On September 14, 1971, Rockefeller appointed a panel, headed by Judge 
Harry D. Goldman, to ensure that the constitutional rights of inmates were being protected. In 
November the panel concluded that the danger o f harassment o f inmates continued and the 
likelihood o f unjust retaliatory and inflammatory acts in parole and other areas also remained.
Report o f  the Goldman Panel Investigation o f  the Aftermath o f  Attica November 16, 1971. Reprinted 
in Russell G. Oswald, Attica: My Story (New York: Doubleday, 1972), 418.
46 Quoted in McKay Report, 429.
47 Quoted in McKay Report, 429.
48 Quoted in McKay Report, 400.
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The decision to retake the prison by force was made following a breakdown 
in negotiations. The state had agreed to 28 demands and despite the fact that a 
number were already being instigated, many of the principles embodied in the 28 
points were major advances in penal reform.49 However, after four days, an 
agreement could not be reached on the issue of amnesty.50 The state was only 
willing to grant amnesty against administration reprisals, civil actions and criminal 
action regarding property-related crimes. Inmates would have to accept the risk of 
criminal prosecution for crimes involving physical injuries. Following the death of 
officer Quinn, who had been beaten unconscious during the initial outbreak, the 
rioters clung to the amnesty demand stronger than ever.
Early on the morning of Monday, September 13, Oswald delivered the final 
appeal to the rioters. Lacking a guarantee of amnesty, however, the leaders declined 
it and hostages were paraded blindfold on to walkways with knives held at their 
throats. Seeing no alternative Rockefeller ordered the retaking of Attica by force. 
At 9.44 am through a radio loudspeaker the attack to recapture Attica was ordered. 
Helicopters above the prison dropped C.S. pepper gas as troopers set off a barrage 
of rifle fire from atop the 30-foot prison walls. In all, over 500 officers armed with
49 The McKay Commission did point out, however, that the actual language o f many o f the agreed 
points was vague and sometimes conditional on legislative action. Thus inmates would have to trust 
in the good faith of Oswald and the state to implement the reforms. As Chairman o f the Board o f  
Parole, Oswald, together with Paul D. McGinnis, Commissioner o f the Department o f Correction, 
chaired a special committee to study the treatment o f offenders in New York state as part of an effort 
in the mid-1960s to convert the New York prison system from one with a purely custodial focus to 
one based on rehabilitation. Oswald announced his commitment to reform in a taped message to the 
inmates at Attica on September 4. Despite this commitment, however, Oswald did point out that due 
to fiscal problems reform would be a slow process and he pleaded for patience. Badillo and Haynes, 
A Bill o f  No Rights, Chapter 1.
50 The state was also unwilling to accept another demand: the dismissal o f Superintendent Vincent 
Mancusi.
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shotguns, rifles, pistols and clubs charged into the compound, shooting as they ran. 
The attack left 26 inmates and nine hostages dead.51 Eighty-three prisoners needed 
surgery for their wounds.
Reactions amongst Americans to the riot at Attica and to the retaking were, 
naturally, varied. Certainly there was a great deal of sorrow and regret expressed at 
the grisly outcome of the riot. At the same time, however, there was a great deal of 
support expressed for the retaking. One letter to the New York Daily News read:
Congratulations to Governor Rockefeller and Attica Prison officers 
who refused to capitulate to the prison insurrectionists. These men 
were incarcerated for failure to obey the law, and it is high time that 
we restore law and order - even if bayonets and guns are necessary.52
For some Americans, the retaking was perceived and presented as a much-needed 
strike for law and order, the re-establishment of which justified a hardline approach. 
A number of Americans not only regarded the riot at Attica as evidence of the need 
to take a harder line with regard to law and order, but more specifically as further 
evidence of the failure of permissiveness. As a letter to the New York Daily News 
read: “The recent increase in vicious and destructive riots shows that the policy of 
leniency and permissiveness in the handling of hardened criminals does not work. .
. . Too much emphasis has been placed on correction and not enough on
51 Forty-three people in total were killed as a result o f the riot. Twenty-six inmates and nine hostages 
were killed during the retaking. A further three inmates and a tenth hostage later died from wounds 
suffered during the retaking. In addition, one officer, William Quinn, died from injuries sustained 
during the initial outbreak, and three inmates were killed during the period the prison was in the 
control o f the inmates.
52 “Letters”, New York Daily News, September 16, 1971, 77.
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punishment.”53 Another letter to the New York Daily News read: “The recent prison 
riots, including the one at Attica, are concrete proof that our liberal, permissive 
society will eventually cause widespread anarchy in the United States.”54 For some 
Americans, liberal, reformist policies were perceived as being out of touch with 
ordinary Americans, whose lives were blighted by crime and disorder. Another 
letter to the New York Times read:
The liberal establishment . . . from their remote ivory tower 
fortresses, in their anguished plea for what is referred to as ‘prison 
reform,’ do not speak for those of us who walk the streets, in contrast 
to those who ride through them in their limos escorted by publicly 
paid for motorcycles.55
This letter places the Attica riot and the issue of prison reform within the wider 
debate regarding the need to tackle crime.
Opinion polls demonstrated that the sentiments expressed in the above 
correspondences were reflective of feelings held nationwide. A Harris poll in 1969 
reported that 64% of Americans felt that mollycoddling hardened criminals was a 
major cause of an increase in crime.56 Similarly, a poll in 1970 found that 64% of 
people - up 15 points since 1967 - believed that the courts were too lenient in
en #
dealing with criminals. The feelings expressed in the letters were also reflective of 
Nixon’s discourse on the issue of law and order and his stand for toughness as 
opposed to leniency and permissiveness.
53 “Letters”, New York Daily News, September 15, 1971, 57.
54 “Letters”, 77.
55 “Letters to the Editor”, New York Times, September 29, 1971, 32.
56 Erskine, “Causes of Crime”, 292.
57 Erskine, “Causes of Crime”, 295.
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A prominent aspect in some public support of the retaking of Attica was the 
presentation of prison inmates as Other. The wife of one Attica prison guard told a 
New York Times reporter: “. . . the inmates aren’t normal humans like you and I -  
we never committed murder.”58 According to this statement, the criminal status of 
the prison inmates set them apart from other Americans and made them abnormal. 
A letter to the Los Angeles Times read: “I regret and feel shocked over the innocent 
lives lost in the horrible Attica fracas. My sympathies go to share the grief of the 
families of the innocent hostages.”59 According to this letter, the inmates killed 
during the retaking somehow deserved their fate, in comparison to the hostages, and 
by association, their families were also guilty and undeserving of sympathy.60 
Another letter to the Los Angeles Times read: “How much longer will we tolerate 
the mentally distorted criminals such as those at Attica? Granted our prisons need 
reform but this was certainly not the purpose at Attica. The attack on those 
criminals was the only language they understood.”61According to this letter, what 
occurred at Attica was not a protest over conditions, but the act of a deranged 
people who were incapable and undeserving of reasoned negotiation and settlement. 
A similar sentiment was expressed in another letter to the New York Daily News 
which read: “Those rioting cons at Attica showed their sincerity in demanding more 
religious freedom and an end to guard brutality by burning down the prison chapel,
58 Quoted in Francis X. Clines, “Attica Has No Fear, But Anger Aplenty”, New York Times, 
September 11, 1971, 31.
59 “Letters”, Los Angeles Times, September 17, 1971, 2.7.
60 See J. Langer, Tabloid Television: Popular Journalism and the ‘Other’ News (London: Routledge, 
1998) for a discussion o f good and bad victims in journalism.
61 “Letters”, Los Angeles Times, September 20, 1971, 2.7.
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fsybrutalizing the guards and throwing one of them from a second story window.” 
According to this letter the demands for reform of the prisoners were superficial 
and it was suggested that the inmates were unworthy of such reforms. The 
representation of the prison rioters as Other echoes Nixon’s discourse on criminals 
and urban rioters.
In contrast to the way prisoners were represented, prison guards were 
presented as courageous and engaged in a difficult, dangerous and under- 
appreciated job. One letter to the New York Daily News read: “Do-gooders and 
bleeding hearts should be made to serve as guards in some of our prisons. If their 
throats were cut, they might change their attitude toward the ‘poor unfortunates’ 
who are imprisoned for crimes they committed.” This letter repeats the theme that 
liberals are out of touch with reality, with grossly misplaced sympathies, wrongly 
portraying criminals as victims. Another letter to the Los Angeles Times made a 
direct correlation between the task faced by police officers and that by prison 
guards: “To be a prison guard, or a policeman is such a dangerous and thankless 
job, it is a wonder that we have people willing to fulfill the task. Perhaps a day will 
come when no one will and we will be forced to draft them or else live in a 
jungle.”64 Prison wardens are presented as unsung heroes, who undertake their job 
out of a sense of personal duty, for which Americans should be grateful. The views 
expressed in these correspondences reflect increasingly popular sentiments
62 “Letters”, 77.
63 “Letters”, New York Daily News, September 15, 1971, 57.
64 “Letters”, 2.7.
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regarding the police during the 1960s, and are also reflective of Nixon’s discourse 
in respect of the police.65
Collectively the public discourses supporting the retaking of Attica illustrate 
the feelings and beliefs that Nixon’s discourse in relation to law and order was 
referring to, tapping into and legitimising. They demonstrate the level of feeling 
regarding law and order, towards permissiveness, and towards those who are 
responsible for crime and the breakdown of law and order. The pubic discourses 
also demonstrate how and why Nixon’s law and order discourse successfully 
appealed to voters. Moreover, Republican discourse on the Attica riot itself served 
to reaffirm the connection between the Republican Party and the law and order 
issue and hence reinforce the appeal of Nixon and the Republican Party to law and 
order voters.
Some of the team of observers had contacted Governor Nelson Rockefeller 
directly to plead with him to come to the prison as a last hope for a peaceful end to 
the riot. They strongly believed that Rockefeller’s presence would give greater 
credit to the 28 points. Rockefeller, however, refused. In a statement he declared:
I have carefully considered the request conveyed to me by the 
Committee of Citizen Observers at Attica, as well as the demands of 
the inmates that I meet with them in the prison yard. . . . The key 
issue at stake, however, is still the demand for total amnesty for any 
criminal act which may have occurred. I do not have the 
constitutional authority to grant such a demand, and I would not, 
even if I had the authority because to do so would undermine the 
very essence of our free society - the fair and impartial application of 
the law. In view of the fact that the key issue is total amnesty - in 
spite of the best efforts of the committee and in spite of
65 Erskine, “Demonstrations and Race Riots”, 659.
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Commissioner Oswald’s major commitments to the inmates - I do 
not feel that my physical presence on the site can contribute to a 
peaceful settlement.66
Rockefeller defended his actions in relation to Attica in a number of ways. Firstly, 
he declared that his decision was based on carefully reasoned judgement. He then 
proceeded to defend his decision not to meet with the prisoners on two grounds. 
Firstly that that he lacked the authority to act upon the issue of amnesty against 
criminal acts perpetrated by the inmates. Secondly, and more importantly, because 
to do so would be to undermine the rule of law. In doing this, Rockefeller is 
sending a clear message regarding his support of the rule of law. Furthermore, 
Rockefeller also sends a clear message in respect of his views of the rioters at 
Attica. Rockefeller presents the inmates at Attica as unreasonable and overly 
demanding; their madate went beyond reform -  a great number of which the state 
was willing to grant -  to the sanctioning of criminal acts, including the wrongful 
death of a prison officer. This is a variant on the theme prevalent in both public and 
political discourse during the late 1960s that African Americans were moving too
fflquickly, and demanding too much.
On the day of the attack, Rockefeller received presidential support during a 
phone call with President Richard Nixon. A few days later Nixon reiterated his 
support of Rockefeller and of the decision to retake Attica by force at a news 
conference. The President stated:
66 Quoted in Badillo and Haynes, A Bill o f  No Rights, 84-85. Oswald had also requested 
Rockefeller’s presence, believing that it would aid acceptance of the 28 points. Rockefeller’s refusal 
was criticised by the McKay Commission.
67 Howard Schuman, Charlotte Steeh, Lawrence Bobo, Racial Attitudes in America: Trends and 
Interpretations (Massachusetts: Harvard University, 1985).
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With regard to Governor Rockefeller’s action.. . .  I can imagine that 
this is the most painful, excruciating experience that Governor 
Rockefeller, a very good man and a very progressive man, has had in 
his term of public service. I knew that he would never have gone this 
far when he called that morning, when I was in the cabinet meeting, 
unless he felt it was the only thing he could possible do to try to save 
some of the guards that were hostages. When a man is in a hard place 
and makes a hard decision and steps up to it, I back him up and I 
don’t try to second-guess him. The next day, when some of the other 
returns come in I still back him. I believe people in public positions, 
heads of government or Prime Ministers, or maybe even Presidents, 
cannot give in to demands for ransom, as was the demand made in 
this instance.68
Nixon presents and defends Rockefeller’s decision to retake Attica as an act of 
statesmanship. His overarching message is that the forceful retaking of Attica was 
unavoidable in order to uphold the rule of law and to save the lives of those being 
held hostage. Additionally, Nixon defends the retaking by stressing Rockefeller’s 
personal virtues, inviting the audience to sympathise with the enormity of the 
decision taken, whilst making only a veiled reference to the grisly outcome of the 
riot.
Other Republican discourse also served to affirm the connection between 
the Republican Party and law and order. Speaking at a Governors’ convention in 
Puerto Rico, then California Governor Ronald Reagan, expressed his sorrow that 
hostages were killed in the attack but also defended the attack, stating: “I don’t 
think that you can allow prison authorities to be intimidated just because hostages
68 President Richard Nixon, “Transcript of the President’s News Conference on Foreign and 
Domestic Matters”, New York Times, September 17, 1971, 27.
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have been seized.”69 Shortly after the retaking, Rockefeller was present at the 
Rockland County Republican Organisation’s 6th annual marina fundraiser. During 
his introduction by the Republican County Chairman, Carmine Freda declared that 
had Rockefeller “. . . not made the decision the rule of law would have been 
completely destroyed.” Freda added that Rockefeller had “. . . saved this nation for 
law and order.”70 When Rockefeller entered the stage he received a standing 
ovation.
Vice President Spiro Agnew echoed Nixon’s support and defended the 
assault at Attica in an interview with the New York Times. Agnew stated:
To position the ‘demands’ of convicted felons in a place of equal 
dignity with legitimate aspirations of law abiding American citizens 
represents not simply an assault on human sensibility but an insult to 
reason. Worst of all it gives status and seeming respectability to the 
extremists in our society whose purpose it is to exacerbate rather than 
ameliorate the problems of race relations - the very problems to 
which the spokesmen, in this instance allude. . . .  In taking the 
necessary steps to end the confrontation at Attica, Governor 
Rockefeller acted courageously. Those who would have had him act 
otherwise have yet to learn the paramount lessons of our century; that 
acquiescence to the demands of the criminal element of any society 
only begets greater violence.71
Like Nixon, Agnew defends and presents Rockefeller’s actions as the necessary 
upholding of law and order in the country. Agnew also marginalises the rioters and 
presents them as outlaws who have no right to make demands upon society. He also
69 Ronald Reagan quoted in John Damton, “Attica Reaction Widens: Prison Reform Proposed”, New 
York Times, September 15, 1971, 33.
70 Quoted in William E. Farrell, “Rockefeller’s Applauded After Allusion to Attica”, New York 
Times, September 23, 1971, 66.
71 Spiro T. Agnew, “The Root Causes of Attica”, New York Times, September 17, 1971, 41.
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questions the motives of the rioters, accusing them of seeking to increase racial 
hostilities. In doing this, Agnew makes a direct link between Attica and the race 
issue in America.
Race was an intrinsic element in Nixon’s discourse in relation to law and 
order, and Attica and the breakdown in law and order that it symbolised was clearly 
perceived in racial terms by some Americans. The mother of one hostage stated of 
the rioting prisoners: “Kill the black bastards and be done with it.”72 Following the 
retaking, when a list of freed hostages was released at the front entrance of Attica 
prison one guard turned to reporters and shouted “White power!” Some 
Americans also perceived an element of racial permissiveness to the riot. The wife 
of the Mayor of Attica blamed the rioting on authorities “. . . letting the coloreds . . 
.” promote trouble in the prison.74 Residents in Attica town also complained to 
reporters that they were only interested in hearing and reporting on “. . . ‘the 
darkies” side of the story.”75 This sentiment echoed the theme of over-attention on 
racial issues and on the grievances and complaints of African Americans to the 
neglect of whites, which was increasingly prevalent during the 1960s and early 
1970s.76
72 Quoted in Joel N. Sharkin, “Outside Attica Walls, a City o f Hate”, Washington Post, September 
15, 1971,6.
73 Quoted in Sharkin, “Outside Attica Walls”, 6.
74 Quoted in Francis X. Clines, “Resentment Rife in Attica Homes”, New York Times, September 12, 
1971,73.
75 Quoted in “Fearful Attica”, Los Angeles Times, September 17, 1971, 20.
76 See Chapter 2.
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In the days following the retaking rumours abounded that hordes of African 
Americans from the inner-city were congregating on the outskirts of the town 
waiting to mount a revenge attack. One villager claimed:
I know of men, more than just a couple, who have already sent their 
families away to stay with relatives. . . . And I can tell you this. The 
whole damn town is an armed camp, everybody’s loaded their 
shotguns and rifles and them that didn’t have weapons have them 
now.
This statement evokes the mythological image of the big, black threat from which 
white men must protect their women, children and homes from invasion. Another 
resident proclaimed: “No one is going to do any damage to me. I have no qualms at 
all about protecting myself. If a militant colored guy ever comes in my yard, he’s
77dead.” This resident not only echoes the sense of outside threat and the 
determination to respond to such a threat, but also makes reference to the growing
70
militancy of African Americans during the 1960s. The theme of the black threat 
was also expressed in a letter to the Washington Post, which read:
Complaints about prison conditions really were cover up excuses. 
We heard the usual complaints about guard brutality, poor food, and 
political impoverishment. Anyone watching the weekend telecasts, 
however, could see that this was a revolution pure and simple, plus
77 Quoted in “Fearful Attica”, 20.
78 Thomas L. Blair, Retreat to the Ghetto: The End o f  a Dream (London: Wildwood House, 1977); 
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ugly racism -  black racism, not white. The brutal and overdemanding 
convicts know that they were ultimately going to kill those hostages, 
no matter what. And it would be poppy cock for anyone to attempt to 
explain away the convicts’ actions with the oft-heard cliches that, 
after all, they were (1) innocent ‘victims of our society’ (2) in prison 
‘only because they were black’, or (3) were ‘political prisoners’. 
Governor Rockefeller did exactly the right thing. And now let’s not
70have the courts get lenient with these murderous convicts.
In this letter the Attica riot is presented as a serious and unjust attack upon 
American society, spurred by anti-white racism. The Attica rioters are presented as 
brutal and over-demanding, echoing two themes. Firstly, that of the brutish black 
male, and secondly, that of African Americans pushing too far and too fast. The 
letter also denounces liberal tendencies to view African-American prisoners as 
victims of a racist society and urges the courts to follow Rockefeller’s lead in 
taking a tough stand against the rioters, making reference to the widespread feeling 
that the courts were too lenient on criminals. In 1968 63% of Americans stated that 
courts in their area did not deal harshly enough with criminals. This figure 
increased to 75% in 1969 and stood at 74% in 1973.80 A Gallup poll in 1972 
reported that the majority of Americans cited lenient penalties as the main cause of
Q  -I
the high crime rate in the country. Similarly a poll in 1972 found that 83% of 
Americans believed that police and other law enforcement agencies should be 
tougher in dealing with crime and lawlessness.
The majority of Americans who supported the retaking of Attica on the 
grounds of law and order did so for aracial reasons. Only a significant few of
79 “Letters”, Washington Post, September 19, 1971, D7.
80 Erskine, “The Causes o f Crime”, 294.
81 Erskine, “The Causes o f Crime”, 293.
82 Erskine, “The Causes o f Crime”, 296.
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Americans interpreted Attica and the issue of law and order in clear, negative racial 
terms. Yet, their discourse reveals the racial sentiments and beliefs that Nixon was 
covertly tapping into and legitimising with his law and order appeals, and illustrates 
how the issue of law and order could be used as a coded racial appeal to some white 
voters.
There were, of course, many public discourses surrounding the Attica riot 
and the retaking. Not all Americans regarded the retaking as a victory for law and 
order, perceiving it instead as nothing short of a massacre. A number of Americans 
were also supportive of the situation of African-American inmates in American 
prisons and empathised with the Attica rioters. Furthermore, a number of 
Americans were highly suspicious and critical of the role race played in attitudes 
towards the riot and retaking. Yet, this oppositional, or counter discourse served to 
further racialise the Attica event and the law and order debate.
There was a great deal of sorrow and regret expressed over the grisly 
outcome of the Attica retaking. A letter to the Los Angeles Times described the 
Attica retaking as an extension of America’s heavy-handed approach abroad, of 
military prowess gone awry: “And so the war comes home. America has its first My 
Lai, also known as Attica. We see the ‘destroy the town in order to save it’ and ‘kill 
anything that moves’ syndrome.”83 In making reference to the war in Vietnam in 
this way, this statement is a reversal of Nixon’s discourse and his use of the war in 
Vietnam to buttress the problem of law and order at home. As well as opposing the 
hardline approach of the retaking, a number of Americans were also troubled by the
83 “Letters”, 2.7.
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racial element that seemed to be visible in the Attica event. One letter to the 
Washington Post read: “As one American I am deeply distressed and consider it my 
duty to remain critical of the quality of our democracy until such time as I no longer 
have to say to myself ‘Thank God I was bom white.’”84 According to this letter, the 
paradoxical co-existence of racial inequality with the American democratic 
tradition had not been completely resolved.
In defending the Attica rioters, some Americans presented African- 
American prisoners such as those at Attica, as victims of a racist society. Professor 
Robert Chrisman declared: “Most black offences have their roots in the political 
and economic deprivation of black Americans by the Anglo-American state, and 
these are the primary causes and conditions of black crimes.”85 Clifford Rollins, 
former inmate at Soledad prison, regarded the prisoners at Attica as symbolic of the 
new generation of African Americans in America’s prisons:
No longer do black prisoners play the sycophant’s game of ‘pleasing 
the powers’. . . . They are in tune with contemporary social and 
political scenes in the free world; they take an interest in elevating 
their perception, have principles and are morally and ethically 
aware.86
Rollins presents African-American prisoners as being engaged in a socio-political 
and psychological revolution. This view echoed those that appeared during the
84 “Letters”, D7.
85 Quoted in C. Gerald Fraser, “Black Prisoners Embrace New View o f Themselves as Political 
Victims”, New York Times, September 16, 1971, 49.
86 Quoted in Fraser, “Black Prisoners Embrace”, 49.
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1960s with regards to the changing psychology of young, urban African 
Americans.87
In another letter to the Los Angeles Times a reader presented the riot at 
Attica as a racial protest, which was borne out of the racial oppression that African 
Americans suffered in American society. The letter read:
Surprisingly, little was made of the fact that this was largely a racial 
confrontation. It was mentioned that the leaders of the rebellious 
faction were black, and that all of the guards taken hostage were 
white; this is no coincidence. Doesn’t the fact that 85% of the 
prison’s population is made up of blacks and Puerto Ricans make it 
abundantly clear that the problems were much deeper than the 
lawlessness of a few inmates? Many of these prisoners have known 
nothing but poverty, oppression, and hostility all their lives, and 
frankly have very little to lose whatever the outcome.88
As well as interpreting the riot in racial terms, a number of Americans also regarded 
the retaking of Attica as an extension of racial oppression. One letter to the 
Washington Post read:
The killings at Attica come as no shock, certainly no shock to black 
people. It is nothing new that white men have been murdering black 
men since this country was founded. From slavery through civil 
rights marches, through riots and the framing of the black panthers, 
black men have been murdered by white police in the name of law 
and order, preservation of freedom. . . . Only the whites will be 
surprised, so-called liberals especially, who deny the existence of 
their own racism and cannot face it when it looks them in the eye. 
Racism takes on new levels of subtlety amongst these people; it is 
hidden in their wealth and education and only shows its face when
87 T. M. Tomilson, “The Development o f a Riot Ideology Among Urban Negroes”, American 
Behavioral Scientist 11.4 (1968): 27-31; Nathan Caplan, “The New Ghetto Man: A Review of 
Recent Empirical Studies”, Journal o f  Social Issues 26.1 (1970): 59-73; David O. Sears and John B. 
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we get an Attica in one of its many forms. Suddenly the violence of 
white racism explodes and becomes clearly evident; but few see it as 
being racism. Their rationalization is: ‘we’ve tried everything . . .’, 
‘give them every benefit,’ ‘how do you deal with people who act like 
animals?’ ‘It’s terrible but what else could they doT  And so on, untilQA
a month from now it’s all forgotten, by the white liberal that is . . .
Here the writer places Attica within the context of a broader history of violent 
suppression of African Americans by whites, historically justified by the issue of 
law and order. It is an attack on whites who deny the existence of racism, both 
personal and within society, and who perpetuate it through the (mis)use of moral 
reasoning.
Some African-American leaders also identified the retaking of Attica as an 
act of racism and racial oppression. Lapolis Ashford, Executive Director of 
Chicago’s Urban League, regarded the retaking as evidence of the “. . . cancerous 
racism” in America’s institutions.90 Newark’s Mayor, Kenneth Gibson, condemned 
the retaking of Attica as “. . . one of the most callous and blatantly repressive acts 
ever carried out by a supposedly civilised society.”91 He continued to say, “When 
we look at prison conditions and the brutal use of force at Attica, we see the same 
face of racism which caused and then put down with force civil disturbances in this 
country’s ghettoes.”92 According to Gibson, the Attica riot, like the urban riots of 
the 1960s, represented the African-American protest against American racism and it 
was that very racism that emerged to destroy it. The fact that African-American
89 “Letters”, D7.
90 Lapolis Ashford, executive director o f Chicago’s Urban League, quoted in “Racism ignited 
Attica”, Chicago Defender, September 16, 1971, 3.
91 Quoted in “War at Attica: Was There No Other Way?”, Time, September 27, 1971, 11.
92 Quoted in Damton, “Attica Reaction Widens”, 33.
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leaders were making such statements, helped fuel the association between Attica 
and urban racial unrest, which in turn helped to fuel the perception of Attica as part 
of the wider problem of black lawlessness.
The media, in its capacity to not only reflect but also to construct public 
opinion, played an integral role in terms of affirming the connection between the 
Republican Party and law and order in light of Republican responses to the Attica 
riot, and also of aiding the racialisation of the law and order debate surrounding 
Attica through its dissemination of the various discourses outlined above. The 
media, however, also aided the interjection of race into the law and order debate 
surrounding Attica in other ways.
Firstly, as has been illustrated, the Attica riot was not just a reaction or 
protest over prison conditions, there were undeniably racial elements to the riot. 
The leaders as well as the majority of rioters were African-American. They cited 
racial grievances and demanded racial reforms amidst more general issues, all of 
which were negotiated with the assistance of prominent African Americans and 
Civil Rights leaders. As well as reporting these racial aspects of the riot, various 
racial statements were made by rioters in D-yard, which were reported in the press. 
For example, the New York Times reported that during the reading aloud of rioters’ 
demands on day one of the riot “. . . the words ‘racists’ and ‘pigs’ were shouted 
out.” The report also printed the statement issued aloud by one of the riot leaders. It
93 For an analysis o f the media’s role in constructing public opinion see Justin Lewis, Constructing 
Public Opinion: How Political Elites do What They Like and Why We Seem To Go Along With It 
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read: “The entire incident that has erupted here at Attica is a result . . .  of the 
unmitigated oppression wrought by the racist administration network of this 
prison.”94 Some press reports on the riot also overestimated the size of the black 
population at Attica. For example, an article in Time on September 20, reported that 
African Americans and Puerto Ricans made up 85% of prisoners. Also, another 
article in Time on September 27 stated that 75% of the prison population was 
African American and Puerto Rican.95
The media also reported on and participated in the debate concerning the 
role of race in the riot and the retaking, all of which aided the perception of Attica 
in racial terms by the public. One of the most prominent debates concerned the 
origin of the riot. A number of officials, participants and commentators identified 
the riot as the organised work of black militants. In a statement on the day of the 
retaking of the prison, Rockefeller blamed the riot on the “. . . revolutionary tactics 
of militants” and stated that “. . . outside forces would appear to have played a role 
in bringing it on.”96 A report to executive deputy commissioner, Walter Dunbar, by 
parole officers assigned to investigate the riot cited that the riot was the result of a 
“. . . long thought out, well-organised plot, conceived and implemented by a group
07of hard core radical extremists mostly from the New York City area.” The 
national press also quoted both officers and inmates stating that the riot was the
94 Fred Ferretti, “Convicts Revolt at Attica, Hold 32 Guards Hostage”, New York Times, September 
10, 1971, 1.
95 “Prisons: Uprising at Attica”, Time, September 20, 1971, 15; “War at Attica”, 11.
96 Quoted in William E. Farrell, “Rockefeller Sees a Plot at Prison”, New York Times September 14, 
1971, 1,30.
97 Quoted in. McKay Report, 104.
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work of a minority of radicals. For example, one white inmate told the National 
Review:
The rebellion was instigated and carried out by no more than 10% of 
the prison population. They were radical political fanatics. They 
belonged to the Black Panthers, People’s Liberation Party, Young 
Lords and Sam Melville’s group of commie fanatics. . . . They 
wanted a rebellion for political reasons.98
A prison officer in the Los Angeles Times blamed the riot on black militants. The 
officer stated: “That riot didn’t happen because we beat or harmed the prisoners. 
That riot happened because those black militants wanted to take over the damn 
place and run it on their own terms.”99
A central factor fuelling support for the retaking of Attica was the belief that 
the surviving hostages had only narrowly escaped death at the hands of the 
prisoners -  a belief greatly buttressed by the freed hostages’ stories, which were 
widely reported in the press. Moreover, some of these hostages’ stories were 
distinctly racial. Hostage Ron Kozlowski told reporters: “They told us, ‘as soon as 
the first shot is fired, you white blankety-blanks have had it.’”100 Similarly, Captain 
Elmer Huehn stated: “They held a knife to my throat. But the Puerto Rican guy 
didn’t have the heart to do it. Some of the others weren’t so lucky.”101
98 Quoted in McKay Report, 104.
99 Quoted in “Fearful Attica”, 20.
100 Quoted in Joseph Lelyveld, “A Hostage Says Threats Left Him Scared Silly”, New York Times, 
September 14, 1971, 1.
101 Quoted in “3 Killed as Troopers Storm New York Prison”, Chicago Tribune, September 14, 
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The law and order debate surrounding Attica was also racialised by media 
opinion itself, which presented the Attica event in overt racial terms. An article in 
the New York Times read:
The uprising was viewed as the result of tension that had been 
building up in Attica for some time. In addition to the customary 
complaints about services, there were the added ingredients of a 
predominantly black body of prisoners being controlled by an armed 
white force and the increasing political and radical awareness of
107black prisoners that often infuriated the guards.
In this piece the Attica riot is presented primarily as not a protest over conditions, 
but rather of racial tension arising out of the changing psychology of African- 
American prisoners. A number of media articles were also critical of the decision to 
retake Attica, perceiving the decision as racially motivated. As the Amsterdam 
News pondered: “And if the rebelling prisoners had been predominantly white - or
1 mall white? Would public pressure have been the same?” Some media articles also 
reported on the perception of Attica’s African-American rioters as Other. An article 
in the New York Times stated: “The rebellious prisoners were black men for whom 
there was neither sympathy nor compassion.”104 Another article in the Los Angeles 
Times stated:
. . . as far as the villagers are concerned the slain prisoners were 
black revolutionaries. And in a village of about 3,000 people, none of 
whom are black, many of who openly distrust persons who are black,
102 Fred Ferretti, “9 Hostages and 28 Prisoners Die as 1,000 Storm Prison in Attica; 28 Rescued, 
Scores Injured”, New York Times, September 14, 1971, 28.
103 Floyd McKissick, “No Other Way at Attica”, Amsterdam News, October 2, 1971, 7.
104 Editorial, “Attica Senseless Killings”, New York Times, September 16, 1971, 19.
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the fact that 32 prisoners died was coincidental to the fact that 10 
villagers died.105
This sentiment was also repeated in the New York Times: “Prisoners, particularly 
black prisoners, in all too many cases are neither considered nor treated as human 
beings. And since they are not, neither are their families.”106
Like public opinion, media opinion surrounding Attica was varied and not 
all media opinion interpreted or presented Attica in overt racial terms. An editorial 
in the New York Times on the day following the retaking was hugely critical of the 
deaths at Attica. The New York Times stated:
The deaths of these persons by knives and gunfire reflect a barbarism 
wholly alien to civilized society. Prisoners slashed the throats of 
utterly helpless, unarmed hostages whom they had held captive 
through the around-the-clock negotiations, in which the inmates held 
put for an increasingly revolutionary set of demands. Police Officers 
storming into the prison to rescue the hostages and restore order were 
stirred to savage retaliation by the horror within. . . . Certainly the 
progressive unreasonableness shown by some of the prisoners and 
the holding of knives at the throats of the hostages provided much 
basis for the official conclusion that neither compromise nor delay 
could effect any thing useful. It was the prisoners’ intransigence 
when confronted with a final appeal ‘to achieve a peaceful resolution 
of the situation’ that left the prison strewn with the dead. . . . Out of 
yesterday’s holocaust must come a recognition that the nation has 
been living on borrowed time in its failure to correct the abysmal 
conditions that make life intolerable in Attica and virtually every 
other penal institution. It is unfair to correctional officers as it is to
1 (Y1prisoners to have such conditions continue.
105 “Fearful Attica”, 20.
106 Tom Wicker, “The Inmates at Attica”, New York Times, September 16, 1971, 43.
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While this piece denounced the deaths of both hostages and prisoners, the retaking 
of Attica is nonetheless presented as inevitable. Authorities are presented as having 
done everything possible to end the riot while the rioters not only refused to 
compromise but increased their demands and threats against the hostages. 
Furthermore, the deaths of the hostages are presented as calculated and savage acts, 
while the death of the inmates are presented as defensive acts in response to the 
actions of the rioters. The piece appears to accept the notorious conditions, which 
had instigated the riot and supports the move for prison reform, yet, this is out of 
empathy with prison officers as much as with prisoners themselves. An article in 
the Washington Post on the day after the retaking also lamented the horrific 
outcome of the riot but considered the retaking as inevitable. As the Washington 
Post stated:
The death of the hostages was a horrible price to pay for regaining 
control of the prison and nothing anyone can say will make that less 
horrible. But the price demanded by the prisoners for the immediate 
freedom of the hostages - amnesty for all, including those who had 
fatally injured another guard last week - was even higher. If New 
York officials had yielded on that demand, they would have set an 
example that would bring more terror to prisons throughout the 
country, for there would then be a terrible precedent; the word would 
be out that a convict has only to kill a guard or grab a hostage in 
order to go free.108
According to the piece, the forceful retaking of Attica was a necessary stand for law 
and order to safeguard prison officers throughout the nation’s prison institutions.
108 slaughter as Attica”, Washington Post, September 14, 1971, 18.
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Media opinion also engaged in the discourse of inmate as Other. An 
editorial in the New York Daily News offered its sympathies to the hostages killed 
during the retaking and to their families, and advocated the swift application of 
justice in respect of their deaths, whilst making no mention of the dead prisoners. 
The editorial read: “37 persons, including 9 hostages were killed -  the hostage 
slayings were murders which we hope will be swiftly, lawfully, and completely 
avenged: and deepest sympathy to these men’s families and friends.”109 Another 
editorial in the New York Daily News read:
9 hostages were killed. Those who were rescued . . . were held in 
terror of their lives for four days by savages and semi-savages who 
deserve -  well, let’s just say they deserve swift and complete justice, 
and it is up to appropriate prosecutors and judges to see they get 
exactly that.110
In this piece again, the inmates of Attica are presented in overtly negative terms and 
it advocates the swift and tough application of justice against the rioters.
Others in the media offered support to the Attica rioters. Anthony Lewis of 
the New York Times argued that the rioters at Attica were justified in making their 
protest about prison conditions and compared the Attica rioters with historical 
freedom-fighting groups, stating:
Those of us who can take for granted the advantages of life in a 
political democracy should beware of smugness in denouncing the 
use of violence to change the system. It is too early to say that violent 
tactics can never be justified. Was it wrong for the American 
colonists to take arms against King George and his ministers? Were
109 “Editorial”, New York Daily News, September 14, 1971, 31.
110 “Editorial”, New York Daily News, September 15, 1971, 57.
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Jewish underground groups wrong in their activities in Mandatory 
Palestine, or Algerians in their guerrilla war against the French? 
Would it have been morally illegitimate for the inmates of a German 
concentration camp to use force against their oppressors if  they could 
have done so effectively?111
An article in the Amsterdam News also denounced the retaking and presented the 
riot as a justified protest.
The events leading up to this horrible slaughterhouse orgy of murder 
of humans, who had been goaded beyond the endurance of human 
mind and body, outdoes any horror movie of prison riots, any 
coldblooded magazine story, or actual experience of modem times. 
The taking of the lives of men by authorities who are supposed to be 
engaged in preparing these same human beings for a new life outside 
prison walls was bestial. Despite the fact that they had erred, 
convicted and taken away from the outside world for a determined, 
or undetermined time to pay for their sins, these men sought only 
dignity.112
According to this piece, the riot is presented as a reaction to inhumane conditions 
and a justified protest to be treated humanely.
Some media opinion was also suspicious of the political motives underlying 
the decision to retake Attica. John Hamilton pondered in the New York Times, the 
effect this would have on Rockefeller’s career. He stated that, “In the aftermath of 
Attica, the bloodiest prison uprising in all American history, Governor Rockefeller 
may well emerge with a new political image in much of the country.”113 Indeed he 
did, and in 1974 he received the Ford nomination for the Vice Presidency. At the 
time of the riot Rockefeller was a potential presidential candidate, but his liberal
111 Anthony Lewis, “The Price of Violence”, New York Times, September 17, 1971, 29.
112 Dick Edwards, “Before, After the Killings”, Amsterdam News, September 18, 1971, 1.
113 John A. Hamilton, “Rockefeller Revisited”, New York Times, September 19, 1971, 25.
image was proving to be a hindrance.114 His decision to retake Attica by force was a 
bow to political pressure. In sworn statements in a class-action suit on behalf of 
Attica prisoners in 1987, two prominent New Yorkers who had been part of the 
observers team gave new accounts of conversations they had with Rockefeller 
before the assault. Clarence Jones, publisher of the Amsterdam News, stated that 
Rockefeller:
Clearly accepted the inevitability of a massacre, and the question was 
not whether it would occur, but when. . . . During our phone 
conversation Governor Rockefeller was indifferent to our report to 
him that the situation was not hopeless, and that much could still be 
done to avoid disaster.
Representative Herman Badillo stated that:
Rockefeller responded that he had a stack of telegrams on his desk 
urging him to storm the prison and that there was overwhelming 
political pressure and sentiment to send in troops. Rockefeller 
indicated to me that he had no choice but to accede to that pressure 
regardless of the consequences to the hostages.115
Rockefeller’s decision to retake Attica by force was clearly therefore a politically 
motivated demonstration of his acquiescence to the Nixon administration’s tough 
stand on law and order.
Media opinion surrounding the Attica riot, as such, like public opinion, was 
varied. Yet, some media opinion in relation to Attica was distinctly racial and
114 Greene, The Limits o f  Power, O’Reilly, Nixon’s Piano', Wills, Nixon Agonistes.
115 Quoted in Elizabeth Kolbert, “Court Awards $1.3m to Inmate Victims of Attica Attack”, New 
York Times, October 26, 1989, B1-B2.
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coupled with the dissemination of the racial elements to the riot, the media did play 
a significant role in racialising the event and law and order debate in the public 
mind. In discussing the role of the media in constructing public opinion with 
regards Attica, however, it is also important to acknowledge that the American 
public were susceptible to influence by law and order discourse other than that of 
Nixon’s. Yet, as an analysis of public discourse surrounding Attica demonstrates, 
there was a clear link between Nixon’s law and order discourse and that of the 
American public in general.
Public discourse surrounding the Attica prison riot illustrates how the coded 
racial political issue of law and order is reproduced in American society. Law and 
order and the need for toughness on the issue, was clearly an important issue for a 
significant proportion of Americans and demonstrates the feelings and beliefs that 
Nixon’s law and order discourse was tapping into and legitimising. Furthermore, 
Republican Party responses to the riot served to reaffirm the appeal of the party to 
law and order voters. While for the majority of Americans, law and order was 
perceived in consciously aracial terms, with only a significant few interpreting the 
riot and the law and order debate in overt racial terms, the media’s role in 
disseminating the various discourses surrounding Attica served to help racialise the 
Attica event and heighten both the conscious and unconscious identification of law 
and order in racial terms.
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CHAPTER 4
Carter and Preferential Treatment:
The Miami Riot, 1980
4.1 The Carter Presidency: 1977 -1981
Gerald Ford issued a modest Southern Strategy revival in the 1976 
presidential election campaign. Ford calculated that Watergate had temporarily 
damaged the Republican Party’s reputation among white voters too much to 
discount the importance of the African-American vote. Aware that he was unlikely 
to capture many African-American votes himself, the Ford campaign strategy was 
to limit further alienation of African-American voters and discourage anti-Ford 
feelings on Election Day.1 The strategy was not much of a success and the African- 
American vote in the North and South provided the margin of victory for Jimmy 
Carter in 12 states.2 In total Carter received 83% of the African-American vote. 
Carter also succeeded in winning back a sizeable proportion of the white vote -
1 Kenneth O ’Reilly, Nixon’s Piano: Presidents and Racial Politics From Washington to Clinton 
(New York: The Free Press, 1995). For a discussion o f the Ford presidency, in addition to works 
cited, see Gerald R. Ford, A Time to Heal: The Autobiography o f  Gerald R. Ford (London: WH 
Allen, 1979); John R. Greene, The Limits o f  Power: The Nixon and Ford Administrations
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992);______ , The Presidency o f  Gerald R. Ford (Kansas:
University Press of Kansas, 1995); A. James Richey, Conservatives in an Age o f  Change: The Nixon 
and Ford Administrations (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 1981).
2 O’Reilly, Nixon’s Piano, 336. See also John Dumbrell, The Carter Presidency: A Re-evaluation 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995), 88; Chuck Stone, “Black Political Power in the 
Carter Era”, Black Scholar (January/February 1977): 6-15.
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48% compared to Ford’s 52%.3 He has also won all the former Confederate
territories expect Virginia, as well as most of the Northeast. Carter’s success in 
1976, however, was far removed from the achievements of the Democratic Party 
during the New Deal era. Moreover, during his presidency, white support of the 
Democratic Party eroded further.4 One of the principal reasons contributing to this 
was the issue of affirmative action, which was most potently symbolised during the 
Carter administration by Regents o f the University o f California V. Bakke (1978).5
Affirmative action, initially conceived by President John F. Kennedy to seek 
out minorities in hiring processes, subsequently developed into a wide-ranging 
initiative that can be broadly defined as encompassing policies that take positive 
steps to promote equality for specific groups. These include programs to increase 
minority hiring and admissions to universities, and economic and social aid for 
minorities.6 According to the predominant racial ideology of the post-Civil Rights 
era, however, in the egalitarian society that had been established through the efforts 
of the Civil Rights movement, affirmative action, as well as undermining the age-
3 Ian Derbyshire, Politics in the United States: From Carter to Reagan (London: Chambers, 1987), 
79.
4 For a discussion o f the Carter presidency, in addition to works cited, see Peter G. Bourne, Jimmy 
Carter: A Comprehensive Biography From Plains to Post Presidency (New York: Scribner, 1997); 
Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs o f  a President (New York: Bantam Books, 1982); Betty 
Glad, Jimmy Carter: In Search o f  the Great White House (New York: Norton, 1980); Charles O. 
Jones, The Trusteeship Presidency: Jimmy Carter and the United States Congress (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1988); Burton I. Kaufman, The Presidency o f  James Earl Carter 
Jr. (Kansas: University Press o f Kansas, 1993).
5 Allan Bakke, having twice been denied admittance to the Davis medical school at the University of  
California, challenged a special minority admissions program that accepted students with lower test 
scores and lesser qualifications than his own. Carter’s response to the Bakke case, in which he 
affirmed his belief in affirmative action, but denounced racial quotas as unconstitutional, proved 
unsatisfactory to the large number o f whites who opposed affirmative action.
6 Although affirmative action is traditionally perceived as programs to increase minority hiring and 
admissions to universities, Howard Schuman made the observation that economic and social aid are 
legitimate affirmative action issues. Charlotte Steeh and Maria Kryson, “Affirmative Action and the 
Public 1970-1993”, Public Opinion Quarterly 60 (1996): 128-158.
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old American value of individualism, was unnecessary and/or unjust. Affirmative 
action as such became increasingly perceived as preferential treatment, which 
resulted in reverse discrimination against whites.7
Hostility towards perceived preferential treatment naturally intensified 
during periods of economic recession. The American economy had been in decline 
since the early 1970s, and as the decade progressed and stagflation took hold, 
Americans had to deal with the dilapidating effects of de-industrialisation and rising
O , .
unemployment. In such an environment, a significant proportion of white 
Americans grew increasingly hostile to government efforts aimed at aiding specific 
groups, such as African Americans.
White hostility towards affirmative action was not only a reaction to the 
growing economic hardship they faced, it was also predicated on the belief that 
African Americans had received all reasonable demands for equality. This was 
symbolised by the growth of the black middle-class. For many whites, the growth 
of the black middle-class seemed to belie the need for any further government aid 
to African Americans: race was no longer a barrier to social progress. Yet, while it
7 For a discussion o f affirmative action see Lawrence Bobo, “Race and Beliefs about Affirmative 
Action” in David O. Sears, Jim Sidanius, Lawrence Bobo (eds.), Racialized Politics: The Debate 
About Racism in America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000); Steven M. Cahn, The 
Affirmative Action Debate (London: Routledge, 1995); Erwin Chemerinsky, “Making Sense o f the 
Affirmative Action Debate” in John Highman (ed.), Civil Rights and Social Wrongs: Black-White 
Relations Since World War //(Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997); Lawrence 
H. Fuchs, “The Changing Meaning o f Civil Rights, 1954-1994” in Highman (ed.), Civil Rights and 
Social Wrongs; Nathan Glazer, Affirmative Discrimination: Ethnic Inequality and Public Policy 
(Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1987); Samuel L. Myers (ed.), Civil Rights and Race 
Relations in the Post Reagan-Bush Era (London: Praeger, 1997); Steeh and Kryson, “Affirmative 
Action and the Public 1970-1993”.
8 For a discussion o f the economic decline o f the 1970s see Harry Magdoff and Paul M. Sweeny, 
The End o f  Prosperity: The American Economy in the 1970s (New York: Monthly Review Press, 
1977); Howard J. Sherman, Stagflation: A Radical Theory o f  Unemployment and Inflation (London: 
Harper and Row, 1976).
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was true that African Americans had made significant advances in terms of levels 
of education, occupational status and income they still lagged behind whites.9 
Furthermore, despite the emergence of a new black-middle class, the proportion of 
African Americans living in poverty had only declined one percentage point, from 
34% in 1970 to 33% in 1979.10 Yet, in the same way that many whites believed that 
the black middle-class was proof that race was no longer a barrier to socio­
economic progress, many whites perceived that the problem of the black urban poor 
was not attributable to race either. This belief was legitimised by the new 
theoretical models developed by social scientists to explain the black ‘underclass’, 
the most notable being William Julius Wilson’s The Declining Significance o f 
Race.n Other theorists, such as Charles Murray, blamed Great Society legislation 
itself for the persistence of poverty, insisting that it had created a culture of 
dependency.12
Arguments against affirmative action were for the most part race-neutral as
1 3opposed to evidence of widespread racism. Yet, whether arguments against and
9 For a discussion o f the black middle-class see Andrew Hacker, Two Nations: Black and White, 
Separate, Hostile and Unequal (New York: Ballantine Books, 1992); Bart Landry, The New Black 
Middle-Class (Los Angeles: University o f California Press, 1987); Manning Marable, Race, Reform 
and Rebellion: The Second Reconstruction in Black America, 1945-1990 (Mississippi: University of 
Mississippi Press, 1991); Alphonso Pinkney, The Myth o f  Black Progress (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994).
10 Bob Blauner, Black Lives, White Lives: Three Decades o f  Race Relations in America (California: 
University o f California Press, 1989), 168.
11 William Julius Wilson in The Declining Significance o f  Race: Blacks and Changing Institutions 
(Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1978) argues that the problems of subordination for certain 
sections o f the African-American population and experiences o f social advancement for others are 
more directly associated with economic class than race.
12 Charles Murray, Losing Ground: American Social Policy 1950-1980 (New York: Basic Books, 
1984).
13 Along with defying the value of individualism and giving preference to one group over another, 
opposition to affirmative action was also made on the grounds that it resulted in feelings of  
victimisation and undeserved achievement.
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opposition to affirmative action were race-neutral or not, the results were inimical 
to black needs.14 Moreover, affirmative action was not an aracial issue, particularly 
politically. Affirmative action - especially when presented as preferential treatment 
- was a major tool with which to win white votes. Like law and order, preferential 
treatment tapped into conscious and unconscious racial feelings among a significant 
proportion of white voters. Along with the economy and the Iranian hostage crisis, 
one of the major reasons behind Carter’s defeat in 1980 was Ronald Reagan’s 
successful appeal to white voters on the issue of affirmative action.15 As Kenneth 
O’Reilly put it: “Carter never quite understood that Allan Bakke was speaking for 
Nixon’s silent and forgotten majority.”16 For a significant proportion of white 
voters, Reagan was the man who would restore stability and prosperity and would 
put an end to policies that favoured certain groups over other groups and 
individuals. When Reagan spoke of ‘. . . getting the government off the back of 
Americans’, for a significant number of voters, this meant an end to busing, quotas 
and expensive social spending.17
This chapter, through the method of discourse analysis, will examine 
Carter’s discourse in relation to affirmative action. It will demonstrate that 
throughout his presidency, Carter clearly established his support of the policy.
14 Michael Omi and Howard Winant regard the assault on affirmative action - especially the stress 
on an egalitarian and colour-blind society - as part o f the rearticulation o f racism in the post-Civil 
Rights era. Michael Omi and Howard Winant, Racial Formation in the United States: From the 
1960s to the 1990s (New York: Routledge, 1994).
15 Dan T. Carter, From George Wallace to Newt Gingrich: Race in the Conservative 
Counterrevolution. 1963-1994 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1996); O’Reilly, 
Nixon’s Piano\ Fred Siegel, “Race: The Missing Issue of 1980”, Dissent 29.4 (1982): 479-483.
16 O’Reilly, Nixon’s Piano, 345.
17 Siegel, “The Missing Issue o f 1980”, 482-483. See also Carter, From George Wallace to Newt 
Gingrich', O’Reilly, Nixon’s Piano.
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Carter maintained that racial inequality remained a serious problem, despite the 
advances that had been made since the Civil Rights era, consequently measures 
such as affirmative action programs were an important aspect in his administration. 
In expressing his support of affirmative action, Carter aligned himself with African- 
American (and other minority) voters and presented the Democratic Party as the 
party for African Americans. This was further affirmed by the presentation of the 
Republican Party as anti-black. Norman Fairclough has asserted that the struggle 
for political power is essentially a power struggle over possession of the dominant 
language.18 In the case of Carter, his discourse in relation to affirmative action 
proved to be out of touch with a significant proportion of white American voters 
who interpreted affirmative action as preferential treatment. This chapter will 
illustrate this through an analysis of public discourse surrounding the Miami riot, 
1980.
Carter’s support of affirmative action is expressed in his Remarks in an 
Interview with the National Black Network Question and Answer Session with 
Representatives o f the Network, July 18, 1977.19 In response to queries regarding 
his position on the Bakke case, Carter declares that affirmative action programs 
prevent discrimination and he confirms that his administration will continue to 
support the policy and resist challenges to affirmative action programs in light of 
the Bakke case. Carter states: “I have a had a discussion with both the Secretary of
18 Norman Fairclough, New Labour, New Language (London: Routledge, 2000);_____ , Language
and Power (Essex: Longman, 2001).
19 “Remarks in an Interview with the National Black Network Question and Answer Session with 
Representatives o f the Network, July 18, 1977” Public Papers o f  the President o f  the United States: 
1977.
149
HEW, Mr. Califano, and the Attorney General about this case. And I think we will 
prevent a reversion to the previous discrimination that did exist.” Carter, however, 
is careful to express his support of affirmative action in education whilst at the 
same time acknowledging the importance of meritocracy. Carter stresses: “. . . at 
the same time, we want to respect the need for an adequate level of education for 
minority groups in our country.” In doing this Carter is tapping into feelings of 
opposition towards affirmative action by those who felt that it undermined 
meritocracy. This conciliatory sentiment is repeated when Carter reiterates his 
administration’s position regarding affirmative action. Carter’s ultimate concern, 
however, is that affirmative action and the discrimination it prevents is not reversed 
by the Bakke case. Carter affirms:
I think that it is accurate to say that I, the Vice President, the 
Secretary of HEW, and the Attorney General are all committed to 
making sure that these concerns that I have just outlined to you are 
met and that the discrimination that has been a part of our national 
life in the past is ended.
Carter’s message is clear: affirmative action tackles discrimination, and it is a 
policy to which his administration is committed.
The importance of meritocracy is repeated in The President’s News
9 0Conference o f July 28, 1977. While Carter expresses his aversion to the principle 
of quotas, once again he ultimately endorses affirmative action programs, which he 
asserts address both past and present discrimination. Carter declares:
20 “The President’s News Conference of July 28, 1977” Public Papers o f  the President o f  the United
States: 1977.
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I hate to endorse the proposition of quotas from minority groups, for 
women, or for anyone else, that contravenes the concept of merit 
selection. However, I think it is appropriate for both private 
employers, for public governments, and also institutions of 
education, health, and so forth, to try to compensate as well as 
possible for past discrimination, and also to take into consideration 
the fact that many tests that are used to screen applicants quite often 
are inadvertently biased against those whose environment and whose 
training might be different from white majority representatives of our 
society.
While Carter acknowledges the complexity of the issue, ultimately he stands firm 
on affirmative action, insisting that without it, discrimination will persist. Carter 
states:
It’s not an easy question for the courts to answer, or the Congress.
It’s not an easy question for me as President to answer, either. I just 
want to be sure that if we do make a mistake in this carefully 
balanced approach, that the mistake might be to end discrimination 
and not the other way around.
Carter’s belief in the necessity of affirmative action as a means to tackle 
discrimination and inequality is again expressed in his Remarks in an Interview for
914Black Perspective News ’ April 5, 1978. Here Carter declares his support for the 
Supreme Court decision in the Bakke case, which upheld the policy of affirmative 
action, but that declared racial quotas were unconstitutional. Moreover, Carter 
denies that the Bakke decision was further evidence of African Americans receiving 
preferential treatment and of discrimination against whites. Carter asserts:
21 “Remarks in an Interview for ‘Black Perspective News’ April 5, 1978” Public Papers o f  the 
President o f  the United States: 1978.
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No, I do not. I think the position that we took in the Bakke case, I 
think the position that we’ve taken in orienting Federal procurement 
contracts for public works, public service job programs, the 
reorganization that’s coming forward in the equal employment 
opportunity area in Government, is going to be of great benefit to 
blacks and other minority groups in the future. And I don’t think 
we’ve done too much at all.
Carter defends the policy by not only claiming it to be of benefit to African 
Americans but also by stressing the necessity of it, by emphasising the disparity 
that continued to exist between minority groups and whites. Carter states:
When you look at the statistics, although we have made progress, as I 
pointed out before, we still have a very embarrassing disparity in 
income, job opportunities, unemployment rates, focused with its 
adverse effects among minority citizens.
Here Carter is echoing the argument that racial inequality was a continuing problem 
in 1970s America requiring government action. Furthermore, Carter seeks to 
present his opinion on the issue of continued racial inequality and the benefits of 
affirmative action as reflective of the opinion of the majority of Americans, 
particularly southerners. Carter states:
Most Americans, particularly myself as a southerner, can still see the 
very difficult circumstances under which minority families live on 
average -  there are obvious exceptions both ways -  because of past 
legal discrimination, plus the illegal discrimination that still exists in 
some areas. That’s why, under civil service reform, under equal 
employment opportunity program reform, we’re trying to root out 
those last vestiges of discrimination in government and set a pattern 
for the private sector.
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Thus, in making this statement, Carter is not only aligning himself with African- 
American voters, but he is also seeking to align himself with white voters.
For the most part, however, in his discourse in relation to affirmative action 
Carter aligns himself and the Democratic Party with African Americans. This 
allegiance is overtly expressed in The President’s News Conference o f April 11, 
1978. Here Carter presents himself as the protector of African Americans and the 
representative of the plight that they continue to face in American society. Carter 
proclaims:
I think it’s incumbent on a President to speak for the Nation and 
particularly to speak for those citizens of our Nation who are 
deprived, who are needy, who are poor, who are non-influential, who 
are inarticulate, and who suffer because of the past discriminations 
that have fallen upon black people and other minority groups, and 
who still have their own families devastated by poverty and 
unemployment out of all proportion to their percentage of the 
national population.
Having declared his duty as representative and protector of minorities, Carter 
details his administration’s achievements in relation to aiding minorities and 
declares his intention, in conjunction with other agents, of continuing to seek racial 
equality. Carter perceives the task of ensuring racial equality as a personal 
responsibility and one to which he is truly committed. He stresses that, despite the 
advances that have been made more needs to be done. Carter asserts:
My own belief is that minority groups have prospered in this country 
in the last 10 years, compared to their previous circumstances. But
22 “The President’s News Conference of April 11, 1978” Public Papers o f  the President o f  the
United States: 1978.
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they have a long way to go, and I feel responsible to make sure that 
they go that long way toward equality of opportunity in our country.
In acknowledging the progress achieved thus far by African Americans, whilst at 
the same time emphasising the continuing disparity, Carter sets himself apart from 
those who argue that too much has already been done.
Carter’s allegiance to African Americans and support of affirmative action 
is also expressed in his Interview with the President and a Question and Answer
23Session with a Group o f Editors and News Directors, June 30, 1978. Here Carter 
expresses his support for the Bakke decision, which upheld affirmative action. Once 
again, Carter presents affirmative action as a policy that tackles past and present 
discrimination. Carter is also keen to stress that the Bakke decision and his position 
in respect of it were in tune with the desires of the Black Caucus. Carter states:
I think it’s accurate to say that the Supreme Court decision on the 
Bakke case was compatible with the desires of the Black Caucus 
members and others before the Attorney General presented the brief 
from the Justice Department. And I read the brief and approved it 
personally. It called for a continuation of the affirmative action 
option to alleviate racial discrimination, either presently extant or the 
apparent results of historical discrimination.
In stressing his consultation with the Black Caucus in respect of the Bakke decision 
Carter is aligning himself and his position in relation to affirmative action with 
African Americans. Carter proceeds to detail his administration’s commitment to
23 “Interview with the President and a Question and Answer Session with a Group o f Editors and
News Directors, June 30, 1978” Public Papers o f the President o f  the United States: 1978.
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affirmative action and presents the Bakke decision as symbolic of his 
administration’s position in respect of affirmative action. Carter affirms:
So, we have a continuing effort to make sure that the affirmative 
action program goes on in Government. And I would say that the 
Bakke decision confirms our stand and leaves adequate option in the 
future, not only in the university system but in all levels of American 
life, for affirmative action to be implemented and racial 
discrimination to be reduced.
Carter again expresses his support of affirmative action in Memorandum 
from the President, July 20, 1978.24 Here Carter perceives the Bakke decision as 
legitimising his administration’s policy on affirmative action. Carter states:
That historic decision indicates that properly tailored affirmative 
action plans, which provide minorities with increased access to 
federal programs and jobs and which are fair to all Americans, are 
consistent with the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and with the 
Constitution.
Carter affirms the message of the decision that affirmative action programs per se 
do not discriminate against whites (although, quotas were declared 
unconstitutional). Carter proceeds to emphasise his commitment to affirmative 
action and urges that this commitment is borne out by publicised action. Carter 
declares:
I want to make certain that, in the aftermath of Bakke, you continue 
to develop, implement and enforce vigorously affirmative action 
programs. . . .  I also want to make certain that the Administration’s
24 “Memorandum from the President, July 20, 1978” Public Papers o f the President o f  the United
States: 1978.
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strong commitment to equal opportunity and affirmative action is 
recognized and understood by all Americans.
In his Interview with the President -  Remarks and a Question and Answer 
Session with Editors and News Directors, May 11, 1979, Carter affirms his belief 
that the gains achieved by African Americans since the Civil Rights movement 
were not being reversed and that his administration is committed to ensuring the 
continuing progressive trend.25 Carter stresses:
On the trend in black and other minority rights, I think the trends are 
still in the right direction. I think we are now in a posture of 
consolidating the gains that have been made legally in guaranteeing 
equality of treatment, equality of right of voting, employment, access 
to public funds. My own administration’s been heavily committed to 
this proposition, to continue progress in a sustained fashion.
In making this statement, Carter is not only acknowledging the backlash against the 
gains achieved during and since the Civil Rights era, he is also aligning himself in 
opposition to those who seek to halt the gains made.
Throughout his presidency Carter’s discourse clearly established his support 
of affirmative action and integral to this, presented the Democratic Party as the 
party for African Americans. In addition, Carter also presented the Republican 
Party as anti-black. Carter’s presentation of the Democratic Party and the 
Republican Party as polar opposites are seen in his Remarks at the Democratic 
Congressional Campaign Committee Victory Luncheon, August 14, 1980. The
25 “Interview with the President -  Remarks and a Question and Answer Session with Editors and 
News Directors, May 11, 1979” Public Papers o f  the President o f  the United States: 1979.
26 “Remarks at the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee Victory Luncheon, August 14, 
1980” Public Papers o f  the President o f  the United States: 1980.
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Republican Party is portrayed as being out of touch with the American people. 
Carter states: “It’s important for everyone in this room, including myself, to make 
sure that the Nation knows what the Republicans stand for, or at least we’re going 
to make them admit that they don’t stand for much of anything that’s valuable to 
the American people.” In presenting the Republican Party as out of touch with 
Americans, Carter is implying that the Democrats are in tune with Americans’ 
needs and desires.
In depicting the Democratic and Republican parties as polar opposites, in 
his Remarks Accepting the Presidential Nomination at the 1980 Democratic 
National Convention, August 14, 1980, Carter specifically presents them as being at
oncomplete odds in respect of the racial issues. Carter states: “In their fantasy 
America, inner-city people . . .  do not exist.” Carter’s message is that unlike the 
Republican Party, the Democratic Party are aware of the problems faced by urban 
African Americans. Carter proceeds to declare his intention of tackling the problem 
of racial inequality and the continued marginalisation of African Americans. Carter 
proclaims: “And I want minority citizens to join the mainstream of America. I want 
from the bottom of my heart to remove the blight of racial discrimination from the 
face of our land and I’m determined to do it.” In doing this Carter is aligning 
himself with African-American voters, and presenting the Democratic Party as the 
party for African Americans.
27 “Remarks Accepting the Presidential Nomination at the 1980 Democratic National Convention, 
August 14, 1980” Public Papers o f  the President o f  the United States: 1980.
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In his Informal Exchange with Reporters Following a Meeting with Black 
Delegates to the Democratic National Convention, August 15, 1980, Carter 
perceives the partisan differences, particularly in respect of the issue of race, as so 
wide that the future for African Americans is at stake in the 1980 presidential 
election.28 Carter declares:
And regardless of whether these delegates here supported Senator 
Kennedy or me -  and they were fairly well divided -  we are 
absolutely united in making sure the Democratic Party wins in the 
fall, because I think the future of this country, particularly for 
minority Americans and their rights, is at stake.
Similarly, in his Remarks at a Meeting o f the Democratic National Committee, 
August 15, 1980, Carter stresses the sharp distinction between himself and his 
Republican opponent, Reagan, and the diverse effects that would befall the country 
in the realm of race, depending on the outcome of the election.29 Carter warns:
. . . there is a sharp, maybe an unprecedented difference between the 
Democratic Party of today and the Republican Party of today -  and 
the Democratic candidate of today and the Republican candidate of 
today. With a possible exception of Goldwater versus Johnson, there 
has never been a sharper distinction about what this election can 
mean.
In all of this Carter is aligning himself and his party with African American voters. 
Carter states:
28 “Informal Exchange with Reporters Following a Meeting with Black Delegates to the Democratic 
National Convention, August 15, 1980” Public Papers o f  the President o f  the United States: 1980.
29 “Remarks at a Meeting o f the Democratic National Committee, August 15, 1980” Public Papers 
o f  the President o f  the United States: 1980.
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One of the most remarkable characteristics of my own campaign in 
1976 and again in the primary season this year and, I think I’ll 
predict, in the coming weeks of the general election, has been that 
we’ve had two or three secret weapons. One was the intense 
outpouring and commitment of the minority citizens of our country 
for me and for Fritz Mondale as expressed this morning by a 
collection of Kennedy and Carter delegates, now all Carter delegates, 
with whom I met to represent black America.
An analysis of Carter’s discourse illustrates that throughout his presidency 
Carter expressed his support for affirmative action. Carter maintained that racial 
inequality continued to blight the lives of African Americans, and without 
affirmative action programs past and present discrimination would persist. In doing 
this, Carter aligned himself with African American voters, and he presented the 
DemocraticParty as the party for African Americans. Carter’s affirmative action 
discourse, however, was at odds with those who felt that government intervention 
to aid African Americans had gone too far; that the legislation of the Civil Rights 
era had done enough. It was at odds with those who felt that continued government 
intervention, particularly affirmative action programs, was now discriminating 
against whites and in effect awarding African Americans preferential treatment. For 
these Americans, it was the Republican Party -  the party which Carter’s discourse 
identified as anti-black - and Reagan’s discourse which held the appeal. An analysis 
of African-American and white discourse surrounding the Miami riot, 1980, 
demonstrates the ways in which Carter’s affirmative action discourse, while in 
touch with the majority of African Americans, was out of synch with a significant 
proportion of whites.
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4.2 The Miami Riot, 1980
The eruption of the city of Miami in May 1980 was the first major outbreak 
of urban racial unrest since the late 1960s. The three days of rioting left 18 dead, 
hundreds injured, and property damage to business totaled approximately $80 
million. The riot was triggered by the acquittal of four police officers in the killing 
of an African-American motorist. Like the riots of the 1960s, this event was merely 
the spark that ignited an explosive city. The riot demonstrated that African 
Americans in Miami were suffering from racial inequality in much the same way as 
urban African Americans had in the 1960s. Although the Miami riot was a clear 
indication that the problem of urban America had not been solved, an analysis of 
public discourse surrounding the riot demonstrates that Carter’s discourse in 
relation to affirmative action was out of touch with a significant proportion of 
whites. While a considerable degree of sympathy was expressed by whites for 
Arthur McDuffie and to a certain extent towards the rioters, the general feeling of 
whites was one of horror. Moreover, there was a considerable degree of hostility to 
what was regarded as the Carter administration’s bowing to unwarranted black 
demands in light of the riot, in effect awarding African Americans preferential 
treatment as a response to violence.
McDuffie, a 33-year-old insurance agent, died from head injuries sustained
11
following a police chase on December 17, 1979. McDuffie had been beaten by
30 Bruce Porter and Marvin Dunn, The Miami Riot o f 1980: Crossing the Bounds (Massachusetts: 
D.C. Heath & Co., 1984), 130.
31 According to police the chase began after Arthur McDuffie slowed down as he approached a red 
light on North Miami Avenue at 1.15am, but failed to stop. McDuffie allegedly pulled a ‘wheelie’ 
on his motorcycle and made an obscene gesture at sergeant Ira Diggs before speeding away. The
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Dade County Public Safety Department (PSD) officers with batons and 18-inch 
flashlights - a beating that had been awarded a ‘score’ of 29 on a 30-point ‘brutality 
scale’. Despite an attempt to make it appear that McDuffie had sustained his 
injuries having lost control of his motorcycle - which included driving a patrol car 
over the motorcycle - following an investigation by Internal Review and the 
confession of one of the officers, Charles Veverka, four officers were eventually 
charged and prosecuted in connection with McDuffie’s death. Officer Alex 
Marrero was charged with second-degree murder, sergeant Ira Diggs and officer 
Michael Watts were charged with manslaughter and tampering with evidence, and 
sergeant Herbert Evans charged with tampering with evidence and leading a cover 
up. Veverka, Mark Mier and William Hanlon received immunity from prosecution 
in return for testimony.34 On May 17, after less than three hours of deliberation, an 
all-white, Tampa jury delivered its verdict.35 Marrero was found not guilty of
chase ended when McDuffie stopped his motorcycle at the comer of North Miami Avenue and 38th 
Street. Paradoxically police contended that McDuffie had instigated the chase because he was 
concerned about being caught driving while his license had been revoked. Police files made public 
under a court order showed that prior to the McDuffie incident, citizens had filed 152 misconduct 
complaints against 10 officers implicated in McDuffie’s death. Alex Marrero, Ira Diggs, Michael 
Watts, William Hanlon and Herbert Evans were among 200 officers whose records showed a high 
number o f complaints, internal investigations or use of force reports.
32 Claudia Wright, “Death in Miami”, New Statesman, May 30, 1980, 808.
33 Inconsistencies in the use of force reports filed on the incident (this was standard procedure) 
alerted suspicions in Commissioner Dale Bowlin. The County medical examiner, Dr. Ronald 
Wright, was also dissatisfied with the accident story and together with Bowlin’s boss, Major Willie 
Morrison and the department’s Internal Review section, began further investigations into the 
incident. On December 18, having spoken to City o f Miami officers who had been at the scene, they 
became convinced that McDuffie’s injuries had been caused by beatings and Internal Review 
notified the state attorney. Veverka’s confession on December 26 provided additional evidence.
34 Due to information provided by Veverka and Mier and also statements made by Hanlon, charges 
against Marerro were increased from manslaughter to second-degree murder. Felony charges against 
Hanlon - manslaughter and tampering with evidence - were dropped on March 28 by the trial judge 
due to a lack of evidence. Following this the prosecution agreed to drop other lesser charges in 
return for testimony.
35 The trial was moved from Miami to Tampa following a motion filed by the defence that argued 
that the defendants would not get a fair trial in Miami. African Americans were angered by this 
move and also by the prosecution’s use o f peremptory challenges that kept African Americans off 
the jury.
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second-degree murder, Watts found not guilty of manslaughter and both Evans and 
Diggs were found not guilty of tampering with evidence. The acquittal of the four 
Miami police officers served to unleash long-held and deeply felt feelings of anger 
and resentment amongst Miami’s black population. Trouble began to erupt within 
hours of the verdict in Liberty City in northwest Dade County and continued 
virtually unabated for three days.
Like the riots of the 1960s, the Miami riot was precipitated by an incident 
involving a case of police brutality. Unlike in earlier riots, however, it was the 
verdict in the case of alleged brutality, five months after the incident, which incited 
the riot in Miami.37 African Americans in Miami had held a certain belief in the 
Criminal Justice System (CJS), even if it was simply that it could not ignore or 
condone such a blatant act of police brutality. This ‘delayed reaction’ was a 
reflection of the changes that had occurred in racial issues since the Civil Rights 
movement: acts of overt racism were no longer ‘permitted’. As in the 1960s riots, 
however, this precipitating incident was not an abstract occurrence. For many 
African Americans in Miami, the beating of McDuffie and the acquittal of those 
responsible were symbolic of the poor relationship between themselves and the
* o opolice and CJS. Thus the rioters in Miami were reacting not only to the McDuffie
36 There were outbreaks o f rioting in other parts o f Miami, but the worst was in Liberty City.
37 Porter and Dunn, The Miami Riot o f 1980.
38 The relationship between African Americans and police in Miami, and the problem o f  racism 
within the Miami police force was indicative o f the situation across much o f  America. See John 
Hagan and Ruth D. Peterson (eds.), Crime and Inequality (California: Stanford University Press, 
1995); Charles J. Ogletree Jr. et al; Criminal Justice Institute at Harvard Law School for the National 
Association for the Advancement o f Colored People, Beyond Rodney King: An Investigation o f  
Police Conduct in Minority Communities (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1995); United 
States Commission on Civil Rights, Who is Guarding the Guardians? A Report on Police Practices 
(Washington D.C.: United States Commission on Civil Rights, 1981); Samuel Walker, Cassia Spohn 
and Miriam Delone, Race, Ethnicity and Crime in America (California: Wadsworth, 2000).
162
case, but also towards a history of racial injustice that the McDuffie case 
represented. As sociologists Bruce Porter and Marvin Dunn pointed out: “Deep 
down, the crowds do not react to what the police are doing in the current situation 
as much as they react to what the police have done in the past - to what they 
‘always’ do in a given set of circumstances.”
The McDuffie incident was in fact the fifth high-profile case involving 
African Americans and the Miami CJS in the 15 months prior to the riot. The first 
case involved a wrongly targeted drug raid on the house of Junior High School 
teacher, Nathaniel LaFleur, in February 1979. During the raid both LaFleur and his 
son were allegedly racially insulted and beaten by police officers and then wrongly 
arrested on charges of resisting arrest, obstructing police officers and battery of a 
police officer. In September 1979, an off-duty Hialeah police officer shot dead 22- 
year-old Randy Newman in the back after he had pulled his car over in a warehouse 
district to urinate. Officer Larry Shokley claimed that his gun went off accidentally 
and a grand jury cited him for negligence in mishandling his weapon but found no 
evidence of criminal wrongdoing. In January 1979, an 11-year-old African- 
American schoolgirl was abducted by Florida Highway Patrol officer, Willie Jones, 
and sexually assaulted. Jones resigned from his post and was arrested and charged 
with lewd and lascivious assault on a child. In an attempt to keep the incident quiet 
both by the victim’s family and Jones’ lawyer, however, an arrangement was made 
with the District Attorney’s office whereby Jones agreed to undergo psychological 
counselling and would pay for counselling for the victim. Less than four months
39 Porter and Dunn, The Miami Riot o f 1980, 39.
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after the trial, however, Jones was pronounced to be no longer in need of 
counselling. He also became delinquent in payments for the counselling of the 
victim and because of this the family went public with the case. African Americans 
were horrified that the state attorney’s office had allowed such an arrangement. Due 
to the high publicity and public outrage the case was reopened and in July 1980, 
Jones was indicted by a federal grand jury of illegally arresting and sexually 
abusing the girl, thereby infringing her civil rights. However, Jones left the county 
before he could be arrested. The final case involved Dr. Johnny L. Jones, Dade’s 
first black public school superintendent. To many African Americans in Miami, 
Jones represented the ultimate in black success stories. In February 1980 he was 
charged with attempting to steal nearly $9,000 in gold plated plumbing fixtures. 
Jones vehemently denied the charges and many of his supporters in the black 
community were convinced that a special effort was being made to destroy him 
because of his race. On April 30, less than three weeks before the McDuffie verdict, 
an all-white jury convicted him of second-degree grand theft and he received a 
three-year sentence. All of these cases reinforced widely held beliefs that African 
Americans would never get a fair deal from the CJS.40
The report by the Dade County Citizens Committee, appointed by Governor
Bob Graham to establish the causes of the Miami riot, found that a fundamental
cause of the rioting was the perception held by African Americans that racism
pervaded the CJS. According to the report, 77% of African Americans felt that the
40 For a fuller discussion o f these cases see Marvin Dunn, Black Miami in the Twentieth Century 
(Florida: Florida University Press, 1997), Chapter 7. The Wille Jones, Lafleurs and Heath cases are 
also discussed in Daryl B. Harris, The Logic o f  Black Urban Rebellions: Challenging the Dynamics 
o f  White Domination in Miami (Connecticut: Praeger, 1999), Chapter 4.
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office of States Attorney Janet Reno was biased against them. Eighty-eight percent 
believed that it was almost impossible for a black person to get a fair trial in Dade 
County, and 85% believed that a white person could do almost anything to a black 
person and get away with it.41 While Reno was not accused of racism herself, the 
committee criticised her for running her office “. . . in such a way as to support the 
black community’s perception of the office as racist.”42 While the committee 
reported that it was a perception of racism that was the problem - a perception 
presumably generated by the cases highlighted - rather than the actual existence of 
racism, this had little effect on the outcome. As Robert Simms, the Executive 
Director of the Dade County Community Relations Board stated in hearings before 
the Unites States Commission on Civil Rights (USCCR): “It is perceived that there 
is unequal treatment of enforcement in the black community. . . . Whether this be 
true or not does not necessarily matter. It is perceived to be that way. Therefore, for 
the perceiver, I suspect that is the truth.”43
The Citizens Committee also found that African Americans perceived the 
police Internal Review structure as geared toward protecting officers and also that 
efforts to overcome racism in the Miami Police Department (MPD) and PSD were 
totally inadequate. The committee reported that 77% of African Americans believed 
that police used unnecessary force in making arrests in black neighbourhoods. 
Seventy-two percent felt that police stopped and searched cars or homes in black
41 Harris, The Logic o f  Black Urban Rebellions, 73.
42 Quoted in “Miami Panel Lists Perceptions of Racism Among Causes o f May Riot”, New York 
Times, November 30, 1980, 43.
43 United States Commission on Civil Rights, Confronting Racial Isolation in Miami (Washington 
D.C.: United States Commission on Civil Rights, 1982), 226. Hereafter cited as USCCR.
165
neighbourhoods for no good reason, and 78% felt that police rousted, frisked or 
searched blacks without good reason.44 A number of African-American police 
officers in county and city forces had filed discrimination suits in federal court and 
at the time of the riot the departments were engaged in an effort to increase the 
number of African-American officers in both city and county departments. Both 
had failed to achieve their aims, however. In 1973 in an out-of-court settlement 
PSD agreed to bring the number of black officers to within 70% of their 
proportionate levels in the countywide population, that is, to 10.5%. By 1980, 
African-American officers accounted for only 7% of officers. Also they remained 
significantly under-represented in upper ranks. The same was true of the MPD. By 
1980, the number of African-American officers stood at 13%, yet, African 
Americans made up 25% of the civilian population.45
Like the urban riots of the 1960s, the precipitating incident to the Miami riot 
was the catalyst that set-off a host of underlying issues. Along with the existence of 
racism in the police and CJS, as in the riots of the 1960s, a major underlying cause 
of the riot in Miami was socio-economic deprivation. There was an acute racial 
disparity in unemployment levels in Miami. In 1960 unemployment among African 
Americans was 7.1% compared to 5.6% for Dade County as a whole. By 1970 there 
was an overall improvement in employment levels, but the African-American 
unemployment rate was still 25% higher than the county as a whole.46 This 
divergence continued and even increased throughout that decade. In 1979 the
44 Harris, The Logic o f  Black Urban Rebellions, 73.
45 Porter and Dunn, The Miami Riot o f 1980, 184-5.
46 USCCR, 20.
166
national unemployment rate was 5.8%, slightly higher than in Dade County where 
it stood at 5%. In community development areas, however, where 73% of Dade’s 
African-American population lived, the unemployment rate was 15.3%.47 The racial 
gap in unemployment levels in Miami was indicative of a nationwide pattern. 
Throughout the 1970s the African-American unemployment rates remained
• J .Rconsistently higher, and on average double, that of whites.
Also reflecting patterns across the country, a significant proportion of 
African Americans in Miami generally only had access to low-paying jobs with 
little prospect for advancement. Approximately 44% of employed African 
Americans worked in unskilled or service industry jobs.49 One of the reasons for 
this was because many young African Americans lacked the basic entry-level skills 
required for jobs. African-American job seekers found it increasingly difficult, for 
instance, to compete for jobs in the retail and service markets that catered for 
Miami’s Spanish-speaking clientele. Miami’s population had undergone a massive 
transformation since the 1960s due to the influx of Cuban -  and later Haitian -  
refugees, which exacerbated the socio-economic problems of African Americans.50 
Lack of entry-level skills was, however, sometimes a veneer under which racial 
discrimination could operate, or racial imbalances be perpetuated. The USCCR 
reported that:
47 USCCR, 21.
48 Hacker, Two Nations, 109.
49 USCCR, 129. The nationwide figure in 1980 was slightly higher at 49.4%. Pinkney, The Myth o f  
Black Progress, 90-91.
50 For a discussion o f Hispanic immigration to Miami see Alejandro Portes and Alex Stepick, City 
on the Edge: The Transformation o f  Miami (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994); Dunn, 
Black Miami, Ch9; Raymond A. Mohl, “On The Edge: Blacks and Hispanics in Metropolitan Miami 
Since 1959”, Florida Historical Quarterly 69.3 (1990): 37-56.
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Among the litany of complaints that unemployed blacks did not 
possess the skills employees required, nowhere was there a sign of 
interest on the part of employers in providing the basic training 
needed by these unskilled youth. Stereotyping that holds black youth 
responsible for not possessing skills that have not been accessible to 
them is an indication of continuing institutional discrimination.51
Young African-American job seekers also faced overt discrimination by employers 
who often held stereotypical perceptions of blacks. This was certainly the 
perception of one witness who testified before the USCCR:
I’ve grown up and lived down here since 1949. . . . There [are] 
subtle, pervasive prejudicial kinds of things going on here. I think 
that an employer, given the choice between a white or Latino 
youngster and a black youngster with equal skills may tend to opt for 
one of the former rather than the latter, and I think that’s a reality we 
have to face.
Allegations of employment discrimination compelled the City of Miami to adopt 
race-conscious affirmative measures including goals and timetables to dismantle the 
discriminatory process that had excluded African-American workers. As a result, 
African-American employment did increase in the public sector. But, these gains 
did not reach upper and managerial levels of the municipal workforce and had not 
occurred to any substantial level in the private sector. The report stated:
As a result of past and present discriminatory practices, Dade County 
Blacks have been effectively excluded from the private job market. 
Discrimination in the job market is so firmly entrenched that 
unemployment in the black community is not limited to periods of
51 USCCR, 154. The USCCR was critical o f the standard o f education received by many o f Dade 
County’s African-American students. See USCCR, Chapter 2.
52 Quoted in USCCR, 149.
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economic recession but remains unrelieved even during periods of 
rapid economic growth.53
Barriers to full participation in the economic life of Dade County were not 
restricted to employment. There were also limited opportunities for independent 
black business people. As the USCCR found:
No data has been compiled to document the number of loan 
applications by potential black entrepreneurs whom commercial 
financial institutions and small business administrations have turned 
down. No one in Miami, however, disputes the fact that black 
entrepreneurs find it exceedingly difficult to get loans.54
As a result, the number of African-American entrepreneurs in Dade County - 
reflecting a nationwide pattern - was low and the businesses owned were generally 
small and struggling. The number of black businesses did increase by 40% between 
1972 and 1977, but they employed 25% fewer people.55 Eighty-two percent of 
black businesses in the County, in fact, were self-run.56 According to the USCCR 
one of the principal reasons behind the difficulty African-American entrepreneurs 
often faced in securing loans was the general inability of African Americans to 
satisfy the three major commercial loan qualifications: collateral, equity in the 
business and track record.57 The commission also concluded, however, that the
personal racial prejudice of loan officers could also be a significant factor. The
53 USCCR, 125.
54 USCCR, 82.
55 USCCR, 81.
56 Bruce Porter and Marvin Dunn, “A Year After the Miami Riot, Embers Still Glow”, New York 
Times, May 17, 1981,4.23.
57 USCCR, 82-85.
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USCCR stated: “Blacks often may be denied loans because bankers, being free to 
exercise subjective judgement, may act on personal biases that might have racial 
underpinnings.”58
High-levels of unemployment and low-level employment naturally affected 
the income of Dade County’s African-American population. In 1970 the average 
African-American family income stood at $5,983 - 64.7% of the average family 
income in Dade County, which was $9,245.59 Throughout the decade the average 
income of African-American families had increased by 7% and gained closer parity 
with the county as a whole. By 1979, the average African-American family income 
was 68% of the average income of all families in the county. This ratio was 
significantly higher than the nationwide rate where the average African-American 
family income was 59% of the average income of all families. Most of the 
economic advances, however, were made by an emerging small black middle- 
class.60 Poverty levels during the decade remained virtually unchanged and were on 
par with national levels. In 1979, 29.6% of African Americans in Dade County 
lived below the poverty level.61
One of the major effects of low income and low employment was poor 
quality and overcrowded housing. Housing conditions, which had always been 
worse for African Americans than whites in Miami, had deteriorated further
58 USCCR, 85. Such incidents could be where loan applications are denied based on the location o f 
the business in a black area and the bank’s estimation o f probability o f safety and success.
59 USCCR, 20.
60 Dunn, Black Miami, 342-244.
61 Dunn, Black Miami, 353.
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between 1970 and 1980.62 The report by the Citizens Committee stated of the
general character of housing in the black community: “In most instances, both 
public and private housing . . . fall below the minimum standard of decency. 
Disrepair is pervasive; holes in walls and ceilings, broken plumbing, and vermin 
infestation are the rule rather than the exception.”63 The report of the USCCR 
stated that such housing conditions “. . . engender apathy, hopelessness, frustration 
and anger.”64 In fact, all of the socio-economic conditions endured by Miami’s 
black community contributed to such feelings, and it was these feelings that fuelled 
much of the rioting in Miami in 1980 and also informed the African-American 
response to the rioting. This is demonstrated through an analysis of African- 
American discourse surrounding the Miami riot.65
African-American discourse surrounding the Miami riot was varied, ranging 
from outright condemnation of the violence and complete support for what was 
regarded as a justifiable reaction to genuine grievances. The discourse of most 
African Americans, however, whether supportive of the rioting or not, revealed that
62 Urban renewal and highway construction had a devastating impact on African-American 
residential areas in Miami.
63 Quoted in USCCR, 58.
64 USCCR, 57.
65 Another contributing factor were the feelings o f exclusion from the political process in Miami. 
Many African Americans believed that they could do little to effect change on a political level due to 
the political structure in Miami. The elected government o f Dade County consisted o f a nine 
member Board o f Commissioners and in the City o f Miami, a five member Board of 
Commissioners. All commissioners were elected at large, that is, by all voters in the city or county. 
The political power o f any group depended on the number o f people in the population willing to give 
support to that group. At the time o f the riot, African Americans had only managed to elect one 
African American to each Commission. One of the problems was that whites were over-represented 
on the voter role. Also black candidates, because they were elected at large, had to appeal to both 
Hispanic and white voters. This meant that they would soften their advocacy o f black issues to 
increase their broad appeal. Many African Americans, especially poorer African Americans, 
perceived these candidates as having sold-out and as having been politically co-opted by the white 
establishment. Porter and Dunn, The Miami Riot o f  1980, 186-188; Harris, The Logic o f  Black 
Urban Rebellions, Chapter 4.
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racial injustice and socio-economic inequality remained a burden for urban African 
Americans in the post-Civil Rights era, thereby confirming the need for affirmative 
action programs by government.
Many African Americans in Miami - 41% - denounced the rioting in Miami 
as unjustified and a number protected the property being seized by rioters and 
looters.66 African Americans were horrified by the events and regarded the violence 
as the senseless activity of thugs. As one African-American reporter for the Miami 
Herald stated: “The tragedy of McDuffie’s death now is compounded by more 
violence and more deaths. . . . Looting and burning is a by-product - perpetuated by 
hoodlums, thugs and punks looking for excuses to rip off people. It must end. 
There’s no justification for riots.”67 Such feelings were echoed by a number of 
African Americans in Liberty City. As one resident stated:
Most of the people out there were those little hoodlums. . . . They 
don’t work and they don’t understand the people who do work trying 
to make an honest buck. It’s just those hoodlums - the ones who’ll 
call you soul sister and be in your house tonight or mug you on the 
comer tomorrow.68
For these African Americans, the rioting was in no way a justified or legitimate 
reaction to the problems faced by African Americans in Miami.
Just as in the riots of the 1960s, however, on the whole Miami rioters were 
not a marginal, criminal element of the black community.69 Even African
66 “Newsweek Poll: A Plurality of Blacks Says Miami Violence was Unjustified”, Miami Herald, 
May 25, 1980, 25.
67 Joe Oglesby, “Blacks Can’t Cure Travesty With Rioting”, Miami Herald, May 19, 1980, 1.
68 Quoted in “There’s a Little Demon Inside All o f Us”, Miami Herald, May 23, 1980, 21.
69 Porter and Dunn, The Miami Riot o f 1980.
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Americans who would not normally participate in any form of violence took part in 
the riot. A 32-year-old lawyer who attended a NAACP rally outside the government 
buildings in Liberty City with his wife and 10-year-old son explained his 
involvement:
I remember being consumed by rage . . . and feeling that somehow I 
had to dramatize it. . . . Even though I was a public official in a 
sense, I didn’t identify with anyone official at that time. All I 
identified with were my black brothers, and all I could think about 
was how the Criminal Justice System I had respected put its foot on 
my neck and face.70
According to a study by the Behavioural Science Research Institute (BSRI) 
commissioned by the Miami Herald, 26% of the riot-area residents participated in 
the riot.71 A study of the Dade Miami Criminal Justice cases found that only 32% of 
those arrested had been arrested prior to the riot and only 24% had been convicted
79of a crime. Furthermore, the study found that rioters and non-rioters were notably 
similar in terms of background and beliefs. Principally, riot participants and non­
rioters were almost indistinguishable in their attitudes towards the police, the courts 
and local government. The survey found that, rather than anything else, age was the 
most important factor in determining riot participation. The mean age of rioters was
n ' l
27.8, whilst the mean age of non-rioters was 38.1.
70 Quoted in Miller and Oglesby, “Cops Freed in McDuffie Case”, 32.
71 Richard Morin, “Miami Rioters Don’t Feel Justice Exists For Them, Poll Finds”, Washington 
Post, June 22, 1980, A7.
72 Porter and Dunn, The Miami Riot o f 1980, 113.
73 “Profile o f a Rioter: Under 30, Male, Frustrated”, Washington Post, June 22, 1980, A7. Although 
not expressed in the survey, it is reasonable to assume that sex was also a significant factor in 
determining riot participation.
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Ultimately in fact, whether the rioting was, at least in some part, due to the 
activity of a criminal element, the actions of most of the rioters were spawned by 
genuine grievances, particularly concerning the CJS.74 As one African American 
stated: “What you got here, you could call this the straw that broke the camel’s 
back. The natives are restless. Even the kids are out. There wasn’t no justice for the 
black people. They shoved everything down our throats. The fires are going to start 
in a few minutes.”75 Another stated: “It was because of McDuffie . . .people just
7  f \feel there was no justice for the black man.” Many of Miami’s rioters felt that the 
McDuffie verdict was further evidence of the ineffectiveness or ineptitude of the 
criminal justice system to protect African Americans and as such violence was the 
only means of obtaining justice. As one riot participant stated: “Let it be an eye for 
an eye and a tooth for a tooth. . . . When we try it their way, look what they do to 
us.”77 Another claimed: “The only way to get the message across is to set this town 
on fire. We’ve made enough violence . . . but that is the only way to get our point
70
across.” There was a growing feeling amongst the rioters that African Americans 
were not being protected by the law and as such to work within the law was futile. 
A letter to the Los Angeles Times expressed a similar view:
74 The majority of those arrested during the riot were treated leniently by the police and courts. Only 
13.5% o f the 997 cases that actually went through the system received a sentence o f any kind. 
Usually, 32% of defendants receive a sentence. Porter and Dunn argue the actions o f the courts 
seemed to be saying that the rioters had considerable justification for what they did and should not 
be too severely punished. Porter and Dunn, The Miami Riot o f 1980, 155-6. What it also appears to 
illustrate, conversely, is quite a liberal attitude by the CJS.
75 Quoted in William R. Amlang, “Angry Blacks, Police Clash; 4 Die in Night o f Violence”, Miami 
Herald, May 18, 1980, 33.
76 Quoted in Nathaniel Sheppard Jr., “Miami’s Blacks Have ‘Nothing to Lose’”, New York Times, 
May 23, 1980, B4.
77 Quoted in Amlang, “Random Acts of Revenge”, 1.
78 Quoted in Margot Homblower, “Miami Violence Abates But Blacks Simmer”, Washington Post, 
May 20, 1980, A l.
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Often a nightmare awakens the sleeper. One can only hope that the 
reality of Miami set afire will help awaken America. Either because 
of inability or inclination, however, white America tends to be slow 
in understanding the boomeranging implications of its racism. . . . 
For a very long time now - from the illusionary promise of 40 acres 
and a mule - white America has relied on black people’s faith and 
hope in the law to curtail acts of anomie and revolt. But despite the 
Brown decision in 1954 and the Civil Rights acts of 1964 and 1968,
iL it.
even despite the 13 and 14 amendments, the law of Afro-America 
remains largely a matter of unrequited rights. If the law continues to 
fail in providing fundamental fairness and substantial justice to 
blacks, and continues to fail in removing the racial element from 
suffering, then will blacks continue to rely of the hope of the law 
without the help of the law? Perhaps many will, but some will not,
70and the “fire next time” will have come yesterday.
According to this letter, the McDuffie verdict was part of an historical pattern of 
racial inequality within the justice system. Moreover, it was a pattern, which was 
increasingly unlikely to be tolerated by African Americans.
Feelings of despair towards the criminal justice system in the wake of the 
McDuffie verdict were expressed in abundance by African Americans. One African 
American stated: “It’s like something unbelievable. . . .  I don’t even know how to 
take this. I feel like I’m nobody. I feel like my family’s nobody. I feel like my 
people are nobody.” Another Miami resident who called the Miami Herald could 
not comprehend how the CJS could operate in such a blatantly unjust way. They 
questioned: “How can this happen? If McDuffie had been a white man and the 
police had been black, the verdict would have been different.”81 For other African 
Americans, however, the verdict had been a certainty even before the case had been
79 “Letters to the Editor”, Los Angeles Times, June 3, 1980, 2.6.
80 Quoted in Fred Grimm and Ellen Bartlett, “McDuffie Decision Brings Dismay, Disbelief, Anger”, 
Miami Herald, May 18, 1980, 32.
81 Quoted in Grimm and Bartlett, “McDuffie Decision Brings”, 32.
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tried. As assistant Dade County manager, Dewey Knight, reported: “Every black 
person I talked to before the verdict felt nothing would be done to the white officers
89that killed him but were holding out for a miracle. It didn’t come.” Similarly
another African American stated: “I finally figured out why I wasn’t screaming
mad . . .  it was like the second time they dropped the atomic bomb. It wasn’t quite 
8*1
as shocking.” For many African Americans in Miami, the acquittal of the officers 
was symbolic of the inferior status of African Americans in society. As Wellington 
Role, a community activist, expressed: “All the McDuffie thing did was to make it 
crystal clear to them that even a middle class nigger who supposedly has made it 
can be jumped on, stamped on and done in by the white power structure.”84
Despite the grievances towards the criminal justice system, a number of 
African Americans expressed dismay at the rioting, regarding it as foolish, and 
hurtful only to blacks. One African American feared that the rioting would pander 
to and legitimise the stereotypical views of African Americans held by a number of 
whites:
We’re turning into the savages that white America thought we were 
in the beginning . . . we just went back 100 years last night. . . . Yes,
82 Quoted in Sheppard Jr., “Miami’s Blacks”, B4.
83 Quoted in Juanita Greene and Brenda Eady, “Black Community Expresses Outrage; Many Hope 
Death to Bring Change”, Miami Herald, December 29, 1979, 3.
84 Quoted in George Lardner Jr. and Margot Homblower, “Miami Brutality Was Not Expected”, 
Washington Post, May 25, 1980, A l. For a discussion o f race and the Criminal Justice System see 
Katherine Beckett and Theodore Sasson, The Politics o f  Injustice: Crime and Punishment in 
America (California: Thousand Oaks, 2000); Hagan and Patterson (eds.), Crime and Inequality in 
America; Coramae Richey Mann, Unequal Justice: A Question o f  Color (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1993); Cassia C. Spohn, “Courts, Sentences, and Prisons” in Obie Clayton Jr. (ed.), 
An American Dilemma Revisited: Race Relations in a Changing World (New York: Russell Sage 
Foundation, 1996); Michael Tonry, Malign Neglect -  Race, Crime and Punishment in America 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press); Walker, Spohn, Delone, Race, Ethnicity and Crime in America.
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an injustice has been done in the Arthur McDuffie case, but do we 
rectify it with the bullet or the ballot? I say the ballot.85
Whilst the injustice of the verdict is acknowledged in this statement, rioting is not 
regarded as the correct means of redress. Similarly, the cook at a restaurant 
explained that African Americans of Dade County economically could not afford to 
destroy their places of work: “When this stuff goes down, all that happens is people 
get thrown out of w ork.. . .  Maybe we’re the lucky ones. Rather than going ‘round 
bashing heads we’ll be working tomorrow.”86 Here too, there is an 
acknowledgement of the socio-economic difficulties faced by the African-American 
population of Miami, but it is not regarded as a valid reason for the rioting.
Yet, a number of African Americans expressed support for the rioting 
despite the damage to the black community. As one resident of Liberty City stated: 
“I don’t care if I have to go to Washington to buy a loaf of bread. . . . There’s got to 
be violence when you want action.”87 Furthermore, the main thrust of the violence 
in Miami was anti-white. Such was the despair felt by so many African Americans, 
the fact that their own community was destroyed in the process, in a sense, did not 
matter. As one young African-American woman explained:
The people around here just don’t care no more. . . . They’ve had 
enough for too long and can’t take it. We’re all tired. . . . The main
85 Quoted in Margot Homblower and Mervin Sigale, “Miami Riot Continues; 18 Killed”, 
Washington Post, May 19, 1980, A 10.
86 Quoted in John M. Crewdson, “14 Die in Miami Riot; Arson and Looting Persist For Second 
Day”, New York Times, May 19, 1980, BIO.
87 Quoted in “There’s a Little Demon Inside All o f Us”, 1.
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reason for all this was to put the white people out of business . . . 
sure, it hurt our community. But it was hurt already.88
Despite the damage done to black businesses, which was another distinct 
difference between Miami and the riots of the 1960s, the Miami riot had a distinctly 
anti-white fervor - the eight whites that died at the hands of rioters were testimony
O Q
to that. As one African-American youth expressed: “It wasn’t just [about] 
McDuffie. It was payback. Payback for all the stuff whitey has done for us.”90 
Another stated: “The white man didn’t be doing us no good. So we don’t do him no 
good. The white man got the jobs and we don’t got no jobs. The white man got 
everything and we got nothing. It ain’t right.”91 One of the most brutal attacks was 
made upon 18-year-old Michael Kulup, his 22-year-old brother Jeffrey and 23-year- 
old Debra Gutman, who were driving home from the beach when their car was 
struck by a shower of rocks and bottles on 62nd street in Liberty City. A block of 
concrete smashed through the windscreen striking Michael and causing the car to 
swerve, hitting two pedestrians. Gutman managed to flee, but the Kulups were 
dragged from the car and savagely beaten, shot at and runover by the mob. 
Miraculously Michael Kulup survived. Jeffrey Kulup, however, died from his 
injuries a few weeks later.
88 Quoted in Jeff Prugh and Bill Curry, “Blacks Vent Rage With Words as Miami Calms”, Los 
Angeles Times, May 21, 1980, 1.
89 Porter and Dunn state that although black businesses were looted along with white, they generally 
were not set alight. Porter and Dunn suggest that black businesses were not spared from looting 
because o f a contentious relationship with ghetto residents who often perceived black business 
people as having ‘sold-out.’ See also Harris, The Logic o f  Black Urban Rebellions, Chapter 6.
90 Quoted in Sheppard, “Miami’s Blacks”, B4.
91 Quoted in George Lardner Jr. and Margot Homblower, “Miami Brutality Was Not Expected”, 
Washington Post, May 25, 1980, A16.
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The anti-white violence in Miami was unprecedented and it marked a major 
change from the riots of the 1960s. The proportion of African Americans who were 
involved in the violence was comparatively small - as many African Americans 
saved whites from harm as did the harming - what was significant was the general 
air of approval surrounding the scenes of violence.92 A number of African 
Americans expressed indifference to the violence, or as one African-American 
youth claimed: “If Whitey don’t care about me, why should I care about Whitey?”93 
Similarly, another African-American resident stated:
I saw a couple of honkies lying on the ground on 62nd street. . . .
Those honkies weren’t dead, but it sure looked to me like they were 
dying. . . .  I didn’t feel nothing for those honkies because I know 
honkies don’t feel nothing for me. I hate them, just like they hate me.
I’m glad it happened . . .  we showed them . . .  we showed them we
i 94can hate, too.
The anti-white violence displayed by a number of rioters and effectively condoned 
by a number of African Americans in Miami, as well as revealing the extent to 
which racism continued to impinge on the life of African Americans, also 
illustrated the effect of the transition of racism upon African Americans: white 
people, as well as white symbols, were the principal targets of violence, indicating
92 Porter and Dunn, The Miami Riot o f 1980. Manning Marable regarded the violence against white 
persons as the exception rather than the rule. See Manning Marable, “The Fire This Time: The 
Miami Rebellion, May, 1980”, Black Scholar (July-August 1980): 2-18.
93 Sheppard, “Miami’s Blacks”, B4.
94 Quoted in Warren Brown, “Black Miami’s Voices”, Washington Post, May 23, 1980, A l.
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how African Americans viewed racism as benefiting all whites, not just overt 
racists.95
Another significant factor compounding the socio-economic problems of 
Miami’s blacks was the large influx of Cuban, and later Haitian, refugees to Miami. 
African Americans complained about the detrimental effect on black employment 
as both ethnic groups competed for scarce resources. One African-American estate 
agent stated: “Black faces used to be all you could see in service jobs at hotels here 
and on Miami Beach. . . .  If you go there now you can hardly find a black face. 
They have been replaced by Cubans.”96 A poll in the Miami Herald found that over 
50% of African Americans believed that the recent influx of Cuban and Haitian
07 •refugees had negatively impacted upon their lives. Some African Americans were 
resentful of the Cuban refugees and pointed to the way they were given greater 
priority. Community activist, Wellington Role, stated that: “We are third class 
citizens in our own country . . . can you believe that? At least in other cities, blacks 
are second class. But here, we’re not even up to that.”98 Overall, however, while the 
Carter administration attributed the Cuban refugee issue as a major factor in the 
rioting, few African Americans - just 4% - identified Cuban refugees as a main 
cause of rioting. Whilst the African-American socio-economic condition was 
significantly affected by the competition from Cuban immigrants, the root cause of 
the problem remained racism. By taking the position that the riot was caused by
95 David Wellman perceives racism as a system benefiting all whites, irrespective o f their intentions 
or awareness o f it. David Wellman, Portraits o f  White Racism (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1993).
96 Quoted in Sheppard, “Miami’s Blacks”, B4.
97 Brown, “Black Miami’s Voices”, A17.
98 Quoted Brown, “Black Miami’s Voices”, A12.
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circumstances unique to Miami, the Carter administration deflected attention from 
the fact that the problems faced by African Americans in Miami were common to 
nearly all urban African Americans. The problems evident in Miami were reflective 
of a nationwide situation. Yet, many whites did not perceive Carter’s response as 
being so measured.
Like African-American discourse, white discourse surrounding Miami was 
also varied. Many whites expressed outrage at the verdict and sympathy for the 
black community. One white resident called the Miami Herald and expressed his 
disbelief at the verdict. He stated: “I can’t believe a person is dead and no one is 
guilty.” Another caller to the newspaper stated: “Would you add my name to the list 
of people who are sick to their stomach by the McDuffie verdict? . . . And I’m as 
white as white can be.”99 As well as phoning newspapers, many whites also wrote 
letters expressing their solidarity with African Americans. One letter read: “I can 
only hope the black community knows how many of us non-blacks are sickened by 
the McDuffie verdict. For once lets give the media a break. It’s frightening to think 
how many crimes are probably swept under the rug because there was no 
publicity.” Similarly, another white resident wrote: “I am truly embarrassed to be a 
member of the white majority.”100 White discourse was emphatic in acknowledging 
the racial injustice of the verdict: “I just don’t believe the Tampa verdict. What if 
the dead motorcyclist were white and the four policemen black? What verdict 
then?”101
99 Quoted in Grimm and Bartlett, “McDuffie Decision Brings Dismay, Disbelief, Anger”, 32.
100 “Letters”, Miami Herald, May 22, 1980, 6.
101 “Letters”, 6.
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A number of whites also expressed sympathy with the rioters. Dr Emanuel 
Orfas, a white naturopathic physician who ran a family clinic in the African- 
American area destroyed by the rioting, said he understood the violence and despite 
the loss to his practice sympathised with the rioters. He stated:
They told me the innocent have to suffer to get true reform . . . I’m 
kind of bitter about the whole thing. . . . Though I lost everything, I 
still sympathise with the blacks. I can’t help it. I think they’re right. 
There has to be some reform in the police.10
Another white Miamian expressed sympathy for the rioting in a letter to the Miami 
Herald'.
After hearing the verdict in the McDuffie trial, I cried. I am white. 
The black people in Dade County have real grievances and no other 
means to vent them except relative rage. . . . The blacks of Dade 
County feel cheated. Their reaction is in proportion to what they 
have suffered.103
Thus, for a number of whites, both the injustice of the courts and the prevailing 
socio-economic inequality legitimised the rioting to a significant degree.
Other whites, however, while not discounting the plight of African 
Americans, were unable and/or unwilling to accept the violent reaction. One white 
Miamian defending his business stated: “I have nothing against them, but this, is all 
I got.”104 For other whites, rioting was not the way to redress the injustices or
102 Quoted in Paul L. Montgommery, “Curfew in Miami is Ended as Size o f Guard is Cut”, New 
York Times, May 22, 1980, A24.
103 “Letters”, 6.
104 Quoted in Crewdson, “14 Die in Miami Riot”, BIO.
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inequalities. “This is not the way to bring about the necessary change in our judicial 
system. It is, however, the way to bring about anger, racism, and increased 
alienation between blacks and whites.”105
The more predominant reaction among whites was one of horror, and a 
number saw no justification for the riot in McDuffie’s death. In fact, they did not 
regard McDuffie’s death as the injustice that the majority of African Americans did. 
Another letter to the Miami Herald expressed this: “All the rioting, racial unrest, 
killing, and looting of the last few days would not have happened if a man, riding a 
motorcycle late at night, had behaved like a normal, responsible, law-abiding 
citizen when hailed by a policeman.”106 A number of whites had expressed this 
feeling in the weeks after the initial incident. Some thought McDuffie believed he 
was above the law: “A citizen thought he was above the law and did not need to
1 ryi
obey the officers.” Others regarded the entire incident as a result of lack of 
respect for authority, both from McDuffie and the officers. As one letter read:
In this bizarre event there is a question nobody seems to ask: what 
could this man, running from the police, possibly have said or done 
to so infuriate them? . . . Whatever it may have been, perhaps he is 
not to be blamed because he grew up in a society bred to have little 
or no regard for authority . . .  if we are to believe the accounts we 
read in The Herald, the police, by their actions, also demonstrated 
gross disregard for authority.108
105 “Letters”, 6.
106 “Letters”, 6.
107 “Letters”, Miami Herald, January 14, 1980, 6.
108 “Letters”, Miami Herald, January 7, 1980, 6.
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Such sentiments reflected the widely held perception amongst whites of the 
lawlessness permeating American society since the 1960s and in particular the 
lawlessness of African Americans.
White discourse was also critical of the official response to the Miami riot. 
Many believed that the authorities should have taken a harder line against the 
rioters to restore order in the city. One man who lost his business in the riots stated:
Whites are being pushed around by blacks. . . . The governor should 
have issued orders to shoot. If he had done that, we wouldn’t have 
had all this burning. The only way to stop violence is with violence - 
especially when they become savages.109
This statement reflects the belief held by a number of whites in the post-Civil 
Rights era that whites were being victimised by African Americans, and that 
government was in effect condoning African-American lawlessness in its 
permissive approach. The use of the term ‘savages’ also reveals the existence of 
racial stereotypes underlying this perception for some whites.
Many whites were also angered by what they regarded as the government’s 
capitulation to the ‘demands’ rioters. Two days after the verdict and the outbreak of 
the riot, Carter sent Attorney General Benjamin R. Civiletti to Miami in an effort to 
calm the outrage of the city’s black community. He arrived with top aides including 
Drew S. Days, Chief of the Justice Department’s Civil Rights Division and Gilbert 
G. Pamps, Head of the Community Relations Service. Within a day Civiletti
109 Quoted in Margot Homblower and Donald P. Baker, “Civiletti Opens Sweeping Probe of Miami 
Police”, Washington Post, May 21, 1980, A14. The observer was presumably unaware o f the irony 
in this statement: African Americans were trying to stop violence with violence too.
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announced that a team of 25 to 35 federal prosecutors and agents would look into 
alleged civil rights abuses by police officers. It was also announced that a grand 
jury would hear evidence that McDuffie’s civil rights had been violated. While 
African Americans welcomed this, some whites regarded it as bowing to mob rule. 
An editorial in the Chicago Tribune declared:
Attorney General Civiletti should require a thorough review of the 
evidence before permitting the second prosecution of the Miami 
policemen. If he is convinced by the facts of the case justice 
miscarried in Tampa, then let him give his authorization. But if the 
deciding factor is in reality the rage as it has manifested itself on 
Miami’s streets, then Mr. Civiletti must refuse. To manipulate the 
system of justice simply to pacify unruly mobs would be to destroy 
the very strength of the law: it is the rule of the law, not the rule of 
brute force, which offers the disadvantaged their greatest 
protection.110
Carter’s actions were widely criticised for appearing to condone the violence of the 
rioters. There was also widespread anger that in bending to the demands of the 
rioters the government was turning its back on the white victims of the violence. As 
a letter to the Chicago Tribune read:
Amidst statements coming from Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti 
and state officials about the Miami riots, nothing has been said about 
prosecuting those members of the mob who murdered several 
innocent victims. Nor has President Carter announced that he will 
send an official to Miami to see if the civil rights of the riot victims 
have been violated. To get justice for these dead, will their relatives 
and fellow ethnics have to conduct their own riot?111
110 Editorial, “Mob and Law in Miami”, Chicago Tribune, May 20, 1980, 2.2.
111 “Letters”, Chicago Tribune, June 8, 1980, 2.4.
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For a number of whites it appeared as though African Americans were being 
granted preferential treatment by government. Some regarded this as a politically 
motivated response by Carter to court the black vote. As reporter Bob Wiedrich 
stated in the Chicago Tribune:
Benjamin Civiletti forgot he is the attorney general to the United 
States when he hit Miami last weekend and started playing to the 
mob. Politically that approach may have been intended as a plus in a 
presidential election year for the boss who dispatched him there, 
Jimmy Carter.112
This statement negatively refers to the connection between the Carter and the 
Democratic Party with African Americans, and emphasises the gulf with white 
voters.
Along with disapproval of government intervention in the McDuffie case, a 
number of whites were critical of government efforts to rebuild the riot-torn areas, 
despite attempts by Carter to avoid appearing to reward rioting by cautioning that
i  1 1
federal aid would be limited. As one white Miamian expressed:
I don’t understand the logic of burning down all those buildings and 
getting 97 million dollars to build them again and then complain it’s 
not enough. . . .  Do you see that empty site? It was a huge 
department store where you could buy almost anything you could 
want. The blacks burned it down . . . they burned down a tyre 
factory. It smouldered for three days. When they rioted in May we 
were told it was because they had 40% unemployment. After the 
riots they had 45% unemployment. . . they haven’t got good schools.
112 Bob Wiedrich, “Civiletti Plays to an Angry Mob”, Chicago Tribune, May 27, 1980, 2.4.
113 Dennis E. Gale, Understanding Urban Unrest: From Reverend King to Rodney King (California: 
sage, 1996), 104.
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But when they have got schools they bum them down and beat up the 
teachers.114
For a number of whites, the answer to African-American problems was not 
government handouts; especially those paid for by white tax dollars. Whites were 
tired of being both scapegoats for black problems and having to meet their cost. As 
one white American expressed: “Being white is not a sin. I do not feel guilty for 
being white, and there is nothing anyone can do to change that. Respect must be 
earned. After this last week, the only people to respect are the taxpayers who will 
have to pick up the tab.”115 Such sentiments reflected feelings nationwide. In 1980, 
while most whites acknowledged the need of aid for African Americans, few whites 
favoured an increase in spending on aid to African Americans. Polls showed that 
29% of whites thought that the government was spending too much on improving 
conditions for African Americans. Fifty-one percent felt that spending was about 
right and only 20% felt that too little was being spent.116
Ultimately, concerns that Miami’s blacks were to receive preferential 
treatment proved unnecessary. Following an indictment by the grand jury, Veverka 
was tried in New Orleans on charges of violating the civil rights of McDuffie but 
was acquitted. On the other hand, nine African Americans were tried and five were 
convicted of the killings of whites during the riot.117 Three African Americans were
114 Quoted in Richard West, “Miami in the Melting Pot”, Spectator, August 16, 1980, 11.
115 “Letters”, Miami Herald, May 29, 1980, 6.
116 Floris W. Wood (ed.), An American Profile: Opinions and Behavior, 1972-1989 (Gale Research 
Inc., 1990), 729. In comparison, 80% of African Americans thought too little was being spent, 18% 
thought it about right, and just 25% thought it too much.
117 In October 1980 James McCullough, 18, and Frankie Lee James, 20, were tried on second-degree 
murder charges in the death of Jeffrey Kulup and o f the attempted murder of Michael Kulup. James 
was acquitted of all charges, but McCullough was found guilty o f manslaughter and sentenced to 15 
years, which was later reduced to four years and two years community service following an
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also killed in the course of the riot by white civilians. The killers cruised the black 
northwest area of the county in a truck or van and randomly shot at blacks. Nearly a 
year after the riot, one white man was arrested as a suspect, but was ultimately 
released due to a lack of evidence. No additional white persons were ever charged 
with the killings of the three African Americans.
Similarly, while the Carter administration did attempt to address the 
grievances of African Americans in Miami, overall, the government response failed 
to address the fundamental cause of the riot in Miami: the persistence of racism. In 
the aftermath of the riot, both the local and state governments’ responses were 
largely limited to economic initiatives and measures, which ultimately were not 
wholly successful. The federal response was also mainly made up of economic aid. 
The federal aid package ultimately consisted largely of loans made available 
through the small business administration (SBA). Although roughly $40 million 
was targeted for first-year use in the riot area, only around half of the money 
available was ever successfully applied for, and almost 90% of this was loaned to
overruling. In February 1981, Leonard Capers, Lawrence Capers, Samuel Lightsey and Patrick 
Moore were tried for first-degree murder for the killings o f Benny Higdon, Robert Owens and 
Charles Barreca. Lightsey was found guilty o f second-degree murder and was sentenced to life 
imprisonment, Leonard and Lawrence Capers were both found guilty o f three counts o f third-degree 
murder and each sentenced to three consecutive 15-year sentences, and Moore was acquitted o f all 
charges. In March 1981, the trial o f Lonnie Bradley, 18, and Samuel Williams, 32, was due to be 
held in Miami. Both were charged with second-degree murder in the killings of Owens, Barreca and 
Higdon. The charges were dropped, however, following the inability o f the state’s two key witnesses 
to identify Williams in a line-up and when another witness recanted her earlier statement implicating 
the defendants. In April 1981, Nathaniel Lane, 18, described by other defendants as the chief culprit 
in the deaths of Owens, Barreca and Higdon was tried on charges o f first-degree murder. The trial 
resulted in a hung jury with the jury split on racial lines. In July 1981, Lane was tried again which 
also ended in a hung jury split along racial lines. His final trial in December 1981 again resulted in 
the jury being unable to reach a verdict and Lane was released. In March 1982 after three and a half 
hours of deliberation a jury found Ira Lee Picket guilty o f first-degree arson and burglary with 
assault in a mob attack on Emilio Munoz, a Cuban refugee. He was sentenced to 15 years. See Porter 
and Dunn, The Miami Riot o f 1980, Chapter 7.
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white-and Hispanic-owned businesses, where fewer than half opened in riot 
areas.118 In reflecting on the government response to Miami, Dunn concluded that: 
“The end result has been disappointing, since none of the post-riot measures taken 
has significantly impacted the lives of inner-city blacks in Miami or other black 
communities.”119 A major problem for the federal aid package was that it was left to 
be implemented by Reagan - who was elected in 1980 partly on the strength of his 
stand against affirmative action - whose administration made much effort to curtail 
it.120
An analysis of public discourse surrounding the Miami riot, reveals that 
white discourse surrounding the Miami riot, like African-American discourse, was 
varied. A number of whites expressed sympathy toward McDuffie and shared 
African-American disbelief and condemnation of the verdict in the case. A number 
of whites also regarded the rioting as an understandable response to African- 
American grievances against the justice system and to the socio-economic 
conditions endured by urban African Americans. Other whites, while denouncing 
the rioting, also acknowledged the grievances of African Americans. Many more 
whites, however, denounced the rioting and saw no justifiable reasons for it. 
Moreover, many whites also denounced government response to the rioting, 
expressing anger toward what they regarded as preferential treatment. Whilst
118 For a fuller discussion o f the response to the riot by government see Porter and Dunn, The Miami 
Riot o f  1980, Chapter 7; Daryl B. Harris, The Logic o f Black Urban Rebellions, Chapter 7.
119 Dunn, Black Miami, 267. For an account o f the socio-economic position o f African Americans in 
Miami up to and after the riot, see Dunn, Black Miami, Chapter 10.
120 One o f the most serious consequences o f Reagan’s election on the federal aid package in Miami 
were the cutbacks to the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act program (CETA) and the 
Economic Development Agency (EDA) the agency that was supposed to figure predominantly in 
redeveloping the riot area.
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opposition to preferential treatment was not evidence of the existence of widespread 
coded racism, the discourse of some whites revealed the racial feelings underlying 
some responses. Irrespective of the presence of racial motivation, however, 
reactions to the Miami riot revealed the potency of preferential treatment as an
191appeal to white voters; it was one which Reagan certainly capitalised upon. 
Furthermore, whether opposition to affirmative action was racially-based - 
consciously or unconsciously -  or not, the effects were still inimical to black needs.
An analysis of African-American and white discourse surrounding the 
Miami riot thus revealed that the problems of urban African Americans, brutally 
highlighted by urban rioting in the 1960s, had not been resolved and hence the 
necessity of government intervention to address the situation. Despite this, 
however, an analysis of white discourse demonstrated a considerable degree of 
hostility towards affirmative action measures by government. What this illustrates, 
is that Carter’s discourse in relation to affirmative action was out of touch with a 
significant proportion of white voters, for whom affirmative action amounted to 
preferential treatment. It was to Reagan’s discourse against big government that 
these voters were attuned. Furthermore, whilst probably only a minority of whites 
were consciously attracted to the racial appeal of Reagan’s preferential treatment 
discourse, the covert nature of the appeal meant that it could be supported by 
consciously non-racist whites also.122
121 Carter, From George Wallace to Newt Gingrich; O’Reilly, Nixon’s Piano.
122 Carter, From George Wallace to Newt Gingrich; O’Reilly, Nixon’s Piano; Siegel, “The Missing 
Issue o f 1980”.
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CHAPTER 5
Reagan and the Fear of Crime: 
Bernhard Goetz, 1984 and Howard Beach, 1986
5.1 The Reagan Presidency: 1981 -  1989
The presidency of Ronald Reagan was the pinnacle of the conservative 
ascendancy in America.1 Reagan’s election also completed the breakdown of the New 
Deal consensus that had begun to fracture in 1968. In the tradition of Nixon’s Southern 
Strategy, Reagan implicitly promoted the Republican Party as the party of white 
Americans though a series of racially coded messages and gestures. In the 1980
1 For a discussion of the Reagan presidency, in addition to works cited, see Norman C. Amaker, Civil 
Rights and the Reagan Administration (Washington D.C.: Urban Institute Press, 1988); Lou Cannon, 
President Reagan: The Role o f a Lifetime (New York: Public Affairs, 2000); Robert Dallek, Ronald 
Reagan: The Politics o f Symbolism (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1999); David Mervin, 
Ronald Reagan and the American Presidency (London: Longman, 1990); Edmund Morris, Dutch: A 
Memoir o f  Ronald Reagan (London: Harper Collins, 2000); Robert D. Plotnick, “Changes in Poverty, 
Income Inequality, and the Standard of Living in the United States During the Reagan Years”, 
International Journal of Health Studies 23.2 (1993): 347-358, Nancy Reagan and Michael K. Deaver, A 
Different Drummer: My Thirty Years with Ronald Reagan (New York: Harper Collins, 2004); Ronald 
Reagan, An American Life (New York: Pocket Books, 1999); Michael Schaller, Reckoning with Reagan: 
America and its President in the 1980s (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992); Maurice A. St.Pierre, 
“Reaganomics and its Implications for African-American Family Life”, Journal o f  Black Studies 21.3 
(1991): 325-340; Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, “Falling Behind: A Report on How Blacks 
Have Fared Under Reagan”, Journal o f Black Studies 17.1 (1986): 148-172.
2 Dan T. Carter, From George Wallace to Newt Gingrich: Race in the Conservative Counterrevolution, 
1963-1994 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1996); Michael Omi and Howard Winant, 
Racial Formation in the United States: From the 1960s to the 1990s (New York: Routledge, 1994); 
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presidential election, Reagan won 55% of the national white vote and 52% of votes in 
the South.3 This was increased in the 1984 election, where Reagan took 66% of the 
white vote, including 74% of the white male vote in the South and 68% of the white 
vote in the West.4
The revival of the law and order theme was one of the ways in which white 
identification with the Republican Party was reinforced during the Reagan era. The ‘get 
tough’ policy on crime during the Reagan era, was in many senses a legitimate 
response to the serious problem of violent crime in the nation’s urban centres, which 
affected African Americans more than it did whites.5 In 1980s America, evidence 
complied by the Bureau of Justice Statistics showed that murder was the leading cause 
of death for African-American males between 20 and 29 years-old.6 African-American 
males were also 2lA times more likely than white males to be the victims of robbery, 
African-American women were up to 60% more likely to be raped than white women, 
and African-American children were far more likely than white children to live in 
households that were burglarised.7 Despite these facts, however, the focus on crime by
3 Ian Derbyshire, Politics in the United States: From Carter to Reagan (London: Chambers, 1987), 79.
4 Omi and Winant, Racial Formation in the United States, 133.
5 Susan Caringella-Macdonald argued that attention to the allegedly increasing crime problem in the 
1980s was not justified or paralleled by increases in the number and rates of officially estimated index 
crime. Susan Caringella-Macdonald, “State Crises and the Crackdown on Crime Under Reagan”, Crime, 
Law and Social Change 14.2 (1990): 91-118. See also Katherine Beckett and Theodore Sasson, The 
Politics o f Injustice: Crime and Punishment in America (California: Thousand Oaks, 2000); Samuel 
Walker, Cassia Spohn, Miriam Delone, Race, Ethnicity and Crime in America (California: Wadsworth, 
2000).
6 Manning Marable, Race, Reform and Rebellion: The Second Reconstruction in Black America, 1945- 
1990 (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 1991), 193.
7 Marable, Race, Reform and Rebellion, 196. For a discussion of the racial disparity between the 
economic losses of black and white victims of crime see Gerald D. Jaynes and Robin M. Williams, A
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Reagan was directed primarily at white voters. While the violent crime rate did decline 
nationally, from a high of 35.3 crimes per 1,000 persons in 1982 to 29.1 crimes per 
1000 persons in 1989, the most dramatic effect of the crackdown on crime on the 
African-American population - especially the war on drugs - was the drastic increase in
o
the number of African Americans caught up in the Criminal Justice System (CJS). By 
1989, nearly a quarter of African-American males between the ages of 20 and 29 were 
either in prison, on parole or on probation.9
This chapter will analyse Reagan’s discourse in relation to the issue of crime 
and the fear of crime. It will illustrate that throughout his presidency, Reagan presented 
crime as an enormous problem facing American society and in doing so helped both to 
fuel and legitimise the fear of crime. Reagan championed the need for toughness 
against crime, and the reversal of liberal attitudes and policies within the CJS. Like 
Nixon before him, he presented the Republican Party as the saviour of law and order 
and conversely the Democratic Party as its undoing. Moreover, also like Nixon, there
Common Destiny: Blacks and American Society (Washington D.C.: National Academy Press, 1989), 
Chapter 9.
8 Mark Warr, “Public Opinion on Crime and Punishment”, Public Opinion Quarterly 59 (1995): 303. For 
a discussion of the war on drugs see Beckett and Sasson, The Politics o f Injustice', Michael Tonry,
Malign Neglect - Race, Crime and Punishment in America (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); 
Walker, Spohn, Delone, Race, Ethnicity and Crime in America.
9 Marable, Race, Reform and Rebellion, 194. For a discussion of African Americans and the Criminal 
Justice System see Alfred Blumstein, “On the Disproportionality of U.S. Prison Populations”, Journal o f  
Crime and Criminology 73 (1982): 1259-1281; John Hagan and Ruth D. Patterson (eds.), Crime and 
Inequality in America: Patterns and Consequences (California: Stanford University Press, 1995); Jaynes 
and Williams, A Common Destiny, Chapter 9; Coramae Richey Mann, Unequal Justice: A Question o f  
Color (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993); Cassia C. Spohn, “Courts, Sentences, and 
Prisons” in Obie Clayton Jr. (ed.), An American Dilemma Revisited: Race Relations in a Changing 
World (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1996); Tonry, Malign Neglect', Walker, Spohn, Delone, 
Race, Ethnicity and Crime in America.
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was a distinctly racial element to Reagan’s representation of the Democratic Party in 
this way. During the 1960s when many whites, as part of the wider reactionary swing 
to the right, had grown increasingly resentful of perceived leniency by government and 
the criminal justice system towards African-American urban rioters, an inherent link 
was established between law and order and race.10 As such, by referring to Democratic 
Party liberalism and leniency towards crime and presenting the Republican Party as the 
antithesis to this, Reagan, like Nixon before him, was sending a covert message to 
white voters. Moreover, there were other racial messages implicit within Reagan’s 
discourse, which helped to further racialise the issue of crime and the fear of crime. 
Collectively, they helped to create an environment where coded racial messages in 
relation to crime could be more easily heard. This chapter will analyse public discourse 
surrounding the Bernhard Goetz subway shootings, 1984, and the death of Michael 
Griffith in Howard Beach, 1986, to illustrate the feelings and beliefs that Reagan 
tapped into with his crime discourse and will demonstrate how the coded racial 
political issue of crime and fear of crime was reproduced in American society.
Reagan’s concern with crime and the issue of fear of crime within American 
society can be seen in his Remarks at the Annual Meeting o f the International 
Association o f Chiefs o f Police in New Orleans, Louisiana, September 28, 1981.11 
Reagan declares that the problem of crime in American society has remained an
10 See Chapter 2.
11 “Remarks at the Annual Meeting o f the International Association of Chiefs of Police in New Orleans, 
Louisiana, September 28, 1981” Public Papers o f the President o f the United States: 1981.
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unresolved and increasing problem, resulting in an atmosphere of fear within society. 
Reagan states:
In preparing these remarks, I had an opportunity to go back and look 
over some of the comments I’ve made to law enforcement officials on 
other occasions. The topic of those discussions was a subject with which 
you have more than a passing familiarity -  the steady, ominous growth 
of crime in our Nation. In one speech some years ago in Las Vegas, I 
once wondered about what was happening in America, and I noted the 
fear and the anger of the citizenry as they locked themselves in their 
homes or refused to walk the streets at night. . . . Then there was a 
speech in Dallas where I mentioned the effect of narcotics on the crime 
rate and the appalling estimates that drug addicts were responsible for 
the economic increase of certain crimes. I don’t mention these speeches 
now because they show any gift of insight on my part; the truth is, what 
I said then was well known at the time, certainly by you. . . . The 
frightening reality -  for all of those speeches by those of us in 
government, for all of the surveys, studies, and blue ribbon panels, for 
all of the 14-point programs and the declarations of war on crime, crime 
has advanced and advanced steadily in its upward climb, and our 
citizens have grown more and more frustrated, frightened and angry.
In his remarks, as well as expressing his concern with the level of crime and the fear of 
crime, Reagan also aligns himself with law enforcement, which he continues to do as 
he proceeds to detail the horrific reality of crime. Reagan declares:
Just during the time that you and I are together today, at least 1 person 
will be murdered, 9 women will be raped, 67 other Americans will be 
robbed, 97 will be seriously assaulted, and 389 homes will be 
burglarized. This will all happen in the span of the next 30 minutes, or 
while I’m talking. Now, if by stopping talking I could change those 
figures, I’d stop. But you know that they will continue at the same rate 
throughout every 30 minutes of the 24 hours of the day. And I don’t 
have to tell you, the men and women of your departments will be the 
first to cope with the mayhem, the wreckage, the suffering caused by
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those who consider themselves above the law with the right to prey on 
their fellow citizens.
In talking about crime in this way, Reagan is aligning himself and the Republican Party 
with Americans and their concern with crime and is demonstrating that he is in touch 
with the of fear of crime that Americans were expressing. Throughout the early-to-mid 
1980s, opinion polls measured the nationwide fear of crime at between 41% and 
48%.12 In doing this, however, Reagan was also helping to both fuel and legitimise the 
fear of crime.
In his remarks, Reagan also aligns himself with those who feel that the CJS is 
failing them. Reagan declares his intention to: “. . . speak for a group that has been 
frequently overlooked in the past -  the innocent victims of crime.” In stating this, 
Reagan is making reference to the liberal ideology of the 1960s and early 1970s, which 
sought to tackle crime by uncovering the socio-economic and/or psychological reasons, 
which supposedly underlay it. This liberal philosophy, which it was perceived wrongly 
treated the perpetrators of crime as victims rather than those who suffered from 
criminal acts, was increasingly resented as Americans grew more reactionary. Opinion 
polls demonstrated that that between 83% and 86% of Americans during the early-to-
1 3mid 1980s believed that the courts were too lenient in dealing with criminals.
12 Warr, “Public Opinion on Crime and Punishment”, 297, 304, 305; Floris W. Wood, An American 
Profile: Opinions and Behaviour, 1972-1989 (Gale Research Inc, 1990), 764.
13 Warr, “Public Opinion on Crime and Punishment”, 307; Greg M. Shaw et al, “The Polls-Trends: 
Crime, Police and Civil Liberties”, Public Opinion Quarterly 82 (1998): 419.
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Reagan advocated a philosophy that put law-abiding citizens at the centre of 
policy on crime. In his remarks, he announces his intention to bring in a host of tough 
new measures re-focusing law on the side of non-offenders.14 Reagan announces: “. . . 
this administration will support a number of statutory reforms that will address the 
imbalance between the rights of the accused and the rights of the innocent.” Further on 
in his remarks Reagan explicitly contests the merits of the liberal philosophy on crime, 
denouncing the argument that poverty was a primary cause of crime. Reagan asserts:
At the very same time that crime rates have steadily risen, our nation has 
made unparalleled progress in raising the standard of living and 
improving the quality of life. It’s obvious that prosperity doesn’t 
decrease crime, just as it’s obvious that deprivation and want don’t 
necessarily increase crime. The truth is that today’s criminals for the 
most part are not desperate people seeking bred for their families; crime 
is the way they’ve chosen to live.
Not only is Reagan stating that the liberal argument that poverty is a primary cause of 
crime is incorrect, he blames such attitudes for the rise in crime in America; liberalism 
and permissiveness towards crime has bred crime. Reagan charges: “The truth is that 
criminals in America today get away with plenty, and sometimes, quite literally, they 
get away with murder. Only 40 percent of the murders ever end with a suspect being 
imprisoned.” In aligning himself with law enforcement and Americans, and with their 
concern with crime and with the leniency of the Criminal Justice System, Reagan
14 Reagan sought revision of the criminal code, bail reform, reform of the exclusionary rule, mandatory 
prison terms for those carrying a gun whilst committing a felony, and the need to tackle drug trafficking.
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presents himself and the Republican Party as the champion of the American people. 
Reagan states:
It’s time for honest talk, for plain talk. There has been a breakdown in 
the criminal justice system in America. It just plain isn’t working. All 
too often, repeat offenders, habitual law-breakers, career criminals, call 
them what you will, are robbing, raping, and beating with impunity and, 
as I said, quite literally getting away with murder. The people are 
sickened and outraged. They demand that we put a stop to it.
Reagan’s concern with crime is again seen in his Radio Address to the Nation 
on Crime and Criminal Justice Reform, September 11, 1982.15 Here too, in expressing 
his concern with crime, Reagan aligns himself and the Republican Party with the 
American people. Reagan declares: “Today I want to talk to you about a subject that’s 
been very much on my mind, even as we’ve been busy with budgets, interest rates, and 
legislation. It’s a subject I know you’ve been thinking about too -  crime in our 
society.” Reagan legitimises both Americans’ concern with and fear of crime. Reagan 
states:
Many of you have written to me how afraid you are to walk the streets 
alone at night. We must make America safe again, especially for the 
women and elderly who face moments of fear. You have every right to 
be concerned. We live in the midst of a crime epidemic that took the 
lives of more than 22,000 people last year and has touched nearly one- 
third of American households, costing them about $8.8 billion per year 
in financial losses.
15 “Radio Address to the Nation on Crime and Criminal Justice Reform, September 11, 1982” Public 
Papers o f the President o f the United States: 1982.
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Reagan asserts the need for toughness against crime and the perpetrators of crime, and 
he vows that his administration will deliver this. Reagan proclaims: “It’s time to get 
these hardened criminals off the street and into jail. . . . I want you to know that this 
administration, even as it has been battling our economic problems, is taking important 
action on the Federal level to fight crime.” In making reference to the economic 
situation facing America in this way, Reagan is sending a message regarding the sense 
of priority the Reagan administration is giving to the crime problem.
Reagan again in his remarks also taps into the sense of frustration and 
disillusionment with the CJS felt by many Americans, and aligns himself with these 
Americans. Reagan states: “. . . an important part of the problem is that Americans are 
losing faith in our courts and our entire legal system. . . .  We can and must make 
improvements in the way our courts deal with crime.” In doing this Reagan is again 
presenting himself and the Republican Party as the champions of law and order. The 
Democratic Party on the other hand is represented in stark contrast to the Republicans. 
Reagan riles that Democrat-controlled Congress is holding up his legislative reforms. 
Reagan states of his Comprehensive Crime bill:
These are important and imaginative steps. They strike a real blow 
against organized crime and professional criminals. Unfortunately, they 
have yet to be passed by the Congress. I urge the Congress to act 
promptly and favourably on these major initiatives against lawlessness 
in America. Every moment wasted is a moment lost in the war against 
crime.
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Like Nixon before him, Reagan makes use of military language and imagery. This not 
only serves to highlight the severity of the crime problem, but it also makes the 
statement that in relation to crime it’s a ‘them and us’ scenario; a situation where only 
one side is right. In his closing comment, Reagan makes a political appeal to 
Americans to join the Republican Party in its battle with crime. He states: “. . . I hope 
we can count on your support in our war on crime and our efforts to protect the 
innocent and put the professional criminals in jail where they belong. Working together 
we can make America safe again for all our people.”
In addition to highlighting the grim reality of crime in the nation through the 
use of statistics and war imagery, a recurring theme from early on in Reagan’s 
administration is the use of cautionary tales in relation to crime and the criminal justice 
system. It is also another way in which Reagan was able to present the Republican 
Party as the party of law and order and the Democratic Party as its undoing. In his 
Remarks at the Annual Meeting o f the International Association o f Chiefs o f Police in 
New Orleans, Louisiana, September 28, 1981, Reagan makes reference to an incident -  
the diaper case - when he was Governor of California.16 Reagan states:
Two narcotics officers, with enough evidence to warrant a search, get a 
search warrant, entered a home where they believed heroin was being 
peddled. A married couple lived there. They searched. They found no 
evidence. As they were leaving, one of them, on a hunch, went over to 
the crib where the baby lay sleeping and removed its diapers, and there 
was the heroin. The case was thrown out of the court because the baby
16 “Remarks at the Annual Meeting of the International Association of Chiefs of Police in New Orleans, 
Louisiana, September 28, 1981” Public Papers o f the President o f the United States: 1981.
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hadn’t given its permission to be searched. [Laughter] It became known 
as the diaper case. I told that story once, and one of the Secret Service 
agents assigned to the presidential detail came up later and said, ‘I was 
one of those narcotics officers. That’s why I quit.’ [Laughter].
Reagan used this diaper tale when talking about crime and the CJS -  specifically when
1 7
discussing the exclusionary rule - throughout his presidency. It served to demonstrate 
how unbalanced the CJS had become, leaving police powerless and protecting the 
rights of offenders to such an extreme it came at the expense of justice. The tale 
demonstrated the need for a common sense approach, where ensuring law and order 
and protecting the lives of non-offenders was the primary aim of the CJS.
Reagan related another tale of when he was Governor of California in his 
Remarks at a Question and Answer Session with Junior High School Students, 
November 14, 1988,18 This tale was in relation to gun control. Reagan stated:
There was talk about having a gun ban in California. It didn’t go 
through. But I got a letter from a man in San Quentin prison, and from 
the prison he wrote me the letter to tell me he was in there for burglary. 
He was a burglar. And he said, ‘I just want you to know that if that law 
goes through, here in San Quentin there will be celebrating throughout 
the day and night by all the burglars who are in prison because’ he said, 
‘we can watch a house we plan to rob for days. We can leam the habits 
of the people living in that house, to know when is the best time to go in 
and be a burglar -  rob it.’ He said, ‘The only question we can never 
answer is: Does the man in that house have a gun in the drawer by his
17 The diaper case was used for example in “Question and Answer Session with High School Students on 
Domestic and Foreign Issues, February 25, 1983” Public Papers o f  the President o f the United States: 
1983\ “Remarks at the Conservative Political Action Conference Dinner, February 18, 1983” Public 
Papers o f  the President o f the United States: 1983; and “Radio Address to the Nation on the Federal 
Judiciary, June 21, 1986” Public Papers o f the President o f  the United States: 1986.
18 “Remarks at a Question and Answer Session with Junior High School Students, November 14, 1988” 
Public Papers o f the President o f the United States: 1988.
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bed?’ He said, ‘That’s the risk we have to run.’ He said, ‘If you tell us in 
advance they won’t have a gun in that drawer by their bed,’ he said, ‘the 
burglars in here will be celebrating for evermore.’
This tale asserts that liberal policies such as gun control play into the hands of 
criminals.19 It suggests that liberalism breeds crime, whereas toughness, or the threat of 
toughness, acts as a deterrent. The use of these tales not only contributed to 
highlighting the problem of crime, they also illustrated what was supposedly wrong 
with the CJS: how the CJS had become too soft under Democrat governance and how it 
needed to be toughened up. They also served to send the message that it was the 
Republican Party that was to do this, thus again serving to present the Republican Party 
as the party of law and order and the Democratic Party as its undoing.
As Reagan’s presidency progressed and as he neared the end of his first term, 
Reagan’s discourse in relation to crime began to focus on the progress made by his 
administration in tackling crime and the fear of crime. In his Radio Address to the 
Nation on Proposed Crime Legislation, February 18, 1984, Reagan announces:
My fellow Americans: Shouldn’t we have the right as citizens of this 
great country to walk our streets without being afraid and to go to bed 
without worrying the next sound might be a burglar or a rapist? Of 
course we should. But in reality we don’t. The sad fact is too many of 
our friends and loved ones live in fear of crime. And there’s no mystery 
as to why. For too many years, the scales of criminal justice were tilted 
toward protecting the rights of criminals. Those in charge forgot or just 
plain didn’t care about protecting your rights -  the rights of law-abiding 
citizens. We came to Washington determined to change that by restoring
19 The tale was also related in “The President’s News Conference in Toronto, Canada, June 21, 1988” 
Public Papers o f the President o f  the United States: 1988.
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the proper balance to our criminal justice system. . . . Common sense is 
beginning to pay off. In 1982 the crime rate dropped by 4.3 percent -  the 
biggest decline since 1972. But we still face a tremendous challenge, and 
meeting the challenge is what I want to talk to you about today.20
In making this statement, Reagan not only legitimises the fear of crime felt by 
Americans, he asserts that such fear was the result of the negligent, permissive 
approach to crime by his -  Democrat -  predecessors in government. Reagan states that 
his administration’s determined effort to be tough on crime and reclaim the safety of 
the nation for the American people has brought tangible results. Reagan is keen to 
point out, however, that the battle against crime is far from won, and that the drive for 
toughness needs to be continued. In doing this, Reagan is presenting the Republican 
Party as the party of law and order of the past, present and future. Moreover, Reagan 
presents the Democratic Party as the barrier to law and order, in the past, present and 
future. Reagan emphatically asserts that the greatest barrier to tackling crime, is not the 
perpetrators of crime themselves, but rather those in power who refuse to act decisively 
and with firmness, that is, Democrats. Reagan declares:
This issue should never turn into a prolonged partisan struggle, but it 
has. The Senate recently passed overwhelmingly our Comprehensive 
Crime Control Act. The House has done nothing and continues to wait. 
But wait for what? Bottling up long-overdue reforms that would provide 
you, the people, greater protection against dangerous criminals is a 
serious mistake you should not tolerate.
20 “Radio Address to the Nation on Proposed Crime Legislation, February 18, 1984"Public Papers of
the President o f the United States: 1984.
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This attack on the Democrat-controlled House of Representatives can be seen also in 
his Remarks at the Annual Conference o f the National League o f Cities, March 2, 
1984, where Reagan asserts:
Our families, friends must be able to live and work without always being 
afraid. Americans are sick and tired of law-abiding people getting 
mugged, robbed, and raped, while dangerous criminals get off scott-free. 
We have a comprehensive crime bill to correct this. It would put an end 
to the era of coddling criminals, and it’s been passed by the Senate. But 
the legislation is bottled up in the House.21
Reagan charges that the Democrat-controlled House of Representatives is too 
concerned with protecting criminals rather than acting on the needs and desires of law- 
abiding Americans who are suffering from the pervasive problem of crime. Similarly in 
The President’s News Conference, February 22, 1984, Reagan contends that his 
administration’s desperately-needed measures to tackle crime are being hindered by the 
Democratic Party.22 Reagan states:
The Senate is completing its work on the most sweeping anticrime bill in 
more than a decade. Our legislation provides a long overdue protection 
to law-abiding Americans, and it would help put an end to the era of 
coddling criminals. The security of our people should take precedence 
over partisan politics, so I ask the House to stop dragging its feet and act 
promptly.
21 “Remarks at the Annual Conference of the National League of Cities, March 2, 1984” Public Papers 
o f the President o f  the United States: 1984.
22 “The President’s News Conference, February 22, 1984” Public Papers o f  the President o f the United 
States: 1984.
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Reagan’s exaltations of the progress made by his administration in relation to 
crime and its commitment to continue this much-needed progress, in spite of 
Democratic based barriers are also seen in his Remarks at the Annual Conference o f the 
National League o f Cities, March 5, 1984.23 In addition to presenting his 
administration and the Republican Party as the party of law and order, whose 
toughness has brought results in relation to crime, Reagan points out that lenient judges 
within the justice system are also a barrier to tackling crime. Reagan proclaims:
We’re cracking down on habitual criminals, organized crime, and the 
drugpushers [sic]. Federal task forces are stepping up the pressure. And 
we’re working hard to improve the criminal justice treatment of the 
innocent victims of crime. But formidable challenges remain. The scales 
of criminal justice are still tilted toward protecting the rights of 
criminals. I believe it’s high time we restore a proper balance and start 
doing more to protect our law-abiding citizens. Lenient judges are only 
lenient on crooks; they’re very hard on society.
In doing this, not only is Reagan tapping into the feelings of resentment held by 
Americans who felt that the rights and needs of the perpetrators of crime were being 
placed above the rights of the victims of crime, he is also tapping into the feeling held 
by a number of Americans that the leniency of courts are a significant factor 
contributing to the problem of crime and the fear of crime.24
23 “Remarks at the Annual Conference of the National League of Cities, March 5, 1984” Public Papers 
o f  the President o f the United States: 1984.
24 Timothy J. Flanagan and Dennis R. Longmire (eds.), Americans View Crime and Injustice: A National 
Public Opinion Survey (London: Sage, 1996); Warr, “Public Opinion on Crime and Punishment”.
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In this vein, when discussing the fall in crime during his term in office, Reagan 
is keen to emphasise his record on court nominations. In his Radio Address to the 
Nation on Law Enforcement and Crime, July 1, 1984, Reagan announces:
When we came to office, crime was taking the lives of over 23,000 
Americans a year. It touched a third of American homes and resulted in 
about $10 billion a year in financial losses. Yet, just as America has 
regained her economic strength and international prestige in the last few 
years, so, too the crime problem in America has shown improvement for 
the first time in many years. . . . From our first day in office, the 
Attorney General and I have emphasized the importance of appointing to 
the Federal bench, including the Supreme Court, judges determined to 
uphold the rights of society and the innocent victims as well as the right 
of the accused.25
Reagan points out that his administration has made considerable progress in tackling 
the extreme problem of crime encountered at the start of his presidency, and a 
significant factor in this was the appointment of judges who sought to move away from 
the liberal ideology on crime of the 1960s. According to Reagan, when he entered 
office there was a preoccupation by judges within the court system with protecting the 
rights of the accused. This liberal attitude was applied at the expense of law-abiding 
citizens and of American society in general, which was left plagued with high crime 
rates. Reagan’s court nominations were made, as such, in answer to the will and need 
of the American people. Reagan states:
25 “Radio Address to the Nation on Law Enforcement and Crime, July 7, 1984” Public Papers o f the
President o f the United States: 1984.
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Believe me, we in the administration have been trying to speak up for 
you, the millions of Americans who are fed up with crime, fed up with 
fear in our streets and neighborhoods, fed up with lenient judges, fed up 
with a criminal justice system that too often treats criminals better than it 
does their victims. Too many Americans have had to suffer the effects of 
crime while too many of our leaders have stuck to the old, discredited, 
liberal illusions about crime -  illusions that refuse to hold criminals 
responsible for their actions.
Reagan’s exaltation of the need of tough judges is also seen in his Remarks at the
26Annual Convention o f the Texas State Bar Association in San Antonio, July 6, 1984. 
Reagan asserts:
The American people are fed up with leniency toward career criminals, 
and they’re fed up with those wrongdoers who are openly contemptuous 
of our way of justice and who do not believe they can be caught and, if 
they are caught, are confident that once the cases against them enter our 
legal system, the charges will be dropped, postponed, plea-bargained, or 
lost in a maze of legal technicalities that make a mockery of our 
society’s longstanding and commendable respect for civil liberties. . . . 
The American people have lost patience with liberal leniency and 
pseudointellectual apologies for crime. They’re demanding that our 
criminal justice system return to idealism; that our courts affirm the 
values that teach us right and wrong matters, and that individuals are 
responsible for their actions, and retribution should be swift and sure for 
those who prey on the innocent.
Again, Reagan is stressing that in appointing tough judges, his administration has 
answered the needs and desires of the American people. Moreover, crime has fallen as 
a result of increased toughness within the justice system. Reagan testifies:
26 “Remarks at the Annual Convention of the Texas State Bar Association in San Antonio, July 6, 1984” 
Public Papers o f the President o f the United States: 1984.
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And the will of the people is at last being felt again. Reported crime 
dropped 4.3 percent in 1982, and that was the first decline since 1977. 
And reported crimes for last year showed an even more remarkable 7 
percent decrease. This is the sharpest decrease in the history of the crime 
statistics and the first time the serious crime index has shown a decline 
for 2 years in a row.
Reagan stressed his administration’s support of tough judges as part of the 
move away from liberalism in order to tackle the problem of crime throughout his 
presidency. In his Radio Address to the Nation on the Federal Judiciary, June 21, 
1986, Reagan states:
. . .during the campaigns of 1980 and ’84, I spoke often of the 
distressing loss of faith by the American people in their criminal justice 
system. It seemed to many of us that the scales of justice had become 
seriously unbalanced, making it difficult to arrest criminals and harder 
and harder to convict them. . . .  So, on the crime issues, we’ve sought to 
appoint judges who look at the law as something to be honored, 
respected, and interpreted according to legislative intent, not whim or 
ideology.27
Similarly, in his Radio Address to the Nation on the Supreme Court Nomination o f 
Douglass H. Gins burg and the Federal Budget, October 31, 1987, Reagan stresses:
My concern is that in recent years too many judges have forgotten that 
one of the goals of our Founding Fathers was to ensure domestic 
tranquility. Too many judges have reinterpreted the Constitution, got 
away from the original intent of the Founders and, in the process, made 
law enforcement a game in which clever lawyers try to find ways to trip 
up our police. Our courts must protect the right of all Americans, and
27 “Radio Address to the Nation on the Federal Judiciary, June 21, 1986” Public Papers o f  the President
o f the United States: 1986.
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that includes the rights of the victims of crime and of society, not just of 
criminals. I believe that Judge Ginsburg will do just that.28
As Reagan approached the end of his presidency his discourse focused on 
highlighting the achievements his administrations had made in relation to crime. In his 
Remarks at a White House Briefing on Proposed Criminal Justice Reform Legislation 
October 16, 1987, Reagan recollects on his time in office and emphasises the grave 
situation facing the nation at the outset of his presidency and how he had vowed to 
tackle it.29 Reagan states:
And yet, for all the critical economic and international problems we 
faced, we should not forget that back in the early days, we faced another 
crisis that was just as grave, one that threatened the very stability and 
survival of our society. And that crisis was: the crisis of crime. Now I 
won’t list the statistics and recite the horror stories. I think we can all 
remember the crime rates that steadily escalated, the fear and terror in 
our streets and neighborhoods, and the undermining of public faith in 
our legal system and democratic institution. In my first year in office, I 
mentioned all of this in a speech to our nation’s police chiefs, and I 
pledged to them and to the Nation immediate action.
Once again, Reagan stresses the gravity of the problem of crime by placing it on a par 
with the economic and international crisis of the turn of the decade. Reagan then 
proceeds to set out the outcome of his pledge to respond to the critical situation:
28 “Radio Address to the Nation on the Supreme Court Nomination of Douglass H. Ginsburg and the 
Federal Budget, October 31, 1987” Public Papers o f the President o f  the United States: 1987.
29 “Remarks at a White House Briefing on Proposed Criminal Justice Reform Legislation, October 16, 
1987” Public Papers o f  the President o f the United States: 1987.
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I want you to know we’ve had results. The number of convictions and 
average sentences have increased dramatically. In the organized crime 
area alone, crime convictions are more than five times what they were. 
I’m proud to tell you, too, that this administration’s judges have shown 
to be statistically far sterner with criminals than their predecessors. All 
of this has added up. Just last week, the Department of Justice released a 
study showing crime was down now for the fifth year in a row and was 
now at its lowest point in 14 years.
Reagan demonstrates that his administration delivered on the problem of crime. By 
turning away from the liberal ideology of his Democrat predecessors, Reagan answered 
the needs and concerns of the American people, and his tough approach brought 
results. Moreover, Reagan stresses that that it was the lenient approach of his Democrat 
predecessors that had fuelled the rise in crime seen before he took office. Reagan 
charges:
Between 1977 and 1981 . . . serious crime went up 22 percent. . . . The 
rise in crime was not an unavoidable accident; it didn’t just happen. It 
was the result of a liberal social philosophy endorsed and supported 
leniency in the courtroom, a social philosophy that said that society, not 
the criminal, was to blame for crime.
In making this statement, Reagan is also tapping into oppositional feelings towards 
liberal philosophies on crime which were concerned with the societal factors that
o n
contributed to criminal behaviour.
30 Flanagan and Longmire (eds.), Americans View Crime and Injustice; Warr, “Public Opinion on Crime 
and Punishment”.
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These messages are also expressed in his Annual Message to the Congress on 
the State o f the Union, 25 January, 1988.31 Reagan proclaims:
The leading threat to domestic tranquility comes in the form of criminal 
offenses of citizen against citizen. When I took office crime rates were 
soaring. The public, with good reason, felt unsafe in our streets and often 
even in homes and places of work. Determined to give America back to 
its law-abiding citizens, our country is in the midst of the most vigorous 
crime-fighting effort in its history. . . .  In spite of our successes, 
however, more needs to be done.
In addition to highlighting how his administration has acted on the will of the people in 
tackling the huge crime problem his administration was faced with when he entered 
office, Reagan emphasises that the effort is ongoing. In doing this, Reagan is making a 
statement about his, and the Republican Party’s commitment to toughness against 
crime. Reagan continues to present the Republican Party as the party of law and order, 
and conversely the Democratic Party as its undoing. This theme remained an integral 
aspect in Reagan’s discourse at the end of his presidency, as it did throughout.
In his Remarks at a Camp Fundraising Luncheon for Senator Pete Wilson in 
Irvine, California, August 23, 1988, Reagan expresses his support of Senatorial 
candidate, Pete Wilson, and in doing so, emphatically sets the Republican Party apart 
from the Democratic Party.32 Reagan declares:
31 “Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union, 25 January, 1988” Public Papers o f  the 
President o f the United States: 1988.
32 “Remarks at a Camp Fundraising Luncheon for Senator Pete Wilson in Irvine, California, August 23, 
1988” Public Papers o f the President o f the United States: 1988.
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Crime is not a statistic: it is an outrage and a sin, and it must be fought. 
Pete’s opponent, like so many of the liberal Democrats on the ballot this 
year, just can’t seem to understand that the way to fight crime is to put 
the criminals in jail and keep them there. To protect our communities we 
need tough laws, strict sentencing, and no nonsense judges.
Once again, Reagan presents the Republican Party as the saviour of law and order and 
the Democratic Party as lenient, permissive and ultimately responsible for permitting 
crime. The representation of the Republican Party as the law and order party is also 
seen in his Remarks at a Republican Campaign Rally in Derea, Ohio, November 2, 
1988.33 Reagan states:
You know, the liberals are going around saying they’re on our side. You 
know better than that. Lets talk about crime. Our side believes people 
who want to protect their home and family from an armed intruder have 
a constitutional right to own a gun; the liberals are against it. . . .  We’re 
also on your side because we take the threat of crime seriously. We’ve 
appointed serious-minded judges who respect the Constitution and know 
the meaning of the word ‘punishment’ . . .  We learned during the 
‘malaise’ years that when judges don’t do their jobs right criminals feel 
like they can run rampant. Well, violent crime has fallen significantly in 
this country since 1981 because we put criminals on notice: Make one 
false move, and the next sound you hear is the clang of a cell door 
slamming.
Here Reagan explicitly aligns the Republican Party with law and order Americans. 
Reagan also makes the point that an integral factor in his administrations’ success in
33 “Remarks at a Republican Campaign Rally in Derea, Ohio, November 2, 1988” Public Papers o f the
President o f the United States: 1988.
212
lowering the national crime rate is the increase in the number of criminals being 
incarcerated. The toughness displayed by the courts under Reagan in sentencing more 
offenders, and for longer, served to act as a warning and thus as a deterrent to would-be 
criminals.
The increased incarceration rate, in fact, was another aspect that Reagan was 
keen to highlight both during his presidency and as he reflected upon it as he neared 
the end of his term in office. In his Remarks on Signing the Victims o f Crime Week 
Proclamation April 19, 1985, Reagan states:
During the 1960s the likelihood of being imprisoned if arrested for a 
serious crime fell by 75 percent. In recent years these figures have 
turned around. The likelihood of going to prison now is almost twice as 
high as it was in 1970. It’s a fact that many thousands more career 
criminals are being imprisoned today than in 1970. That fact must be 
acknowledged and its meaning understood. It’s happening because our 
criminal justice system is responding to the public outcry over crime. 
It’s happening because we’re doing more to protect the innocent and 
punish the guilty. And that’s why, today, our homes, our families, and 
our societies are far safer.34
Reagan applauds the marked turnaround in the number of people who are being 
imprisoned for their crime, and he emphatically attributes this to the way the CJS 
during his administration responded to the demands of Americans to end the era of 
leniency seen in the 1960s and 1970s. Similarly, in his Annual Message to the 
Congress on the State o f the Union, January 25, 1988, Reagan announces:
34 “Remarks on Signing the Victims of Crime Week Proclamation, April 19, 1985” Public Papers o f the
President o f the United States: 1985.
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One result of our increased efforts to fight crime is that the number of 
criminals serving time in Federal prisons has increased dramatically -  
nearly 80 percent since 1981. We anticipate that the Federal inmate 
population will continue to increase in the future, particularly in light of 
the enhanced criminal penalties contained in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act 
of 1986 and the new sentencing guidelines. One of my top priorities for 
the next year will be to increase substantially the construction of new 
prison space to accommodate the increased number of criminals being 
removed from our streets.
Here, Reagan presents the increase in the prison population as a positive result in the 
battle against crime achieved during his presidency.
While Reagan makes no overt reference to race in either of these remarks, they 
had significant racial implications. Perhaps the biggest effect that the crackdown on 
crime under Reagan had on the African-American population -  especially the war on 
drugs - was the increase in the number of African Americans that were imprisoned 
during this period.35 The large, and disproportionate, number of African Americans 
imprisoned within the nation helped to increase the identification of crime in racial 
terms, especially when it was combined with the propagation of the threat of the black 
criminal by the news media.36 Some Americans as such, were able to interpret
35 Blumstein, “On the Disproportionality o f U.S. Prison Populations”; Hagan and Patterson (eds.), Crime 
and Inequality in America; Jaynes and Williams, A Common Destiny, Chapter 9; Richey Mann, Unequal 
Justice; Spohn, “Courts, Sentences, and Prisons”; Tonry, Malign Neglect, Walker, Spohn, Delone, Race, 
Ethnicity and Crime in America.
36 Beckett and Sasson, The Politics o f Injustice-, Christopher P. Campbell, Race, Myth and the News 
(London: Sage, 1995); R. M. Entman, “Modem Racism and the Images of Blacks in Local Television 
News”, Critical Studies in Mass Communications 7 (1990): 332-346; Robert M. Entman and Andrew 
Rojecki, The Black Image in the White Mind: Media and Race in America (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2000); Franklin D. Gilliam Jr., and Shanto Iyengar, “Prime Suspects: The Influence of 
Local Television News on the Viewing Public”, American Journal o f  Political Science 44.3 (2000): 560- 
573; Allen E. Liska, Joseph J. Lawrence, Andrew Sanchirico, “Fear of Crime as Social Fact”, Social
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Reagan’s remarks in relation to prison populations in racial terms, thus allowing
Reagan to use the issue as a coded appeal to white voters.
There were also other inherently racial aspects to Reagan’s discourse on crime. 
In addition to making reference to the Democrat tradition of liberalism and leniency in 
relation to crime, Reagan also makes a direct link between crime and Great Society 
spending, which was generally perceived in racial terms.37 This is seen in his Remarks 
at the Annual Meeting o f the International Association o f Chiefs o f Police in New
3 0
Orleans, Louisiana September 28, 1981. Reagan remarks:
. . .it has occurred to me that the root causes of our other major domestic 
problem, the growth of government and the decay of the economy, can 
be traced to many of the same sources of the crime problem. This is 
because the same utopian presumptions about human nature that hinder 
the swift administration of justice have also helped fuel the expansion of 
government. Many of the social thinkers of the 1950s and ‘60s who 
discussed crime only in the context of disadvantaged childhoods and 
poverty-stricken neighborhoods were the same people who thought that 
massive government spending could wipe away our social ills. The 
underlying premise in both cases was a belief that there was nothing 
permanent or absolute about any man’s nature, that he was a product of 
his material environment, and that by changing that environment -  with 
government as the chief vehicle of change through educational, health, 
housing and other programs -  we could permanently change man and
usher in a great new era It’s time . . . that we acknowledge the
solution to the crime problem will not be found in the social worker’s 
file, the psychiatrist’s notes, or the bureaucrat’s budgets.
Forces 60 (1982): 760-770, Jon Hurwitz and Mark Peffley, “Public Perceptions of Race and Crime: The 
Role of Racial Stereotypes”, American Journal o f Political Science 41.2 (1997): 375-401; Walker, 
Spohn, Delone, Race, Ethnicity and Crime in America.
37 James W. Button, Black Violence: Political Impact o f the 1960s Riots (New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1978); Robert Cook, Sweet Land o f Liberty? The African American Struggle fo r Civil 
Rights in the Twentieth Century (London: Longman, 1998); Maurice Isserman and Michael Kazin, 
America Divided: The Civil War o f the 1960s (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).
38 “Remarks at the Annual Meeting o f the International Association of Chiefs of Police in New Orleans, 
Louisiana, September 28, 1981” Public Papers o f the President o f the United States: 1981.
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Reagan sends the message that big government and the rise in social spending during 
the 1960s through Great Society programs, was no more an answer to the problem of 
crime than it was to the problems of poverty and inequality. In doing this, Reagan is 
conjoining the issues of race and crime. The link between big government spending 
and crime is also made in his Remarks at the Conservative Political Action Conference 
Dinner, February 18, 1983 39 Reagan asserts:
. . .  it is abundantly clear that much of our crime problem was provoked 
by a social philosophy that saw man as primarily a creature of his 
material environment. The same liberal philosophy that saw an era of 
prosperity and virtue ushered in by changing man’s environment through 
massive Federal spending programs also viewed criminals as the 
unfortunate products of poor socioeconomic conditions or an 
underprivileged upbringing. Society, not the individual, they said, was at 
fault for criminal wrongdoing. We were to blame.
Again, Reagan’s remarks send the message that the increased social spending 
witnessed during the 1960s does not stop crime; poverty is not the primary cause of 
crime. In making this statement, Reagan not only helps to racialise the crime issue 
through discussing crime in conjunction with social spending of the 1960s, he also taps 
into the growing feeling amongst whites that African Americans should take 
responsibility for their own lives. Since the late 1960s whites increasingly felt that the
39 “Remarks at the Conservative Political Action Conference Dinner, February 18, 1983” Public Papers
o f the President o f the United States: 1983.
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onus for achieving socio-economic advancement rested upon African Americans 
themselves.40
Reagan evokes the American values of self-reliance and responsibility in his 
Remarks on Signing the Victims o f Crime Week Proclamation, April 19, 1985.41 
Reagan states:
Since our first days in office the problem of crime has been a major 
concern of this administration, even while we had to act immediately to 
deal with the twin crises of a declining economy and a jeopardized 
national defense. Making our homes and streets safe again remained 
among our highest priorities. At the time we took office, government 
was bloated and had taken on responsibilities in areas where it was 
neither competent or needed. Yet, at the same time government was 
failing in its most legitimate and important functions, particularly 
preserving domestic order and protecting society from those who would 
prey on the innocent. In the past few years we’ve seen a return to the 
values that are the basis for a free and a just society: the belief that right 
and wrong matters, that individuals are responsible for their actions, and 
that punishment must be swift and sure for those who transgress against 
the rights of their fellow citizens. It was such values and beliefs that 
guided us when we took office.
Once again, Reagan makes the direct link between big government spending and crime. 
Furthermore, Reagan emphasises the much-needed restoration of the traditional values 
of self-reliance and responsibility in relation to crime during his presidency.
Reagan’s discourse in relation to crime and fear of crime reveals that 
throughout his presidency, Reagan presented crime as an enormous issue of concern
40 Isserman and Kazin, America Divided.
41 “Remarks on Signing the Victims of Crime Week Proclamation, April 19, 1985” Public Papers o f the 
President o f the United States: 1985.
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for American society. In doing this, Reagan helped both to fuel and legitimise the fear 
of crime in American society. Reagan championed the need for a reversal of the liberal 
attitudes and policies towards crime and advocated a get-tough philosophy. In doing 
this, Reagan built upon the work of Nixon and presented the Republican Party as the 
party of law and order, whereas the Democratic Party was presented as the antithesis to 
this. More importantly, however, again building upon the work of Nixon, contained 
within Reagan’s discourse were implicit racial elements which not only helped increase 
the racial interpretation of crime, it also helped create an atmosphere where coded 
racial messages could be more easily heard.
The level of concern with crime and the fear of crime during the Reagan era is 
illustrated by the massive public response to the Bernhard Goetz subway shootings in 
1984. An analysis of public discourse surrounding the incident demonstrates the 
feelings and beliefs that Reagan tapped into with his crime discourse. Despite evidence 
which cast significant doubt on Goetz’s claim of self-defence, the majority of 
Americans continued to support him. To them, Goetz was an everyman, symbolising 
the fears and frustrations of ordinary Americans in relation to crime. For the most part, 
responses to the shootings were seemingly aracial, with only a minority interpreting the 
incident in overtly racial terms. Yet, a counter discourse existed, especially amongst 
African Americans, which questioned the role of race in both the incident and in public 
support of Goetz. For these Americans, there was concern that fear of crime translated 
into a fear of blacks. An analysis of public discourse surrounding the death of Michael
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Griffith in Howard Beach, New York, in 1986, demonstrates how the issue of crime 
was interpreted in overtly racial terms by some Americans, whereby fear of crime was 
indeed translated into fear of blacks. Moreover, the incident illustrates the way in 
which fear of crime was used by some to justify a racial attack. The public reaction to 
the ensuing trials further demonstrated the negative racial prism through which a 
significant proportion of whites viewed crime.
5.2 The Bernhard Goetz Subway Shootings, 1984
On the afternoon of December 22, 1984, Bernhard Goetz a 37-year-old 
electrical technician, shot four African-American youths who had confronted him on 
the New York subway and demanded money from him.42 The subway shootings, 
perpetrated by a “. . .  neatly dressed gunman .. .”43 against four “. . .  teenagers from the 
Bronx. . . . Three of [whom] have arrest records and . . . were carrying long 
screwdrivers in their jackets”44, were regarded as a case of self-defence by the majority 
of New Yorkers. According to a New York Daily News poll, 75% of New Yorkers 
regarded the incident as an act of self-defence 45 More than that, in fact, the actions of 
the ‘subway vigilante’ as he was dubbed were hailed as nothing short of heroic by
42 The four were: Barry Allen, 18, Darrell Cabey, 19, Troy Canty, 19, and James Ramseur, 18. Although 
none were killed, Cabey was left paralyzed and brain-damaged.
43 Ruben Rosario, Bob Rappstatter, Don Singleton, “‘Victim’ on Subway Shoots 4”, New York Daily 
News, December 23, 1984, 3.
44 Robert D. McFadden, “A Gunman Wounds 4 on IRT Train, Then Escapes”, New York Times, 
December 23, 1984, 1, 23.
45 Stuart Marques, “Half of us Back IRT Gunman: Polls”, New York Daily News, January 6, 1985, 30.
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much of the American public. Because Goetz had fled the scene of the shooting a 
police hotline was established and appeals were made for information. Rather than 
providing information on the shooting and information on the whereabouts of the 
shooter, however, the hotline was inundated with calls of support for Goetz. Most 
callers simply expressed their support of Goetz, whilst some offered financial help for 
his defence if needed and a few even suggested he should run for Mayor.46 It seemed 
that Goetz’s actions had struck a cord with New Yorkers and indeed with people all 
over America. In the aftermath of the shootings national opinion polls put support for 
Goetz at approximately 45-52%.47
Radio call-in shows and newspapers were inundated with calls and letters of 
support for Goetz, which help to reveal why support amongst Americans was so strong. 
One letter to the New York Times stated: “People have been running scared. Here’s 
someone who struck back.” Another letter read: “His excess, if any, must not blind us
A O
to the essential legitimacy of his response: he was right to resist. And so are we.” 
While the letter acknowledges the severity of the response, the author maintains that 
Goetz’s defence of himself was legitimate. Moreover, all Americans have that right; 
Americans do not have to accept victimisation by criminals. According to these letters,
46 David G. Sanger, “Callers Support Subway Gunman”, New York Times, December 25, 1985, 19.
47 Marques, “Half of us Back IRT Gunman”, 30; Chicago Tribune, February 24, 1985, 4; “Vigilante 
Mystique”, Washington Post, January 17, 1985, B11.
48 Syndey H. Schonberg, “The Bernhard Goetz Mailbag”, New York Times, January 19, 1985, 21.
220
Americans were living in fear of crime and Goetz’s tough defence of himself had given 
them a sense of empowerment.
Americans embraced the empowerment that the Goetz incident symbolised 
because of the pervasive sense of despair and frustration that many Americans felt 
about crime.49 One caller to Bob Grant’s ABC Radio talk show stated: “I feel frustrated 
like he did. . . .  It’s a frustration that’s been digging deep into people for many years.” 
On Catherine Catalone’s WGN radio show, a caller in Chicago stated: “He’s an 
example that we are still all being taken to an edge of anger, fear and frustration . . . 
parents and communities have been shoved up against an emotional wall without any 
alternatives.”50 Letters to newspapers echoed these feelings of despair and frustration. 
One correspondence to the New York Daily News read:
Why is there such a huge fuss being made over the citizen who 
performed a civic duty in trying to blow away four would-be robbers on 
the subway? This man should be given a good citizen’s award instead of 
Commissioner Ward’s sending out his troops to capture him. Instead, 
Mayor Koch should start an investigation into the bleeding heart liberal 
judges and D.A.'s who are negligent in their duty by not keeping these 
creeps in jail where they belong. Why did every one of them have a long 
arrest record, yet were allowed to be out preying on the public? Long 
live Charles Bronson!51
49 Flanagan and Longmire (eds.), Americans View Crime and Injustice-, Warr, “Public Opinion on Crime 
and Punishment”.
50 Quoted in Esther B. Fein, “Angry Citizens in Many Cities Supporting Goetz”, New York Times, 
January 7, 1985, B l.
51 “Letters”, New York Daily News, January 9, 1985, 27.
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This letter reveals the sense of frustration Americans felt towards the Criminal Justice 
System (CJS), which they felt was doing little to protect them from crime. It also 
reflects the widely held perception that the leniency of the CJS was a major cause of 
crime in America. Similarly another letter stated:
Hooray for that guy who shot those 4 muggers on the subway. I 
congratulate him on his act of self-defense. We should all follow his 
example. Since our judicial system stinks, and it favors the criminal over 
the victim, it’s time for people to take matters into their own hands and 
give the scum what they’ve got coming to them. All the politicians 
should take this as a message that people are fed up, and if they don’t 
take some action, other people will. And to that new urban hero? All I 
have to say is ‘keep up the good work’.52
A great many Americans felt besieged by criminals and that the CJS was doing little to 
protect them. The letter also echoes the belief amongst a number of Americans that the 
CJS was preoccupied with protecting the rights of criminals at the expense of ordinary 
Americans. This was expressed in another letter to the New York Daily News, which 
read:
People are beaten and robbed daily in our city. Reports of these crimes 
flow freely into the NYPD, yet not much is done. Let one honest citizen 
defend himself against these terrorists and all of a sudden we find an 
additional 1,350 cops to hunt him down as if he were an animal! I 
wonder if he had been successfully mugged and then stabbed with one 
of those screwdrivers how many extra police officers would have been 
sent to find his attacker?53
52 Letters”, New York Daily News, December 30, 1984, 31.
53 Letters”, New York Daily News, January 2, 1985, 39.
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For a number of Americans, the CJS was quite simply totally ineffective in combating 
crime and protecting law abiding citizens. Moreover, it appeared that the CJS was 
grossly unbalanced, offering protection and leniency towards those who perpetrated 
crime, while affording little protection or support to ordinary Americans.
Americans also directed their feelings of frustration towards ineffective 
politicians. One letter charged:
Our problem is that subways are used only by little, unimportant, un- 
influential people. We really don’t count much for politicians. The 
mayor, council president, governor all have big autos supplied at our 
expense. They don’t have to use subways to be at work on time. Our 
local government is not doing the job; that’s why the guy with the gun is 
a hero.54
Americans felt that politicians were ineffective in fighting crime and that they were out 
of touch with the needs and desires of the people. Another letter asserted:
Mayor Koch sure is a funny guy. He thinks by putting a few rookie cops 
on the subways for a week people will feel the subways are safer. 
Frankly, the so-called ‘vigilante’ did more to make the subways safe by 
getting the four punks off our collective backs with some sharp 
shooting.55
This correspondence reveals that it was the toughness against criminals displayed by 
Goetz that Americans wanted. Goetz was praised in another letter for single-handedly
54 Schonberg, “The Bernhard Goetz Mailbag”, 21.
55 Letters”, New York Daily News, December 28, 1984, 31.
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making New York City a safer place through his actions. It read: “Those four slobs out 
of commission are probably responsible for a crime a week in the subway. Someone 
won’t be pushed off the platform or raped on a roof because they were hospitalized. I 
wonder how many murders they committed.”56 Another letter, echoing calls to the 
hotline, illustrated the kind of action they wished to see from those in power. The letter 
stated: “Thank -  God for that vigilante. Bernhard Goetz for Mayor.”57
While some Americans regarded Goetz’s actions as a good deed, for many New 
Yorkers, Goetz had sent a message to would-be criminals that they would no longer be 
tolerated. Many of Goetz’s supporters, in fact, regarded his approach as an effective 
form of crime prevention. As one letter stated: “It’s a risk . . . but isn’t it time we tried 
another approach to the crime problem. It might even get more police protection and 
dissuade would-be criminals and isn’t that what we all really want.” Similarly another 
read: “It’s not that everyone will be armed (in imitation of Goetz), but that potential 
muggers believe they may be. Perception is everything and so be it.”58Another 
exclaimed: “They used to hang people for stealing horses. It worked!”59
The letters and calls of support for Goetz revealed the level of concern with 
crime, the frustration of Americans living in fear of crime and the sense of despair 
towards an ineffective CJS that appeared to favour the rights of criminals over the 
rights of law abiding citizens. Americans wanted the restoration of law and order in
56 Schonberg, “The Bernhard Goetz Mailbag”, 21.
57.Schonberg, “The Bernhard Goetz Mailbag”, 21.
58 Schonberg, “The Bernhard Goetz Mailbag”, 21.
59 Schonberg, “The Bernhard Goetz Mailbag”, 21.
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society. They wanted a concerted effort to be made by those in power to tackle crime 
and make all of America’s cities free from the fear of crime. Moreover, the statements 
of support for Goetz reveal the feelings and beliefs that Reagan’s discourse in relation 
to crime and fear of crime was tapping into, reflecting, and legitimising.
Reagan further legitimised these feelings and aligned himself with Americans 
and their concern with crime when he spoke about the Goetz incident at news 
conference. When asked how he felt about citizens who used deadly force to defend 
themselves, Reagan replied: “In general, I think we all can understand the frustration of 
people who are constantly threatened by crime and feel that law and order is not 
particularly protecting them.”60 In doing this Reagan also further aligned the 
Republican Party with Americans and their concern with crime. The Republican Party 
at the state level was also aligned with law and order Americans through the comments 
of George Clark, chairman of the New York State Republican Committee, who offered 
$5000 to Goetz. Clark asserted that he was “. . . scared of some of the creatures on the 
subway.. . .  In a way, I think he was defending New York society.”61
While most responses to the subway shootings were aracial, a number of 
responses revealed the racial interpretation of crime held by some. Certainly a number 
of responses were overtly racial. For example, one letter on the subject to the New York 
Times read: “Bernhard H. Goetz makes me proud. P.R.O.U.D. to be a white, male 
American! At long last we can hold up our heads again!” This letter, exalting the
60 Quoted in “Asked About Goetz, Reagan Cities the law”, New York Times, January 10, 1985, B3.
61 Quoted in “Head of State GOP Offered Aid to Goetz”, New York Times, January 6, 1985, 22.
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empowerment of white men, reveals how some Americans perceived the fear of crime 
in distinctly racial terms. Another reader commented:
Why do you conceal the truth and write that merely ‘a lot o f  the crime 
in the New York subways are caused by blacks and Hispanics? You 
know very well that they commit virtually all of the crimes (as well as in 
the city generally). When are you going to use your column on our 
behalf and call out ‘Enough!’ Tell them we have had enough of their 
cold, murderous ways.62
These statements also reveal the racial feelings and beliefs concerning crime and the 
fear of crime that Reagan was tapping into and legitimising with the racial messages 
contained within his crime discourse.
Despite the overtly racial reaction by some, support for Goetz was strong from 
both African Americans and whites. The threat of crime was indeed of huge concern 
for African Americans as well as for whites, especially as they were more likely to be
/■ I
the victims of crime than whites. As such, African Americans were 
empathise with Goetz. As one resident from the youths’ South Bronx 
stated:
The neighbourhood is bad. . . . Everybody robbing people. There’s lots 
of drugs, cocaine, robberies. People get killed in these projects. 
Sometimes you get so frustrated that you can’t help it. You begin to feel,
equally able to 
neighbourhood
62 Schonberg, “Bernhard Goetz Mailbag”, 21.
63 Jaynes and Williams, A Common Destiny; Marable, Race, Reform and Rebellion-, Tonry, Malign
Neglect.
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‘Hey, get them before they get me.’ I’ve been robbed. I know if I’d had a 
gun, I would have shot him.64
Opinion polls demonstrated that the sentiments expressed in this statement were 
reflective of a wider pattern of support amongst African Americans. National 
newspaper polls placed African-American approval of Goetz at between 45% and 49%, 
compared to the white approval rating of approximately 52%.65
Despite the high levels of support amongst Americans, both African-American 
and white, however, a counter discourse, especially amongst African Americans, did 
exist, which increased as time progressed and more details were released about the 
incident and about Goetz. The fact that two of the youths were shot in the back cast 
doubt in the minds of some of the claim of self-defence.66 One African American 
stated: “I don’t think, legally, any lawyer believes that what Goetz did was self- 
defense, not as to the two with holes in their back.”67 Also, there had been a lot of 
inaccuracy in the press about the incident. Only two of the youths had screwdrivers in 
their pockets and none were sharpened. Yet, these facts were misreported by some of
64 Margot Homblower, “Wounded Youth Denies Threat to Rob New York City ‘Subway Vigilante’”, 
Washington Post, January 11, 1985, A3. Lillian B. Rubin in Quiet Rage: Bernhard Goetz in a Time o f  
Madness (Boston: Faber & Faber, 1986) charges that the press made considerable effort to demonstrate 
African-American support of Goetz.
65 According to a poll in the New York Daily News 49% of African Americans compared with 52% of 
whites approved of Bernhard Goetz’s actions, while 36% of African Americans and 28% of whites 
disapproved. Marques, “Half o f us Back IRT Gunman”, 30. A poll in the New York Times showed that 
45% of African Americans supported Goetz compared to 52% of New Yorkers as a whole. Chicago 
Tribune, February 24, 1985,4. A Washington Post poll put African-American support at 49% and white 
support at 52%. “Vigilante Mystique”, B11.
66 Both Allen and Canty were shot in the back.
67 Quoted in Joyce Pumick, “Ward Declares Goetz Didn’t Shoot in Self-Defense”, New York Times, 
February 22, 1985, 1.
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the media. Two articles in the New York Times on the 29th and 30th of December 
respectively, and one in the Chicago Tribune on the 1st of January, talked about three 
sharpened screwdrivers as did Phil Donahue on his daytime chat show.68 African 
Americans also questioned the role race played in Goetz’s actions. As Alvin F. 
Poussaint, a Professor of Psychiatry at Harvard stated: “. . . would Goetz have gotten 
on a subway and felt that white kids would attack him?”69 These worries were further 
fuelled following revelations in the press concerning Goetz’s character. Goetz had been 
the victim of a previous mugging in 1981, which had led him to apply for a gun permit 
and neighbours of Goetz described him as being preoccupied with crime and personal 
safety and claimed that he made frequent racial remarks about African Americans and 
Hispanics, especially in relation to crime, at tenants association meetings, which had 
led to him being removed from the board of directors.70
Some African Americans questioned the ease with which a significant 
proportion of the population - both white and African-American - had unequivocally 
believed that Goetz had reacted in self-defence against a deadly threat perpetrated by
68 Sydney H. Schonberg, “A New Morality Play”, New York Times December 29, 1984, 21; David E. 
Sanger, “The Little Known World of the Vigilante”, New York Times, December 30, 1984,4.6; Chicago 
Tribune, January 1, 1985, 1; Rubin, Quiet Rage, 8-9; George P. Fletcher, A Crime o f Self-Defense: 
Bernhard Goetz and the Law on Trial (New York: The Free Press, 1988), 3.
69 Quoted in “Vigilante Mystique”, B 11.
70 Dan Gentile and Brian Kates, ‘“A Little Strange’: Neighbours Describe Him as a Zealot”, New York 
Daily News, January 1, 1985, 3; Murray Weiss, Randy Diamond and Dan Singleton, “A Quiet, Intense 
Man”, New York Daily News, January 2,1985, 2; Chicago Tribune, January 1, 1985; “Fans Pitch in to 
Bail Out Vigilante”, Chicago Tribune, January 6, 1985, A16. Goetz’s application for a gun permit was 
denied and so he purchased a handgun out-of-state in Florida. On February 26, U.S. Attorney Rudolph 
W. Giuliani, announced that there was insufficient evidence that the shootings had been racially 
motivated and as such Goetz would not face federal prosecution for denying the youths o f their civil 
rights.
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young black men.71 One African American stated: “I’m not surprised that you can
round up a lynch mob . . .  we were always able to do that in this country. I think that 
the same kind of person that comes out and applauds the lynching is the first that 
comes out and applauds someone that shoots four kids.”72 According to this statement, 
the instinctive reaction of whites to support Goetz and his actions was based on deeply- 
held racist feelings.
By charging that public reaction in support of Goetz was fuelled by negative 
racial feelings, however, this counter discourse, particularly through its dissemination 
in the media, helped to racialise the discussions surrounding the event, which in turn 
helped to racialise the crime debate. The debate was also racialised by the media in its 
coverage of the event, and in editorials and columns. The vast majority of mainstream 
media opinion on the case -  amongst both white and African American journalists - 
was supportive of Goetz.73 African-American journalist, Mike Royko, wrote in the Los 
Angeles Times:
To hell with the questions. I’m glad that Goetz shot them. . . . Sure 
Goetz took the law into his own hands. When 4 tough-looking punks on 
a New York Subway demand money, what are you supposed to do - 
draft a motion and ask the conductor to file it with the Supreme Court?
71 For a discussion of the degree to which non-whites are associated with dangerous street crime in the 
popular beliefs and stereotypes of both African Americans and whites see Liska, Lawrence, Sanchirico, 
“Fear o f Crime as Social Fact”; Hurwitz and Peffley, “Public Perceptions of Race and Crime”; Walker, 
Spohn, Delone, Race, Ethnicity and Crime in America. For a discussion of the role of the media in the 
racialisation of crime see also Campbell, Race, Myth and the News', Entman, “Modem Racism and the 
Images of Blacks in Local Television News; Entman and Rojecki, The Black Image in the White Mind; 
Gilliam Jr., and Iyengar, “Prime Suspects”.
72 Quoted in Pumick, “Ward Declares Goetz”, 1.
73 For a discussion of the press and Goetz see Rubin, Quiet Rage\ Fletcher, A Crime o f Self-Defense.
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All things considered, I’d say that Goetz was effective in making his 
point, which was that he has a right to sit on a public subway, minding 
his own business and bothering nobody, without being threatened, 
intimidated, frightened or harmed.74
For some, the inter-racial public-support for Goetz signified that the problem of crime 
had at last become an aracial issue. Midge Decter wrote in the New York Times:
Yet in the midst of all the nasty declarations on both sides of the issue, 
the real significance of the Goetz case has gone obviously unmarked. 
For beyond anything else, the response to this case promises to end race 
and racism as relevant categories in which to discuss the problem of 
crime. That Bernhard Goetz is white and the 4 young men he shot are 
black has clearly played small part in the community’s feeling...  . Now 
the Goetz case has made it evident beyond the power of anyone to deny 
that when it comes to the problem of street crime and what to do about 
it, there are no blacks and whites - there are only New Yorkers.
It was not just African Americans who were troubled by the case, particularly 
as it progressed.76 The mood of Americans in general concerning the case shifted 
somewhat with press revelations about Goetz’s character and further details of the 
shootings. Public opinion critical of Goetz intensified following the grand jury verdict 
that indicted Goetz on a charge of illegal weapons possession only.77 A month after the
74 Mike Royko, “A Victim Sees Goetz in Different Perspective”, Los Angeles Times, January 18, 1985, 
2.5.
75 Midge Decter, “A Goetz Case Legacy”, New York Times, February 22, 1985, 27.
76 Lillian B. Rubin argues that oppositional discourse to the Goetz incident had existed from the very 
beginning but had been largely ignored by the press. Yet, editorials critical of Goetz did appear in the 
New York Times. See Rubin, Quiet Rage; Fletcher, A Crime o f Self-Defense.
77 The grand jury accepted Goetz’s claim of self-defence. The law o f self-defence in New York State 
states that a person can use deadly force if it is necessary to defend himself against imminent use of 
unlawful physical force and if  he reasonably believes that he is about to become the victim of rape, 
sodomy, robbery, kidnapping or burglary. District Attorney Robert Morgenthau was criticised by some
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verdict, details of the police report on Goetz’s confession to police in New Hampshire 
were released, which had a big impact on public reaction.78 According to the report, 
Goetz confessed to shooting one of the youths a second time because he did not appear 
to have been badly injured. Goetz described how he approached Darrell Cabey and 
before firing a second shot, paused and told him: “You seem to be doing all right; 
here’s another.”79 With these revelations a number of Americans began to doubt the 
self-defence story and some questioned whether Goetz had overreacted to the 
incident.80 Following the supply of information by a new eyewitness, a second grand 
jury was convened which indicted Goetz on four counts of attempted murder in the 
second degree, four counts of assault in the first degree, one count of criminal 
possession of a weapon in the second degree and one count of reckless endangerment 
in the first degree.81 Yet, despite growing doubts as to what happened, and the new 
charges, the predominant discourse surrounding the case was in support of Goetz.
for not granting the youths immunity in return for testimony. As a result, none of the youths testified 
before the grand jury.
78 Goetz turned himself into police in Concord, New Hampshire on December 31, 1984. He was returned 
to New York on January 3 and arraigned on charges of attempted murder.
79 Quoted in Marcia Chambers, “Goetz Spoke to One Youth, Then Shot Again, Police Say”, New York 
Times, February 28, 1985, 1. In the trial, the defence challenged the credibility of this part of the 
confession. See Fletcher, A Crime o f Self-Defense, Chapter 7.
80 Los Angeles Times, March 3, 1985, 2.
81 It has been charged that political reasons compelled Morgenthau to seek a second grand jury. With the 
shift in public opinion, Morgenthau had to be seen to take acts of vigilantism seriously. See Rubin, Quiet 
Rage.
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On June 17, 1987 Goetz was acquitted of all charges, except for illegal gun
O '}
possession. The verdict was supported by the majority of New Yorkers, both African- 
American and white: according to a Gallup poll, 71% of people approved of the
O l
verdict. Like the jury in the case, it appeared that the majority of Americans were 
able to identify with Goetz and the situation he faced.84 Although the proportion was 
considerably higher for whites, the majority of both African Americans and whites - 
54% and 77% respectively - agreed that race was not an important factor in the 
shootings.85 It was an attitude well conveyed by one South Bronx resident:
I think that if I had a gun in that situation, I would have done the same 
thing . . . I’m a victim too . . .  I have to ride the train late at night 
sometimes, and young people have approached me too. I think what 
Goetz did was done in self-defense. Those young guys terrorised people 
around here. You would not characterize them as good kids.
Similarly, another resident stated:
I don’t see this as a racial thing. . . . Robbery is a big problem up here, 
where crack is everywhere. When I walk the streets at night, I carry a 
weapon. If it were me in the same situation as Goetz, I would have shot 
them too. This is self preservation sweetheart.
82 For a juror’s account of the verdict see Mark Lesly, Subway Gunman: A Juror’s Account o f the 
Bernhard Goetz Trial (British American Publishers Ltd, 1988). Goetz was subsequently sentenced to 
one-year imprisonment for the gun possession charge.
83 Barbara Whitaker, “City Poll Finds Support For Goetz Verdict”, New York Newsday, June 28, 1987, 6.
84 Amongst the jury of 10 whites and two African Americans, six had been the victims o f crime, three of 
whom has been the victims of subway crime.
85 Whitaker, “Support For Goetz Verdict”, 6.
86 Quoted in David E. Pitt, “Blacks See Goetz Verdict as Blow to Race Relations”, New York Times,
June 18, 1987, 1.
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African Americans of New York City, perhaps more than anybody, were able to 
empathise with the situation Goetz found himself in.
For the majority of African-American and white supporters, in New York and 
beyond, the Goetz verdict was about the triumph of the victim over the criminal. This 
was expressed in numerous letters to national newspapers. In a letter to the 
Washington Post, a reader wrote:
I believe we all owe a debt of gratitude to Bernhard Goetz, a potential 
victim, for doing exactly what we wish we had the guts to do at a critical 
time: stand up to a smirking bully or a menacing gang of toughs and not 
merely defy them but administer deserved retribution. 7
Similarly, another correspondence read:
In response to Clarence Page’s question, ‘why did Goetz have to shoot?’ 
I would like to answer. Had Lori Roscetti, the medical student who was 
raped and had her head crushed by 4 ‘cardfare’ seekers used a handgun, 
she would still be a medical student!88
For the majority, crime was the central issue of the case, as was expressed by another 
reader:
If Goetz had not had a reason to fear for his safety, he would not have 
been carrying a revolver while riding the subway; and if those 
‘rambunctious kids’ had not been so eager to add to their list of prior 
offences, they would all be well today - which leads me to believe that
87 “Letters”, Washington Post, July 2, 1987, 26.
88 “Letters”, Washington Post, July 12, 1987, 4.2.
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it’s not Goetz’s acquittal we should be arguing over, but how best to 
resolve the problems that led to the shootings in the first place.89
Despite the facts that had emerged around the case and around Goetz himself, most 
Americans still perceived the case as a symbolic triumph of the law abiding citizen 
over the criminal in an atmosphere of threat and fear of crime. It was to these feelings 
and sentiments that Reagan’s fear of crime discourse tapped into and fuelled.
Not all Americans, particularly African Americans, supported the verdict, 
however; a counter discourse continued to exist. While a great number of African 
Americans supported the verdict the proportion was considerably less than it was for 
whites. Whites approved by a margin of 9-1, while African Americans were evenly 
split.90 The racial aspect to the case troubled many African Americans. A number 
questioned whether the case would have been perceived differently had the youths been 
white. As Benjamin Hooks, head of the National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People (NAACP), stated:
The jury verdict was inexcusable. I think it was a terrible and grave 
miscarriage of justice. . . .  If a white youth had been shot in similar 
circumstances by a black man while the youth was prone and 
defenseless . . .  what would have been the outcome then?91
“Letters”, Washington Post, July 3, 1987, 18.
90 Whitaker, “Support For Goetz Verdict”, 6. African-American men were more likely to disapprove of 
the verdict than African-American women: 51% compared to 36%.
91 Quoted in Pitt, “Verdict as Blow to Race Relations”, 1.
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For many African Americans, the Goetz verdict was evidence of a racial double 
standard within the CJS.92 The crux of the trial had been whether or not Goetz had 
acted in a reasonable manner when confronted by the youths on the subway train. A 
number of African Americans were concerned about the extent that the race of the 
youths played in this. As a letter to the Amsterdam News read:
The racial controversy that envelopes this case speaks more to the 
American condition than to Goetz himself, and separates his supporters 
into two categories: those who know there is a racial issue and don’t 
care, and those who genuinely feel there is no racial issue, only one of 
self-defense. I ask the latter to consider what media reaction would have 
been to a black Bernhard Goetz. Would he have been ‘avenging angel’ 
or a subway gunman? More importantly, I ask what your reaction would 
have been had those 4 white teenagers been shot, under identical 
circumstances, by a black man? How much the hero would a black 
Bernhard Goetz have seemed after shooting 4 white teenagers in the 
back? If you can honestly tell yourself that reaction would have been the 
same, then the issue of racism can be diminished in the case of Bernhard 
Goetz.93
For a number of African Americans, support for Goetz’s actions by the jury and the 
public, whether explicitly revealed in public discourse or not, was bome out of the 
contemporary socio-political climate in which fear of crime was translated, to a 
significant degree, in racial terms. As Roscoe C. Brown Jr., President of Bronx 
Community College, stated: “The climate in which this decision was made, whether it
92 Blumstein, “On the Disproportionality of U.S. Prison Populations”; Hagan and Patterson (eds.), Crime 
and Inequality in America; Jaynes and Williams, A Common Destiny, Chapter 9; Richey Mann,
Unequal, Spohn, “Courts, Sentences, and Prisons”; Tonry, Malign Neglect-, Walker, Spohn, Delone, 
Race, Ethnicity and Crime in America.
93 “Readers Write”, Amsterdam News, June 20, 1987, 14.
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be by white jurors or black jurors, is one of racism and fear of young black men.”94 As 
such, a number of African Americans were concerned that the Goetz case heightened 
the link between race and violent crime and legitimised a fear of blacks. As reporter 
Donald Grant stated in the Washington Afro-American:
Black people should note that Tuesday, June 16, 1987 was the day in 
which blacks became fair game for armed white Americans. On that day, 
a New York judge and jury acting in complicity in the Bernhard Goetz 
case legitimized the right of white people to claim self-defense with 
legal impunity in their use of deadly force against any black male, on the 
mere basis of a racist belief. It is now the rule as determined by their 
decision, that whites may kill any black male on the grounds of an 
unarticulated fear, no matter how irrational that fear may be. The rule 
further states that the white actor need only plead as a defense that his or 
her justification was that, ‘I acted in fear that they would do something 
to me’, even though that something is not shown, subjectively or 
objectively. White persons are no longer required to base their acts of 
self-defense on ‘apparent necessity,’ or ‘reasonable force,’ so long as the 
feared persons are black. The rule does not operate in the reverse. 5
5.3 Howard Beach: The Michael Griffith Killing, 1986
Reactions to the death of Michael Griffith, a young African American in 
Howard Beach, New York, in 1986 reveal the way in which crime and fear of crime 
was interpreted racially by a significant proportion of white Americans. Griffith and his 
friends were attacked by a gang of whites in Howard Beach and one of the ways in 
which a number of residents defended the local youths’ actions was through citing a
94 Quoted in Pitt, “Verdict as Blow to Race Relations”, 1.
95 Donald Grant, “Goetz Verdict Opens the Hunting Season”, Washington Afro-American, June 27,
1987, 5.
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fear of crime. This notion was also a central feature for the defence in the ensuing 
trials.96 The reaction of a number of whites in Howard Beach and in New York 
following the outcome of the case further illustrated the way in which crime was 
negatively perceived in racial terms.
On the evening of December 19, 1986, Michael Griffith, 23, along with his 
stepfather Cedric Sandiford, 36, his cousin Curtis Sylvester, 20, and his friend Timothy 
Grimes, 18, drove from Brooklyn to Queens to pick up pay cheques. During the trip, 
however, Sylvester’s 1976 Buick broke down on Cross Bay Boulevard, Queens. He 
remained with the car while the other three went in search of a phone. They walked 
three miles to the New Park Pizzeria in Howard Beach. The movements of the three 
African Americans through Howard Beach had not gone unnoticed. Dean Lewis, a 
youth counsellor from Brooklyn, spotted the three from his car and out of concern, 
warned them that it was unsafe for them to be in the neighbourhood. Almost 
immediately after this act of goodwill, proof of the warning came when another driver 
of a car approached the three and told them to leave the area in no uncertain terms.97 
Another resident of Howard Beach reported the ‘suspicious’ presence of the youths at 
the pizzeria to the police.98 For some residents of Howard Beach, then, the presence of 
three African Americans was a matter of considerable importance. It was the attention
96 Charles J. Hynes and Bob Drury, Incident at Howard Beach: The Case For Murder (New York: GP. 
Putman & Sons, 1990).
97 Hynes and Drury, Incident at Howard Beach, Chapter 2.
98 Robert D. McFadden, “Black Man Dies After Beating by Whites in Queens”, New York Times, 
December 21, 1986, 44.
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caught by three white youths in driving two girlfriends home from a birthday party, 
however, that was to have the most tragic of consequences.
Before entering the pizzeria, the three youths had encountered the car of whites, 
carrying Jon Lester, 17, William Bollander, 17, Salvadore Desimone, 16, Claudia 
Calogero, 16, and Laura Castagna, 16, and insults had been exchanged. While Griffith 
and the others proceeded to the pizzeria, Lester and the other two young men, returned 
to the party and announced that there were “. . . 3 niggers on the boulevard -  let’s go 
kill them!”99 When Griffith, Grimes and Sandiford left the pizzeria at 12.40 a.m., they 
were confronted by 12 youths armed with bats and sticks who taunted them with racial 
epithets and insults.100 The three youths tried to flee, but were caught and beaten. 
Grimes eventually managed to escape the mob, but Griffith and Sandiford were chased 
and caught again. Sandiford suffered further severe beatings, which only abated when 
he feigned unconsciousness/death and Griffith was left with no place to run from the 
mob except onto the busy highway where he was fatally struck by a car.101
In wake of the incident there was condemnation from across New York. A New 
York TimesfWCBS-TW poll showed that 74% of New Yorkers believed that there was 
“absolutely no excuse for what happened that night.”102 For most New Yorkers the
99 Testimony of Robert Riley quoted in Joseph P. Fried, “Attacker Describes Death at Howard Beach”, 
New York Times, October 23, 1987, B l.
100 Along with Jon Lester, William Bollander and Salvadore DeSimone were Harry Buonocore, 18, 
Thomas Farino, 16, Thomas Gucciardo, 17, Scott Kem, 18, Jason Ladone, 16, Michael Pirone, 17, James 
Povinelli, 16, Robert Riley, 17, and John Saggese, 19.
101 The driver o f the car was Dominik Blum. He claimed not to have realised that he hit Griffith and 
returned to the scene having discovered some damage to the car after arriving home.
102 Richard J. Meislin, “Racial Division Seen in Poll on Howard Beach Attack”, New York Times,
January 8, 1987, B2.
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death of Griffith was nothing less than a racial lynching. He, Grimes, and Sylvester had 
been targeted by the youths for no other reason than the colour of their skin: African 
Americans were not welcome in Howard Beach and Michael Griffith paid with his life 
for the intrusion. At a news conference, reflecting public opinion, Mayor Edward Koch 
declared that:
All crimes are terrible, but crimes involving racial bigotry are the 
absolute worst. . . . The survivors were chased like animals through the 
streets, with one of them being killed on the highway. . . . This incident 
can only be talked about as rivaling the kind of lynching party that took 
place in the Deep South - this is the number one case in the city.103
A $10,000 reward was offered for information leading to the apprehension of those 
responsible. Also a series of anti-racism marches involving African Americans and 
whites were held in both Howard Beach and New York City.104 While New Yorkers 
rallied around to condemn the attack, a number of Howard Beach residents, objected to 
the way their community was being identified as a haven of racist violence and sought 
to justify what had occurred.
Despite the fact that the Howard Beach youths had used the word ‘nigger’ 
before the attack - an issue widely reported in the press - residents of Howard Beach 
denied that the attack had been racial.105 One resident regarded the confrontation
103 Quoted in McFadden, “Black Man Dies After Beating”, 1.
104 Some of the protests in Howard Beach were met with counter-demonstrations by some residents who 
hurled abuse and racial epithets.
105 Use of the word ‘nigger’ by the Howard Beach youths was reported in the New York Times on 
December 21, 23, and 30, 1986.
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between the two groups of youths as nothing more than a territorial battle and that race 
had played no part. They stated: “When I was a kid and we used to fight, they never 
called it racial . . . ever since the 60s, when they came out with discrimination, 
everything that happens is racial.”106 For this resident the racialisation of a fight 
between youths was further evidence of the unnecessary pre-occupation with race and 
discrimination since the Civil Rights era. This feeling was echoed in other responses to 
the incident in Howard Beach. As another resident charged: “If a black guy attacks a 
white guy, it’s called a crime. If a white attacks a black, it’s racial.”107 Residents 
directed specific anger towards Mayor Koch and Police Chief Benjamin Ward for 
labelling the incident as racial. As one resident asserted: “Koch and Ward jump in and 
say ‘racism’ . . .  why should they assume it’s racism just because it's between black and 
white?”108 Members of the congregation at Our Lady of Grace R.C. Church in Howard 
Beach booed and snubbed Koch during a visit there and a member of the congregation 
warned Koch of the dangers of a preoccupation with race, exclaiming: “You want 
another racial war? . . .  You want another 60s on your hands with that attitude? Leave 
it alone! Leave it alone!”109 The objection to perceived preoccupation with race 
amongst Howard Beach residents was reflective of a nationwide trend.
106 Quoted in Jane Gross, “As Priest Censures Racism as Sin, Howard Beach Deals with Attack”, New 
York Times, December 22, 1986, B2.
107 Quoted in Michael Dobbs, ‘“Nice Kids’ and ‘Outsiders’: The View Form Howard Beach”, 
Washington Post, February 18, 1986, A8.
108 Quoted in Gross, “As Priest Censures Racism as Sin”, B2.
109 Quote in Joyce Pumick, “Koch Sees Racial Talk, Gets Irate Reception at Queens Church”, New York 
Times, December 29, 1986, B3.
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While some residents of Howard Beach fiercely objected to the way their 
neighbourhood was being portrayed as racist, claiming the incident to be nothing more 
than a confrontation between two gangs of youths, other residents sought to explain or 
defend the actions of the Howard Beach youths by claiming that they were reacting to a 
threat: to a fear of crime. Yet, this fear of crime translated into a fear of blacks. As one 
resident expressed: “It’s very easy to spot a black person in this neighborhood, and 
whenever I see one, I know he’s up to no good. . . . They come in the neighborhood 
and rob everyone. It’s a known fact. That’s why everybody has a thing about them.”110 
Another resident stated: “People have been robbed and raped right in Howard Beach . . 
. you get to be afraid. So when kids see black people coming in here at night together, 
they feel they’re up to no good.. . .  People are sorry the kid got killed, but people have 
to protect themselves.”111 According to this resident, given the problem of black- 
perpetrated crime the Howard Beach youths reacted in a perfectly reasonable manner to 
a perceived threat. Similarly, a resident whose family owned a restaurant in Howard 
Beach, claimed: “It’s a natural reaction. . . .  If there were a whole lot of crimes being 
committed by green people, and you met a green person on the street, then you would 
probably associate him with criminal activity.”112 In this statement, the resident seeks 
to defend his attitude as a common sense approach, rather than as racist. Crime,
110 Quoted in Gross, “As Priest Censures Racism as Sin”, B2.
111 Quoted in “Blacks, Whites Join at Mass for New York Construction Worker”, Washington Post, 
December 28, 1986, A21.
112 Quoted in Dobbs, “The View From Howard Beach”, A8.
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particularly black crime, was a significant problem in Howard Beach, resulting in a 
fear of blacks, which explained the confrontation between the two groups of youths. 
Such sentiments were not restricted to Howard Beach; 1 in 10 New Yorkers believed 
that the incident was “bad, but it’s understandable why the white youths acted the way 
they did.”113
Some residents of Howard Beach also expressed anger at the lack of concern 
with the problem of black crime in Howard Beach. As one resident charged: “You 
know how many houses they’ve broken into. . .  . You have no idea what goes on here. 
How come Koch doesn’t make that a priority?”114 This statement also reflects the 
nationwide frustration at a perceived lack of action by government and the Criminal 
Justice System (CJS) to tackle crime decisively. Despite criticism of Koch, however, in 
a statement about the incident he legitimised the concept of fear of blacks. Koch 
declared:
In the aftermath of the Howard Beach incident, we must restate certain 
truths about the evil of racism, the need for racial tolerance and the 
importance of the fight against discrimination. But we will not advance 
racial understanding unless we also attempt to come to grips with the 
fear of crime in general and white fear of black crime in particular.115
113 Meislin, “Racial Division Seen in Poll”, B2.
114 Quoted in Gross, “As Priest Censures Racism as Sin”, B2.
115 Edward Koch, “Race, Crime, Prejudice, Fear”, New York Times, January 19, 1987, 17. A number of 
people, however, believed that Koch’s administration had done much to fuel racism in New York. See 
Nicolaus Mills, “Howard Beach - Anatomy of a Lynching: New York Racism in the 1980s”, Dissent 34. 
4 (1987): 470-484; Alphonso Pinkney, Lest We Forget: White Hate Crimes: Howard Beach and Other 
Racial Atrocities (Chicago: Third World Press, 1994); Jonathan Rieder, “Inside Howard Beach: Fear and 
Racism in White New York”, New Republic, February 9, 1987, 17-19.
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The responses of Howard Beach residents reveal the level of concern with 
crime and the fear of crime that was reflected nationwide. Furthermore, they reveal the 
feelings, beliefs and attitudes concerning crime that Reagan’s discourse on crime and 
the fear of crime tapped into, fuelled and legitimised. More importantly, however, the 
responses of Howard Beach residents reveal the way in which concern with crime and 
fear of crime was interpreted racially by some, thus also revealing the racial feelings, 
beliefs and attitudes that Reagan’s discourse on crime and the fear of crime tapped into, 
fuelled and legitimised.
Following a grand jury hearing which heard testimony from both Grimes and 
Sandiford, and Robert Riley, 12 youths were indicted, four on charges of attempted 
murder and/or manslaughter.116 The Howard Beach defendants were tried in two 
stages. The first and most significant trial was that of Scott Kem, Jason Ladone, Lester 
and Michael Pirone. During the trial the notion that the actions of the Howard Beach 
youths were spurred by the threat of crime was a significant feature in the defence’s 
strategy. Denying that it had been a racially motivated attack, the defence portrayed the 
incident at Howard Beach as a tragic accident driven by “. . . old macho garbage . . .”
116 Kem, Lester and Ladone were charged with attempted murder, manslaughter and other charges; 
Gucciardo was charged with attempted murder and assault; Pirone with manslaughter and other charges; 
Farino, Povinelli, and Saggese with first-degree riot; Desimone with first-degree riot and criminal 
faciliation; Bollander with first-degree riot and inciting to riot; and Buonocore with first-degree riot. In a 
deal with the prosecution, Riley agreed to plea guilty to assault and receive youthful offender treatment.
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in which both groups of youths played a part.117 Griffiths, Sandiford and Grimes, 
however, were portrayed as the aggressors of the situation. In the words of Bryon 
Levinson, attorney for Jon Lester, they were not “. . . three lambs walking into sodom .
..  they were three antagonistic men spoiling for a fight, looking for trouble and coming 
across some youngsters.”118 The jury, however, concluded otherwise and having 
chased Griffith into the path of oncoming traffic deemed the defendants were 
responsible for his death. Lester, Ladone and Kem were found guilty of 
manslaughter.119
The Howard Beach verdict was supported by the majority - 59% - of New 
Yorkers.120 For many the verdict was perceived as a strike against racism and sent the 
message that criminal actions based upon racial prejudices were not going to be 
tolerated or sanctioned by law. In this sense for some it stood as the legal 
counterweight to the Goetz verdict. As Hynes stated: “The jury sent a message loud 
and clear that society is not going to tolerate violence based on hatred that is based on
117 Quoted in Joseph P. Fried, “Lawyer Argues Blacks Incited Attack in Queens”, New York Times, 
December 9, 1987, B3.
118 Quoted in Joseph P. Fried, “Howard Beach Jurors Hear Divergent Views”, New York Times, October 
8, 1987, B l.
119 Lester, Kem and Ladone were found guilty o f manslaughter and first-degree assault. The 
manslaughter verdict rested on the jury’s decision that they were guilty of reckless behavior with a 
disregard for risk of life as opposed to depraved indifference to human life, which was needed for a 
murder verdict. Lester and Kem were found not guilty of second-degree murder; Lester, Kem and 
Ladone were found not guilty of attempted murder and of riot charges; Kem was found guilty of 
conspiracy and Pirone was found not guilty of manslaughter, riot and assault.
120 Richard J. Meissin, “New Yorkers Say Race Relations Have Worsened in the Last Year”, New York 
Times, January 19, 1988, 1.
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differences.”121 In sentencing the leader of the youths, Lester, to a maximum term of 10 
to 30 years, Judge Thomas Demakos explicitly identified the incident as a racial attack, 
stating: “What happened at Howard Beach - and make no mistake about it, no ifs, ands 
or buts about it - it was a racial incident that triggered off this violence.”122
The proportion of New Yorkers who supported the verdict, however, was 
considerably lower than the number who had condemned the attack. Moreover, those 
who disagreed with the verdict were split along racial lines as to the reason why. 
Approximately one-third of African Americans disagreed with the verdict because they 
felt that the defendants should have been convicted of more serious charges.123 As an 
African-American resident of Bedford-Stuyvestant, Griffith’s neighbourhood, stated: 
“If that had been a black, they would have sentenced him to life.”124 This statement 
reflected the widely held perception amongst African Americans that the CJS was 
biased against them and that white defendants were treated more leniently. According 
to polls, the vast majority of African Americans in New York believed that judges and 
courts favoured whites over African Americans.125 For a number of African Americans
121 Quoted in Sam Roberts, “Howard Beach Verdict: Mixed Message”, New York Times, December 23, 
1987, 1.
122 Quoted in Joseph P. Fried, “Howard Beach Defendant Given Maximum Term of 10-30 years”, New 
York Times, January 23, 1988, 1. Two weeks after Lester’s sentencing Kem was sentenced to 6-18 years 
(consisting of two consecutive 3-9 year terms). The following week Ladone received a sentence of 5-15 
years.
123 Meissin, “Race Relations Have Worsened in the Last Year”, 1.
124 Quoted in Howard Kurtz, “New Yorkers View Howard Beach Verdict Through Racial Prism”, 
Washington Post, December 23, 1987, A3.
125 Meissin, “Race Relations Have Worsened in the Last Year”, B2. See also Flanagan and Longmire 
(eds.), Americans View Crime and Injustice and Warr, “Public Opinion on Crime and Punishment”.
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this belief was validated following the outcome of the cases against the other Howard 
Beach defendants.126
In contrast to African-American disagreement with the verdict, the quarter of 
white New Yorkers who opposed the verdict did so because they believed the jury 
should have returned a lighter verdict. Moreover, a number of Howard Beach residents 
regarded the verdict as another example of whites being treated more harshly by the 
CJS than African Americans. As one resident stated: “What if it was the other way 
around? Nothing would have happened.”127 Residents claimed that the three would 
have received more lenient treatment had they been black and the victims white, and 
they rebuked the trend for the lack of attention paid to the white victims of black crime. 
These sentiments were reflective of feelings held nationwide regarding the 
ineffectiveness of the CJS in tackling black-perpetrated crime.128 Furthermore, like the 
responses to the attack by a number of Howard Beach residents, these reactions to the
126 The remaining eight defendants were scheduled to be tried at the same time with two separate juries. 
(There was a separate jury for Gucciardo’s charges). However, Harry Buonocore and Salvatore 
DeSimone pleaded guilty to misdemeanour riot charges before the trial and were sentenced to five years’ 
probation. Riley was sentenced to six months after pleading guilty to assault charges as part of his deal. 
At the second Howard Beach trial Thomas Gucciardo and John Saggese were acquitted of all charges. 
William Bollander, Thomas Farino, and James Povinelli were convicted of misdemeanour riot charges 
and were sentenced to three years’ probation and 200 hours of community service. In December 1989, 
the New York State appeals court quashed the riot convictions of three defendants after deciding that the 
trial judge had erred by not giving the jury the option of finding the defendants guilty of the less serious 
offence of disorderly conduct.
127 Quoted in Meissin, “Race Relations Have Worsened in the Last Year”, 1; Flanagan and Longmire 
(eds.), Americans View Crime and Injustice-, Warr, “Public Opinion on Crime and Punishment”.
128 Flanagan and Longmire (eds.), Americans View Crime and Injustice-, Warr, “Public Opinion on Crime 
and Punishment”.
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verdict illustrated the racial feelings concerning crime that Reagan’s discourse tapped 
into.
Public discourse in response to the death of Michael Griffith in Howard Beach 
illustrates not only the concern with crime and the fear of crime held amongst 
Americans, but also and more importantly the way in which crime and fear of crime 
was interpreted in distinctly racial terms by some Americans. For these Americans, not 
only was crime and the fear of crime an overwhelming problem, it was a problem 
buttressed by leniency within the CJS towards black-perpetrated crime. Reagan’s 
coded racial messages contained within his crime discourse were easily heard by these 
Americans.
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CHAPTER 6
Bush and Soft on Crime:
The Central Park Jogger, 1989, and The Carol Stuart
Murder, 1989
6.1 The Bush Presidency: 1989 - 1993
The Republican Party’s Southern Strategy continued under the leadership of 
George Bush, and like his predecessors, also, one of the ways in which Bush sought to 
appeal to white voters was through the issue of crime. Bush’s presidential election 
campaign in 1988 graphically illustrated the way in which crime could be used as a 
successful coded appeal to white voters. Just as Ronald Reagan had in 1980 and 1984, 
in the 1988 presidential election campaign, Bush subtly identified the Democratic Party 
as the party for blacks and thus the Republican Party as the party for whites.1 This was 
subtly done but the effects were immense. As Susan Estrich, Michael Dukakis’s 
campaign manager, declared:
1 Dan T. Carter, From George Wallace to Newt Gingrich: Race in the Conservative Counterrevolution, 
1963-1994 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1996); Kenneth O’Reilly, Nixon’s Piano: 
Presidents and Racial Politics From Washington to Clinton (New York: The Free Press, 1995); Juan 
Williams, “Divided We Fell: Race and the ’88 Election”, American Visions 4.1 (1989): 31-37.
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Democrats are seen as the party of blacks . . .  the Republicans never 
attack us for that explicitly. But every time we are attacked as the party 
of the poor and the party that is soft on crime, there lurks, I think, that 
subtle hint of our ‘blackness’ - and with it, an appeal to those who want 
no part of it.2
In the 1988 presidential election, Bush received 66% of the white male vote.3 One of 
the most effective and significant tools used by the Bush campaign in 1988 was the 
identification of Bush’s Democratic presidential challenger, Michael Dukakis, as being 
soft on crime.4 The exact manner in which this identification was made, however, led 
some to regard the 1988 Bush election campaign as “. . . so implicitly racist that it 
appeared suited to a prior century.”5
As Governor of Massachusetts, Dukakis supported and endorsed the furlough 
program in state prisons. This program granted prisoners short-term leaves home as an 
incentive for good behaviour and to ease inmates back into society.6 Despite the overall 
success of the furlough program in Massachusetts and other states, the absconding of 
one convict whilst on a furlough from the Northeast minimum-security prison in 
Massachusetts became the essential ingredient to the Republican attack on Dukakis.
2 Quoted in O’Reilly, Nixon's Piano, 387-388.
3 O’Reilly, Nixon’s Piano, 391.
4 David C. Anderson, Crime and the Politics o f Hysteria: How the Willie Horton Story Changed 
American Justice (New York: Random House, 1995); Carter, From George Wallace to Newt Gingrich', 
Kathleen Hall Jamieson, Dirty Politics: Deception, Distraction, and Democracy (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1992);______ , Packaging the Presidency: A History and Criticism o f Presidential
Campaign Advertising (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996); O’Reilly, Nixon’s Piano.
5 O’Reilly, Nixon’s Piano, 378.
6 Massachusetts was not the only state to operate this program: since 1975, 44 states and Washington 
D.C. had used it. Although the Massachusetts program was one of the more liberal, statistics showed that 
it functioned relatively well and many regarded the program as a success. In 1991 Daniel P. LeClair and 
Susan Gugrino-Ghezz concluded from their study of convicts released between 1971 and 1983 that 
furloughs reduced recidivism. Anderson, Crime and the Politics o f Hysteria, 108.
249
William R. Horton Jr. had been convicted in 1975 of first-degree murder and 
sentenced to life imprisonment without parole.7 Under Massachusetts law, in 1985 he 
became eligible for the furlough program and while a number of furloughs were 
completed without incident, whilst on a weekend furlough in June 1986, Horton 
absconded.8 Ten months later, on April 3, 1987, Horton illegally entered the home of 
Angela Miller and Cliff Bames in Oxon Hill, Maryland. After physically assaulting 
Bames, Horton raped Miller. After fleeing the house, Horton was apprehended by 
police and on October 27, 1987 was sentenced to two consecutive life terms plus 85 
years.9
What was most significant about the Horton case for the Bush team was not just 
the fact that it symbolised for them the failure of the furlough program and the liberal 
policies of Dukakis, but it also touched a cultural raw nerve. Angela Miller and Cliff 
Bames, a young, middle-class, suburban white couple, had become the victims of a 
random violent crime perpetrated by a black criminal. In Horton, the Republican
7 William Horton, along with Alvin Wideman and Roosevelt Pickett, were convicted of the robbery of a 
service station in Lawrence, Massachusetts on October 26, 1974. Horton was convicted of the murder of 
Joey Fournier, 17, who was on duty that evening.
8 Under Massachusetts law, after serving 10 years a prisoner with a lifetime conviction could be moved 
to a minimum security prison and become eligible for furloughs.
9 Following the Horton case, Michael Dukakis came under pressure to abolish the furlough program for 
first-degree murderers. Subsequently Giardino’s bill was signed into law by Dukakis on April 28, 1988. 
For an account of both the Fournier, and Bames and Miller cases, as well as Horton’s opinion of the 
Bush campaign, see: Jeffrey M. Elliot, “A Few Words From Willie Horton”, Playboy, December (1989), 
116-223;______ , “The Willie Horton Nobody Knows”, The Nation, August 23/30 1993, 201-205.
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campaign team had the perfect tool not only to manipulate fear of crime, but also 
subconscious racial paranoia in order to lever itself into the White House.10
Bush began using the Horton story on the stumps in the summer of 1988. He 
told the Illinois Republican State Convention that Dukakis let:
Murderers out on vacation to terrorize innocent people. . . . Democrats 
can’t find it in their hearts to get tough on criminals. . . . What did the 
Democratic governor of Massachusetts think he was doing when he let 
convicted first degree murderers out on weekend passes, even after one 
of them criminally, brutally raped a woman and stabbed her fiance? Why 
didn’t he admit his mistake? Eight months later, he was still defending 
his program, and only when the Massachusetts legislature voted by an 
overwhelming majority to abolish this program did he finally give in. I 
think Governor Dukakis owes the American people an explanation of 
why he supports this outrageous program.11
There were lingering concerns within the Bush campaign that the extensive use of 
Horton would invite charges of racism. These fears were allayed, however, following 
the positive response in Market Opinion Research focus-group sessions to an article on
19Horton and his furlough escape in Reader’s Digest.
Inspired by the positive response to the Reader’s Digest article, in early 
October, Bush campaign manager, Lee Atwater, and media advisor, Roger Ailes, 
released a hard-hitting television advertisement, under the aegis of the Bush Re- 
election committee. While a voice-over described the Massachusetts furlough plan as a
10 Anderson, Crime and the Politics o f  Hysteria', Carter, From George Wallace to Newt Gingrich', Joe R. 
Feagin and Heman Vera, White Racism: The Basics (New York: Routledge, 1995); Jamieson, Dirty 
Politics',______ , Packaging the Presidency; O’Reilly, Nixon’s Piano.
11 Quoted in Anderson, Crime and the Politics o f Hysteria, 215.
12 Robert James Bidinotto, “Getting Away With Murder”, Reader’s Digest, July 1988, 27-63.
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rogue operation that resulted in the escape of convicted murderers who killed and 
robbed, a screen graphic showed the number 268 (the number of absconding prisoners) 
superimposed over a line of convicts who moved in and out of a revolving prison
1 3door. The race of the prisoners in the ad was indiscernible and there was no mention 
of Horton. In this sense the ad was similar to the Reader’s Digest article: the focus was 
on Dukakis and the failure of the furlough program. However, by this time it was 
superfluous for the Bush campaign team to mention Horton.14
In the second week of September another Republican group, Americans for 
Bush/National Security Political Action Committee (NSPAC), blanketed Cable News 
Network (CNN) with an advertisement that explicitly identified Horton, a convicted 
murderer - released under Dukakis’s furlough program - as the black rapist of a white 
woman. The ad, comparing Bush and Dukakis on crime, interchanged images of the 
candidates and Horton while a voiceover announced:
Bush and Dukakis on crime. Bush supports the death penalty for first- 
degree murderers. Dukakis not only opposes the death penalty, he 
allowed first-degree murderers to have weekend passes from prison. One 
was Willie Horton, who murdered a boy in a robbery, stabbing him 
nineteen times. Despite a life sentence, Horton received ten weekend 
passes from prison. Horton fled, kidnapping a young couple, stabbing 
the man and repeatedly raping his girlfriend.15
13 Despite what the ad inferred, of the 268 inmates who escaped whilst on furlough during Dukakis’s 
first two terms, only four were convicted murderers. During this time over 11,000 inmates participated in 
the program without incident. Moreover, 269 inmates escaped whilst on furlough during the three years 
of Dukakis’s Republican predecessor’s term who had created the furlough program. Jamieson, Dirty 
Politics, 20.
14 Carter, From George Wallace to Newt Gingrich, 77.
15 Quoted in Jamieson, Dirty Politics, 17.
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Two days after the initial airing of the NSPAC ad, the California Committee for the 
Presidency released a radio advertisement featuring Cliff Bames. Americans were 
given a first hand account by victims of the consequences of furloughs. Listeners were 
told by Bames: “Mike Dukakis and Willie Horton changed our lives forever. . . . 
Horton broke into our home. For twelve hours, I was beaten, slashed and terrorized...  . 
My wife Angie was brutally raped.”16 In the third week of October, while the official 
ad was still airing, Committee for the Presidency advertisements featuring the victims 
of Horton’s crimes were aired on television. Along with Bames, the sister of Joey 
Fournier - the victim of the crime for which Horton was convicted in 1975 - appeared. 
Donna Fournier Cuomo expressed her opinion of Dukakis:
Governor Dukakis’s liberal experiment failed. We are all victims. First, 
Dukakis let killers out of prison. He also vetoed the death penalty. Willie 
Horton stabbed my teenage brother nineteen times. Joey died. Horton 
was sentenced to life without parole, but Dukakis gave him a furlough.
He never returned. Horton went on to rape and torture others. I worry 
that people here don’t know enough about Dukakis’s record.17
Thus, when the official Bush ad aired the American public were more than able to read 
Horton into the furlough debate, not only through the ads which preceded and ran
16 Quoted in Carter, From George Wallace to Newt Gingrich, 77.
17 Quoted in Jamieson, Dirty Politics, 21.
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alongside the official ad but also through the reinforcement of the Horton-furlough 
narrative in the press and television reports.18
Dukakis responded to the ads firstly by defending the furlough program and 
then by accusing the Republicans of racism. Bush and the Bush campaign team 
rebuffed the charges of racism, however. Ailes was adamant that his advertisements 
did not mention Horton in connection with the Massachusetts furlough program, and 
both he and Atwater insisted that the national Republican Party had nothing to do with 
the ‘independent’ advertisements. 19 The Bush team, however, could not have been 
oblivious to the fact that the American public would read Horton into the official 
advertisement from the advertisements that aired alongside it and the preceding 
advertisements. Furthermore, the Bush team could not have been ignorant to the racial 
implications of the advertisements. As the New Republic charged:
The Bush campaign strategists take justifiable pride in their 
sophisticated understanding of what’s going on inside people’s heads. 
It’s impossible to imagine that when they sat around months ago, and 
came up with the idea of making Willie Horton a centerpiece of their 
campaign - hardly an obvious or inevitable decision - they were unaware 
of the special power of the image of a black man raping a white woman. 
And it’s impossible to imagine it didn’t occur to them that this power 
would make their theme more effective. If it didn’t occur to them that by 
rubbing this cultural raw nerve they also would be inflaming it, they’re
18 Jamieson, Dirty Politics, 22, 23.
19 Evidence was uncovered by Robert Beckel, a former Walter Mondale campaign manager, 
demonstrating that the contributors and organisers of Americans for Bush and Committee for the 
Presidency were all closely tied to mainline Republican politics. Carter, From George Wallace to Newt 
Gingrich, 78.
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pretty dense. In exploiting racial paranoia, you inevitably promote it as 
well.20
In the spring of 1988, Bush had been trailing Dukakis by 15 to 20 points.21 The surge 
of support for Bush during the late summer and early autumn, was attributable to a 
number of factors including the popularity of Reagan and Bush’s promise of ‘no new 
taxes’. However, as Dan T. Carter emphatically states: “... no one - no one - who 
followed that campaign believes George Bush had any more devastating an ally than 
the homicidal maniac Willie Horton.”22 Horton was the silver bullet in the Republican 
attack on Dukakis because despite the atypical nature of the event, the Horton narrative 
fed into subconsciously held assumptions about race, crime and sex in America in the 
late 1980s.23
The chapter will analyse Bush’s discourse in relation to crime and will illustrate 
that throughout his presidency, Bush continued to present the Democratic Party, with 
its inherent racial link, as soft on crime. Throughout his presidency Bush advocated the 
continued retreat from the liberal Democrat ideology of the past that was presented as
20 TRB From Washington, “Pandora’s Box”, The New Republic, November 14, 1988, 45. According to 
Tali Mendelberg, the consequences of this mobilization were greater resistance to government efforts to 
address racial inequality, heightened perception of racial conflict, and greater resistance to policies 
perceived as illegitimately benefiting African Americans. Tali Mendelberg, “Executing Hortons: Racial 
Crime in the 1988 Presidential Campaign”, Public Opinion Quarterly 61 (1997): 134-157.
21 Carter, From George Wallace to Newt Gingrich, 68.
22 Carter, From George Wallace to Newt Gingrich, 79.
23 The majority of murders, assaults and nearly 9/10 rapes are intraracial. For a discussion of the Bush 
presidency, in addition to works cited, see Ryan J. Barilleaux and Mary E. Stucky (eds.), Leadership and 
the Bush Presidency: Prudence or Drift in an Era o f Change? (Connecticut: Praeger, 1992); David 
Mervin, George Bush and the Guardianship Presidency (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996); Richard Rose, 
George Bush as a Postmodern President (Glasgow: University of Strathclyde, 1991); Kenneth W. 
Thompson (ed.), The Bush Presidency: Ten Intimate Perspectives o f George Bush (Maryland: University 
Press of America, 1997).
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pro-criminal and championed the need for a continued tough approach from
government to tackle crime. In doing this, Bush sought to continue with the objective 
of the Southern Strategy and encourage white support of the Republican Party. The 
chapter will analyse public and media discourse in relation to crime surrounding two 
incidents of interracial assault and murder -  the Central Park jogger attack, 1989, and 
the Carol Stuart murder, 1989, in order to demonstrate the reproduction of the coded 
racial political issue of soft on crime in American society.
Bush’s support of toughness and the continued retreat from the liberal 
Democrat ideology of the past is seen in his Remarks at a Republican Fundraising 
Luncheon in East Brunswick, New Jersey, September 22, 1989.24 In talking of the 
impending gubernatorial election in New Jersey, Bush states:
I’ve come to East Brunswick not just to say thank you but for an even 
more important reason. And this reason goes beyond party to the essence 
of this campaign. New Jersey’s elections are among the most crucial in 
America. This election will decide whether New Jersey builds on what 
you began 8 years ago or whether it risks everything by returning to the 
past, and to whether New Jersey has the inspired leadership it needs to 
win the war on drugs and crime or whether it reverts to failed social 
policies that blame everyone but the criminal. . . . And that’s what this 
election is about; that’s what it’s going to decide. And it’s that 
important, and it’s that clear-cut. And today I make a prediction: This 
November, New Jersey will make the right decision, and Jim Courter 
will be our next Governor. They do not want to go back to the past.
24 “Remarks at a Republican Fundraising Luncheon in East Brunswick, New Jersey, September 22, 
1989” Public Papers o f the President o f  the United States: 1989.
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According to Bush, the voters of New Jersey could either vote Democrat and see a 
return of ill-fated social policies, or vote Republican and see the continuation of the 
successful tough approach to crime. As such, Bush essentially asserts that voters have 
no choice to make. Bush then continues to set the parties apart as he states: “. . .with a 
Republican Governor and a Republican general assembly, that future will also include 
not just a war against drugs but a crusade against crime: supporting tougher laws, 
giving our law enforcement officers more resources, declaring open warfare on the con 
artists and the hoods.” Here Bush clearly presents the Republican Party as the party of 
law and order. The statement also serves to further infer that the Democratic Party will 
not deliver on crime. The use of the term ‘hoods’ also served to increase the racial 
dimension to his message. Bush also sets the two parties apart by presenting Courter as 
a law and order crusader, whilst blasting the law and order credentials of his Democrat 
opponent. Bush states that Courter holds a:
..  .magnificent record in combating crime... . And he knows the terrible 
toll that’s caused by crime. And that’s why he wants mandatory time for 
firearms offenses, and I support him on that. No deals -  no deals with 
those criminals who use a gun. . ..  And unlike his opponent, he wants to 
amend New Jersey’s Constitution so that the death penalty on the books 
will be strengthened and enforced and, as he said, become a much 
clearer deterrent for those that go out and kill our police officers and 
others.
In these remarks, Bush is unabashedly sending the message that while the Republican 
Party is tough on law and order, the Democratic Party is soft on crime. For Bush, the
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Republican Party holds the future for law and order Americans. Aligning himself and 
his party with law and order Americans, Bush states:
Let me ask you a question. You make the choice. Do you want a 
Democratic Governor and a Democratic general assembly who thinks 
that New Jersey’s death penalty is fine? Or do you want a Republican 
Governor and a Republican general assembly who says that murderers 
and drug kingpins and cop killers should get exactly what they deserve? 
I believe that’s what the people want -  that last alternative . . .  the failed 
policies, in sum, of the 1970s just aren’t good enough -  not for New 
Jersey, not for the United States of America.
Bush again positions himself and the Republican Party alongside law and order 
Americans in his Remarks at the American Legion Annual Convention in Baltimore, 
Maryland, September 7, 1989.25 Bush asserts:
. . . our mission at home: to free our country from the fear of drugs and 
crime. When we ask what kind of society the American people deserve, 
our answer is and must be a nation in which law-abiding citizens are safe 
and feel safe. And that is why, 2 nights ago, I announced America’s first 
comprehensive national strategy to win the war on drugs and crime 
which plague the United States.
In making this statement, like Reagan before him, Bush makes reference to the fear of 
crime in America and vows that his administration will tackle it.26 Bush then proceeds 
to outline his approach to crime and in doing so displays his toughness. Bush declares:
25 “Remarks at the American Legion Annual Convention in Baltimore, Maryland, September 7, 1989” 
Public Papers o f the President o f the United States: 1989.
26Katherine Beckett and Theodore Sasson, The Politics o f Injustice: Crime and Punishment in America 
(California: Thousand Oaks, 2000); Samuel Walker, Cassia Spohn, Miriam Delone, Race, Ethnicity and
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First, our plan seeks to rid America of violent criminals with an attack 
on four fronts: new laws to punish them, new agents to arrest them, new 
prosecutors to convict them, and new prisons to hold them. Criminals in 
this nation must understand that if they commit a crime, they will be 
caught; and if caught, they will be prosecuted; and if convicted, they will 
do time. But, you see, by taking the hoods off the streets, we can and we 
will take back the streets.
Not only is Bush displaying his commitment to act in relation to crime, he is affirming 
the Republican Party’s philosophy on crime, which is the antithesis of the lenient 
philosophy of liberal Democrats. Moreover, once again, by making reference to the 
term ‘hoods’, Bush succeeds in increasing the racial element to Republican crime 
discourse.
Bush again makes reference to the fear of crime in American society in his 
Remarks at a White House Briefing for the American Legislative Exchange Council,
97April 27, 1990. Bush charges: “. . . Americans must be free from fear. When honest 
working people are afraid to go to the comer grocery store or to walk home from the 
bus at night, then fear of crime has stolen our most precious possession -  our liberty.” 
In making this statement, Bush is tapping into traditional American values of freedom 
and liberty. Bush continues to do this as he again demonstrates his administration’s 
commitment to tackling the fear of crime through tough legislation. Bush announces:
Crime in America (California: Wadsworth, 2000); Mark Warr, “Public Opinion on Crime and 
Punishment”, Public Opinion Quarterly 59 (1995): 300-320.
27 “Remarks at a White House Briefing for the American Legislative Exchange Council, April 27, 1990” 
Public Papers o f the President o f the United States: 1990.
259
. . .  it is to protect this freedom and the freedom to walk the streets that 
we offered up a good crime package. I sent this crime package last year 
to the Hill. Congress has, to its credit, approved new prison space and 
more Federal law enforcement officers. But too much work remains 
unfinished on the rest of the crime package, the portion that concerns 
violent crime. And once again, I call on Congress to pass laws at least as 
tough as the criminals we convict.
In making this statement, Bush sends the message that without tough new legislation, 
the traditional values that Americans hold dear will continue to be undermined as 
American society continues to suffer from the fear of crime. In doing this, Bush is 
aligning himself and the Republican Party with the American nation and with ordinary 
Americans who are living in the shadow of crime and who want to see decisive action 
to combat it.
In his Remarks at a White House Ceremony for the Observance o f National 
Crime Victims ’ Rights Week, April 25, 1990, Bush stresses his allegiance to Americans 
who are not only the victims of the fear of crime, but also the victims of actual crime. 
Bush states:
In the not-so-distant past, crime victims often became the forgotten 
people, subjected to continued victimization by the criminal justice 
system. . . . And the past 8 years have seen a new emphasis placed on 
crime issues: Landmark Federal legislation, task forces led by the 
President and the Attorney General, 45 States where a victims bill of 
rights is now in force, and a nationwide expansion of victim assistance 
and compensation programs. My administration has continued to build 
on this foundation.
28 “Remarks at a White House Ceremony for the Observance of National Crime Victims’ Rights Week, 
April 25, 1990” Public Papers o f the President o f the United States: 1990.
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In making this statement, Bush is making reference to the widely-held feeling amongst 
Americans during the 1980s, that since the 1960s, the Criminal Justice System (CJS) 
had become too preoccupied with protecting the rights of criminals and seeking to 
understand the reasons behind criminal behaviour, and that ordinary Americans and the 
needs of victims were being neglected.29 Furthermore, Bush emphasises that this 
neglect had been addressed under the Republican governance of his predecessor -  
Reagan - and he asserts the Republican Party’s continued commitment to this agenda. 
As part of this, Bush also asserts his administration’s commitment to enacting tough 
new laws to deal with crime. Bush stresses: “. . .all of these efforts are important, but 
we also know that the best defence is a good offense. We’re determined to stop crime 
at its source, and that means tougher laws . . .” Furthermore, Bush claims to be 
responding to the will of the people in this pursuit -  unlike Democrats - thereby 
aligning himself and the Republican Party with law and order Americans. Bush states:
The people of this country are prepared to do whatever it takes for as 
long as it takes to take back the streets, to take back what’s theirs. And 
it’s here we’d like to ask your help. I mentioned tougher laws. Congress 
has approved our request for more agents, more prosecutors, and more 
prisons to catch, convict, and contain this country’s most dangerous 
offenders. But Congress also must act on our full range of tough new 
anticrime proposals. Our package is in danger of being weakened in the 
Senate, and it’s been left gathering dust in the House. And it’s time to 
act. The American people want it done right, and they want it done 
responsibly, and they want it done now.
29 Timothy J. Flanagan and Dennis R. Longmire (eds.), Americans View Crime and Injustice: A National 
Public Opinion Survey (London: Sage, 1996); Warr, “Public Opinion on Crime and Punishment”.
261
While Bush sends the message that the Republican Party is in tune with the needs of 
Americans, in making reference to the inaction of Congress, he also sends the message 
that the Democratic Party is neglecting the will of the people.
Bush demonstrates that Republican philosophy on crime is in tune with the 
American people in his Remarks at the Dedication Ceremony for the North Los 
Angeles County Correctional Facility in Santa Monica, California, March 1, 1990.30 
Bush states of the new prison in Santa Monica:
This facility was built to meet the needs of L.A. County. Every penny -  
every penny -  was produced by State and local funding. And that’s a 
sign that your vibrant community, the Los Angeles community, the Los 
Angeles taxpayer, knows that in the fight against crime and drugs, tough 
talk is simply not enough . . .  if you're going to be tough on crime you’ve 
got to be tough on criminals. . . . No more revolving door. No more 
criminals out on the street because there isn’t enough cell space to hold 
them.
Bush stresses that his administration’s commitment to the expansion of prisons in the 
country is based upon the clear understanding and appreciation of the problem of 
crime; an understanding that is missing amongst liberals. Bush proclaims:
Prisons are very much about the real world. There’s a tendency, 
particularly among people of great sensitivity, to think about justice in 
airy and abstract terms; the idea, for example, that in spite of crime, all 
people are basically good. But it is unwise to think in the abstract when 
it comes to crime. Most people are good. But some, let’s face it, are not.
30 “Remarks at the Dedication Ceremony for the North Los Angeles County Correctional Facility in 
Santa Monica, California, March 1, 1990” Public Papers o f the President o f the United States: 1990.
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Bush ends his remarks by honouring prison guards. Bush states: “You are . . . society’s 
unsung heroes. And I thank you for your service not just to your community but to our 
country. . . .  I salute you for your work.” In the same way that both Nixon and Reagan 
did with law enforcement, in aligning himself and the Republican Party with prison 
guards, Bush further presents the party as the party of law and order.
Continuing the Republican trend, Bush also aligns himself with law 
enforcement. In his Remarks at the Dedication Ceremony for the Police Memorial in 
Portland, Oregon, May 20, 1990, in talking about how best to honour fallen police 
officers, Bush remarks:
First, in the most elemental sense, by recalling what they stood for -  and 
against, as well. They were men of peace, fighting crime. They stood for 
good, against evil. . . . Second, we can honor them by enacting laws 
which free our country from the fear of crime and drugs. When we ask 
what kind of society the American people deserve, our answer is a 
nation in which law-abiding citizens are safe and feel safe. We must
“X 1reject those who sofl-peddle the need to be hard on crime.
In this statement, not only does Bush present police officers as heroes in the battle 
against crime, he also asserts that the Republican Party has a duty to the American 
people to further empower police, through tough legislation, in order that they be able 
to continue the fight against crime. Bush sends the message that it is only through this 
tough approach that the battle against crime can be won, and Americans can live
31 “Remarks at the Dedication Ceremony for the Police Memorial in Portland, Oregon, May 20, 1990” 
Public Papers o f the President o f the United States: 1990.
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without fear. In this endeavour, a tough stand needs to be also taken against those who 
reject toughness, that is, those who are soft on crime; the Democratic Party. Bush 
further rejects the soft approach to crime when he asserts:
Now, I know some say there are reasons for crime, and I say there’s 
never an excuse. And, yes, we support programs for rehabilitation and 
recovery -  we should. We do. We support education, the goal of which 
is to keep people off drugs and away from crime. And we support 
counseling [sic] and other steps to prevent crime. But we cannot and we 
must not neglect law enforcement. When it comes to understanding, I 
say let’s have a little more understanding and caring for the victims of 
crime and certainly for law enforcement officers.
In making this statement, Bush acknowledges the importance of rehabilitation and 
education in the prevention of crime. Yet, ultimately Bush advocates the need for law 
enforcement, which focuses more directly on addressing the needs of the victims of 
crime rather than those who commit crime. Bush proceeds: “Criminals must 
understand that if they commit crimes they will be caught; and if caught, they will be 
prosecuted; and if convicted, they will be punished. By taking the hoods off the streets, 
we can, and must, take back the streets.” Once again, Bush increases the racial element 
to the crime issue with use of term ‘hoods’.
In aligning himself with law enforcement and advocating a tough approach to 
crime, Bush also makes use of military language and imagery. Bush portrays the fight 
against crime as a war-like situation, demanding decisive action, particularly by 
Democrats in Congress. Bush states: “Remember, it does no good to send law troops
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into battle wearing handcuffs. And so, I urge the Senate and, in the coming weeks, the 
House to act quickly and build America up by opposing those who would tear America 
down. Together let’s pass this bill and help win our war on crime.”
In addition to positioning himself and the Republican Party alongside prison 
guards and police officers, Bush also aligns himself with another agency of the CJS: 
prosecutors. In his Remarks to Federal, State, and Local Prosecutors, September 12, 
1990, Bush announces:
. . .  on behalf of all the American people, I want to thank you, all of you, 
for working to help us take back the streets. We know full well that the 
life of a prosecutor is not easy. For gifted, hard-working lawyers like 
yourselves, the financial sacrifice is immense. And more importantly, 
over the past 30 years America’s criminal justice system has become 
bogged down with technicalities that stymie our prosecutor’s simple 
goals -  to see the truth come out, the guilty punished, the law upheld and 
justice done. Too many times, in too many cases, too many criminals go 
free because the scales of justice are unfairly loaded against dedicated 
law men and women like you. Since taking office, we’ve worked with 
many of you to try to steady the scales of justice, to seek a fair balance 
between the legitimate rights of criminals and criminal suspects, and 
society’s right to protect itself from evil predators.32
Not only does Bush align himself with prosecutors by honouring the work that they do, 
he also sympathises with them in respect of the constraints placed upon them by the 
CJS, which has too heavily favoured protecting the rights of criminals at the expense of 
victims and American society. In the same way that Bush urges Congress to enact
32 “Remarks to Federal, State, and Local Prosecutors, September 12, 1990” Public Papers o f the 
President o f the United States: 1990.
265
legislation to empower police officers, he also urges Congress to enact legislation to 
empower prosecutors. Bush asserts:
. . .  I stood before the Capital on a rainy day in May last year . . . calling 
on Congress to pass legislation to give our prosecutors and police the 
tools they need to fight back against the epidemic of violent crime still 
raging in America. That was over a year ago. And despite the urgency of 
the problem, the Congress has failed to act on key aspects of my 
proposal. What’s worse, several measures receiving serious 
consideration in the House this week would actually weaken law 
enforcement and hamper your efforts to protect the citizens of this 
nation. But your presence here today sends a powerful warning to 
Congress, a shot across the bow of a ship that is moving in the wrong 
direction. We will not accept a crime bill that is tougher on law 
enforcement than it is on criminals.
Bush presents the Democrat-controlled Congress, through its inaction and attempts to 
soften the crime bill, as erring, and Bush asserts his determination to fight for a tough 
approach to crime by government. In making this statement, Bush presents the 
Republican Party as the champions of law and order and, conversely, the Democratic 
Party as a hindrance. Moreover, Bush presents the Democratic Party’s softness on 
crime as out of touch with the American people. Bush charges: “The American people 
really are fed up. You know this perhaps better than I because you’re on the front lines, 
but they’re fed up. And I urge the Congress to heed the voices of our people, our 
police, and our prosecutors, and send me a crime bill that will help take back the 
streets.” In this statement, Republicans, the American people, and Criminal Justice 
agencies are placed in opposition to the Democrat-controlled Congress.
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The representation of the Republican Party as the party of law and order and the 
Democrat Party as the party that is soft on crime was made in a series of statements by 
Bush at fundraising and campaign events for congressional and gubernatorial election 
candidates. In his Remarks at a Fundraiser for Congressional Candidate Tom 
Anderson in Gulfport, Mississippi, October 12, 1989, in discussing the problem of drug 
trafficking, Bush states: “Part of getting tough on drugs is getting tough on crime itself. 
And I’ve sent a strong crime package to the Capitol Hill, and I want to see action on 
that crime package now. And with Tom in the House, I know he would be pushing 
hard to get that crime bill to the floor.”33 Here Bush not only emphasises his 
administration’s efforts to tackle crime, by implying that it would take elected 
Republicans in Congress to act on his crime package, he infers a level of resistance or 
apathy on the part of the Democrat-controlled House of Representatives.
Similarly, in his Remarks at a Fundraising Luncheon for Gubernatorial 
Candidate Clayton Williams in Dallas, Texas, October 15, 1990, in addition to 
espousing the law and order virtues of the Republican candidate, Bush more directly 
presents Congress as resistant to his crime bill.34 Bush remarks of Williams:
He’s tough on crime. He knows that the handcuffs belong on the 
criminals and not on the cops and the courts committed to uphold the 
law. This position that he has stacked out -  this position meshes 
perfectly with the no-nonsense anticrime package that I sent up to the
33 “Remarks at a Fundraiser for Congressional Candidate Tom Anderson in Gulfport, Mississippi, 
October 12, 1989” Public Papers of the President o f  the United States: 1989.
34 “Remarks at a Fundraising Luncheon for Gubernatorial Candidate Clayton Williams in Dallas, Texas, 
October 15, 1990” Public Papers o f the President o f the United States: 1990.
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United States Congress almost a year and a half ago. So, let me take 
advantage of you all to put a little heat on the Congress to act now and 
make life a little bit tougher on the criminals.
This is done more explicitly in his Remarks at a Fundraising Dinner for Gubernatorial 
Candidate John Rowland in Stamford, Connecticut, October 23, 1990.35 Bush states of 
Rowland: “One of the issues that plagues this State and all the States is the question of 
crime. He’s tough on crime. He’s been a strong supporter of our comprehensive crime 
bill, a bill that’s been stalled and sabotaged by the liberal Democrats in Congress for 
the past 16 months.” Here Bush explicitly accuses Democrats in Congress of 
hampering the crime bill.
The need for Republican governors and congressmen and women who support 
tough legislation on crime, which address the needs of the victims of crime, is also seen 
in Bush’s Remarks at a Fundraising Breakfast for Representative Stan Parris in 
Alexandria, Virginia, October 31, 1990.36 Bush lambastes Congress for diluting the 
strength of his crime bill. Bush declares:
. .  .Stan has stood for the kind of crime bill that I sent up to the Congress 
and that has been gutted by the liberal Democrats in the Congress. We 
don’t need more people that are going to continue to have a little more 
concern about the criminal rather than the victim. We need to do it the 
other way: more concern about the victims of crime and less about the 
criminals themselves.
35 “Remarks at a Fundraising Dinner for Gubernatorial Candidate John Rowland in Stamford, 
Connecticut, October 23, 1990” Public Papers o f the President o f the United States: 1990.
36 “Remarks at a Fundraising Breakfast for Representative Stan Parris in Alexandria, Virginia, October 
31, 1990” Public Papers o f the President o f the United States: 1990.
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Here Bush positions himself alongside law and order Americans and charges that they 
have been cheated by Democrats in Congress. Bush charges:
. .  .Congress passed a crime bill, a tough bill; and then they proceeded to 
weaken it, later, out of sight, in a back room someplace. And in the 
crush of final legislation -  Congress finally getting out of town -  the 
mutilation of this bill was itself a mugging, a legislative attack on this 
legislation that could only take place behind closed doors, because the 
American people have spoken strongly about the need for tough 
anticrime legislation.
In making this statement, Bush sends the message that only the Republican Party truly 
represent Americans on the issue of crime. Democrats, with their soft on crime attitude, 
are on the side of criminals -  an association made greater by Bush accusing Democrats 
of engaging in a ‘mugging’.
This theme is repeated in his Remarks at a Reception fo r  Gubernatorial 
Candidate Pete Wilson in Thousand Oaks, California, November 3, 1990.31 Again 
referring to the dilution of the crime bill by Democrats in Congress, Bush states:
. . .Pete, the grandson of a police officer who gave his life in the line of 
duty. He knows, I know . . . America is fed up with crime. And we want 
people who have a little more sensitivity to the police officers, and a 
little less for the criminals themselves. Shortly after I took office, I stood 
before the Capitol and I called on the Congress to pass tough, new laws 
to help America take back the streets. And instead, in the final hours of 
the Congress . . .  the Democrat liberals choked, and they completely 
gutted our package to fight back against violent crime.
37 “Remarks at a Reception for Gubernatorial Candidate Pete Wilson in Thousand Oaks, California, 
November 3, 1990” Public Papers o f the President o f  the United States: 1990.
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Despite the resistance encountered by Congress, however, Bush vows to continue the 
campaign against crime. Bush asserts:
We fought for habeas corpus reforms aimed at stopping the convicted 
criminals from endlessly abusing the appeals process. We fought for 
reforms of the exclusionary rule, a law that lets the guilty go free far too 
often. And we fought for a real Federal death penalty for drug kingpins 
and terrorists and those who gun down our police officers. And the 
liberals gutted those right out of our package. They blocked them, and 
we’ve got to get tough now.
Bush’s message is that not only do the Republican Party, law enforcement, and 
Americans need to get tough on criminals, they also need to be tougher in their pursuit 
of their crime agenda, particularly in the face of Democratic softness in Congress.
Bush’s determination to be tough on crime is seen in his Remarks at the 
Attorney General’s Crime Summit, March 5, 1997.38 Using military language and 
imagery, Bush presents the Republican Party, together with representatives from 
criminal justice agencies, as an alliance engaged in a war against crime. Bush states:
I want to salute the U.S. attorneys, the State Attorney Generals, the 
judges, the local DA’s, the sheriffs, police, State and local officials -  and 
then also, most especially, the community leaders from across America. 
It is an honor to welcome you to Washington. You represent one of the 
most powerful peacetime forces known to man. And that’s why you’ve 
been invited to this unprecedented council of war -  to share ideas and 
successes and to help frame the battle plan for the fight against violent 
crime and drugs for the next decade and beyond.
38 “Remarks at the Attorney General’s Crime Summit, March 5, 1991” Public Papers o f the President of 
the United States: 1991.
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In presenting the Republican Party and the issue of crime in this way, Bush emphasises 
the gravity of the situation and the need for tough action. Bush further stresses the 
seriousness of the situation by making comparisons between the problem of crime in 
America to the Gulf war. Bush proclaims:
Perhaps you saw the report that during the first 3 days of the ground 
offensive more Americans were killed in some American cities than the 
entire Kuwaiti front. Think of it -  one of our brave National Guardsmen 
may have actually been safer in the midst of one of the largest armored 
offensives in history than he would have been on the streets of his 
hometown. It’s outrageous. It’s wrong and it’s going to change.
Not only is Bush stressing the gravity of the situation, he also stresses his commitment 
to tackle it. Referring to the sections of the crime bill that were not enacted by 
Congress, Bush states:
America needs a crime bill that’s tough on criminals, not on law 
enforcement. Too many times, in too many cases, too many criminals go 
free because the scales of justice are unfairly loaded against dedicated 
law men and women like you. But even after a year and a half, and 
despite the urgency of the problem, Congress never did act on our 
proposals. And that’s why we’re here again to work with you -  to 
develop new proposals, to try to steady the scales of justice, to seek a 
fair balance between the legitimate rights of the suspects and society’s 
right to protect itself.. . .  I promise you this: We’re not going to give up 
on this crime bill. We’re not going to let it get watered down.
Bush again sets the Republican and Democratic Party apart on the issue of crime in his 
Remarks to the International Association o f Police in Detroit, Michigan, October 25,
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1992.39 Here Bush presents the Republican Party as the saviour of law and order. Bush 
declares:
I think when the history of this century is written, it will be clearly seen 
that America got too soft on crime in the sixties, and for 20 years you 
and your brothers and sisters in law enforcement paid for it. But we 
fought back, and for the first time in decades, the overall crime index is 
actually down. And with your help, your leadership, we’ve slowed the 
rate of violent crime the past 12 years. . . . But as you can tell by 
comparing our crime statistics with other nations, we still have a way to 
go, a long way to go. And that’s what I really want to talk to you about 
today.
According to Bush, through a reversal of liberal policies towards crime, the Republican 
Party has turned the tide on crime. Bush, however, issues a warning that this effort is 
an on-going battle. In comparing himself with his Democratic presidential election 
opponent, Bill Clinton, Bush asserts:
There are so many issues in this Presidential campaign where the voters 
have a clear choice. And crime is one of the most important. And I do 
have big differences with Governor Clinton on crime and law 
enforcement. . . . Records reveal it. Here are some of the facts. Under 
Governor Clinton, Arkansas’ violent crime rate went up about 60 
percent in the eighties: more than twice the national average. They had 
the Nation’s single-biggest increase in serious crime during the decade. 
In ’83, there were about 300 violent crimes for every 100,000 people in 
Arkansas. Last year there were about 600 violent crimes. It has doubled 
on the Governor’s watch. The average inmate there served less than one- 
fifth of his sentence last year. But the Federal inmate, as I’m sure most 
know here, an inmate for which I have responsibility, he served 85 
percent of his time. . . .  It’s obvious and I firmly believe . . . that that
39 “Remarks to the International Association o f Police in Detroit, Michigan, October 25, 1992” Public 
Papers o f the President o f the United States: 1992.
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crime record, that Clinton record, is wrong for Arkansas, and it clearly 
would be wrong for America.
In making this statement Bush is issuing a warning that a vote for Clinton, would see a 
return to America’s past crime agenda; a return to a period of softness on crime and 
subsequently a rise in crime.
An analysis of Bush’s discourse in relation to crime illustrates that throughout 
his presidency, Bush presented the Republican Party as the party that was tough on 
crime; the party of law and order. Bush advocated the need for a continued reversal of 
liberal policies in relation to crime, a process first instigated during Nixon’s 
presidency, which would place the rights and needs of criminals over the rights and 
needs of ordinary Americans. Bush also sent the message that one of the biggest 
challenges in the fight against crime, was the continued soft approach by the 
Democratic Party. Moreover, through his crime discourse and his soft on crime charge 
against the Democrats, Bush was able to capitalise upon the racialisation of the crime 
issue in the public mind, which had developed since the 1960s, and use it as a coded 
appeal to white voters.40
An analysis of public discourse surrounding two incidents of interracial crimes 
against women during the late 1980s demonstrate why the Willie Horton narrative, 
employed during the 1988 presidential election campaign, and the soft on crime 
discourse, with its inherent racial element, used throughout Bush’s presidency, was a
40 Carter, From George Wallace to Newt Gingrich', O’Reilly, Nixon’s Piano.
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successful appeal to white voters. The Central Park jogger case, 1989, and the Carol 
Stuart murder, 1989, demonstrated not only the level of concern regarding crime that 
Bush’s soft on crime discourse tapped into, but also the enormous symbolic weight 
interracial crimes against women carried in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and hence 
reveals the racial feelings that Bush’s soft on crime discourse manipulated and 
capitalised upon.
6.2 The Central Park Jogger Case, 1989
On the evening of April 19, 1989, a loosely organised group of approximately 
30 African-American and Hispanic youths were involved in a crime-spree in New 
York’s Central Park.41 Several people in the park that evening were harassed, attacked 
and robbed by the youths 42 The most vicious attack, however, was that on a young, 
female jogger by approximately 12 of the youths. The 28-year-old woman was bound 
and gagged, seriously assaulted and raped. The Jogger - as she became known - was 
discovered lying unconscious shortly after lam on April 20, 1989 43 She had suffered
41 The number involved ranged from 30 to 33. The group was made up of two sets of youths, one from 
the Taft Housing project who were spontaneously joined by the other youths at Schomburg Plaza. The 
group was largely African-American, although there were some Hispanics.
42 Of the identified victims, the first was Antonio Diaz a 52-year-old Latino man who was beaten by the 
youths. Prior to this they had stopped another Latino man and a couple but decided not to harm them. 
The second known victims were Jerry and Patricia Dean Malone, a white couple cycling on a tandem 
who managed to get away from the youths. The jogger was attacked after this incident and this was then 
followed by an attack on a number of male joggers including John Loughlin who was beaten, and David 
Lewis, who was also assaulted.
43 In 2003, Trisha Meili published her account of the attack in I am the Central Park Jogger: A Story o f  
Hope and Possibility (New York: Scribner, 2003).
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severe head wounds and had lost nearly 80% of her blood. Her injuries were so severe 
that doctors at Metropolitan Hospital feared that she would not survive.44 Six youths 
were indicted on six felony charges against the jogger: Steve Lopez, 15, Kharey Wise, 
16, Kevin Richardson, 14, Antron McCray, 15, Yusef Salaam, 15, and Raymond 
Santana, 14, were charged with attempted murder, rape, sodomy, sexual abuse and two 
counts of assault.45
The case of the Central Park jogger sent shockwaves throughout New York. 
Media accounts reported on the attack in the most dramatic way. The front-page 
headline of the New York Daily News on the day the story broke read: “Central Park 
Horror: Wolf Pack’s Prey, Female Jogger Near Death After Savage Attack By Roving 
Gang”. The article described the horrific attack: “A 28-year-old investment banker who 
regularly jogged in Central Park was repeatedly raped, viciously beaten and left for 
dead by a wolf pack of more than a dozen young teenagers who attacked her at the end 
of an escalating crime spree.”46 The New York Daily News front-page headline the 
following day read: “Park Marauders Call it ‘WILDING’ . . . and it’s Street Slang for
44 The jogger had suffered a fractured skull, swelling of the brain, her windpipe had nearly been crushed 
and she had sustained a blowout fracture of the left eye along with numerous lacerations to her face and 
limbs. She remained in a coma for over a month. Yet, she stunned doctors with her recovery and was 
able to return to her position at Salamon Brothers Bank. She was, however, left with no memory of the 
attack, a loss of sense of smell, double vision and balance problems.
45 Under New York law, only Wise at 16 was an adult, the other five were juveniles. However, all six 
were charged with certain violent acts designated as crimes for which they could be tried in Supreme 
Court as adults as opposed to Family Court. Along with the charges relating to the jogger, all six were 
also charged with three robbery counts and two assault counts against Loughlin, one assault count 
relating to Lewis, and riot. Michael Briscoe, also an adult, was indicted for the assault of Lewis and riot. 
Jermain Robinson, 15, having struck a plea-deal, was indicted on charges of robbery and the attacks on 
Lewis and Loughlin.
46 Dan Singleton and Dan Gentile, “‘She Put up a Terrific Fight’”, New York Daily News, April 21, 1989, 
3.
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Going Berserk”.47 The New York Times also reported on the use of the term ‘wilding’ 
that day to describe the attack. The Times quoted Chief of Detectives, Robert 
Colangelo, in its front page article, who stated: “It’s not a term that we in the police 
had heard before . . . they just said, ‘we were going wilding’. In my mind at this point, 
it implies that they were going to raise hell.”48
The attack was presented and perceived as an abhorrent act of aggression for 
which the youths felt no guilt or remorse. Media reports of the written and video 
statements made by the youths described how they “. . . hunted down the woman, 
chased her down a path, beat her with a lead pipe, a brick and rocks, stripped her of her 
clothes and then held her down while at least four of them raped her.”49 It was reported 
that one of the youths - Salaam - had described the attack as ‘fun’ and along with 
others had behaved in a jocular fashion at the police station following their arrests. As 
the Washington Post reported: “[Salaam] laughed, joked, and carried on in the precinct 
house, not showing the least bit of remorse.”50 Similarly, the New York Daily News 
reported: “The gang of teenagers that raped a young investment banker in Central Park 
believed they had beaten her to death -  and laughed about the vicious attack later in a
47 New York Daily News, April 22, 1989.
48 Quoted in David E. Pitt, “Jogger’s Attackers Terrorized at Least 9 in 2 Hours”, New York Times, April 
22, 1989,1.
49 James C. Mckinley Jr., “Official Says Youths Admit Role in Attack”, New York Times, April 24,
1989, B l.
50 Paula Span and Howard Kurtz, “Aftermath of Assault”, Washington Post, April 27, 1989, A34. A 
report in the New York Daily News on April 23, 1989 also described the jovial behavior of the youths in 
the police station. See also Timothy Sullivan, Unequal Verdicts: The Central Park Jogger Trials (New 
York: Simon & Schuster, 1992), 51.
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police station house. . . . They were heard whistling at policewomen, comparing what 
they had admitted on tape and laughing about what they had done to the woman.”51
The Central Park jogger attack was discussed in numerous editorials and 
columns in the press, where for the most part the case was presented as a symbol of 
how violent crime had permeated New York City, and how tough and decisive action 
was needed to tackle it. Ronnie Eldridge wrote in the New York Times:
A 28 year-old woman was raped and left to die in Central Park. She was 
there because she was a citizen of New York City, brimming with joy 
and life, who would not even consider surrendering one step of it. She 
felt like using her park at 10 o’clock at night and she did. Now people 
are blaming her for being there at that hour. From all sides I hear that the 
woman attacked in Central Park was crazy to be there and that we must 
stay out of Central Park when the sun goes down . . . .  We must not give 
up Central Park at night because someone tells us to be afraid. That park 
belongs to us and this time nobody is going to take it from us.52
According to Eldridge it was time for New Yorkers to strike back at criminals, to 
refuse to feel the fear of crime and reclaim the city for themselves. This sentiment was 
more explicitly expressed in an editorial in the New York Daily News, which read:
There was a full moon Wednesday night. A suitable backdrop for the 
howling of wolves. A vicious pack ran rampant through Central park. . . 
. Wolf packs have been roaming the subways in increasing numbers. 
Assaulting and robbing passengers. They’ve declared the subways their 
turf. Should they be free to pick and choose their domains this way? 
Should the entire city be turned over to them?53
51 Patrick Clark and Ruth Canda, “Rape Suspects Laugh Over Attack”, New York Daily News, April 23, 
1989, 2-3.
52 Ronnie Eldgridge, “Central Park Can be Ours”, New York Times, May 4, 1989, 27.
53 “Editorial”, New York Daily News, April 22, 1989, 11.
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For others, reclaiming the freedom of the city for New Yorkers was not enough, 
retribution was the most important thing to be achieved. Mary McGrory wrote in the 
Washington Post: “Gang mentality? Male black rage? We don’t know. In a sense, we 
don’t care. . . .  It’s not important why they did it, only that they should be punished.”54 
This feeling was more comprehensively expressed in an advertisement by business 
tycoon, Donald Trump, carried by four New York newspapers. Entitled “Bring Back 
the Death Penalty, Bring Back the Police!”, it stated:
What has happened to our city over the past ten years? What has 
happened to law and order, to the neighbourhood cop we all trusted to 
safeguard our homes and families, the cop who had the power under the 
law to help us in times of danger, keep us safe from those who would 
prey on innocent lives to fulfil some distorted inner need. What has 
happened to the respect for authority, the fear of retribution by the 
courts, society and the police for those who break the law, who blatantly 
trespass on the rights of others? What has happened is the complete 
breakdown of life as we know it. Many New York families -  white, 
black, Hispanic, and Asian -  have had to give up the pleasure of a 
leisurely stroll in the park at dusk, the Saturday bike ride at dawn, or just 
sitting on their stoops -  given them up as hostages to a world ruled by 
the law of the streets, as roving bands of wild criminals roam our 
neighbourhoods, dispensing their own vicious brand of twisted hatred on 
whomever they encounter. At what point did we cross the line from the 
fine and noble pursuit of genuine civil liberties to the reckless and 
dangerously permissive atmosphere which allows criminals of every age 
to beat and rape a helpless woman and then laugh at her family’s 
anguish? And why do they laugh? They laugh because they know that 
soon, very soon, they will be returned to the streets to rape and maim 
and kill once again -  and yet face no great personal risk to themselves. 
Mayor Koch has stated that hate and rancour should be removed from 
our hearts. I do not think so. I want to hate these muggers and murderers. 
They should be forced to suffer, and, when they kill, they should be 
executed for their crimes. They must serve as examples so others will 
think long and hard before committing a crime or an act of violence.
54 Mary McGrory, “Horror in the Park”, Washington Post, April 30, 1989, C5.
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Yes, Mayor Koch, I want to hate these murderers and I always will. I am 
not looking to punish them. If the punishment is strong, the attacks on 
innocent people will stop. I recently watched a news cast trying to 
explain the ‘anger in these young men’. I no longer want to understand 
their anger. I want them to understand our anger. I want them to be 
afraid. How can our great society tolerate the continued brutalization of 
its citizens by crazed misfits? Criminals must be told that their CIVIL 
LIBERTIES END WHEN AN ATTACK ON SAFETY BEGINS! When 
I was young, I sat in a diner with my father and witnessed two young 
bullies cursing and threatening a very frightened waitress. Two cops 
rushed in, lifted up the thugs and threw them out the door, warning them 
never to cause trouble again. I miss the feeling of security New York’s 
finest once gave to citizens of our city. Let our politicians give back our 
police department’s power to keep us safe. Unshackle them from the 
constant chant of ‘police brutality’ which every petty criminal hurls 
immediately at an officer who has just risked his or her life to save 
another’s. We must cease our continuous pandering to the criminal 
population of this city. Give New York back to its citizens who have 
earned the right to be New Yorkers. Send a message loud and clear to 
those who would murder our citizens and terrorize New York -  BRING 
BACK THE DEATH PENALTY AND BRING BACK THE POLICE!55
Trump’s article expressed the widely-held feelings of despair and frustration held by 
both New Yorkers and Americans in general regarding crime. There was a widespread 
belief that permissive and liberal attitudes and policies were allowing criminals to act 
with impunity. Also, it was widely felt that the Criminal Justice System (CJS) had 
become so preoccupied with protecting the rights of offenders that the needs of 
ordinary Americans living in the shadow of crime were being neglected. Related to 
this, there was a feeling that the police had been disempowered by the focus on
55 “Bring Back the Death Penalty, Bring Back the Police!”, New York Times, May 1, 1989, A13.
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offenders’ rights. In all, Trump’s message was that the CJS needed to get tough on 
criminals.56
These expressions of horror, outrage and frustration in the media were also 
reflected in public responses to the Central Park jogger attack. One New Yorker stated: 
“I don’t remember people talking about anything like this since Challenger.”57 Barry 
Gray, a WMCA talk show host, claimed: “We have more calls on this than on any 
other situation I can recall, going back to the McCarthy period. . . .  It has inflamed 
people, no question.”58 One caller remarked: “The horror was the utter randomness of 
it.”59 A caller to a Denver radio show stated: “There is certainly very little sense of 
sympathy and understanding for these kids . . . there is more anger, a feeling that we 
should not be talking about solution so much as retribution.”60 Letters to newspapers 
also illustrated the sense of shock and disbelief amongst Americans. A letter to the New 
York Daily News read:
Your use of the phrase ‘wolf pack’ to describe the recent Central Park 
predators was understandable but inappropriate. Wolves hunt for food. 
Dogs instinctively chase whatever runs by. Only humans willfully inflict 
suffering and even death because they’re bored, but haven’t the brains to 
do something constructive. Wilding indeed! Wild creatures have better 
sense.61
56 Flanagan and Longmire (eds.), Americans View Crime and Injustice; Warr, “Public Opinion on Crime 
and Punishment”.
57 Quoted in Michael T. Kaufman, “New Yorkers Wrestle With a Crime”, New York Times, April 28, 
1989, B2.
58 Quoted in Celestine Bohlen, “The Park Attacks Weeks Later: An Anger That Will Not Let Go”, New 
York Times, May 12, 1989, B l.
59 Quoted in Bohlen, “The Park Attacks Weeks Later”, B l.
60 Quoted in Bohlen, “The Park Attacks Weeks Later”, B l .
61 “Letters”, New York Daily News, April 30, 1989,42.
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Similarly, another letter stated: “Referring to the gang of marauders in Central Park as 
a ‘wolf pack’ is an insult to wolves! The wolf is shy and peaceful.”62
The response by the media and the American public illustrated thus far, reveals 
the feelings, attitudes and beliefs regarding crime that Bush’s soft on crime discourse 
tapped into, thus demonstrating how it was a powerful issue with which to win votes. 
Not all of the responses to the attack in Central Park, however, were as fervent. One 
article in the New York Times just over two weeks after the incident warned against the 
rush to judgement that was being displayed by the media. The article stated:
Please wait -  just a few questions about that gang of thugs arrested for 
beating and raping a jogger in the park. . . . Who ruled that they were 
guilty? If we really believe in laws, we have to let it take its course, not 
short-circuit it by what we write or say. If we really want order, we must 
follow the understandings upon which it depends. One of them is the 
understanding against verbal lynching, which is what judgements before
ATtrial amounts to.
A letter to the New York Daily News also revealed that the response of some Americans 
focused on the societal causes underlying such violent acts as the attack on the jogger. 
The letter read:
Why would 8 individuals decide to hurt another human being in such a 
brutal and barbaric manner? Who taught them to express rage and anger 
in such a way? The answers are plain. Society as a whole has taught a 
whole generation that the way to live is to be brutal. The world that 
mankind has created is filled with hate and violence. The young lady
62 “Letters”, 42.
63 A.M. Rosenthall, “The Guilty Verdict”, New York Times, May 5, 1989, 35.
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who was raped and brutalized is a victim. My heart goes out to her and 
the countless other victims. Those young men are also victims because 
they see death and decay all around them. They see no love, no 
compassion. I am a victim because fear is instilled in my heart because I 
know and see that the world is decaying in front of my eyes. We are all 
victims.64
The most prominent counter discourse in relation to the attack, however, came 
from those who expressed concern regarding the racial aspect to responses by the 
media and public. The racial composition of the other Central Park victims seemingly 
undermined the notion of racial motivation in the jogger attack. Of the nine victims, six 
were white, two were Hispanic and one was African-American. Statements made by 
some of victims in the park as well as statements made by some of the youths 
themselves, however, indicated that race could have been a motivating factor. Due to 
this evidence, investigations were made to ascertain to what extent the attacks were 
racial. Manhattan District Attorney Robert Morgenthau concluded, however, that there 
was no conclusive evidence to support this.
According to a report by the New York Times on reactions to the attack in the 
first week, few New Yorkers believed that the attack was racially motivated. Barbara 
Campbell, an African-American writer on children’s issues, disagreed that the attack 
was racially motivated, and regarded it as an example of the anarchic state of many 
teenagers in New York, both white and black. Campbell stated:
64 “Letters”, 42.
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Some of the people who were attacked in the rampage were, I 
understand, non-whites. I don’t feel they were out to get some white 
people, but what is important, I think, is that there is in this city among 
teenagers, white and black, something that is anarchic. They feel that 
anything goes, that all the rules have broken down. Black teenagers may 
rob for sneakers; middle-class white teenagers may buy counterfeit 
credit cards.
Another, white, New Yorker also denied that the attack was racially motivated and 
bemoaned the tendency to perceive all interracial crime as motivated by race. She 
stated in the Times report:
I don’t think it was a racial crime. . . . Everything is turned into a racial 
thing. It wasn’t a group of blacks and Hispanics who raped this white 
woman, it was a group of children who raped this woman. I think they 
would have been as vicious with a black woman.65
In addition to not perceiving the attack as being racially motivated, a number of 
Americans, particularly African Americans also pleaded for the case not to be 
perceived in racial terms by others. As one Harlem resident expressed: “It’s not racial. 
Don’t make it racial.”66
Yet, race was an integral component in responses to the incident from the very 
beginning. In addition to the fact that discussions on the irrelevancy of race in the 
attack themselves racialised the debate, some of the terminology used to describe the 
attack in the press was heaped with racial overtones. Not only were there references to
65 Quoted in Kaufman, “New Yorkers Wrestle With a Crime”, A1.
66 Quoted in “Central Park Gang Rape Stirs Racial Tension”, Chicago Tribune, April, 26 1989, 10.
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‘wolfpacks’, as has been illustrated, but also to ‘animals’, ‘savages’ and ‘beasts’.67 The 
reactions of some whites to the incident were also heavily laced with racial prejudices. 
As New York Daily News columnist Mary McAlary asserted:
There is so much paranoia and poisoned passion. . . . Everywhere you 
go in this city today, you hear it. The phone lines to this newspaper are 
busy with people screaming, ‘call the case for what it is; black savages
rape white girl’. No one is even making an attempt to mask their
68racism.
Similarly, Gray on WMCA stated: “I describe it as Mississippi Burning comes to 
Times Square. . . . I’ve heard more yells of ‘nigger’, ‘they should be castrated’, ‘they 
should string them up’ than belong in a civilised community.”69
The centrality of race in responses to the case could also be seen in the calls 
made to the black leadership to respond to the attack. This came not only from whites 
but African Americans too. African-American columnist, William Raspberry, in the 
Washington Post argued that just as African Americans had demanded that white 
leaders speak out and condemn the attack in Howard Beach, so too should black 
leaders respond to the attack in Central Park. He charged:
67 “Central Park Horror: Wolfpack’s Prey: Female Jogger Near Death After Savage Attack by Roving 
Gang”, New York Daily News, April 21, 1989, 1. Such terminology was also present in the following 
articles: Singleton and Gentile, ‘“She Put Up a Terrific Fight’”, 3; “‘Wilding’ Teens Held in Rape: 7 are 
Called Part o f Wolfpack”, New York Daily News, April 22, 1989, 3; “Editorial”, New York Daily News-, 
April 22, 1989, 11; Donald E. Pitt, “Gang Attack: Unusual For its Viciousness”, New York Times, April 
25, 1989, B l; Kaufman, “New Yorkers Wrestle With a Crime”, B2; Elizabeth Lyttleton Sturz, “What 
Kids Who Aren’t Wolves Say About Wilding”, New York Times, May 1, 1989, A17; Mike Royko, 
“Thugs Deserve Blame, Not Society”, Chicago Tribune, April 27, 1989, 3.
68 Quoted in Lentz, “New York Fears Racial Unrest After Rape”, 1.
69 Quoted in Bohlen, “The Park Attacks, Weeks Later”, B2.
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The woman lies near death in a New York Hospital, victim not merely 
of her own foolish daring but also of a singularly bestial attack: vicious, 
brutal, unprovoked. And I keep wanting the black leadership to say 
something about i t . . .  it wasn’t ‘white America’ that assaulted the three 
black men who strayed into Howard Beach, chasing one to his death in 
the path of a car. It was a mob of white teenagers. Still, the black 
leadership demanded that white leaders speak out about the incident, if 
only to demonstrate that they weren’t all represented by that club- 
wielding mob. And white leaders did speak out. 0
Richard Cohen, also in the Washington Post, argued that a failure by black leaders to 
respond was tantamount to condoning and fuelling racial attacks. He stated:
This country’s black leadership is not only silent when it should be 
outspoken, but it sometimes says - or condones - rhetoric that is 
downright racist. We are sometimes told that blacks cannot be racists - 
that, powerless and inordinately impoverished they cannot implement 
their feelings. The argument is sophistry. Black racism is acted out every 
day - and blacks and whites know it. The adrenaline alert that blacks feel 
in certain white neighborhoods whites feel in certain black ones. 
Whatever the reasons for their silence (racial solidarity, for instance) 
black leaders ought to look at the results. That explosion of hate in 
Central Park might have been one.71
African Americans, like whites, were appalled by the jogger case. Community 
Leader, Charles Rangel, stressed: “I think it was a shocking attack on humanity . . .  and 
every human being has to feel the pain. . . . I’ve never seen such an animalistic attack, 
even during the period of time I served in Korea.”72 A number of African Americans
70 William Raspberry, “Our Missing Anger”, Washington Post, May 1, 1989, A9.
71 Richard Cohen, “Lethal Silence”, Washington Post, May 4, 1989, A23.
72 Quoted in Harold L. Jamison, “Leaders Temper Anger with Caution”, Amsterdam News, April 29,
1989,3.
285
were also angered that media reports failed to reflect African-American condemnation
of the attack. As community activist, Abiola Sinclair, stated in the Amsterdam News:
Despite the small mention in the press and on TV, the Harlem 
community is deeply angered and ashamed of the hideous and 
thoroughly despicable sin that was committed. . . .  Why is the press not 
giving voice to our true feelings on this matter? They seem to only stick 
the mic into the face of the person who has an excuse, so that’s all TV 
viewers see.73
African Americans also spoke out against those who attempted to explain the actions of 
the youths. Mike Royko wrote in the Chicago Tribune: “. . . the blame for violence 
rests with those who commit the violence, not with the frightened masses who look 
over their shoulders and hope to avoid being clobbered.”74
Despite condemnation of the attack, however, a significant proportion of 
African Americans were concerned by the racial element to responses to the case. 
Campbell was disturbed by the media portrayals of the youths. She stated:
My first reaction had been one of horror that young people had hurt 
someone so badly. . . . But shortly thereafter I read news reports that 
portrayed the children as bestial, with the implication that they were not 
human, and they were animals, and I became angry about that. I felt it 
was going to further polarize the city and make it unsafe for all teenager 
black boys to walk in the street. That kind of coverage played into a lot 
of people’s prevailing racist attitudes.75
73 Abiola Sinclair, “Shocking, Shameful: ‘Wilding’ ... Indeed”, Amsterdam News, April 29, 1989, 30.
74 Royko, “Thugs Deserve Blame, Not Society”, 3.
75 Quoted in Kaufman, “New Yorkers Wrestle With a Crime”, B2.
A number of African Americans were also angered by the use of coded racial language 
in the case. As Randolph Scott, a Pace University law professor, charged: “These black 
youths are called savages.. . .  No one referred to the Howard Beach youths as savages 
and wild dogs. It seems only these code words are used when blacks are involved, and 
that’s frightening.”76
The extensive coverage of the attack in comparison to the attention given to 
crimes against African-American women also disturbed a significant proportion of 
African Americans. As David Campel, Program Director of WLIB, the city’s leading 
black radio talk show, expressed:
The average person of African-American descent in this community 
feels if the victim of an incident is white it gets treated one way, and if 
it’s black or Latino, it gets treated another way. . . . They ask how many 
times have these things happened to African American or Latino women 
in the past months and there was not a line in the press.77
A number of residents of Shomburg plaza, where a number of the Central Park youths 
lived, echoed these feelings. While not condoning the attack, many were critical of the 
high-profile nature of the case. As one resident explained: “Some people resent that 
there’s been so much discussion. . . .  If it had been a black woman you wouldn’t have 
had all this. Our children are being raped and hurt, but nobody talks about it.”78
76 Quoted in Lentz, “New York Fears Racial Unrest After Rape”, 6. This terminology was used by 
African-American journalists also.
77 Quoted in Lentz, “New York Fears Racial Unrest After Rape”, 6.
78 Quoted in Susan Chira, “Rape Suspects’ Neighbors Feel Accused”, New York Times, May 1, 1989, 
B6.
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The issue of a racial double standard was discussed by some in the press. Sam 
Roberts of the New York Times for instance reported that two women were raped in 
New York City, on April 19 and 29 respectively, the latter receiving little attention, of 
which the he explained: “But a world of difference distinguished the two grisly crimes. 
The 28-year-old victim was a white investment banker, attacked while jogging in 
Central Park. The 19-year-old was black, identified by police as a prostitute, and was 
found in Fort Tryon Park in upper Manhattan.”79
A number of African Americans were also critical of the aggressive manner in 
which the case was pursued by the police and CJS.80 Reverend Calvin O. Butts 
declared: “The first thing you do in the United States of America when a white woman 
is raped is round up a bunch of black youths, and I think that’s what happened here.”81 
Elombe Brown, a community activist in Schomburg Plaza, making reference to the 
Tawana Brawley case of 1987 in which a 15-year-old African-American teenager 
claimed to have been kidnapped and raped by up to four white law enforcement 
offificals in Wappingers Falls, New York, stated: “Tawana Brawley could talk and 
identified her attackers, and they arrested nobody. This woman can’t talk and they
79 Sam Roberts, “When Crimes Become Symbols”, New York Times, May 7, 1989, 4.1. A number of 
whites, however, charged that it was white victims of crime that did not receive the same level of 
attention as black victims. For a discussion of the media and the way it reports on crime see Beckett and 
Sasson, The Politics o f Injustice-, Christopher P. Campbell, Race, Myth and the News (London: Sage, 
1995); Franklin D. Gilliam Jr., and Shanto Iyengar, “Prime Suspects: The Influence of Local Television 
News on the Viewing Public”, American Journal o f Political Science 44.3 (2000): 560-573.
80 Beckett and Sasson, The Politics o f Injustice-, John Hagan and Ruth D. Patterson (eds.), Crime and 
Inequality in America: Patterns and Consequences (California: Stanford University Press, 1995); 
Coramae Richey Mann, Unequal Justice: A Question o f Color (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
1993); Walker, Spohn, Delone, Race, Ethnicity and Crime in America.
81 Quoted in William Glaberson, “In Jogger Case, Once Viewed Starkly, Some Skeptics Side With 
Defendants”, New York Times, August 8, 1990, B3.
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arrest everybody.”82 For a number of African Americans, the response to the Central 
Park jogger case was illustrative of the racial double standard inherent within the CJS, 
the media, and society generally.83
A number of whites, however, denounced this counter discourse. A letter to the 
Chicago Tribune read:
82 Quoted in Jamison, “Leaders Temper Anger With Caution”, 3. For details of the Brawley case see 
Robert McFadden, Outrage: The Story Behind the Tawana Brawley Hoax (New York: Bantam Books, 
1990); Robert C. Smith and Richard Seltzer, Contemporary Controversies and the American Racial 
Divide (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000); Mike Taibbi and Anna Sims-Philips, Unholy 
Alliances: Working the Tawana Brawley Story (New York: Harcourt Inc., 1989).
83 Speculation by some in the African-American community that the youths were being scapegoated to 
appease white society persisted as the case went to trial. Some African Americans questioned why the 
suspects in the Central Park case were held without bail unlike in the Howard Beach case in 1986 and 
the Bensonhurst case in 1989. (The Bensonhurst case refers to the shooting of a 16-year-old African- 
American youth, Yusuf Hawkins, on August 23, 1989, following a confrontation by a group of white 
youths.) Wise, Lopez, McCray and Briscoe were initially denied bail by Judge Carol Berkman. When 
the youths were granted bail, African Americans also questioned the disparity in the level o f bail 
between the Central Park case and the Bensonhurst case. Initial bail levels for the Central Park 
defendants were $250,000 compared to $75,000- $100,000 for the Bensonhurst youths. Some African 
Americans were also critical o f the way in which the judge was assigned to the case. Counter to New 
York State policy that stated judges be assigned at random, Judge Thomas D. Galligan was specifically 
assigned to the case by Judge Carol Berkman. (Berkman was following orders from the Office of the 
Court Administration.) According to Berkman this decision was made because o f Galligan’s experience. 
A number of African Americans, however, regarded the selection as politically motivated, for Galligan 
was perceived as a pro-prosecution judge. The Central Park defendants were tried in two separate trials. 
The first was that o f McCray, Salaam and Santana, which commenced on June 18, 1990, the second was 
that o f Richardson and Wise, which began on October 11, 1990. A refusal by witnesses to testify against 
Lopez, along with a lack of confession resulted in a plea-deal whereby Lopez pleaded guilty only to the 
robbery of Loughlin. For this he was sentenced to VA-AVi years. In both of the Central Park trials the 
defendants were convicted on the basis of the written and taped statements made by the youths after their 
arrest. The defence in each case charged that these confessions were false and had been coerced out of 
the youths. Santana, Salaam and McCray were convicted of rape, assault, riot, robbery and assault o f  
Lewis and Loughlin but were acquitted of attempted murder and sodomy. The jury did not believe them 
to have raped the jogger but believed them to have acted in concert to her rape. They were sentenced as 
juveniles to the maximum of 5-10 years. Richardson was found guilty of attempted murder and rape and 
sentenced to the maximum of 5-10 years. Wise was found guilty of sexual abuse and assault and 
sentenced as an adult to 5-15 years. At an earlier trial Briscoe, having pleaded guilty, was sentenced to 
one year for the assault on Lewis, and Robinson, who also pleaded guilty, received a one-year sentenced 
for the robbery and attack on Lewis and Loughlin. For an account of the trial and the investigation, see 
Sullivan, Unequal Verdicts. In September 2002, an imprisoned Hispanic murderer and serial rapist, 
Mafias Reyes, confessed that he alone had attacked the jogger.
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Expressed in calls to newspapers and radio and TV talk shows, whites 
are concerned. They feel unsafe. They feel the actions of those 30 odd 
youths were horrible. They feel grief for the woman jogger. Also 
expressed in those public forums are the feelings of black New Yorkers. 
Almost to a person they are concerned about the treatment of the youths 
under what they perceive as an unfair double standard. They contend 
that if the roles were reversed, the victim a black woman and the 
assailants white youths, the crime would be treated differently. They’re 
right. If it had been a black woman jogging in that park at night and 
subjected to that violent spree, there would be demonstrations on the 
streets of New York City, complete with black leaders fanning the 
flames of righteous anger. Jesse Jackson quickly would denounce the 
youths, as would any other politician eager to get on the bandwagon of 
concern. The woman herself would be elevated to the status of martyr, 
her name on the lips of every American. The youths would be the 
subject of death threats and would almost welcome police protection.. . .  
If I were a black woman, I at least would know that society, black and 
white, would rally to my side if I were a victim of violence by white 
men. However, because I am white, I am abandoned. A white man or 
woman will not openly express sympathy or horror at my pain without 
being accused of bigotry or of not having enough concern for the plight 
of blacks. Black leaders will be concerned only with the ‘civil rights’ of 
my assailants.84
According to this letter, African Americans were preoccupied with claims of racial 
discrimination and double standards, when in fact it was not black victims but rather 
white victims of crime who were marginalised by a society that had become too 
preoccupied by race and civil rights. Similarly, another letter to the New York Daily 
News asserted:
Only one thing was more appalling than the beating, attempted murder 
and rape of the young woman in Central Park. That was the comment of 
a woman from the neighbourhood of the punks who are accused of the 
crime. She was quoted as saying, ‘If it was a black woman in our 
neighbourhood, no one would care.’ Where was this woman during the
84 “Letters”, Chicago Tribune, May 1, 1989, 13.
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past year? Does the name Tawana Brawley ring a bell? That woman 
should ask, ‘what the hell is going on in my neighbourhood when not 
one of these punks has said, ‘I’m sorry” . Why would we expect that 
from them when the attitude of some adults in their life is, ‘what’s the 
big deal?’85
Again, the author of this letter denounces African-American preoccupation with the 
claim that black victims of crime are marginalised by white society. The author asserts 
not only that the charges are incorrect, but that the focus on alleged racial 
discrimination and double standards within the CJS is wrongly prioritised by African 
Americans, resulting in an indifference to law and order. The sentiments in these letters 
reveal the feelings concerning crime -  particularly the racial feelings -  that Bush’s soft 
on crime discourse tapped into.
The response to the Central Park jogger case illustrates why Bush’s use of the 
Willie Horton narrative in the 1988 presidential election, and his soft on crime 
discourse used throughout his presidency, was a successful coded appeal to white 
voters. The case demonstrated not only the level of feeling concerning crime that 
Bush’s discourse tapped into, but also, and more importantly, the racial feelings that 
his discourse manipulated and capitalised upon.
85 “Letters”, 42.
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6.3 The Carol Stuart Murder, 1989
The murder of Carol Stuart in 1989 was Boston’s equivalent to the Central Park 
jogger case. The shooting of a pregnant white woman by an African-American robber 
whilst driving home with her husband from a pre-natal class became another terrifying 
tale of random, urban violence in late 1980s America. Like the Central Park jogger 
case, the Carol Stuart case demonstrated why Willie Horton was such a powerful tool 
in the Bush presidential election campaign in 1988. Responses to the case revealed the 
feelings and beliefs regarding race and crime that both the Willie Horton narrative and 
Bush’s soft on crime discourse, used throughout his presidency, tapped into. That the 
story was subsequently revealed as a hoax, said a great deal about the power that the 
racial imagery of black on white violent crime had within American society: white 
America had been all too willing to believe in the fabricated crime against Boston’s 
“Camelot Couple”.86
On October 23, 1989, at approximately 8.30 p.m., Carol and Charles Stuart 
were returning home from a Lamaze class at Brigham Women’s Hospital when, 
according to Charles Stuart, as their car pulled up to a stoplight at a busy intersection in 
the Mission Hill section of Boston - a predominantly Hispanic and African-American 
area - an African-American man armed with a gun got into the back of the car and 
forced the couple to drive deep into Mission Hill. Apparently becoming frustrated by
86 Patricia Mangen and Andrea Estes, “A Family’s Agonizing Vigil”, Boston Herald, October 25, 1989,
1.
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Charles Stuart’s inability to produce his wallet and agitated upon sighting the Stuarts’ 
ear-phone - which he mistook for a police radio - the man shot Carol Stuart in the back 
of the head and shot Charles Stuart in the abdomen before fleeing on foot. Charles 
Stuart called the police on the ear-phone but was unable to report his location. He 
therefore drove around for thirteen minutes attempting to find a recognisable landmark 
before falling into unconsciousness.87 The police and ambulance team eventually 
located the Stuarts by tracing the ear-phone signals. By this time, however, Carol 
Stuart was very near death and she died hours later. The Stuarts’ baby was delivered by 
cesarean section, but also died 17 days later.
Media coverage of the case was immense, with both the local and national press 
giving the story saturation coverage. Graphic images of the murder scene were aired on 
CBS-News, as a broadcast team had been travelling with emergency services on the 
night of the shootings. Charles Stuart’s call to the emergency dispatcher was also aired 
on television and transcripts were published in newspapers. On the day after the 
shooting, the Boston Herald published a picture of Carol Stuart’s shattered head on its 
front page. In many press reports the Stuarts were presented as the ideal, suburban, 
American couple. In one article in the Boston Globe, for example, the couple were 
described as possessing: “. ..  a relationship that was so loving it warmed even those at 
its edge.” Also, friends were quoted as saying: “They were the best type of people.”
Q Q
Another friend described Charles Stuart as “. . . an all-round terrific guy.” An article
87 Charles Stuart told police that he had a spare set of car keys which he used after the assailant had left.
88 Sally Jacobs, “The Shatters of a Shining Life”, Boston Globe, October 25, 1989, 16.
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in the Boston Herald described the tragedy of the incident: “The dreams of a ‘Camelot’ 
couple, awaiting the birth of their Christmas baby, exploded in a burst of gunfire on a 
Boston street.”89 In press reports also, the shooting was presented as symbolic of the 
violent crime plaguing urban America. A front-page editorial in the Boston Herald 
stated: When will we demand that the random shooting, the gratuitous violence that we 
too often accept as part of urban life cease?”90 Taking these two discourses together, 
the case was presented as a symbol of urban lawlessness and black criminality versus 
suburban tranquillity and white victimization.
The double-murder of Carol Stuart and her unborn child caused a dramatic 
response amongst local and state leaders. Both Mayor Raymond Flynn and Governor 
Michael Dukakis were among the hundreds of mourners to attend Carol Stuart’s 
funeral. Flynn and Police Commissioner Francis Roache, had also met with the Stuarts’ 
family at the hospital on the evening of the shooting. Speaking on the night of the 
shooting, Flynn stated:
This is a terrible, terrible night for us [in the city]. . . . These were good 
decent family people having their lives snuffed out. Our hearts go out to 
the families. . . .  I have asked Police Commissioner Roache to put every 
single available detective on this case to find out who is responsible for 
the cowardly, senseless tragedy.91
89 Mangen and Estes, “A Family’s Agonizing Vigil”, 1.
90 “Editorial: The Time is Now”, Boston Herald, October 25, 1989, 1.
91 Quoted in David Weber, ‘“A Terrible Night’. Gunman Invades Car, Shoots Couple”, Boston Herald, 
October 24, 1989, 1, 4.
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The response of some leaders to the incident was more furious. State Republican 
leaders called for the reinstatement of the death penalty, as did state legislators. City 
Councillor, Albert O’Neil declared: “I’ll volunteer to pull the switch. . . . Here’s a 
young couple having a baby, being sure that they get all the right prenatal care, then an 
animal like this comes along and ruins their lives. It makes you want to execute him on 
the spot.” Similarly, Suffolk District Attorney Newman Flanagan stated: “This is a 
killing which justifies the ultimate sentence of capital punishment for vicious criminals 
who think nothing of taking someone else’s life.”93
In the wake of such a crime, the police were under enormous pressure to 
apprehend the killer. The police response to the case was massive. Flynn ordered 100 
extra police officers to the Mission Hill area, and a relentless stop and search tactic was 
implemented. Between October 24 and 28 alone, 150 stop and frisk searches were 
carried out on African-American men matching the description of the assailant as given 
by Stuart.94 According to a Boston //era/d/WCVB poll, the majority of both African- 
American and white residents - 66% and 77% respectively - supported the stop and 
frisk policy.95 African Americans were as shocked and outraged over the shootings as
92 Quoted in Charles Craig, Joe Sciacca and Eric Fehmstrom, “A New Call For Death Penalty”, Boston 
Herald, October 25, 1989, 9.
93 Quoted in Craig, Sciacca and Fehmstrom, “A New Call For Death Penalty”, 9.
94 The description given by Stuart of the assailant was considerably general: 6 ’ African-American male 
in his thirties and wearing a tracksuit.
95 Wayne Woodlief, “Poll: Death Penalty, Searches Backed”, Boston Herald, October 26, 1989, 1.
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white Bostonians, and were also equally concerned by crime in the city and were 
therefore supportive of a strong police presence.96
A number of African Americans, however, were critical of the police response 
in the Stuart case. This counter discourse was critical of what it perceived to be a 
double standard by police. As has been stated, crime was of equal concern to African 
Americans, yet many felt that the police did not respond with as much intensity to 
crime when the victim was black. As one resident of Mission Hill stated: “Where all 
the attention is now on them, I don’t want to forget about the rest of the crime. We 
want to see that more police are brought on to protect everybody. We want that (more 
police coverage) every day because we’re tired of it too.”97 Another resident described 
the police response to the murder of a young mother from the area: “She got shot in 
front of her building, shot in the head, and left 5 children. Nothing happened. This
Q O
white lady gets shot, and you see police everywhere.” Similarly, another resident 
stated: “My sister died the same way, a bullet in the back of her head. I’m not surprised 
at the police presence, because it’s a white couple, and that speaks to the importance of 
a black’s life and the community.”99 For a number of African Americans, the dramatic
96 For a discussion of the racial disparity between the economic losses of black and white victims of 
crime see Gerald D. Jaynes and Robin M. Williams, A Common Destiny: Blacks and American Society 
(Washington D.C.: National Academy Press, 1989), Chapter 9.
97 Quoted in Gary Witherspoon, “Mission Hill Stands Firm”, Boston Herald, October 26, 1989, 5.
98 Quoted in Witherspoon, “Mission Hill Stands Firm”, 5.
99 Quoted in Witherspoon, “Mission Hill Stands Firm”, 5.
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response to the Stuart murder was further evidence of the racial double standard in 
society’s response to crime.100
Following the intensive investigation a prime suspect eventually emerged in 
William Bennett, a 39-year-old African-American man from Roxbury with a criminal 
record.101 Witnesses testified that Bennett had admitted to the shootings and he was 
positively identified by Charles Stuart in a police line-up. However, in a dramatic turn 
of events in the New Year, Charles Stuart replaced Bennett as the prime suspect in the 
case. On January 3, 1990, Charles Stuart’s brother, Matthew Stuart, contacted Boston 
police and gave them a statement in which he named Charles Stuart as the murderer of 
Carol Stuart and their unborn child. Later that day the engagement ring that had 
allegedly been stolen was also turned over to the police. According to his attorney, 
John Pereni, Matthew Stuart had arranged to meet Charles Stuart at the Brigham 
Women’s Hospital on October 23 to collect and dispose of a bag as part of a deal for 
which Charles Stuart had promised to pay him $10,000. Along with an accomplice, 
John McMahon, Matthew Stuart collected the bag from Charles and disposed of a gun
1 09in the Pines River, unaware at the time that it had been used to kill Carol Stuart. 
Matthew Stuart become suspicious after hearing the news of the shootings and he 
confided in his brother, Michael Stuart. Together they confronted the rest of the Stuart
100 Flanagan and Longmire (eds.), Americans View Crime and Injustice-, Warr, “Public Opinion on Crime 
and Punishment”.
101 William Bennett was arrested on November 11 on unrelated charges of robbery. There were two other 
suspects before Bennett: Timothy Talbert, 23, and Alan Swanson, 29.
102 The bag also contained the personal items that Charles Stuart had claimed had been stolen by the 
assailant.
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family on January l .103 Aware that his family intended to inform the police, on January 
4, Charles Stuart committed suicide by driving his car into Boston Harbour. A note 
attached to the steering wheel stated that he was unable to bear the allegations against 
him.104
With these startling developments the image of Carol and Charles Stuart as the 
symbolic all-American couple tom apart by urban, black lawlessness shattered. In the 
aftermath of Charles Stuart’s suicide, evidence emerged that painted a very different 
picture of the couple than had previously been presented. The notion of the ‘Camelot 
couple’ was in actuality, quite far from the truth. The media reported that a neighbour 
of the Stuarts claimed that in the months before her death, Carol Stuart had been 
complaining about her husband going out and staying out late and it was subsequently 
revealed that Charles Stuart had been involved in an affair with a work colleague, 
Deborah Allen. During his time in hospital, Allen made repeated phone calls to Stuart 
using his credit card and within two weeks of his release from hospital he had bought 
women’s jewellery.105 It was also reported that Charles Stuart had also previously 
spoken to family and friends about killing his wife, and had sought their assistance to
103 Matthew Stuart had reportedly decided to confess to the police after it transpired that Bennett was 
likely to be tried for the crime.
104 Based upon evidence provided by Matthew Stuart, police found additional evidence at the Stuarts’ 
home and in the Pines River, near Revere, to tie Charles Stuart to the crime. On January 24, a pocket 
book belonging to Carol Stuart was found, containing her wallet, make-up and other personal items. On 
January 29, police divers found the murder weapon in the river. The gun matched the one missing from 
Edward F. Kakas and Sons fur-shop, which Stuart managed. Following these revelations and 
discoveries, the grand jury investigating the crime exonerated William Bennett.
105 Deborah Allen’s attorney, Thomas E. Dwyer, stated that Allen had broken off the affair after Stuart 
was released from hospital.
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do this.106 Furthermore, it transpired that Charles Stuart had taken out large life
insurance policies on his wife in the months prior to her death and it was concluded 
this had been the motivation behind her murder. Shortly after the shooting Charles 
Stuart had received $82,000 from a life-insurance policy.107
FBI statistics demonstrate that 42% of murdered women are killed by a member 
of their family, usually the husband. Yet, Charles Stuart had managed to deflect 
attention away from himself. Following his suicide it was revealed that detectives in 
the case had been suspicious of certain aspects to the incident, but could uncover no 
evidence to substantiate these suspicions.108 One of the fundamental reasons why 
Charles Stuart had been able to deflect attention, however, was his use of the 
stereotypical black criminal as the alleged perpetrator. The idea that the white, middle- 
class businessman who had read an emotional eulogy at his wife’s funeral and had 
watched as his son died, could have been responsible was simply too incredible. On the 
other hand, the idea that an African-American robber in a tracksuit was to blame was 
highly believable. By identifying his wife’s killer as a black man in a tracksuit, Charles 
Stuart tapped into assumptions about race and crime so powerful they overwhelmed
106 David F. Maclean, a friend of Stuart’s, came forward and claimed that Stuart had asked him to help 
kill his wife. Michael Stuart stated that he had also been approached. Other members of the family, to 
whom Stuart had spoken to about killing his wife, thought he was joking. Maclean also claimed that 
Charles Stuart had been upset by his wife’s refusal to have an abortion.
107 Carol Stuart had apparently commented on the strangeness of her husband taking out such a large 
policy on her. Rumours abounded that Charles Stuart wanted to raise money in order to open a 
restaurant.
108 Detectives wondered why Charles Stuart had only been shot in the stomach while his wife had been 
shot in the head. They also wondered why Carol Stuart had been shot first as she would have posed less 
of a threat. They also questioned why he had taken an indirect route home from the hospital and why he 
was unable to identify any street names or locations during the 13 minutes he drove around talking to the 
emergency dispatcher.
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scepticism about his story.109 According to a poll in the Boston Globe, 77% of whites 
believed Charles Stuart’s version of events.110
There was a great deal of anger from the African-American community of 
Boston following the revelation that it was Charles Stuart who was responsible for the 
murder of Carol Stuart. African Americans were angry that Charles Stuart’s story had 
been so readily accepted as truth because of the racial dimensions to his alibi. As 
Chuck Turner, director of the Centre for Community Action in Roxbury, expressed: 
“Here’s a man who is trying to get rid of his wife. Chuck Stuart didn’t drive into a 
white neighbourhood to do it. He understood very clearly the mentality of the public. 
The emotional construct of white female endangerment by black males is such a strong 
emotional force.”111 For African Americans the unquestioned acceptance of Stuart’s 
story was indicative of how many in the white community perceived them. State 
Representative Gloria Fox, stated at a news conference:
People wanted to believe we were the culprits . . . once again we have 
been victimized and wronged . . . people wanted to believe people in the
109 Feagin and Vera, White Racism, 64. For a discussion of the role of racial stereotypes and crime see 
Jon Hurwitz and Mark Peffley, “Public Perceptions of Race and Crime: The Role of Racial Stereotypes”, 
American Journal o f  Political Science 41.2 (1997): 375-401; Allen E. Liska, Joseph J. Lawrence, 
Andrew Sanchirico, “Fear of Crime as Social Fact”, Social Forces 60 (1982): 760-770; Esther I. Madriz, 
“Images o f Criminals and Victims: A Study on Women’s Fear and Social Control”, Gender and Society
11.3, (1997): 342-356; Walker, Spohn, Delone, Race, Ethnicity and Crime In America.
110 Peter J. Howe, “Poll: Case Hurt Race Relations”, Boston Globe, January 21, 1990, 14. Only 32% of 
African Americans responded that they had believed Stuart’s version of events. The comparatively low 
number could reflect a degree of reluctance amongst some African Americans to admit that they too had 
been manipulated by racial stereotyping.
111 Quoted in “Boston: Charges of Racism Follow Probe of Killing”, Los Angeles Times, January 10, 
1990, A9.
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African-American community were mad-dog killers, and it’s not true 
and now we know.112
Residents of Mission Hill in particular expressed anger at they way race was 
manipulated in the case. One resident commented:
All the people of Mission Hill have been maligned by this picture of the 
community as a violent neighborhood.. . .  I think that part of that picture 
was being painted by people from outside the area because it was poor 
and black . . .  people used those elements to fan the flames of hysteria.113
Another resident stated that she had feared the racially-based response from the outset: 
“When it first happened I said, ‘please don’t let a black person be responsible’ because 
you know how people get a real lynch-mob attitude with those things.”114 For many 
African Americans, the Stuart case revealed the inherent link between race and crime 
in the minds of Americans.
In the aftermath of the revelation, a number of white Bostonians acknowledged 
the validity of these beliefs. One letter to the Boston Globe read:
We saw a victim, and we believed it. We trusted the white clean-cut and 
good-looking image, and quickly wanted to appease our anger at 
apparent random violence by ‘lynching’ the invisible black. The 
American quick-fix. And now? Now, we are faced with an even greater 
horror. Not the fear of a black man impulsively killing out of 
desperation, but the more heinous act of a ‘good’ white man who cold 
bloodedly planned and executed the murder of this pregnant wife, and
112 Quoted in Jesse H. Walker, “Blacks Angered at Biggest Case Since Boston Strangler”, Amsterdam 
News, January 13, 1990, 44.
113 Quoted on Renee Graham, “Image Proved Unjust”, Boston Globe, January 5, 1990, 21.
114 Quoted on Graham, “Image Proved Unjust”, 21.
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who cunningly exploited our age-old racial bias to cover up his crime. 
Charlie Stuart knew us better than we know ourselves. He duped us all. 
Now he’s forcing us to look back at our own gullibility and naivete. Our 
human nature still struggles to look at the evil that can and does reside in 
us all. Stuart, in his pernicious individual crime, has taught us all a bitter 
lesson and has put us all to shame.115
This Bostonian readily admitted the unconscious racial feelings held amongst a large 
number of white Americans, which had been easily manipulated by Charles Stuart’s 
lie. The statement reveals the racial attitudes and feelings held by a number of whites 
that Bush’s use of the Willie Horton narrative and his soft on crime discourse tapped 
into.
Many in the African-American community demanded retribution for the way in 
which they had been treated. Bruce C. Bolling, a city councilman representing Roxbury 
called for “. . . apologies across the board. . . . Black people were marginalized . . . 
because the alleged perpetrator was described as a black man.”116 Calls were made in 
particular for the resignation of Mayor Flynn. Louis Elisa of the Boston chapter of the 
NAACP declared:
I demand an apology from the Mayor of Boston, not just to Mission Hill, 
but to every black person in the city of Boston who was traumatized and 
victimized by political hysteria. . . . Every white person was looking at 
members of the black community as a possible killer.117
115 “Letters”, Boston Globe, January 13, 1990, 14.
116 Quoted in Constance L. Hays, “Husband of Slain Boston Woman Becomes a Suspect, Then a 
Suicide”, New York Times, January 5, 1990, A21.
117 Quoted in Walker, “Blacks Angered at Biggest Case Since Boston Strangler”, 5.
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State representative Fox, at a news conference, stated of the Mayor’s response to the 
case: “He reacted emotionally as a white male, not as Mayor of this city.”118 Sadiki 
Konban, a community activist in Roxbury, charged Flynn with ordering a “South 
Affican-style attack on the African community by the Boston Police Department.”119 A 
resident of Mission Hill stated: “They were very intent, almost desperate to find a 
person who was responsible for that action.”120 These sentiments were reflective of the 
feelings of the majority of African Americans. Polls showed that 74% of African
191Americans believed that Flynn had overreacted during the investigation.
There were also calls for the resignation of Police Commissioner Francis 
Roache over police handling of the crime. African-American religious, civic and 
political leaders were highly critical of the police’s response to the crime. Ninety-two 
percent of African Americans believed that the police had overreacted to the case.122 
Along with the way the police had too readily accepted Stuart’s story, they were also 
critical of the stop and frisk searches. Despite a relatively high approval rating 
according to some reports for the stop and frisk searches, many African-American 
leaders charged that such a scheme would never be utilised to apprehend a white 
suspect. Furthermore, it was claimed that police exerted pressure on witnesses to 
develop evidence against Bennett. Much of the information against Bennett - that
118 Quoted in Walker, “Blacks Angered at Biggest Case Since Boston Strangler”, 44.
119 Quoted in Peggy Hernandez, “Blacks Assail Handling of Case”, Boston Globe, January 6, 1990, 1.
120 Quoted in Gary Witherspoon, “Community Blasts Cops, Media”, Boston Herald, January 5, 1990, 10.
121 Howe, “Case Hurt Race Relations”, 14.
122 Howe, “Case Hurt Race Relations”, 14. Fifty-three percent of whites agreed and 41% disagreed.
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Bennett boasted about the killing - had been provided by two teenagers who later 
claimed to have been coerced into giving it.123 In December 1990, a report released by 
Massachusetts Attorney General James Shannon after a near year long investigation 
concluded that Boston police were guilty of a pattern of civil rights infringements in 
the investigation of Carol Stuart’s murder. According to the report’s findings, police 
had illegally stopped and searched young black people and had coerced the two 
African-American teenagers into giving false testimony against William Bennett.124
The Boston media also came under fire for its coverage of the case.125 As a 
resident of Mission Hill stated: “The media should also look at what role they played in 
having someone railroaded.”126 Another resident proclaimed: “We have been tried, 
convicted and sentenced. . . .  I want to know now, will the media call Charles Stuart an 
animal?”127 Condemnation of the way the media reported the case also came from 
white Bostonians. As one letter to the Boston Globe asserted:
All journalism is selective reporting, and the Globe either followed or 
led the rest of the media in the focus on the tragedy inflicted, as it was 
told, by an urban black man on a suburban white couple. It was a story
123 Jesse H. Walker, “Blacks Say Cops Forced Them to Tell Lies in Stuart’s Scandal”, Amsterdam News, 
January 27, 1990, 5.
124 Police Commissioner Roache charged that the allegations were unjustified and lacking in due process. 
Feagin and Vera argue that the Stuart case is evidence of the personal and structural racism within police 
and judicial institutions, White Racism, 69.
125 The media’s role in the Stuart case is discussed in Feagin and Vera, White Racism, 64-65. For a 
discussion o f the media, race and crime see Beckett and Sasson, The Politics o f Injustice-, Campbell, 
Race, Myth and the News; R.M. Entman, “Modem Racism and the Images of Blacks in Local Television 
News”, Critical Studies in Mass Communications 7, (1990): 332-346; Robert M. Entman and Andrew 
Rojecki, The Black Image in the White Mind: Media and Race in America (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2000); Gilliam Jr., and Iyengar, “Prime Suspects”.
126 Quoted in Witherspoon, “Community Blasts Cops, Media”, 10.
127 Quoted in Hernandez, “Blacks Assail Handling of Case”, 1.
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to be repeated on every front page, radio and TV broadcast nationwide. 
It would feed the racism in our society and give further credence to the 
view that there is something inherently superior about a white person 
and her death. . . .  It is time for the media to begin to cover the real 
tragedy of this event: the scapegoating of people of color for all the 
crimes of our society, when they have been victims of racism, which is 
so prevalent and all-consuming that we cannot imagine the scope and 
depth of reparations.128
A number in the media acknowledged the role race had played in reporting on 
the case. Boston Globe journalist, Mike Burnside, accepted that the reporting of the 
case was fuelled by the fact that it had all the essential ingredients of a sensational 
story, of which race was a crucial element. As he stated: “You had a network camera 
crew on the spot, an amazingly dramatic 911 call and the great white victims. 
Beginning, middle and end of story.”129 A number in the media also accepted that 
Stuart’s story was only able to work because of the prejudices and racial stereotypes 
held, consciously or not, by much of the public, media and police. As Philip Balbani, 
Vice President and News Director on WCVB-TV, the ABC affiliate in Boston, 
admitted: “I believe that, in retrospect, it’s clear there was some unconscious or 
subconscious racism in the response of the public, press and police . . . but I would 
adamantly deny there was conscious racism involved.”130 Similarly, an article in the 
Washington Post stated: “So credit Charles Stuart with something. He knew his
128 “Letters”, Boston Globe, January 13, 1990, 22.
129 Quoted in Karen Tumulty, “Press Had Unvoiced Doubts in Boston Slaying”, Los Angeles Times, 
January 12, 1990, A24. Italics author’s own. The Managing Editor of the Boston Herald, Alan S. Eisner, 
claimed that reporters urged the Suffolk County District Attorney to investigate Charles Stuart.
130 Quoted in Alex S. Jones, “Bias and Recklessness Are Charged in Boston Reporting on Stuart 
Slaying”, New York Times, January 14, 1990, 21.
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country. When he wanted to frame someone for his wife’s murder, he chose a whole
1^1category - young black men.” The charge was echoed in the New York Times: “We 
should recognize that Charles Stuart’s tale was widely accepted because it played so 
shrewdly in the cherished visions - and tenaciously held illusions - of many 
Bostonians, many Americans.”132
A number of those in the media, however, denied that race was a factor in the 
way the case was reported. The Editor of the Boston Globe defended its reporting as 
“responsible” journalism.133 John S. Driscoll, editor of the Boston Globe, denied any 
element of racism to the coverage. Claiming the media had been duped along with the 
public, Driscoll declared: “I really don’t see the racist aspect.”134 Journalists in the 
Boston Herald also defended the paper’s coverage of the case. One article stated:
The racial guilt-mongers are having a field day with the latest 
developments in the Stuart case. . . . Sorry guys, but no apologies are 
due here. If the case was a focus for attention, it was due to justified 
outrage at the nature of the offense -  a pregnant woman murdered as she 
was leaving a birthing class -  not the race of the alleged assailant.135
According to this statement, media response to the case reflected the media-worthiness 
of violent crimes, irrespective of race.
131 Richard Cohen, “The Boston Distraction”, Washington Post, January 11, 1990, A23.
132 J. Anthony Lukas, “Illusion is Slain in Camelot”, New York Times, January 16, 1990, 27.
133 Editorial, “The Stuart Tragedy”, Boston Globe, January 5, 1990, 14. It was also revealed following 
Charles Stuart’s suicide that rumours and doubts were circulating amongst members o f the media, but 
like the police, they had found it difficult to substantiate them.
134 Quoted in Jones, “Bias and Recklessness Are Charged”, 21.
135 Don Feder, “No: Racial Guilt Mongers Shouldn’t Get Their Way Here”, Boston Herald, January 7, 
1990, 35.
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Similarly, Flynn defended his response to the case and denied that he had 
overreacted. Flynn stated: “I think I did what any Mayor would have done. I wanted to 
send a strong signal - as strong as I could - to show the city’s outrage and to show that 
we would not tolerate such an act anywhere. Was I wrong? I don’t think so. An 
unthinkable crime was committed.”136 For Flynn, the reaction to the case was in 
proportion to the severity of the crime. Fifty percent of whites supported the Mayor’s 
position.137 Like Flynn, they believed that violent crime demanded a decisive response 
-  again illustrating the feelings and attitudes towards violent crime that Bush’s soft on 
crime discourse tapped into.
A number of white Bostonians, in fact, disagreed with accusations that 
responses to the case were influenced by race. One letter to the Boston Globe stated: 
“It infuriates me that the Stuart case is being used as a vehicle to cry out against the 
injustice of discrimination. . . . The reason this case was so highly publicized was the 
unbelievable horror of the attack on a seemingly innocent family.”138 Another letter 
defended the action of the police in the case:
I think that the Stuart murder case has been blown out of proportion. 
Many black people assert that racism on the part of the police resulted in 
the arrest of William Bennett. I disagree. I believe that the police were 
doing their job - and that is all they were doing. They had no reason to 
doubt what Charles Stuart told them, and they carried out their 
investigation based on that info. If anyone in this case was racist, it was
136 Quoted in Steve Marantz, “Flynn Issues Plea to Bind Wounds From Stuart Case”, Boston Globe, 
January 11, 1990, 26.
137 Howe, “Case Hurt Race Relations”, 14. Forty-one percent of whites believed that Flynn had 
overreacted.
138 “Letters”, Boston Globe, January 11, 1990, 14.
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Stuart, who planned the murder in Mission Hill. The people of Mission 
Hill should be given an apology, but they are carrying too far their 
criticism of the investigators. I feel sorry for the Mission Hill 
community, and especially Bennett, however, I do not want to see the 
police condemned for doing their job.139
While the author of the letter acknowledges the negative effect of Stuart’s lie on both 
Bennett and the Mission Hill community, the author claims that the police acted in 
good faith and not out of racism. This sentiment was reflective of a large proportion of 
white opinion of the police response. While the vast majority of African Americans 
believed that the police had overreacted to the case, 41% of whites disagreed.140 Again, 
these figures demonstrate the feeling amongst a large proportion of whites that the 
police should act decisively against violent crime, and hence reveal the public mood 
that Bush’s soft on crime discourse tapped into.141
Other letters of support more clearly reveal the racial sentiments that Willie 
Horton and Bush’s soft on crime discourse tapped into. For example, one letter to the 
Boston Herald read: “Why is it incredible that authorities initially believed Stuart’s 
story? If a violent crime occurs in the inner-city, statistically it probably wasn’t 
committed by a Jewish accountant or an Irish tenor.” Another letter read: 
“Overreaction is far more evident in cases like Howard Beach and Tawana Brawley 
(white on black crime) than in the more common instances where the victim is white
139 “Letters”, Boston Globe, January 28, 1990, 12.
140 Howe, “Case Hurt Race Relations”, 14.
141 Flanagan and Longmire (eds.), Americans View Crime and Injustice; Warr, “Public Opinion on Crime 
and Punishment”.
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and the assailant black.”142 A number of whites were quick to make comparisons 
between the Stuart and Brawley cases, as one letter to the Boston Herald read: “I have 
only two words for the racial guilt mongers. Tawana Brawley. . . . How easily the 
establishment swallowed her story, with what relish it savored this latest testament to 
the white man’s violence.”143 Yet, while the protagonists of both the Stuart and 
Brawley cases sought to manipulate race in order to fabricate a lie, there had been a 
marked difference in responses to the cases.144 From the very beginning, a great many 
people were sceptical of Tawana Brawley’s tale. Charles Stuart’s story, however, was 
almost unequivocally believed.
As in the Central Park jogger case, an analysis of the discourses surrounding 
the Carol Stuart murder, demonstrates the widespread concern with crime in American 
society, which Bush’s crime discourse tapped into. Moreover, however, it also 
illustrated the enormous symbolic weight violent and sexual crimes, perpetrated against 
white women by African-American men, carried in late 1980s. Both cases as such, 
provide a graphic illustration of the racial feelings held by a great number of 
Americans that Bush’s use of the Willie Horton narrative and his soft on crime 
discourse manipulated and capitalised upon.
142 Quoted in Don Feder, “No: Racial Guilt Mongers Shouldn’t Get Their Way Here”, Boston Herald, 
January 7, 1990, 35.
143 Quoted in Feder, “No: Racial Guilt Mongers Shouldn’t Get Their Way Here”, 35.
144 McFadden, Outrage; Smith and Seltzer, Contemporary Controversies; Taibbi and Sims-Philips, 
Unholy Alliances.
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CHAPTER 7
Clinton and Reverse Racism:
Rodney King, 1991, The Los Angeles Riots, 1992, and 
O.J. Simpson, 1994-1995.
7.1 The Clinton Presidency: 1993 - 1997
The election of Bill Clinton to the presidency in 1992 brought an end to the 
Republican dominance in the Post-Civil Rights era.1 To win the election, however, 
although the central emphasis was on the economy, Clinton also sought to broaden the 
appeal of the Democratic Party in order to win the support of white - Reagan Democrat 
- voters. Race, or rather the identification with racial issues, was the Democratic 
Party’s Achilles’ heal. Thus, in 1992, in order to appeal to white voters, Clinton 
avoided any overt reference to racial issues, other than to move away from them. This
1 In addition to works cited, for a discussion of the Clinton presidency see William C. Berman, From the 
Center to the Edge: The Politics and Policies o f the Clinton Presidency (Maryland: Rowan and 
Littlefield, 2001); Bill Clinton, My Life (New York: Hutchinson, 2004); David Maraniss, First in His 
Class: A Biography o f  Bill Clinton (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995); Stanley A. Renshon, High 
Hopes: The Clinton Presidency and the Politics o f Ambition (London: Routledge, 1998); Bob 
Woodward, The Choice: How Clinton Won (New York: Touchstone, 1996); Martin Walker, Clinton:
The President They Deserve (London: Vintage, 1997); Unites States Commission on Civil Rights, A 
Bridge to One America: The Civil Rights Performance o f the Clinton Administration (Washington D.C.: 
United States Commission on Civil Rights, 2001).
2 Race was only ever overtly mentioned in relation to the Los Angeles riots in May 1992. While Clinton 
placed the blame on Republican policies that had ignored racial division and fostered urban decay, he 
also suggested that such divisions stemmed in part from a culture of poverty and dependency in the inner
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was not simply an electoral strategy, however. It also reflected Clinton’s political 
philosophy as a new Democrat. Clinton and his advisors were aware that he had to 
work within a popular political culture that was largely conservative and increasingly 
antipathetic to group-specific reforms. As such, as a new Democrat Clinton sought a 
more centrist position that moved away from divisive and identity politics. Clinton 
advanced a neo-liberal agenda that stressed universalism rather than group and/or race 
specific policies. Thus, during the 1992 presidential campaign, while Clinton in 
Democratic tradition campaigned for the black vote - perhaps most visually illustrated 
by his saxophone playing on the Arsenio Hall show - he also sent a series of coded 
racial messages in order to court the white vote.3
One of these coded racial messages was Clinton’s stand against reverse racism. 
The Democratic Party platform in 1992 was the first for almost half a century that 
made no specific pledge to address racial injustice and inequalities.4 Yet, while no 
mention was made of a commitment to tackle injustice against African Americans,
cities. Moreover, Clinton also expressed his understanding of the fears of those who had fled the inner 
cities to the suburbs like Simi Valley. Dan T Carter, From George Wallace to Newt Gingrich: Race in 
the Conservative Counterrevolution, 1963-1994 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1996), 
98; Philip A. Kilner, “Bill Clinton and the Politics of the new Liberalism” in Adolph Reed Jr. (ed.), 
Without Justice For All: The New Liberalism and the Retreat From Racial Equality (Colorado: 
Westview Press, 1999), 16.
3 Carter, From George Wallace to Newt Gingrich; Jon. F. Hale, “The Making of the New Democrats”, 
Political Science Quarterly 110.2 (1995): 207-232; Kilner, “Bill Clinton and the Politics of the New 
Liberalism”; Claire Jean Kim, “Clinton’s Race Initiative: Recasting The American Dilemma”, Polity 
33.2, (2000): 175-197; Manning Marable, “U.S. Commentary: Race and Class in the US Presidential 
Election”, Race and Class 34.3 (1993): 75-85; Kenneth O’Reilly, Nixon’s Piano: Presidents and Racial 
Politics From Washington to Clinton (New York: The Free Press, 1995); Michael Omi and Howard 
Winant, Racial Formation in the United States: From the 1960s to the 1990s (New York: Routledge,
1994); Monte Piliawsky, “Racism or Realpolitik? The Clinton Administration and African-Americans”, 
Black Scholar 24.2 (1994): 2-10; E. Frances White, “Diss(miss)ing Clinton: Reflections on African 
Americans and the Elections”, Radical America 24.3 (1990): 22-27.
4 Andrew Hacker, “The Blacks and Clinton”, The New York Review o f Books, August 28, 1993, 14.
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Clinton spoke out against reverse racism. The target of his attack was rap performer, 
Sister Souljah.5 Souljah had allegedly made a number of racially inflammatory remarks 
to a Washington Post reporter apparently endorsing violence against whites in Los 
Angeles following the Rodney King verdict. Souljah was quoted as saying: “I mean if 
black people kill black people every day, why not have a week and kill white people?”6
n
Clinton denounced her remarks as: “. . . the kind of hatred we do not honor.” “If you 
took the words ‘white’ and ‘black’ and reversed them, you might think David Duke
o
was giving that speech.”
Clinton’s underlying message was that African Americans could be as guilty of 
racism as whites, and that black racism needed to be confronted and challenged as 
vigorously as any other form.9 However honourable the commitment to rid society of 
all forms of racial prejudice, this was not the intention behind Clinton’s remarks. 
Clinton’s comments against reverse racism were part of a planned and deliberate 
strategy to appeal to white voters, a number of whom had grown weary of what they 
perceived as an over-emphasis on race and race-specific policies and initiatives.10 
Clinton’s politiking was not lost on Americans, as an editorial in the Atlanta Journal 
and Constitution observed:
5 Clinton also sought to distance himself from Jesse Jackson in attacking Sister Souljah (real name Lisa 
Williams).
6 Quoted in Carter, From George Wallace to Newt Gingrich, 99. Souljah claimed that her comments had 
been taken out of context. See Kilner, “Bill Clinton and the Politics of the new Liberalism”, 17.
7 Quoted in Piliawsky, “Racism or Realpolitik?”, 5.
8 Quoted in Carter, From George Wallace to Newt Gingrich, 99.
9 Omi and Winant, Racial Formation in the United States, 151.
10 Kilner, “Bill Clinton and the Politics of the new Liberalism”.
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I have no problem with Clinton jumping on Sister Souljah for her racist 
and irresponsible rhetoric. . . .  Of course, that’s why Clinton jumped. He 
knew sane people could not disagree with his assertion that black people 
should not kill white people. Including sane black people, though they 
must be tempted at times. But, in the process, veteran vote-huckster 
Clinton no doubt figured he might win a few white votes from those 
honkies galled to their depths to see a big-mouthed young black woman 
with funny hair and an attitude criticizing the system. Especially a black 
woman who makes videos and more money than most of us will ever 
see. The daring denunciation must have seemed like a safe bet in the 
Clinton strategy session. Now here’s a sound bite with bite.11
The strategy was indeed a success. Republican polls indicated that 68% of the 
electorate were aware of the incident. Moreover, whites approved of Clinton’s 
statement by a three-to-one margin.12
Clinton’s limited success on election day, where he won just 39% of the white 
vote, compared to Bush’s 40% and Ross Perot’s 20%, did not detract from what he 
achieved in his stand against reverse racism.13 With his attack on Sister Souljah, 
Clinton had succeeded in tapping into a highly emotive issue. Reverse racism is largely 
a reaction to pervasive racism, the existence of which African Americans and whites, 
generally speaking, perceive very differently. Yet, whether interpreted in this way or 
not, reverse racism causes resentment in many whites and helps fuel the argument
11 “Editorial”, Atlanta Journal and Constitution, June 24, 1992, A 11.
12 Kilner, “Bill Clinton and the Politics of the new Liberalism”, 17; Piliawsky, “Racism or Realpolitik?”, 
5.
13 O’Reilly, Nixon’s Piano, 416. As well as his limited success in winning the white vote, Clinton’s share 
of the popular vote at 43% was the second lowest received by an elected President in the twentieth 
century, and the fourth lowest ever.
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prevalent in the post-Civil Rights era that too much emphasis is unduly placed upon
The issue of reverse racism remained an important political topic during 
Clinton’s first administration, and Clinton spoke out ardently against it. In particular, 
the charge of reverse racism surrounded the affirmative action debate.15 Like his 
Democrat predecessor, Carter, Clinton had to deal with considerable opposition to 
affirmative action programs. This opposition centred around claims that in the 
egalitarian society that had been established through the efforts of the Civil Rights 
movement, affirmative action, as well as undermining the American value of 
individualism, was unnecessary and/or unjust. Because many whites did not share the 
same perception of the existence of pervasive discrimination, affirmative action was 
often perceived as reverse racism, or reverse discrimination. When Clinton spoke out 
against reverse racism in relation to Sister Souljah, he was tapping into many of the 
same feelings of opposition held towards affirmative action.
This chapter will analyse Clinton’s discourse in relation to affirmative action 
and will demonstrate that throughout his first administration Clinton expressed his
14 Omi and Winant, Racial Formation in the United States.
15 For a discussion of affirmative action see Lawrence Bobo, “Race and Beliefs about Affirmative 
Action” in David O. Sears, Jim Sidanius, Lawrence Bobo (eds.), Racialized Politics: The Debate About 
Racism in America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000); Steven M. Cahn, The Affirmative 
Action Debate (London: Routledge, 1995); Erwin Chemerinsky, “Making Sense of the Affirmative 
Action Debate” in John Highman (ed.), Civil Rights and Social Wrongs: Black-White Relations Since 
World War II (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997); Lawrence H. Fuchs, “The 
Changing Meaning of Civil Rights, 1954-1994” in Highman (ed.), Civil Rights and Social Wrongs; 
Nathan Glazer, Affirmative Discrimination: Ethnic Inequality and Public Policy (Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press, 1987); Samuel L. Myers (ed.), Civil Rights and Race Relations in the Post 
Reagan-Bush Era (London: Praeger, 1997); Charlotte Steeh and Maria Kryson, “Affirmative Action and 
the Public 1970-1993”, Public Opinion Quarterly 60 (1996): 128-158.
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support of affirmative action programs and policies as necessary tools in tackling 
pervasive racism which continued to hinder the opportunities of African Americans 
(and women). At the same time, however, Clinton also acknowledged and addressed 
the concern of white Americans, for whom affirmative action was perceived as reverse 
racism. The chapter will then analyse public discourse surrounding two monumental 
events in America’s racial history in the late twentieth century - the Rodney King case 
and the Los Angeles riots, 1991-1992, and the O.J. Simpson case, 1994-1995, -  in 
order to illustrate the divergent feelings and beliefs that Clinton’s pervasive racism and 
reverse racism discourse tapped into.
Clinton expresses his feelings on affirmative action in the President’s News 
Conference, October 21, 1994.16 When asked to comment on a decision by a school 
board to retain an African-American teacher over a white teacher, Clinton responds by 
expressing his support for affirmative action, but stresses that it is only valid when 
making a decision when both parties are equally qualified, and that the choice based on 
race is made in order to maintain or ensure racial diversity. Clinton declares:
. . .  if you have a school district where the children are overwhelmingly 
of one race or another and you stipulate that -  in this case, both sides in 
the lawsuit stipulated they were absolutely equally qualified -  then can 
trying to preserve some racial diversity on your faculty be a ground for 
the decision, as opposed to flipping a coin? As long as it runs both ways, 
or all ways, I support that decision; that is there are other conditions in 
which if there were only two teachers, they were equally qualified, and
16 “President’s News Conference, October 21, 1994”, Public Papers o f the President o f  the United 
States: 1994.
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the school board or the school administrator decided to keep the white 
teacher, also to preserve racial diversity.
In this statement Clinton stresses both the importance of meritocracy and of flexibility 
in affirmative action. In doing this, Clinton is tapping into the concerns of a number of 
Americans, that whites are losing jobs to lesser-qualified or unqualified African 
Americans, or that ensuring racial diversity will always benefit African Americans over 
whites. Clinton acknowledges the concerns of whites, and asserts that affirmative 
action is about ensuring racial diversity and not reverse racism against whites.
Clinton again taps into the concerns of Americans regarding affirmative action 
in his Remarks at a Question and Answer Session with the College Press Forum, 
March 27, 1995.17 Again, Clinton defends affirmative action, but also acknowledges 
those who are concerned by it: principally white males. Clinton states:
The point I want to make to you is that we have made a lot of progress in 
this country. It has been inexact. It has been imperfect. There are still 
problems. We have made a lot of progress because we tried to take 
action to open up more opportunities to people without regard of their 
race or gender. And all of us, including white males, are better off 
because of that. The general point I want to make to you is that it is in 
everyone’s interest to see that everybody gets the best chance to live up 
to the fullest of their abilities. On the other hand, it is in no one’s interest 
to see that people get positions if they’re completely unqualified to hold 
them.
17 “Remarks at a Question and Answer Session with the College Press Forum, March 27, 1995”, Public
Papers o f the President o f  the United States: 1995.
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While stressing the positivity of affirmative action, even for white males, Clinton does 
acknowledge that problems do exist, and he stresses that affirmative action is about 
ensuring equal opportunity for all and not giving priority to less qualified people; merit 
is essential. Clinton then proceeds to emphasise that his administration’s review of 
affirmative action programs is designed to address these problems. Clinton questions:
So the question is this, how do we now go forward? And let me tell you 
the questions I’ve asked my folks to answer. I’ve said, first of all, how 
do these programs work, and do they have a positive effect? . . . 
Secondly, even if they work, are they sometimes, at least, unfair to 
others? Could you argue that in some cases there is reverse 
discrimination, and if so, how? Thirdly, are there now others in need 
who are not covered by affirmative action programs?
Clinton is sending the message that while he endorses affirmative action, he does not 
support programs or polices that discriminate against whites. Furthermore, he 
acknowledges that other societal groups are in need of affirmative action, which are not 
based on race or gender, that is, those who are economically disadvantaged. In doing 
this, Clinton is expressing the new universalism of the Democratic Party. Clinton seeks 
to align himself with white Americans and their concern with affirmative action in 
order to end divisive politics. Clinton asserts: “We must not let this debate be another 
cheap political wedge issue to divide the American electorate.”
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Clinton again positions himself alongside white concern over affirmative action 
in his Remarks at the California Democrat Party in Sacramento, 8 April, 1995.18 
Clinton proclaims:
This is psychologically a difficult time for a lot of white males, the so- 
called angry white males. Why? Because those who don’t have great 
educations and who aren’t in jobs which are growing, even though they 
may have started out ahead of those of you who are female and of 
different races, most of them are working harder for less money than 
they were making 15 years ago. Imagine what it’s like for them . .. they 
go home to dinner, and they look across the table at their families, and 
they think they’ve let them down. They think somehow, ‘what did I do 
wrong?’.
In making this statement Clinton is both acknowledging and legitimising the feelings 
of large number of white males who have been struggling with economic recession, 
and who sometimes feel that they are being discriminated against. Clinton stresses that 
these feelings must be addressed by the Democratic Party, and part of that involves 
reviewing affirmative action to ensure that no programs or policies result in reverse 
racism or reverse discrimination. Clinton declares:
. . .  we have to realise that there is a real problem out there in this 
country. We can’t deny that. There are a lot of people who go home 
every night and look across the table at their families and think that 
either they have failed or they must have been struck by somebody 
treating them unfairly. That is what we must respond to. . . . We don’t 
have to retreat from these affirmative action programs that have done 
great things for the American people and haven’t hurt other people. We
18 “Remarks at the California Democrat Party in Sacramento, 8 April, 1995”, Public Papers o f the
President o f  the United States: 1995.
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don’t. But we do have to ask ourselves, are they all working? Are they 
all fair? Has there been any kind of reverse discrimination? And more 
importantly, what we really ought to ask ourselves is, what are we going 
to do about all these folks that are out there working hard and never 
getting ahead.
In emphasising his support for affirmative action when properly applied, and his 
understanding of the concerns of white Americans in relation to affirmative action, 
Clinton is seeking to appeal to Reagan-Democrat voters. Once again, Clinton warns 
against the divisive politics of the Republican Party. Clinton stresses:
What the people who want this issue out here for political gain hope is 
that we will get in a big old shouting match with them, and they’ll have 
more people on their side of the shouting match than we will, and it’ll be 
a wedge, and they will drive it right through the stake of progressive 
efforts in the State and in this Nation.
This sentiment is also expressed in his Remarks at a Clinton/Gore '96 Dinner in 
Denver, Colorado, September 20, 1995.19 Clinton states:
There’s too much in our politics today driving people to the extremes, 
trying to use every issue as a wedge issue. . . . This affirmative action 
issue, there are a lot of people who say this ought to be a big issue in the 
Presidential campaign because they believe that they can convince white 
voters who’ve got stagnant wages that the real reason is somebody did 
something for minorities or for women under affirmative action. Well, 
let me tell you, I conducted a huge review of all the affirmative action 
programs of the United States Government. And there are some 
problems with some. We've already abolished one. Some more may be 
abolished. Several more will have to be amended. . . . I’m against 
quotas. I’m against reverse discrimination. We have brought reverse
19 “Remarks at a Clinton/Gore ’96 Dinner in Denver, Colorado, September 20, 1995”, Public Papers o f
the President o f the United States: 1995.
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discrimination suits in our administration. But I say we should not end 
affirmative action until we have gotten the job done, and we should not 
use this issue to divide the American people when we should be united 
over it.
Clinton’s appeal for unity over the issue of affirmative action is also seen in his 
Remarks on Affirmative Action at the National Archives and Records Administration, 
19 July, 1995.20 Clinton asserts:
I am absolutely convinced we cannot restore economic opportunity or 
solve our social problems unless we find a way to bring the American 
people together. To bring our people together we must openly and 
honestly deal with the issues that divide us. Today I want to discuss one 
of those issues, affirmative action.
While Clinton outlines the purpose of affirmative action he also emphasises that it is 
neither unfair nor discriminatory against whites. Clinton declares:
The purpose of affirmative action is to give our Nation a way to finally 
address the systemic exclusion of individuals of talent on the basis of 
their gender or race, from opportunities to develop, perform, achieve, 
and contribute. Affirmative action is an effort to develop a systemic 
approach to open up the doors of education, employment, and business 
development opportunities to qualified individuals who happen to be 
members of groups that have experienced longstanding and persistent 
discrimination. . . .  I know some people are honestly concerned about 
the times affirmative action doesn’t work, when it’s done in the wrong 
way. And I know there are times when some employers don’t use it in 
the right way. They may cut comers and treat a flexible goal as a quota. 
They may give opportunities to people who are unqualified instead of 
those who deserve it. They may, in so doing, allow a different kind of
20 “Remarks on Affirmative Action at the National Archives and Records Administration, 19 July, 
1995”, Public Papers o f the President o f the United States: 1995.
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discrimination. When this happens, it is also wrong. But it isn’t 
affirmative action, and it is not legal.
In making this statement Clinton is acknowledging the concerns of a number of white 
Americans regarding affirmative action. Clinton further emphasises his 
administration’s commitment to ensuring that affirmative action does not result in 
reverse racism when he states:
. . . when our administration finds cases of that sort [reverse 
discrimination], we will enforce the law aggressively. The Justice 
Department files hundreds of cases every year attacking discrimination 
in employment, including suits on behalf of white males. Most of these 
suits, however, affect women and minorities for a simple reason, 
because the vast majority of discrimination in America is still 
discrimination against them. But the law does require fairness for 
everyone, and we are determined to see that that is exactly when the law 
delivers. Let me be clear about what affirmative action must not mean 
and what I won’t allow it to be. It does not mean and I don’t favor the 
unjustified preference of the unqualified over the qualified of any race or 
gender. It doesn’t mean and I don’t favor numerical quotas. It doesn’t 
mean and I don’t favor rejection or selection of any employee or student 
solely on the basis of race or gender without due regard to merit.
Thus while Clinton stresses that pervasive discrimination remains, and it is largely 
women and minorities who suffer from discrimination, he also emphasises that 
affirmative action to address this discrimination will not result in discrimination against 
white males. In seeking to allay the concerns of white males, Clinton is sending the 
message that he appreciates and understands their concerns, and moreover his
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administration is committed to addressing them. Clinton reiterates his message when
he announces:
Today, I am directing all our agencies to comply with the Supreme 
Court’s Adarand decision and also to apply the four standards of fairness 
to all our affirmative action programs that I have already articulated: No 
quotas in theory or practice; no illegal discrimination of any kind, 
including reverse discrimination; no preference for people who are not 
qualified for any job or other opportunity; and as soon as a program has 
succeeded, it must be retired. Any program that doesn’t meet these four 
principles must be eliminated or reformed to meet them.21
Clinton’s message of the need for affirmative action both in the face of 
pervasive discrimination, and because of the resulting positive benefits brought to the 
entire nation, was an oft-repeated message. In his Remarks to the Progressive National 
Baptist Convention in Charlotte, North Carolina, 9 August, 1995, Clinton states:
That’s why I made the speech I did on affirmative action. Let’s don’t get 
away from something that’s helping us until we don’t need it anymore. I 
though it was important to tell the American people that everything is 
not equal in terms of opportunity in our country today, even though the 
laws have changed, and also important to remind people about what 
affirmative action is and isn’t. It’s not about quotas. It’s not about 
unqualified people getting anything. It’s not about reverse 
discrimination. All of that is illegal and will not be tolerated wherever 
we can find it.22
21 The Supreme Court decided in Adarand Constructors Inc v. Pena (1995) that the practice and effects 
of racial discrimination against minority groups persisted and that government was not disqualified from 
acting in response to it.
22 “Remarks to the Progressive National Baptist Convention in Charlotte, North Carolina, 9 August, 
1995”, Public Papers o f  the President o f the United States: 1995.
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While espousing the need for affirmative action, at the same time Clinton also stresses 
that affirmative action policies and programs will not result in reverse discrimination 
against whites. Similarly, in his Remarks at a Breakfast with Religious Leaders, 
September 8, 1995, in talking about affirmative action, Clinton stresses:
There are some problems in the way these programs have been 
implemented. They ought to be fixed. There are some of them that don’t 
work right, and they ought to be fixed. And nobody has a stake in 
America in promoting reverse discrimination or quotas or giving 
somebody something they’re not qualified to receive. But we should 
make a conscious effort to include all Americans in the bounty of 
America. Conscious effort is not the same thing as giving preference to 
unqualified people.23
In doing this, Clinton is sending the message that while he endorses affirmative action 
he is aware of and appreciates the concerns of Americans who believe that affirmative 
action results in reverse racism or reverse discrimination.
Clinton’s discourse in relation to affirmative action during the first 
administration of his presidency reveals that he continued to support and endorse the 
value and need of affirmative action. Clinton emphatically acknowledged that 
discrimination persisted in American society and as such policies and programs 
designed to ensure that all Americans irrespective of race (or gender) were given the 
opportunity to achieve their potential were wholly necessary. At the same time, 
however, Clinton also acknowledged and addressed those who were concerned by and
23 “Remarks at a Breakfast With Religious Leaders, September 8, 1995”, Public Papers o f the President 
o f the United States: 1995.
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opposed affirmative action. Clinton stressed that affirmative action, when working 
correctly, did not lead to preferential treatment for the lesser qualified nor to 
discrimination against whites. Clinton accepted, however, that problems with some 
affirmative action programs existed, and that sometimes this led to reverse racism. In 
response to this, Clinton vowed that his administration’s review of affirmative action 
would end or reform those programs and policies which did result in reverse 
discrimination. Thus, while Clinton acknowledged the existence of pervasive racism, 
and hence the necessity of race-based policies such as affirmative action, he also 
sought to appeal to those who opposed affirmative action as part of a wider opposition 
to what was perceived as an unnecessary and unfair overemphasis on race, which led to 
reverse discrimination. In speaking out against reverse racism in this way, Clinton, as 
part of his strategy as a new Democrat, sought to align himself and the Democratic 
Party with white -  Reagan-Democrat -  voters.
In many ways, as such, as a new Democrat, Clinton’s discourse was double 
edged. On the one hand, in traditional Democrat style, he stressed the existence of 
pervasive racism and the need for race-based policies such as affirmative action. On the 
other hand, he aligned himself with those, that is, whites, who opposed race-based 
polices and the perceived over-emphasis on race. The divergent feelings and beliefs 
that Clinton tapped into with his double-edged discourse of pervasive racism and 
reverse racism can be seen through an analysis of public discourse surrounding the
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Rodney King case and the Los Angeles riots, 1991-1992, and the O.J. Simpson case, 
1994-1995.
An analysis of public discourse surrounding the King case and the Los Angeles 
riots demonstrate that while Clinton’s discourse concerning the existence of pervasive 
racism and racial discrimination was in touch with the majority of African Americans, 
it was distinctly out of touch with a significant proportion of whites. Public reactions to 
the events demonstrated the subtle but clear differences in African-American and white 
perceptions of the extent of pervasive racism in American society in the 1990s. 
Reactions to the King case and the Los Angeles riots also provide a central backdrop to 
the reaction of both African Americans and whites in the Simpson case. As well as 
having a direct impact on African-American opinion of the Simpson case, they also go 
some way to explaining the racial divergence of opinion on the verdict in the trial. 
African-American approval of the Simpson verdict was largely a reaction to the 
perception of the existence of pervasive racism, which had been revealed in reactions 
to the King case and the Los Angeles riots. Whites, not sharing the same perception of 
pervasive racism, which had also been revealed in reactions to the King case and Los 
Angeles riots, regarded the verdict and African-American support of it as an expression 
of reverse racism. For many whites it served as further evidence that too much focus, 
wrongly placed upon race since the civil rights era, had resulted in black racism against 
whites. Thus, while Clinton was out of touch with whites with his pervasive racism
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discourse, his reverse racism discourse was very much in synch with many white 
Americans.
7.2 Rodney King and the Los Angeles Riots, 1991-1992
The Rodney King case highlighted the issues of police brutality and police 
corruption in the most dramatic of ways. The King case and the Los Angeles riots that 
followed also demonstrated the subtle but clear differences in African-American and 
white perceptions of the extent of pervasive racism in American society in the 1990s. 
Along with African Americans, the majority of white Americans condemned the 
verdict in the King trial in 1992 as indeed they had the beating a year previously. Many 
whites, however, did not perceive the acquittal as evidence of a wider pattern of racial 
injustice in the way the majority of African Americans did. While the majority of 
whites virulently denounced blatant racism many did not see it as symptomatic of the 
existence of more pervasive racism. This was evident not only in the reaction to the 
King beating and verdict, but also to the riots that followed. In this sense, Clinton’s 
assertions regarding the existence of pervasive discrimination were out of touch with a 
significant number of whites.
When the majority of Americans - African-American and white - saw the 
infamous Holliday video, which captured the arrest and beating of Rodney King 
following a police chase, they recoiled in horror at the stark images of extreme
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brutality meted out by the police officers on a helpless victim.24 The Amsterdam News 
described the incident as . . a stark, brutal scene right out of the Selma of the ‘60s or 
contemporary Soweto . . .” and compared the police officers involved to “. . .a klavem
9 Sof Kluxxxers [sic]”. White Americans, too, compared the incident to the past acts of 
America’s infamous racist organisation. As one white woman exclaimed in the New 
York Times'. “It looked like something the KKK would do.”26 Despite cross-racial 
condemnation, however, there were notable differences between the reactions of whites 
and African Americans to the King incident.
For the majority of African Americans, the Holliday video did not come as a 
surprise in the way that it did to the majority of whites. As one African American 
explained: “I wasn’t surprised at all, what happened to King was happening in the 
1960s. There wasn’t a lot of attention paid to it back then. I guess we didn’t have video
97cameras. Thank God for that tape otherwise none of this would have come out.” 
While African Americans, like whites, had been shocked by the video footage, more 
than anything it depicted long-held views concerning law enforcement in America. As 
another resident of South Central Los Angeles stated: “We are convinced, that no white 
man, even if he resisted arrest, which Rodney King did not, would have been beaten
24 George Holliday, had witnessed and taped the arrest and beating of Rodney King from his Lake View 
Terrace balcony. Holliday tried, unsuccessfully, to report what he had witnessed to the police at Foothill 
police station. He sold the tape to local TV station, KTLA. It was picked up and transmitted nationally 
by CNN on March 6, 1991.
25 Herd Boyd, “LA Police Likened to a Gang With Colors, Guns . . . and the Law on Their Side 
Protecting Them”, Amsterdam News, March 16, 1991, 4.
26 Quoted in Don Terry, “Badge Tarnished on L.A. Streets, Police Say”, New York Times, March 25, 
1991, A l.
27 Quoted in Terry, “Badge Tarnished on L.A. Streets”, B6.
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the way they did this brother.”28 For this resident, the King beating was evidence of the 
existence of racial brutality by the police.
For many African Americans in the nation’s largest cities, the police force 
represented an occupying army that operated with “reckless abandon”.29 One resident 
of Los Angeles stated of police-community relations there: “They treat even law- 
abiding citizens like dogs. We feel the most violent, vicious gang in all of Los Angeles 
wears blue and a badge. The King case only proves the point once again.” Similarly, 
a resident of South Central Los Angeles described the perception of the LAPD there: 
“Our community does not believe the LAPD is here to protect and serve as it says on 
the side of their cars. They’re here to prosecute and abuse. When people see them, they 
fear them. They do not welcome them.”31
African-American complaints of police brutality in Los Angeles expressed in 
African-American discourse surrounding the incident were confirmed by the 
Christopher Commission, which had been established in light of the King incident to
28 Quoted in Ron Dungee, “Black Community Union Man: ‘Gates Must Go!’”, Los Angeles Sentinel, 
March 14, 1991, 1.
29 Quoted in Terry, “Badge Tarnished on L.A. Streets”, B6. See John Hagan and Ruth D. Peterson (eds.), 
Crime and Inequality (California: Stanford University Press, 1995); Charles J. Ogletree Jr. et al\ 
Criminal Justice Institute at Harvard Law School for the National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People, Beyond Rodney King: An Investigation o f Police Conduct in Minority Communities 
(Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1995); United States Commission on Civil Rights, Revisiting 
'Who is Guarding the Guardians ’ (Washington D.C.: United States Commission on Civil Rights, 1991).
30 Quoted in Terry, “Badge Tarnished on L.A. Streets”, B6. See Mike Davis, City o f  Quartz: Excavating 
the Future in Los Angeles (New York: Vintage, 1992); Tom Owens and Rod Browning, Lying Eyes: The 
Truth Behind the Corruption and Brutality o f  the LAPD and the Beating o f  Rodney King (New York: 
Thunder’s Mouth Press, 1994); Jewelle Taylor Gibbs, Race and Justice: Rodney King and O.J. Simpson 
in a House Divided (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1996); Ogletree Jr., Beyond Rodney King-, 
United States Commission on Civil Rights, Racial and Ethnic Tensions in American Communities: 
Poverty, Inequality and Discrimination. Volume V: The Los Angeles Report (Washington D.C.: United 
Stated Commission on Civil Rights, 1999).
31 Quoted in Terry, “Badge Tarnished on L.A. Streets”, A l.
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investigate the use of excessive force within the Los Angeles Police Department 
(LAPD). The commission’s investigations concluded that there were a significant 
number of officers in the LAPD who repetitively used excessive force against the 
public and persistently ignored the written guidelines of the department regarding 
force.32 The report noted that between 1986-1990 there were 1,800 LAPD officers with 
allegations of excessive force or improper tactics against them.33 According to the 
commission the problem of excessive force was aggravated by racism and bias, which 
was revealed in the investigation of Mobile Digital Terminal (MDT) communications 
and by the results of a survey of LAPD officers.34 The commission also concluded that 
officers who engaged in acts of brutality and racism were protected by an unofficial 
code of silence. The report stated: “The code of silence influences the behaviour of 
many LAPD officers in a variety of ways, but it consists of one simple rule: an officer 
does not provide adverse information against a fellow officer.”35 Furthermore, the 
commission confirmed that the problem of police brutality was not confined to Los 
Angeles.36
32 Report o f the Independent Commission on the Los Angeles Police Department, (1991) iii. Hereafter 
cited as Christopher Commission.
33 Christopher Commission, x.
34 Christopher Commission, iii.
35 Christopher Commission, 168. See also Ogletree Jr. et al, Beyond Rodney King. For an update on the 
reforms recommended by the Christopher Commission see USCCR, Racial and Ethnic Tensions in 
American Communities.
36 Christopher Commission, i. In 1990, there were 2,366 brutality complaints in New York, 284 in 
Detroit and 223 in Philadelphia. Ted Gest, “Why Brutality Persists”, U.S. News & World Report, April 
1, 1991,24.
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Opinion poll figures also demonstrated that the sentiments expressed by 
African Americans in response to the King beating were reflective of feelings widely 
held amongst African Americans. Overall, however, African Americans and whites had 
significantly different perceptions of the extent of the problem of police brutality in 
America’s cities. According to a Los Angeles Times poll, while 39% of whites agreed 
that police brutality was fairly common in the city - the same figure as for African 
Americans - only 19% of whites perceived it as very common, while the figure for 
African Americans was 44%.37 Another Los Angeles Times poll also demonstrated that 
in the wake of the King incident, the African-American approval rating of the LAPD 
was nearly three times lower than it was for whites, at 14% and 41% respectively.38 
This disparity of opinion on the police was reflected nationwide. A New York Times 
poll showed that while two-thirds of New Yorkers stated that they regarded allegations 
of police brutality, when they were made, as justified, whites did not necessarily 
perceive police brutality to be a widespread problem.39 The poll also confirmed a sharp 
division between blacks and whites on how they were treated by the police. White New 
Yorkers expressed a positive relationship with the police that was not matched by 
African Americans. According to the poll, three-fifths of whites claimed to be able to 
regard the police as their friends, yet only 37% of African Americans agreed.40 Thus,
37 Ted Rohrlich, “Majority Says Police Brutality is Common”, Los Angeles Times, March 10, 1991, A1.
38 Steven A. Tuch and Ronald Weitzer, “Racial Differences in Attitudes Toward the Police”, Public 
Opinion Quarterly 61 (1997): 650.
39 The issue of police brutality in New York had been highlighted by the Michael Stewart case, 1983 and 
the Eleanor Bumpers case, 1984. See Alphonso Pinkney, Lest We Forget: White Hate Crimes. Howard 
Beach and Other Racial Atrocities (Third World Press, 1994)
40 Steven A. Holmes, “Poll Finds Most Satisfied With Police”, New York Times, April 5, 1991, A16.
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while whites were willing to accept that police brutality existed, they were far more 
likely to regard it as an isolated problem, rather than symbolic of a wider pattern of 
racism within law enforcement.41
The general disparity in perceptions of police brutality between African 
Americans and whites was an integral aspect in the verdict in the case of the four 
officers - Sergeant Stacey C. Koon, Laurence M. Powell, Theodore J. Briseno and 
Timothy E. Wind - prosecuted for their involvement in the King incident42 In the trial 
the defence lawyers’ strategy was firstly to make the jury . . look at the case not from 
the eye of the camera but from the eyes of the officers.”43 While the Holliday video 
shows police striking King 56 times with metal batons, kicking him six times and 
shooting him with taser guns twice, the defence sought to establish in the eyes of the
41 Dennis E. Gale believes that the King tape might make whites more perceptive to claims of police 
brutality in the future. Denis E. Gale, Understanding Urban Unrest: From Reverend King to Rodney 
King (California: Sage Publications, 1996). For a discussion of the racially divergent views on the police 
see also Timothy J. Flanagan and Dennis R. Longmire (eds.), Americans View Crime and Justice: A 
National Public Opinion Survey (London: Sage, 1996); Tuch and Weitzer, “Racial Differences in 
Attitudes Towards the Police”.
42 The charges against the four were as follows: all four faced charges of assault with a deadly weapon 
and use of excessive force. Laurence Powell and Stacey Koon also faced the charge of falsifying police 
reports, and Koon faced the additional charge of accessory to assault. On May 7, 1991, Timothy Wind 
was fired from the LAPD and the other three were suspended without pay. There were 23 LAPD officers 
in total at the scene of the incident. Other than the four prosecuted, there were two officers in the 
helicopter and 10 others on the ground during some portion of the beating. Seven other LAPD officers 
merely drove by or did not directly witness the use of force. There were also four uniformed officers 
from the California Highway Patrol (CHP) and Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD). None of 
those who had witnessed the beating were prosecuted because under California law they had not broken 
any criminal statutes. For an account of the trial see Lou Cannon, Official Negligence: How Rodney King 
and the Riots Changed Los Angeles and the LAPD (New York: Random House, 1997); Robert Deitz, 
Willful Injustice: A Post-O.J. Look at Rodney King, American Justice and Trial by Race (Washington 
D.C.: Regnery, 1996); Gibbs, Race and Justice-, Patricia J. Williams, “The Rules o f the Game” in Robert 
Gooding-Williams (ed.), Reading Rodney King: Reading Urban Uprising (London: Routledge, 1993); 
Kimberle Crenshaw and Gary Peller, “Real Time/Real Justice” in Gooding-Williams (ed.), Reading 
Rodney King.
43 Quoted in Richard Lacayo, “Anatomy of an Acquittal”, Time, May 11, 1992, 42.
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jury that King was controlling the incident by resisting the police.44 They tried to make 
the jury empathise with the danger faced by the police, portraying King as a large, 
aggressive man, who was drunk, and they inferred, also under the influence of PCP.45 
In turn, they portrayed the officers as frustrated and frightened by King’s failure to lie 
down and submit to arrest. The second part of the defence’s strategy was to persuade 
the jurors that everything was within LAPD guidelines concerning the use of force. As 
Paul Depasquale, Wind’s attorney, claimed: “[Wind] dealt with the situation as it 
unfolded in accordance with his experience and training. His situation was one of fear 
and frustration, and not pleasure in inflicting injuries.”46
The strategy worked, despite one of the four, Briseno, testifying against the 
others that their behaviour had been out of control47 The King jury acquitted the four 
officers on all counts, except for one charge against Powell of excessive force on which 
they were deadlocked and a mistrial was declared. While there were a number of 
cmcial factors to the jury’s decision, namely that jurors had become desensitised to the 
video and that King had not testified, the chief factor was that the predominantly white 
jury of Simi Valley in Ventura County - a largely white, suburban community, that was
44 It has been charged that the Holliday video transmitted on TV was an edited version, which did not 
show King resist arrest and attack the officers. Cannon, Official Negligence; Owens and Browning, 
Lying Eyes. King denied attacking the officers and resisting arrest. Witnesses to the incident also stated 
that King did not resist arrest and that the officers involved appeared to be beating King for no reason. 
See Hector Tobar and Leslie Berger, “Tape of L.A. Police Beating Suspect Stirs Public Furor”, Los 
Angeles Times, May 6, 1991, A21.
45 King was over the legal alcohol limit for driving when arrested and small traces of marijuana were 
found in his blood. He tested negative for PCP - a hallucinogenic drug.
46 Quoted in Lacayo, “Anatomy of an Acquittal”, 42.
47 Jurors felt that Briseno was merely trying to protect himself.
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home to a number of LAPD officers - ultimately empathised with the police and not
AO
with King. The statements of jurors who spoke out following the verdict illustrated 
their identification and empathy with the police and with the job they had to perform. 
As one juror put it: “They’re out there to do a low-down dirty job. Would you want 
your husband doing it, or your son or your father?”49
The majority of Americans -  both whites and African Americans - were 
shocked and appalled by the verdict that appeared to condone the most blatant act of 
racist brutality. A poll by the Los Angeles Times showed that 81% of Los Angeles 
residents disagreed with the verdict, including a clear majority of whites: 70% of 
whites stated that they disagreed with the verdict.50 This figure was reflected in polls 
nationwide. A Washington Post/ABC poll found that 64% of whites thought that the 
defendants should have been found guilty.51 Similarly, 62% of whites in a Time/CNN 
poll stated that they would have voted to convict had they been on the jury.52 There 
was a gulf between African Americans and whites in their condemnation of the verdict,
48 The trial was moved to Ventura County by Judge Stanley Weisberg. (The defence had previously won 
an appeal to have the trial moved out of L.A. County on the grounds of pre-trial publicity). There was 
much opposition to this due to the demographical differences with L.A. Whites in Ventura made up 
65.9% of the population, while African Americans made up 2.2%. In comparison, whites in L.A. County 
accounted for 40.8% of the population and African Americans 10.5%. Simi Valley, the chosen site of the 
trial, had an African-American population of 1.5%. “Little City in the Valley Must Live With a Verdict”, 
Chicago Tribune, May 1, 1992, 1. Residents of Ventura County rejected the racist reputation gained by 
the verdict o f their community and in a poll 69% stated that they disagreed with the verdict. Carlos V. 
Lozano, “The Times Poll: Verdicts Anger Ventura County”, Los Angeles Times, May 7, 1992, A1.
49 Quoted in Sheryl Stolberg, “Juror Says Panel Felt King Actions Were to Blame”, Los Angeles Times, 
April 30, 1992, A23.
50 Frank Clifford and David Ferrell, “Los Angeles Strongly Condemns King Verdicts and Riots”, Los 
Angeles Times, May 6, 1992, A4.
51 Washington Post/ABC News Poll, “Views on the King Verdict”, Washington Post, May 1, 1992, A31.
52 Church, “Fire This Time”, 31.
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however. In the Los Angeles Times poll 96% of African Americans disagreed with the 
verdict and in both the Washington Post/ABC poll and Time/CNN poll, 92% of African 
Americans thought the defendants should have been found guilty.53
As in perceptions of the beating too, the majority of African Americans 
perceived the verdict in a different way to many whites. Not only was the verdict, 
naturally, far more personal for African Americans than whites - as one African- 
American, ex-police officer stated: “I felt each one of those not guiltys - each one of 
them” - for the vast majority of African Americans, the verdict also symbolised their 
status in American society.54 As one Harlem resident stated at a rally in Times Square:
We got so many people here saying justice for Rodney King, but this 
whole issue is bigger than Rodney King. People will forget who Rodney 
King is next week . . . [the point is] you could have been Rodney King 
or anybody could have been a Rodney King.55
For African Americans the verdict demonstrated the pervasive nature of racism in the 
American justice system.56 According to a poll in Time the majority of African
53 Clifford and Ferrell, “Los Angeles Strongly Condemns King Verdicts and Riots”, A4; Washington 
Post/ABC News Poll, “Views on the King Verdict”, A31; Church, “Fire This Time”, 31.
54 Quoted in Richard A. Serrano and Tracy Wilkinson, “All 4 in King Beating Acquitted. Violence 
Follows Verdicts; Guard Called Out”, Los Angeles Times, April 30, 1992, A22.
55 Quoted in Carolyn A. Butts, “Today Rodney King, Tomorrow Me”, Amsterdam News, May 9, 1992, 
4.
56 Katherine Beckett and Theodore Sasson, The Politics o f Injustice: Crime and Punishment in America 
(California: Thousand Oaks, 2000); Hagan and Patterson (eds.), Crime and Inequality in America; 
Coramae Richey Mann, Unequal Justice: A Question o f Color (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1993); Cassia C. Spohn, “Courts, Sentences, and Prisons” in Obie Clayton Jr. (ed.), An American 
Dilemma Revisited: Race Relations in a Changing World (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1996); 
Michael Tonry, Malign Neglect -  Race, Crime and Punishment in America (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press); Samuel Walker, Cassia Spohn, Miriam Delone, Race, Ethnicity and Crime in America 
(California: Wadsworth, 2000).
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American - 45% - cited racism as the principal reason behind the jury’s verdict; only 
12% of whites agreed.57 A letter to the Los Angeles Sentinel also illustrated this 
feeling:
To me, the Rodney King beating, trial and verdict were reminiscent of 
the trials held in the Old South when white defendants were always 
found not-guilty by all-white juries when being charged with crimes 
against blacks regardless of the preponderance of evidence and 
conversely, blacks were usually found guilty with little or no evidence. 
This verdict has made me lose more faith in the American justice system
C O
and as a black male, I didn’t have much faith to start with.
African Americans outside of Los Angeles also expressed this sentiment. An African 
American from Chicago stated: “It is absolutely reprehensible . . .  it proves that racism 
is alive and well and it says that a police officer in California, Chicago or around the 
country can do whatever he wants to an African American or a minority. It proves that 
they can do what they want and just get away with it.”59 Similarly, an African 
American in a letter to the Atlanta Journal and Constitution, wrote: “The acquittal 
showed that if you are a black person and the police are white, they will do what they 
will to you and there is nothing you can do about it.”60 For a number of African
57 Sylvester Monroe et al, “Fire This Time”, Time, May 11, 1992, 35.
58 Dwight Williams, “Letters”, Los Angeles Sentinel, May 14, 1992, 19. Concern with racial injustice in 
the criminal justice system in L.A. had been heightened by the recent case o f Latasha Harlins. Harlins, a 
15-year-old African American girl, had been fatally shot in the back by a Korean shop owner who had 
accused the girl o f shoplifting, in March 1991. Soon Ja Du, although found guilty of Harlins’ death, was 
put on probation.
59 Quoted in Larry Gross and Justin Blum, “4 Cops Found Not Guilty in Rodney King Beating”, Chicago 
Defender, April 30, 1992, 30.
60 “Letters”, Atlanta Journal and Constitution, May 1, 1992, B7.
335
Americans the verdict also illustrated the pervasive nature of racism within American 
society in general. As one African American stated in the Los Angeles Times:
I don’t know Rodney King, but I think he symbolizes a lot of people. 
Part of me. He is an African American and so am I. The Rodney King 
incident has brought out frustrations that I have. I’ve had a basic desire 
to be accepted as simply a human being. . . . What I believe happened 
when I heard the verdict was the reality that some people are never 
going to see me, or may never see me, or my brother, or a friend of 
mine, or somebody within my family, as a human being...  . That’s what 
made me cry, because it was sort of a reality check. That was perhaps 
something I had kept in the back of my mind, and that come forth as a 
result of the verdict.61
Similarly, another African American stated: “Every black person in America should be 
outraged. This is an indication of what society is trying to do to black men.”62 The 
impact of the verdict on African Americans also crossed class lines. Some members of 
black middle-class who thought they had made considerable progress in assimilating 
into the American mainstream were troubled by what the verdict meant for them. As 
one African-American lawyer stated in the Chicago Tribune: “Even as a black
professional person getting my nibble of the American pie, I still have to feel 
threatened by an element in the Los Angeles Police Department that sees a black face 
and translates it to criminal.”63 Similarly, an African-American physician told the New 
York Times'.
61 Quoted in “Witness to Rage: Part 3”, Los Angeles Times, May 13, 1992, Tl.
62 Quoted in Marion Moore, “NAACP Chief, Others Blast King Verdict”, Chicago Defender, April 30, 
1992, 13.
63 Quoted in “After the Riots, a Sense of Betrayal, Regret”, Chicago Tribune, May 3, 1992, 10.
What happened to Rodney King could happen to me at any time . . .  I 
don’t have ‘physician’ written all over my car. There are so many land 
mines out there for us. If they can get away with that with a videotape, 
what chance do I have as black man with only lumps on my head as 
evidence?64
Many whites, of course, fully comprehended the wider implications of the 
verdict, but many more did not. The Washington Post-ABC News poll found that there 
was a wide disparity between whites and African Americans on what the verdict said 
about race and justice in America. Reflecting the predominant African-American 
discourse in relation to the verdict, 78% of African Americans claimed that the verdict 
showed that blacks could not get justice in America, while 66% of whites disagreed 
with this view. Eighty-five percent of African Americans disagreed with the statement 
that police in most cities treated blacks as fairly as whites, while 47% of whites agreed 
with the statement. Similarly, 89% of African Americans stated that blacks and 
minorities did not get equal treatment as whites in the CJS, yet only 43% of whites 
shared this view.65 Furthermore, according to a USA Today poll, 81% of African 
Americans claimed that the justice system was biased against blacks, but only 36% of 
whites thought so.66 Thus, while the majority of whites rejected a blatant racial attack 
and the acquittal of those responsible, they did not see it as symptomatic of pervasive 
racism.67
64 Quoted in Isabel Wilkerson, “Riots Shook Affluent Blacks Trying to Balance Two Worlds”, New York 
Times, May 10, 1992, A20.
65 Washington Post-ABC News Poll, “Views on the King Verdict”, A31.
66 Richard Serrano, “King: ‘Truth Will Come Out”’, Los Angeles Times, May 2, 1992, A7.
67 For a discussion of the racial disparities in opinions on the CJS see Flanagan and Longmire (eds.), 
Americans View Crime and Justice.
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The general gulf between African-American and white perceptions of these 
wider issues helps explain why many African Americans and whites held diverse 
opinions on the rioting that followed the verdict. Within hours of the acquittal of the 
LAPD officers rioting broke out in South Central Los Angeles which lasted for four 
days. Fifty-two people were killed and over 2,500 injured. Damage was estimated at $1 
billion.68 While the majority of African Americans, like whites, condemned the rioting 
the percentage for African Americans was considerably lower than for whites - 58% 
compared with 81%. Also, a significant proportion of African Americans expressed an 
understanding of the riots. The Los Angeles Times poll found that 32% of African 
Americans believed that the violence was partially justified; only 15% of whites 
agreed.69 The Time/CNN poll also found that while 63% of whites and 42% of African 
Americans thought the rioting was completely unjustified, 35% of African Americans, 
compared to 18% of whites, thought it was either somewhat or totally justified.70 These 
figures were reflective of African-American discourse surrounding the rioting. For
68 Unlike the Watts riot in 1965, the L.A. riots were not strictly a black-on-white affair. Koreans were as 
much a target as whites in 1992. Sumi K. Cho, “Korean Americans vs. African Americans: Conflict and 
Construction” in Gooding-Willliams (ed.), Reading Rodney King; Gerald Home, The Fire This Time:
The Watts Uprising and the 1960s (New York: Da Capo Press, 1997); Elaine H. Kim, “Home is Where 
the Han Is: A Korean-American Perspective on the Los Angeles Upheavals” in Gooding-Willliams (ed.), 
Reading Rodney King. However, it would be wrong to conclude from this that the riots were not a 
reaction to white racism. In a certain sense, for African Americans, Koreans were ‘white’. See 
Kyeyoung Park, “Use and Abuse of Race and Culture: Black-Korean Tension in America”, American 
Anthropologist 98.3, (1996): 492-97. For a discussion of the causes and meanings of the riots see 
Cannon, Official Negligence; Gibbs, Race and Justice; Gooding-Williams (ed.), Reading Rodney,; Haki 
R. Madhubuti (ed.), Why L.A. Happened: Implications o f the ’92 Los Angeles Rebellion (Chicago: Third 
World Press, 1993).
69 Clifford and Ferrell, “Los Angeles Strongly Condemns King Verdicts and Riots”, A l.
70 Church, “Fire This Time”, 32. Twenty percent of African Americans thought it somewhat justified, 
compared to 14% of whites, and 15% of African Americans thought it completely justified, compared to 
4% of whites.
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some African Americans, the rioting was perceived as a justified rebellion, in keeping 
with American tradition. As a letter to the Los Angeles Sentinel read:
While watching the burning of Los Angeles, I could not help but feel 
proud of the fact that African Americans, in the face of the Rodney King 
decision, did not lie down and play dead. The African Americans in Los 
Angeles demonstrated to the world that they will react when confronted 
with a travesty of justice. . . .  I could not help but see the similarities 
between the burning of Los Angeles and the Boston Tea Party. That is to 
say, when the American public is confronted with blatant ‘taxation 
without representation’, they will let the world know that it is NOT 
ACCEPTABLE.71
Similarly, a letter to the Washington Afro-American stated: “Whites glorify their 
riotous history (Boston Tea Party, Whiskey Rebellion, 1968 Democratic Convention, 
Kent State) yet deny that expression of discontent to others.”72 While many other 
African Americans, like whites, regarded the rioting as unjustified, many also 
acknowledged that the rioting was a reaction to genuine grievances against the police 
and CJS. As Attorney Chester Blair expressed in the Chicago Defender:
No one can, of course, condone the orgy of senselessness that empted 
almost immediately after the verdict was announced and took the lives 
of so many people. But no one can honestly deny that it was provoked 
by the great sense of injustice, by the excmciating sense of 
powerlessness in the face of an unhearing, unseeing white majority that 
seems incapable of treating its darker-hued citizens fairly.73
71 “Letters”, Los Angeles Sentinel, May 7, 1992, 6.
72 “Letters”, Washington Afro-American, May 16, 1992,4.
73 Chester L. Blair, “The ‘Not Guilty’ King Verdict”, Chicago Defender, May 18, 1992, 12. According 
to figures from the L.A. District Attorney’s office, 40% of those arrested had a prior criminal record. 
However, having a criminal record could mean that they had been arrested and released without charge 
so it did not necessarily mean that 40% of riot arrestees were criminals. Rather, it could reflect the high
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For others, the rioting was a reaction to the socio-economic situation. As one African 
American asserted: “Yeah, it’s madness . . . but it’s also understandable. And if the 
social conditions don’t change, it will happen again and again and not just in L.A.”74 
Similarly, another African American stated: “The issues and the social ills that gave 
rise to the discontent in Los Angeles exist in virtually every community in this 
country.”75 While many whites also acknowledged these grievances, polls by both the 
Los Angeles Times and New York Times found that whites were more likely to cite the 
work of opportunists and gang members as the chief cause of the riots, whereas African
nf\Americans were more likely to cite the reaction to the verdict.
The Rodney King case and the Los Angeles riots exposed the problems of 
police brutality and corruption in the most dramatic manner, not only to residents of 
Los Angeles but to Americans nationwide. In Los Angeles, approval ratings of the 
LAPD following the incident were, quite naturally perhaps, low. In subsequent years, 
white and African-American opinion of the LAPD gradually improved. For African 
Americans, perhaps the single most decisive factor in this was the replacement of Daryl
arrest rates in ghetto areas. Dennis Schatzman, “50-60 Percent o f Riot Arrestees Had No Prior Contact 
With the Law”, Los Angeles Sentinel, May 28, 1992, 1. From the point of view of this work, however, it 
is the attitude of African Americans to the rioters, rather than the actual make-up of the rioters and their 
actual motivation that is of most concern.
74 Quoted in Don Terry, “Decades of Rage Created Crucible of Violence”, New York Times, May 3, 
1992, A l.
75 Quoted in Chris Whitaker, “The Rodney King Wake-Up Call: Which Way America?”, Ebony, July 
1992, 116.
76 Clifford and Ferrell, “Los Angeles Strongly Condemns King Verdicts, Riots”, A l; Robin Taner, “L.A. 
Riots Are a Warning, Americans Fear”, New York Times, May 11, 1992, B7. As in Miami in 1980 and 
the riots o f the 1960s, the underlying causal factor of the L.A. riots was socio-economic deprivation. For 
a discussion of the socio-economic problems of African Americans in L.A. see Urban Institute, 
Confronting the Nation’s Urban Crisis From Watts (1965) to South Central Los Angeles (1992) 
(Washington D.C.: Urban Institute Press, 1992).
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Gates by Willie Williamson as police chief. Studies demonstrated, however, that 
African-American opinion within Los Angeles and nationally, had been far more 
adversely affected by the case than white opinion and was much more likely to have a 
longer-lasting negative impact; an indication that the King case could influence opinion 
of any subsequent incident between the police and African Americans, such as the O.J. 
Simpson case.77 Indeed, the King case and the Los Angeles riots provide a central 
backdrop to the reaction of both African Americans and whites in the Simpson case.
The King case and the riots also clearly illustrated the divergent perceptions 
African Americans and whites held about the extent of the problem of police brutality. 
Reactions to the King beating, the trial and to the rioting in Los Angeles that followed 
demonstrate that while the majority of whites abhorred and condemned overt acts of 
racism, many did not perceive it to be symptomatic of more pervasive racism in the 
way that many African Americans did. This divergence in perception between African 
Americans and whites, also explains, to a significant extent, the racial division in 
reactions to the Simpson case. And while reactions to the King case and the Los 
Angeles riots revealed that Clinton’s assertions of the existence of pervasive racism 
was out of touch with whites, reactions to the Simpson case reveal that his 
denunciation of reverse racism was not.
77 Tuch and Weitzer, “Racial Differences in Attitudes Toward the Police”, 642-663.
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7.3 The O.J. Simpson Case, 1994-1995
The acquittal of O.J. Simpson of the murders of Nicole Brown and Ronald 
Goldman in 1995 and the widespread African-American support of the verdict was 
widely perceived by whites as a case of reverse racism. As Kimeberle Williams 
Crenshaw stated:
Of the many startling dimensions of the O J . Simpson saga, perhaps few 
are as remarkable as the manner in which Simpson has been transformed 
into a new symbol of reconfigured vision of racism. . . . Racism 
represented during the civil rights era through images such as white 
lynch mobs proudly displaying their ‘strange fruit’ or defiant white 
defendants acquitted by all-white juries for various racial atrocities, has 
now been represented in snapshots depicting blacks sharing high-fives 
and dancing in the streets to celebrate the acquittal of one of their own.78
African-American response to the Simpson case, however, was not simply a case of 
racial solidarity and/or prejudice but a more complex reaction to pervasive racism in 
American society in general and the Criminal Justice System (CJS) in particular: an 
issue which for African Americans had been graphically illustrated by the Rodney 
King case. A number of whites did interpret African-American reaction this way, 
however, a number did not. Yet, regardless of how it was translated by whites, reverse 
racism helped fuel white feelings of opposition to race-specific policies and
78 Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, “Color-blind Dreams and Racial Nightmares: Reconfiguring Racism in 
the Post-Civil Rights Era” in Toni Morrison and Claudia Brodsky Lacour (eds.), Birth o f a Nation ’hood: 
Gaze, Script and Spectacle in the O.J. Simpson Case (New York: Pantheon Books, 1997). Nicole Brown 
and Ronald Goldman had been fatally stabbed outside Brown’s home on June 12, 1994.
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70initiatives. It was these feelings that Clinton’s reverse racism discourse - used in 
relation to Sister Souljah during the 1992 presidential election campaign, and in 
relation to his affirmative action discourse during the first administration of his 
presidency - tapped into.
At the beginning of one of the most public murder cases in twentieth century 
America, there was considerable inter-racial support for the chief suspect and 
eventually accused, O.J. Simpson. Millions of people watched and supported Simpson 
during the live, televised Bronco chase while hundreds lined the highway, waving
D A
placards and sounding their horns, cheering the fleeing suspect. Simpson was highly 
popular with both African Americans and whites as an American sports hero and actor. 
In many ways Simpson’s celebrity had enabled him to transcend race. As Simpson 
once told reporter, Robert Lipsyte:
My biggest accomplishment is that people look at me like a man first, 
not a black man. I was at a wedding, my wife [Marguerite] and a few 
friends were the only Negroes there, and I overheard a lady say, ‘look 
there’s O.J. Simpson and some niggers.’ Isn’t that weird? That sort of 
thing hurts me, even though it’s what I strive for, to be a man first.81
79 Andrew Hacker, Two Nations: Black and White, Separate, Hostile and Unequal (New York: 
Ballantine Books, 1995), 221; Toni Morrison, “The Unofficial Story: Dead Man Golfing” in Morrison 
and Lacour (eds.), Birth o f  a Nation ’hood.
80 Police had found evidence at Simpson’s Brentwood home linking him to the scene of the crime. He 
submitted to voluntary questioning on June 13, 1994. On June 17 Simpson had agreed to hand himself 
over to police at his lawyer’s office. However, Simpson and long-time friend, A1 Cowlings, fled in 
Simpson’s Bronco. He eventually handed himself over to police at his Brentwood home.
81 Quoted in Jonathan Alter, “Black and White and Read All Over”, Newsweek, August 1, 1994, 18. 
Simpson became separated from his first wife in 1978 and they divorced in 1980.
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When Simpson became the chief suspect in the Brown and Goldman murders, 
however, he quickly began losing his all-American hero status and his aracial 
identification. Very soon, perceptions of the Simpson case became divided along racial 
lines. For a great number of African Americans, the Simpson case quickly began to 
take on huge, symbolic importance.
African Americans became concerned with the way that as Simpson was 
emerging as the villain of the crime, he was also regaining his blackness. African
O '}
Americans saw that the media soon began recasting Simpson. Within days of the 
murders, a startling new image of the all-American hero began to appear in the press. 
Simpson emerged as a violently obsessive man as news stories revealed shocking 
details about his abusive marriage to Brown. The media reported how police had been 
called to the Simpson’s home, and to Brown’s residence following their divorce, on 
numerous occasions.83 Transcripts of Brown’s 911 calls were published, allowing 
Americans to read her desperate pleas for help: . .he broke the back door to get in . ..
. He’s f—ing going nuts.. . .  He’s going to beat the s— out of me.”84
82 Crenshaw, “Color-blind Dreams and Racial Nightmares”; Gibbs, Race and Justice; Morrison and 
Lacour (eds.), Birth o f a Nation 'hood.
83 During the divorce, Brown cited that she had suffered abuse at the hands o f Simpson since 1977 - the 
year they had met. Brown only pressed charges after one incident in 1989, however, and Simpson 
pleaded no contest to spousal battery.
84 Quoted in Josh Meyer and Andrea Ford, “911 Tapes Tell of Stormy Simpson Relationship”, Los 
Angeles Times, June 23, 1994, 1. The excerpt comes from a 911 call placed by Brown on October 25, 
1993 after Simpson broke into her home.
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At the same time, newspaper and magazine articles focused on Simpson’s roots 
in the black section of San Francisco, Potrero Hill. An article in the Los Angeles Times, 
for example, reminisced on Simpson’s rise to fame:
The boy who wore braces on his legs because of rickets survived the 
projects to become one of the greatest running backs in pro football. The 
popular teenager, a natural leader in the ghetto, went on to win fame as a
Q C
television pitchman and football commentator.
In the minds of many African Americans it was as if the media was reminding or 
reinforcing to Americans where the fallen all-American hero had come from. As one 
resident of Potrero Hill stated: “O.J. lived in their world. He was created by Hollywood 
and Madison Avenue. He was the token they loved to love. Suddenly he slips and 
everyone starts talking about Potrero Hill.”86 The pinnacle of the racial recasting of 
Simpson came with the infamous issue of Time Magazine. Time printed a digitally 
altered image of Simpson on its front cover, which made him appear blacker.87 
Simpson the all-American hero had been transformed into the mythical black villain of 
ancient white fears. As one African American sarcastically told the U.S. News & World
85 Richard C. Paddock and Jennifer Warren, “I Was Somebody Who Didn’t Care About Anything”, Los 
Angeles Times, June 18, 1994, 8.
86 Quoted in Richard Rodriguez, “Is It Really Because O.J. Simpson is Black?”, U.S. News & World 
Report, July 4, 1994, 7.
87 Time June 27, 1994. Serving as a contrast, Newsweek used the same image of Simpson in its June 27 
issue, but had not digitally altered it like Time.
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Report: “O.J. turns out to be a nigger, after all. He’s the boogeyman who will murder 
your blond daughter.”88
As Simpson emerged as the black villain in the eyes of the media and much of 
the American public, African Americans grew increasingly defensive of Simpson and 
offered him unwavering support. A New York Times poll in June 1994, found that 74% 
of African Americans were sympathetic towards Simpson, compared to 38% of 
whites.89 Similarly, a USA Today-CNN-Gallup poll found that 77% of African 
Americans were sympathetic to Simpson, compared to 42% of whites. Furthermore, 
60% of African American respondents in the poll stated that they believed Simpson 
was innocent; only 15% of whites stated the same.90
Reflecting concern with the broader issue of injustice within the CJS, a number 
of African Americans were not only critical of Simpson’s racial recasting by the media 
but also questioned Simpson’s treatment by the police in the investigation. Much 
debated was Simpson’s handcuffing upon his arrival back in Los Angeles for voluntary 
questioning.91 As one African-American lawyer, stated:
88 Quoted in Rodriguez, “Is It Really Because O.J. Simpson is Black?”, 7. For a discussion of the media 
in the Simpson case see Morrison and Lacour, Birth o f  a Nation ’hood; Paul Thaler, The Spectacle: 
Media and the Making o f the O.J. Simpson Story (Connecticut: Praeger, 1997).
89 Richard Lee Colvin, “Half Say They Are Sympathetic Toward Simpson”, New York Times, June 28, 
1994, 16.
90 “Poll Finds Simpson Opinions Split Along Racial Lines” Chicago Tribune, July 6, 1994, 10; Gibbs, 
Race and Justice.
91 Simpson had flown to Chicago on the night of the murders for a business meeting. He arrived back in 
L.A. and submitted to voluntary questioning on June 13, 1994. See Beckett and Sasson, The Politics of  
Injustice; Hagan and Patterson (eds.), Crime and Inequality in America; Richey Mann, Unequal Justice; 
Spohn, “Courts, Sentences, and Prisons”; Tonry, Malign Neglect; Walker, Spohn, Delone, Race, 
Ethnicity and Crime in America.
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My buttons were pushed when O.J. was handcuffed initially, not as [a] 
suspect but a person who may be able to provide information. . . .  I 
don’t want to suggest that this is all racial, but having served as a 
prosecutor, I realized that at that stage, O.J. was not a suspect. It wasn’t 
appropriate to put on the handcuffs . . .  he was going to speak to police, 
he was not combative. The handcuffs illustrated at an early stage that the 
LAPD were inappropriately exercising their discretion.
Similarly, another African American questioned the different treatment of Simpson 
compared to serial killer Jeffrey Dahmer.93 They questioned: “Why was Simpson 
handcuffed not long after he returned from Chicago after learning of the murder of his 
ex-spouse, and Dahmer wasn’t?” An article in the Los Angeles Sentinel stated of the 
handcuffing: “It was nothing but the kind of pre-lynching parading that has always 
taken place, whether they had the right man or not.”94 The sentiments expressed here 
were reflective of the feelings of a significant number of African Americans. A 
Newsweek poll found that 30% of African Americans claimed that Simpson had been 
treated worse than a white murder suspect, compared to 5% of whites.95
African-American doubts and criticisms of the investigation intensified with 
media revelations that the defence planned to attack the credibility of a prosecution 
chief witness, Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) detective Mark Fuhrman.96 The
92 Quoted in Lynnell George, “Focus on Simpson Troubling for Blacks”, Los Angeles Times, July 10, 
1994, 22.
93 Jeffrey Dahmer, dubbed the Milwaukee Cannibal, murdered 17 mainly black, Asian and Hispanic 
young men before being apprehended in 1991.
94 A. Asadullah Samad, “O.J.: Can Even an American Hero Get Justice in America? ”, Los Angeles 
Sentinel, June 30, 1994, 1. A number of other African Americans - 40% - believed that Simpson was 
being treated better than ordinary African Americans due to his celebrity status. Sixty-five percent of 
whites also shared this view. Alter, “Black and White and Read All Over”, 18.
95 Quoted in Alter, “Black and White and Read All Over”, 18.
96 The strategy was to be revealed in the July 25, 1994 editions of the New Yorker and Newsweek. 
However, national newspapers including the New York Times and the Los Angeles Times reported on the
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reports revealed that Fuhrman’s credibility had previously been questioned during a 
disability pension application in 1982. Moreover, the details of the psychological 
evaluation Fuhrman underwent as part of the application revealed deeply racist 
attitudes. Fuhrman was quoted as saying that after six months as a marine he “. . . got 
tired of having Mexicans and niggers that should be in prison telling [him] they 
weren’t going to do something.”97 Despite attempts by Robert Shapiro for the defence 
to stress that the issue of concern was Fuhrman’s credibility, the issue of race in the 
case, with reference to Fuhrman in particular, escalated throughout the summer. In 
August the defence sought to gain access to the personnel records of four police 
officers involved in the case, including Fuhrman. According to Johnnie Cochran, the 
defence wanted access to records that would show Fuhrman had a history of racial bias. 
Cochran claimed that Fuhrman “. . . harbors racial animosity toward African 
Americans and more specifically, toward African Americans who are married to 
Caucasians.”98
By the end of the summer, while polls showed that support for Simpson from 
African Americans had dipped slightly, it was still very firm at 68%.99 To a significant
planned revelations on July 19, 1994. Mark Fuhrman was one of four detectives to arrive at the scene of 
the murder and to go to Simpson’s home in Brentwood. It was he who found the blood-stained glove that 
matched the one at the scene of the crime.
97 Quoted in Jim Newton and Henry Weinstein, “Simpson Lawyers Attack Key Detective’s Credibility”, 
Los Angeles Times, July 19, 1994, 15.
98 Quoted in Seth Mydans, “Tempers Flare as Lawyers in the Simpson Case Raise Questions of Race”, 
New York Times, August 30, 1994, 14. The motion was denied. Disputes over what role race should play 
in the case were a source of much division in the defence team, in particular between Robert Shapiro and 
Johnnie Cochran. There was also a division between Shapiro and F. Lee Bailey.
99 Rich Connell and Richard Lee Colvin, “Most in Country Still Uncertain in Simpson Case”, New York 
Times, September 26, 1994,20.
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degree this support was influenced by his racial recasting in the media, perceived 
mistreatment by police and allegations of racism against a chief prosecution witness, an 
LAPD detective. For a large number of African Americans, even before the trial, 
support for Simpson had begun to take on a symbolic value.
Race was unabashedly employed in the case by the defence during the trial.100 
The defence hailed Simpson as the victim of unreliable evidence, unreliable witnesses 
and fundamentally a racist conspiracy from within the LAPD. This argument was not 
easy to dispute following the revelations of the Christopher Commission. The 
cornerstone of the defence’s attack was Fuhrman. The prosecution had challenged the 
defence’s request to allow the use of the word ‘nigger’ in the trial, warning Judge 
Lance Ito: “If you allow Mr. Cochran to use this word and play the race card . . .  the 
direction and focus of the case changes: it is a race case now.”101 Use of the word was 
granted, however, and the defence introduced graphic evidence that questioned 
Fuhrman’s racial attitude and his credibility.102 A letter to the defence from estate
100 For an account of the trial see Joseph Bosco and William Morrow, A Problem o f  Evidence: How the 
Prosecution Freed O.J. Simpson (New York: W. Morrow & Co., 1996); V. Bugliosi, Outrage: Five 
Reasons O.J. Got Away With Murder (New York: Norton, 1996); Marcia Clark and Teresa Carpenter, 
Without a Doubt (New York: Penguin, 1998); Janet Cotterill, Language and Power in the Court: A 
Linguistic Analysis o f the O.J. Simpson Trial (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003); Christopher 
Darden, In Contempt (New York: Harper Collins, 1995); Alan M. Dershowitz, Reasonable Doubts: O.J. 
Simpson and the Criminal Justice System (New York: Pocket Books, 1997); Frank Schmalleger, Trial o f  
the Century: People o f the State o f  California vs. O.J. Simpson (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1996); Janice 
Schuetz and Lin S. Lilley (eds.), The O.J. Simpson Trials: Rhetoric, Media and the Law (Chicago: 
Southern Illinois University Press, 1999); Jeffrey Toobin, The Run o f His Life: The People vs. O.J. 
Simpson (New York: Random, 1997).
101 Quoted in Kenneth B. Noble, “Issue of Racism Erupts in Simpson Trial”, New York Times, January 
14, 1995, 7. The defence wanted to introduce evidence that Furhman had used the word ‘nigger’.
102 While the jury only heard a small segment of the evidence against Fuhrman, media coverage of the 
trial and in particular the legal wrangling over the admission of evidence, ensured near saturation 
coverage for the American public.
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agent, Kathleen Bell, who had met Fuhrman 10 years previously at a marine 
recruitment station revealed Fuhrman’s animosity towards inter-racial couples. The 
letter read: “Officer Fuhrman said that when he sees a ‘nigger’ (as he calls it), driving 
with a white woman, he would pull them over. . . .  I asked would [sic] if he didn’t 
have a reason, and he said he would find one.”103 Two other witnesses also testified 
that Fuhrman had used the word ‘nigger’ to refer to African Americans.104 It was the 
introduction of the Fuhrman tapes in the case, however, that really bolstered the race 
issue.
The alleged purpose of the tapes was to challenge Fuhrman’s credibility by 
proving that he had lied in previous testimony about not having used racial epithets. 
The tapes, however, did much more than that. Recorded by Laura Hart McKinney as 
part of the scriptwriting project, in the tapes, Fuhrman spoke of torturing suspects: “. . . 
their faces were just mush. They had pictures of the walls with blood all the way to the 
ceiling and fingermarks of trying to crawl out of the room.” He also boasted about the 
code of silence employed by police: “Most of the guys worked 77th [street division] 
together. We were tight. I mean, we could have murdered people. We knew what to 
say.”105 Fuhrman also expressed his opinion of African Americans: “Nigger drivin’ a 
porsche that doesn’t look like he’s got a $300 suit on, you always stop him.”106 The
103 Quoted in David Margolick, “‘Nervous’ Detective Testifies on Simpson”, New York Times, March 
10, 1995, 18. Fuhrman could not recall meeting Kathleen Bell and denied making any racist comments.
104 The witnesses were Natalie Singer and Roderick Hodge.
105 Quoted in Jim Newton and Henry Weinstein, “Detective Recalls Beatings, Lying to Officers in 
Interview Tapes”, Washington Post, August 18, 1995, A3.
106 “'phg Purhman Tapes”, Los Angeles Times, August 30, 1995, 14.
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Fuhrman tapes were the ‘soundtrack to the Rodney King video’, confirming the 
negative perception African Americans had of the police.107
The defence’s use of race culminated in a highly contentious closing argument 
by Cochran. Having compared Fuhrman - “. . . a genocidal racist . . . ” - to Hitler, 
Cochran urged the jury to send a message to the police with their verdict. He stated: 
“Your verdict talks about justice in America, and it talks about the police and whether
1 n o
they’re above the law.” Cochran urged the jury: “Stop this cover up! . . .  Stop this
cover up! If you don’t stop it, then who?”109
The defence’s approach in the trial was fervently debated. The vast majority of
African Americans - 87% - approved of the way in which the defence handled the
case.110 On the other hand, a majority of whites - 55% - disapproved of the way in
which the defence handled the case, and 69% believed that the defence had used race
inappropriately.111 These results reflected white opposition to the perceived
107 Brent Staples, “The Rodney King Soundtrack”, New York Times, September 11, 1995, 14; William 
Claiborne and Kathryn Wexler, “Tapes Hit Home for L.A. Blacks”, Washington Post, August 31, 1995, 
A16. Unlike much of the public, the jury only heard two excerpts from the tapes, one played and the 
other read aloud. Fuhrman maintained that the tapes were a work of fiction and while he later apologised 
for making the statements he denied that they reflected his views or how he operated as a police officer. 
Mark Fuhrman, Murder in Brentwood (Washington D.C.: Regnery Publishing, 1997). For analysis of the 
relationship between African Americans and the LAPD, and the police nationally see Davis, City o f  
Quartz; Owens and Browning, Lying Eyes; Gibbs, Race and Justice; USCCR, Racial and Ethnic 
Tensions in American Communities; Hagan and Peterson (eds.), Crime and Inequality; Ogletree Jr. et al, 
Beyond Rodney King; USCCR, Revisiting ‘Who is Guarding the Guardians
108 Quoted in Jim Newton and Andrea Ford, “Acquit Simpson and Send Police a Message, Cochran 
Urges Jury”, Los Angeles Times, September 28, 1995, 1.
109 Quoted in Jim Newton, Tim Rutten, Jones Rainey, “Jury Urged to Free Simpson as Act of Courage, 
Social Justice”, Los Angeles Times, September 29, 1995, 1.
110 Cathleen Decker, “Most in County Disagree With Verdict”, Los Angeles Times, October 8, 1995, 36.
111 “Race and the Verdict: Poll”, Los Angeles Times, October 10, 1995, 52. Only 12% of African 
Americans agreed.
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preoccupation with race amongst African Americans. Furthermore, such feelings 
increased with the announcement of the Simpson verdict.
When the not guilty verdict by the majority black jury was announced on 
October 3, 1995, 77% of African Americans agreed with it, with 68% agreeing 
strongly.112 The majority of whites condemned it, however, with 65% disagreeing with 
the verdict, and 51% disagreeing strongly.113 A majority of whites also believed that 
jury nullification had occurred.114 According to a national poll in the Los Angeles 
Times, 56% of whites said the jury had made its decision based on their own personal 
prejudices.115 A Washington Post poll also showed that 49% of whites thought the jury 
ignored the evidence and decided the case on feelings and emotions.116 District 
Attorney Gil Garcetti’s response to the verdict reflected white opinion. At a press 
conference following the verdict Garcetti claimed of the jury: “Apparently their 
decision was based on emotion that overcame reason.”117 Lead prosecutor, Marcia 
Clark, also caused a wave of controversy by allegedly telling a CNN correspondent: “..
112 Decker, “Most in County Disagree With Verdict”, 36.
113 Decker, “Most in County Disagree With Verdict”, 36. The make-up of the jury altered during the 
course of the trial as two jurors were dismissed, but remained substantially black. In the beginning there 
were eight African Americans, two Hispanics, one white and one mixed race (white-native American). 
At the end of the trial there were nine African Americans, two whites and one Hispanic. From the 
beginning, whites had charged that the majority black jury would be biased in favour of Simpson. 
Following the verdict, 63% of whites nationally thought that the jury had been biased in favour of 
Simpson; 71% of African Americans disagreed. Decker, “Most in County Disagree With Verdict”, 36.
114 Gibbs, Race and Justice, Hacker, Two Nations.
115 Decker, “Most in County Disagree With Verdict”, 36. Only 18% of blacks agreed.
116 Morin, “Poll Reflects Division Over Simpson Case”, A31. Eighty-two percent of African Americans 
disagreed.
117 Quoted in William Claiborne, “Acquitted, O.J. Simpson Goes Home”, Washington Post, October 4, 
1995, A l.
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. liberals don’t want to admit it, but a majority black jury won’t convict in a case like 
this.”118
For many whites the verdict was completely unjust and a blatant act of reverse 
racism. One California resident argued that the Simpson verdict was as unjust as the 
King verdict:
The last time I was this shocked by a verdict and thought it was this 
wrong was the original Rodney King decision. . . . What’s going on in 
this town . . .  is that we’re using our legal system as a manifestation of 
our racism - and it wrecks [that] legal system.119
A number of whites, in fact, regarded the verdict as pay-back over the King verdict. 
Police officer Mark Aragon, stated:
I honestly believe if they had caught O.J. on film committing the 
murders they would have found him not guilty. . . . They would have 
said it was Fuhrman in an O.J. mask. This had nothing to do with two
1,8 Quoted in “Marcia Clark Says Verdict is No Surprise”, Chicago Tribune, October 6, 1995, 1.8. Clark 
denied making the comment during a conversation she regarded as being off-record and claimed she had 
been misquoted. For a discussion of the role race played in the verdict and in African-American and 
white opinion of the verdict see John C. Brigham and Adina W. Wasserman, “The Impact o f Race, 
Racial Attitude, and Gender on Reactions to the Criminal Trial of O.J. Simpson”, Journal o f  Applied 
Social Psychology 29.7 (1999): 1333-1370; Carl E. Enomoto, “Public Sympathy for O.J. Simpson: The 
Roles of Race, Age, Gender, Income and Education”, American Journal o f Economics and Sociology 
58.1 (1999): 145-161; Christen D. Iannone et al, “The Impact of Racial Identification on Courtroom 
Verdicts”, Psychology 34.1 (1997): 52-57; Daniel Latedresse et al, “Black Identity: The O.J. Simpson 
Case”, Journal o f  Social Distress and the Homeless 5.3 (1996): 273-303; K.D. Mixon et al, “The 
Influence of Racial Similarity on the O.J. Simpson Trial”, Journal o f  Social Behavior and Personality 
10.3 (1995): 481-490; Paul Skolnick and Jerry I. Shaw, “The O.J. Simpson Criminal Trial Verdict: 
Racism or Status Shield”, Journal o f Social Issues 53.3 (1997): 503-516.
119 Quoted in John L. Mitchell and Jeff Leeds, “Reaction: High-Voltage Jury, Angry Denouncements”, 
Los Angeles Times, October 4, 1995, A7.
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people being murdered. It had to do with the police department on trial. 
. .  It just really gets under your skin.120
For these white Americans the verdict was a clear case of reverse racism. As another 
white American wrote in a letter to the Atlanta Journal and Constitution:
Now that the O.J. verdict is known, I no longer believe that a group of 
blacks on a jury can convict a black man on a crime of murder 
perpetrated against a white. Blacks are inherently racist. They are bigots 
as a rule. . . . The black mindset is just as bad as the Nazi mindset, and
191should be treated as such.
This statement is the reverse of what many African Americans charge about white 
juries and black defendants. The reaction of other whites revealed a feeling of betrayal 
amongst once-liberal whites -  the demographic Clinton sought to appeal to. As another 
letter to the Atlanta Journal and Constitution read:
You blacks are stupid. . . .  You probably think that the gains your race 
has made toward equality in the past 35 years are due primarily to efforts 
of your race. Trust me . . . you had plenty of help from the likes of white 
liberals like me. But now the light has turned on. . . .  I may be slow, but 
eventually I get it. You may have legalized murder by blacks today, but 
tomorrow you may have trouble getting on a jury. Racism you want? 
Racism you got.122
120 Quoted in Jeff Brazil and James Rainey, “LAPD Was on Trial, Say Angry Officers”, Los Angeles 
Times, October 4, 1995, A8.
121 “Letters”, Atlanta Journal and Constitution, October 4, 1995, 13A.
122 “Letters”, Atlanta Journal and Constitution, 13A.
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The sentiments expressed in this letter were reflective of the reactionary shift to the 
right by a large number of whites in the post-Civil Rights era. Many whites were 
troubled by both the verdict and widespread African-American approval and 
celebration of it, which they also regarded as the expression of explicit reverse racism. 
As one white man stated: “I do not trust blacks now. They have proven that they are 
worse racists than any whites.”123 Another stated: “I felt deep disgust when I saw black 
people cheering and celebrating the acquittal of a double murderer.”124
Some whites accepted jurors’ claims that the verdict was based on reasonable 
doubt. They acknowledged that the racial divide in opinion on the verdict was because 
interpretations of reasonable doubt were markedly different for African Americans and 
whites, principally because of the King case. As one journalist expressed, in the New 
York Times’.
For most of us who are white, the evidence against O.J. Simpson was 
conclusive. . . . But black Americans could not so easily dismiss the 
idea of a police conspiracy. They did not need a lawyer’s evidence to 
believe that police all over the country have it in for blacks, beat them, 
manufacture evidence against them. They know what happened to 
Rodney King, and they knew how effective the state of California was in 
prosecuting the policemen who beat him.125
A Los Angeles Times poll illustrated the different perception African Americans and 
whites held of law enforcement: 84% of blacks claimed that local police or sheriffs
123 Quoted in Mark Whitaker, “. . .and Division”, Newsweek, October 16, 1995, 14.
124 “Letters”, Atlanta Journal-Constitution, 13A.
125 Anthony Lewis, “An American Dilemma”, New York Times, October 6, 1995, 31.
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treated African Americans harsher than whites, yet only 36% of whites agreed.126 The 
poll also found that 75% of African Americans said that racist feelings were common 
among local police or sheriffs. Again, only 38% of whites agreed while 47% of whites 
disagreed. Furthermore, the poll found that 68% of African Americans said it was 
common for local police or sheriffs to give false testimony, while 67% of whites said it
1 97was uncommon. African American perceptions of the CJS did indeed play a 
significant role in black views of the Simpson verdict.
African-American support of the verdict was somewhat more complex than the 
charge of reverse racism implied. Some African Americans supported the verdict 
because they agreed with the defence’s argument that Simpson was the victim of a 
racist police conspiracy. As one African-American supporter stated: “Well, now that 
they’ve found that he’s not guilty, I’m glad, because that framing has been going on for 
years. It has now been brought out.”128 According to a Washington Post poll seven-out- 
of-ten African Americans believed that there had been a police conspiracy against 
Simpson.129 This was especially troubling, however, given Simpson’s celebrity status. 
As another African American stated: “If they could do all this to O.J. a man with all his 
money, imagine what they could do to a poor man.”130 Other African Americans were
126 “Race & Verdicts”, 52. Fifty percent of whites stated they were treated the same.
127 “Race & Verdicts”, 52.
128 Quoted in Fareed Muwwakkil, “Residents Respond to Jury Decision”, Los Angeles Sentinel, October 
5, 1995, 1.
129 For a discussion of conspiracy theories and African Americans see Gibbs, Race and Justice, Chapter 
11 .
130 Quoted in Byron P. White and Paul de la Garza, ‘Trial Places a Spotlight on Racial Divisions 
Plaguing America”, Chicago Tribune, October 1, 1995, 1.
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slightly less convinced by the idea of a conspiracy, but believed that there was 
reasonable doubt and supported the verdict for that reason.131
A great number of African Americans, however, supported the verdict despite 
believing Simpson to be guilty. According to the poll of Los Angeles County, 61% of
1 ^9those who supported the verdict did not believe that Simpson was innocent. The 
large proportion of this support, however, was not based simply on racial solidarity and 
prejudice, that is, reverse racism. A number of African Americans who believed that 
Simpson was guilty supported the verdict because they saw it as payback for the racism 
suffered by African Americans. As one resident of South Central stated: “I’m happy 
for the verdict. . . .  I think he did it, but this is just a little payback for all the things 
black people have had to take off the LAPD.” Another resident of South Central 
agreed: “I’m not going to be a hypocrite.. . .  Even if he did kill her, a lot of us are glad 
he got off. That can’t begin to balance out all the black men who been lynched, jailed, 
beaten, for things they didn’t do.”133 For a number of African Americans their response 
was not about Simpson so much as a reflection of their anger and frustrations over the 
treatment of African Americans in the CJS. As one African American expressed: “Poor 
blacks don’t give a damn about O.J. . . . It’s not O.J. they give a damn about. He’s a 
movie star. It’s the system they’re angry about. It’s the cops that beat them. It’s their
131 Gibbs, Race and Justice, Hacker, Two Nations.
132 Decker, “Most in County Disagree With Verdict”, 36.
133 Quoted in Tom Kenworthy and Jon Jeter, “At the Emotional Epicenter, Cheers, Jeers and . . . 
Shopping”, Washington Post, October 4, 1995, 31.
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kids in jail.”134 Similarly another African American stated in the Los Angeles Times'. 
“If you haven’t been pulled over and patted down, then the O.J. verdict doesn’t make 
much sense. If you have, it makes all the good, sweet, sense in the world.”135
Many African Americans in supporting the verdict were also applauding the 
fact that class had transcended race. As one Howard University law student articulated: 
“The issue is, for once in a lifetime, a black man was able to afford adequate 
representation.. . .  We can now do what white people have been doing all the time.” 
Even those who believed Simpson was guilty were celebrating the ability of an African 
American to play the system like rich whites were able to do. As a letter to the Atlanta 
Journal-Constitution read: “For too many times in my short lifetime I’ve watched rich 
white guys get away with murder. Finally, we’ve moved to a time when there is 
equality among the ultra-rich if not for the rest of us. Remember, Claus von Bulow 
walked also.”137
A number of whites did perceive that the response of many African Americans 
who supported the verdict but believed Simpson was guilty was motivated by anger 
and frustrations toward racism within American society in general and the CJS in 
particular. Yet, whatever the underlying reason behind African-American support, the 
expression of reverse racism that the verdict and African-American support of it was
134 Quoted in White and de la Garza, “Trial Places a Spotlight on Racial Divisions”, 1.
135 Quoted in Robert A. Jones, “Mirroring Deep Divide Among Us”, Los Angeles Times, October 4,
1995, B l.
136 Quoted in Paul Duggan, “Washington Comes to a Stop”, Washington Post, October 4, 1995, 1.
137 “Letters”, Atlanta Journal-Constitution, October 11, 1995, 12A.
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widely perceived to embody, helped fuel a backlash in race relations. Polls at the time 
showed that 61% of whites thought that the trial had hurt race relations. Furthermore, 
in a Los Angeles Times poll, 66% of whites stated that they believed that African 
Americans often used race as an excuse to justify wrongdoing.138 For a number of 
whites, the case stood as proof that too much emphasis was being placed upon race. As 
was stated in the Los Angeles Times:
It is nearly 30 years since we made the fateful decision to start down the 
road of righting wrongs by group, and doing so by officially treating 
different groups differently. In America today we routinely hire, 
promote and even fire on the basis of race. The shock felt across much 
of America at 1pm Tuesday was the awful realization that perhaps now 
we acquit murderers on the basis of race too. The Simpson verdict 
should not surprise. We have lived now for a generation under a theory 
that declares that for officially designated victim classes the ordinary 
rules do not apply.139
From the beginning, African-American support for Simpson was largely a 
reaction to the role many African Americans perceived race was playing in the case. As 
the case progressed and culminated in the not guilty verdict African-American support 
was a combination of those who believed in his innocence, those who believed there 
was reasonable doubt and those who believed he was guilty. Support from many of 
those who believed in his innocence and those who believed there was reasonable 
doubt was influenced by African-American perceptions of racism in the LAPD and the
138 Morin, “Poll Reflects Division Over Simpson Case”, A31.
139 Charles Krauthammer, “America’s Show Trial: The Trial Was About Political Message Sending”, 
Los Angeles Times, October 6, 1995, A25.
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CJS, which had been highlighted by King case in 1991-1992. Similarly, support from 
many of those who believed he was guilty was largely a reaction to the pervasive 
racism endured by African Americans in society in general and in the CJS in particular. 
Yet, as the King case and Los Angeles riots illustrated, there was a wide disparity 
between African-American and white perceptions of the existence of pervasive racism. 
As such, African Americans who supported Simpson despite believing him to be guilty 
did so because of what the case symbolised. Yet, this support was widely regarded by 
whites as a display of reverse racism. This in turn helped fuel white feelings of 
opposition towards race-conscious policies and initiatives. It was the feelings displayed 
in relation to the Simpson verdict that Clinton successfully tapped into with his attack 
on reverse racism during the 1992 presidential election campaign, and through his 
reverse racism discourse in relation to affirmative action; both of which were not 
simply an electoral strategy to appeal to white voters, but was also reflective of his 
neo-liberal philosophy.
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Conclusion
It cannot be denied that the Post-Civil Rights era has witnessed enormous 
progress in America’s racial situation. Since 1968, the racial attitudes of white 
Americans have continued in the progressive trend that began in the 1940s. In 
contemporary America, the vast majority of whites ardently endorse racial equality. 
African Americans have also made significant gains in their socio-economic status. 
The post-Civil Rights era has seen steady progress in educational attainment, advances 
in occupational status, and increases in incomes. Yet, while it is important not to 
dismiss these gains, it is also imperative to acknowledge that despite these advances, a 
large disparity continues to exist between the general socio-economic status of African 
Americans and whites. Furthermore, African Americans continue to testify that race 
remains a significant feature in their life experiences. Many whites, of course, duly 
share this perception. Many others, however, do not. Moreover, the post-Civil Rights 
period has witnessed an opposition amongst whites to racial policies due to their 
ineffectiveness and/or legitimacy and an increase in support for conservative racial 
policies. The aim of the dissertation has been to uncover the extent to which support of 
racial conservatism amongst whites is evidence of a new coded racism, which has 
evolved as part of the transition of racial ideology and discourse on race in the late 
1960s.
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Following the immense social upheavals of the 1960s, in the 1968 presidential 
election Richard Nixon succeeded in exploiting the reactionary opinion of a significant 
proportion of white voters to return the Republican Party to the White House. The 
election of Nixon heralded the beginning of the conservative ascendancy in American 
politics and society. The election also marked the beginning of a new political 
realignment in which race was a definitive factor. Increasingly in the post-Civil Rights 
era, the Republican Party became associated with white Americans and the Democratic 
Party with African Americans. The use of coded words, symbols and phrases was one 
of the principal ways in which all of this was achieved. Yet the use of coded racial 
politics was part of a transition in America’s racial ideology and discourse on race, 
which ensured the maintenance of racism in post-Civil Rights America. Although Bill 
Clinton in 1992 advanced a neo-liberal philosophy that sought to further rearticulate 
the racial politics of the post-Civil Rights period, as part of this, he too, engaged in the 
use of coded racial messages to voters.
The dissertation, through the method of discourse analysis, has sought to 
examine the use of coded racial politics between the Nixon and Clinton administrations 
and explore their reproduction in American society. In this endeavour, the dissertation 
has demonstrated the use of coded racial politics by Presidents, during election 
campaigns and throughout presidencies. An analysis of presidential and public 
discourse has illustrated that the coded racial political issues of law and order, fear of 
crime, soft on crime and reverse racism, used by Nixon, Reagan, Bush and Clinton
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respectively, all succeeded in tapping into public concern with these issues. 
Alternatively, Carter’s discourse in relation to affirmative action failed to tap into 
public concern with preferential treatment, as indeed did Clinton’s pervasive racism 
discourse in relation to affirmative action, which failed to resonate with whites more 
concerned with reverse discrimination. The question remains, however, to what extent 
was support for these issues dependent on racial feelings.
Public discourse surrounding the Attica prison riot, 1971, illustrated that while 
the responses of some whites were overtly racial, the reactions of the majority of 
whites were based on a concern with law and order, with no apparent racial motivation. 
Opinion polls demonstrated, however, that particularly in the aftermath of urban 
rioting, law and order was perceived in racial terms by the majority of white 
Americans. Furthermore, Attica was not simply a protest over prison conditions, it had 
distinct racial elements, which were disseminated through the media. The media also 
helped to racialise the event in the public mind through debating the event in racial 
terms. If nothing else, Attica served to heighten the link between law and order and 
race. Moreover, the Republican response to the riot also helped to increase the 
identification of the party as the party of law and order, and hence its appeal to white 
voters for whom law and order was a racial issue as well as to those for whom it was 
not.
Public response to the Miami riot, 1980, demonstrated the role that possession 
of the dominant political language played in obtaining and maintaining political power.
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Responses to the riot illustrated that Carter’s discourse in relation to affirmative action 
was out of touch with many whites, who interpreted the policy as preferential treatment 
-  a coded political term used by Reagan. The Miami riot revealed that African 
Americans were suffering from socio-economic deprivation and racial discrimination 
much as they had in the 1960s. Yet, while a number of whites expressed sympathy 
towards African Americans, and also an understanding towards the rioting, most whites 
reacted in horror. More specifically, they objected to Carter’s response to the riot, 
which they perceived as bowing to mob rule and awarding blacks preferential 
treatment. Whilst, for the majority of whites, this opposition was not based on negative 
racial feelings, for a clear minority it was. Furthermore, opposition to preferential 
treatment was largely a white affair, as such it existed as a potent appeal to white voters 
whether or not racial animus underlay its attraction. Moreover, whether intentional or 
not, opposition to affirmative action was inimical to black needs.
Responses to the Bernhard Goetz subway shootings, 1984, provided a clear 
illustration of the level of concern with violent crime in 1980s America. Once again, 
only the reactions of a minority of whites to the case revealed overtly racial feelings 
regarding crime. For the most part, support of Goetz was seemingly aracial, arising 
purely out of a sense of frustration and despair towards violent crime in the nation’s 
cities. An analysis of counter discourse surrounding the case, however, reveals that 
concern existed, particularly amongst African Americans, with the extent to which race 
influenced public support of Goetz. Certainly, the racialisation of crime in the public
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mind - particularly through the media - has been well documented. Responses to the 
Howard Beach case, 1986, explicitly revealed the racial feelings underlying 
perceptions of crime amongst a significant proportion of white Americans, for whom 
fear of crime meant a fear of blacks.
Reactions to the Central Park jogger case, 1989, and the Carol Stuart case, 
1989, provided further evidence of the level of concern with crime in America and the 
demand for tough and decisive action as a response to the problem. Although the 
majority of reactions to the cases were not overtly racist, a significant proportion were. 
Without a doubt, the dramatic response to both cases amongst the public, politicians 
and the media, did reveal the significance of race on reactions to crimes, particularly 
interracial crimes against women. An analysis of counter discourse in both cases also 
starkly illustrated the racial double standard regarding crime held in American society.
Like Carter, Clinton’s discourse received mixed fortunes. Reactions to the 
Rodney King case and the Los Angeles riots, 1991-1992, illustrated the different 
perceptions regarding pervasive racism, generally speaking, held by African Americans 
and whites. While the vast majority of whites, like African Americans, condemned the 
verdict in the case, as they had the beating a year previously, many did not perceive the 
acquittal as evidence of a wider pattern of racial injustice in the way the majority of 
whites did. In that sense, Clinton’s pervasive racism discourse expressed in relation to 
affirmative action was out of touch with a significant proportion of white Americans. 
This was similarly illustrated by reactions to the O.J. Simpson case, 1994-1995. The
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King case and the Los Angeles riots, in fact, provide a central backdrop to the reaction 
of both African Americans and whites in the Simpson case. As well as having a direct 
impact on African-American opinion of the Simpson case, they also go some way to 
explaining the racial divergence of opinion on the verdict in the trial. African- 
American approval of the verdict in the case was largely a reaction to the perception of 
the existence of pervasive racism. Whites, not sharing the same perception of pervasive 
racism, regarded the verdict and African-American support and indeed celebration of it 
as an expression of reverse racism and evidence that too much focus wrongly placed 
upon race since the civil rights era had resulted in black racism against whites. Thus, 
while Clinton was out of touch with whites with his pervasive racism discourse, his 
reverse racism discourse was very much in synch with many white Americans. While 
white reactions to the verdict and to African-American support of the verdict revealed 
some level of racism and certainly a degree of anti-black feeling, for the most part, 
white charges of reverse racism betrayed no racist element. As such, reverse racism, 
appealed and promoted the negative racial feelings held by some whites, but for the 
majority of whites the attraction, at least consciously, was non-racist. In helping to fuel 
opposition to racial policies, however, reverse racism, had an adverse effect upon 
African Americans.
In summation, for the majority of whites, the appeal of coded racial political 
issues (at least those examined in this dissertation), appear to be based, at least 
consciously, on non-racial feelings. Concern with law and order and crime, frustration
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towards leniency and ineffectiveness within the Criminal Justice System, and the 
demand for tougher action, as well as the concern that affirmative action programs and 
policies discriminated against whites were, for the most part, aracial. Yet, it is clear that 
the intention behind the use of coded racial politics was to manipulate and capitalise on 
latent racial feelings. In each case, though perhaps in varying degrees, this was 
successfully achieved. Moreover, in exploiting racial feelings and attitudes, the use of 
coded racial politics also succeeded in legitimising and fuelling negative racial beliefs. 
Furthermore, because of the ambiguous nature of coded racial politics, many 
consciously non-racist whites, unconsciously became the unwitting proponents of 
coded racism.
In describing the role of coded racial politics in the reproduction of racism 
within American society, it is important to stress that, as the dissertation has 
demonstrated, the power of discourse does not operate purely in a top-down fashion. 
The success of racial politics depended on tapping into and thus reflecting existing 
racial feelings. As both Carter and Clinton illustrated, presidential discourse could not 
simply be imposed on the American public. The success of coded racial politics 
depended on a bottom-up relationship of power too. It is also important to stress that 
the American public, and hence public discourse, were influenced by a number of other 
discourses, other than presidential, which would have aided the reproduction of coded 
racial political issues. Certainly, while the dissertation has examined the role of the 
press in this process, television news media would also have had a considerable impact.
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An analysis of television news media, although perhaps logistically difficult, would be 
extremely interesting.
The time-period under focus in the dissertation has been 1968 to 1997: the 
Nixon to Clinton era. An analysis of more recent data and information reveals, 
however, that at the end of the twentieth century and the dawn of the new millenium, 
the paradox between socio-economic data and African-American testimony, and white 
testimony on the significance of race, continues to exist. In terms of unemployment, in 
2000 African Americans remained twice as likely as whites to be unemployed, with the 
rate for African Americans standing at 7.6% compared with 3.5% for whites.1 This 
disparity also existed for both high school graduates and university graduates. In 2000 
the unemployment rate for white high school graduates was 3.3%, yet for African 
Americans it stood at 6.3%. Similarly, the unemployment rate for university graduates 
was 1.4% for whites, and 2.5% for African Americans.2 A racial divergence continued 
to exist in educational attainment in 2000. Twenty-one and a half percent of African 
Americans did not graduate from high school, compared with 15.1% of whites. While 
17.3% of whites held a university degree, compared to 11.4% of African Americans. 
Income levels between white and African Americans also continued to differ to a 
significant degree. In 2000 the median income for white individuals was $28,564,
1 U.S. Bureau of the Census, Table No. 569 “Employment Statistics o f the Civilian Population: 1970 -  
2000”, Statistical Abstract o f the United States: 2001.
2 U.S. Bureau of the Census, Table No. 389 “Unemployed and Unemployment Rates By Educational 
Attainment, Sex, Race and Hispanic Origin”, Statistical Abstract o f the United States: 2001.
3 U.S. Bureau of the Census, Table No. 217 “Educational Attainment By Selected Characteristics: 2000”, 
Statistical Abstract o f the United States: 2001.
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while for African Americans it stood at $20,579.4 For families, the gulf was even 
wider: the median income for African-American families was $31,778, compared with 
$51,224 for white families.5
In terms of attitudes towards race, The Gallup Poll Social Audit found that 
whites continued to regard race as less significant in determining the life chances and 
experiences of African Americans than African Americans did themselves. In 2001, 
69% of whites compared with 41% of African Americans believed that blacks were 
treated the same as whites in their own community.6 Eighty-five percent of whites 
stated that black children had as good a chance as white children to get a good 
education in their local community, compared with 52% of African Americans.7 In 
terms of accessibility to good housing, the gap between white and black opinion 
increased in the last decade of the twentieth century. In 2001, 83% of whites believed 
that African Americans had the same chances as whites to get affordable housing in 
their own community, compared to 48% of African Americans.8 Similarly, a 
significant proportion of African Americans stated that they were treated less fairly 
than whites in a variety of everyday interactions and settings: 46% whilst shopping in a 
mall; 39% in restaurants/bars/theatres; 38% in neighbourhood shops. Conversely, the
4 U.S. Bureau of the Census, Table No. 675 “Money Income of Persons -  Selected Characteristics By 
Income Level: 2000”, Statistical Abstract o f the United States: 2001.
5 U.S. Bureau of the Census, Table No. 668 “Money Income of Families -  Percent Distribution By 
Income Level, Race and Hispanic Origin: 2000”, Statistical Abstract o f the United States: 2001.
6 Gallup Organization, The Gallup Poll Social Audit on Black/White Relations 2001 Update (Princeton: 
Gallup Organization, 2001), 7.
7 Gallup, Black/White Relations 2001, 9.
8 Gallup, Black/White Relations 2001, 10.
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percentage of whites who agreed was far smaller: 16%, 12%, and 12% respectively.9 
The Gallup Poll Social Audit also found significant differences between African 
Americans and whites in terms of satisfaction with a number of aspects of personal life 
in America. In 2001 while 92% of whites expressed satisfaction with their personal 
life, the figure for African Americans was 79%. Similarly, 89% of whites expressed 
satisfaction with their standard of living, compared with 73% of African Americans.10
The Gallup Poll Social Audit also revealed that less than 50% of both African 
Americans and whites -  41% and 46% respectively -  rated the state of race relations in 
America in 2001 as ‘very or somewhat good’.11 The poll also revealed that in 2001 
66% of African Americans and 45% of whites believed that relations between blacks 
and whites in America will always be a problem.12 Such figures perhaps make for a 
pessimistic view of race relations in America in the future. Perhaps, however, such 
acknowledgement of the significance of race, particularly during an era which has 
sought to move away from the issue, is ground for optimism. While Americans may 
continue to differ in their beliefs on the causes of the problem and hence the solutions, 
without the acknowledgement of a problem, a solution can never be achieved.
9 Gallup, Black/White Relations 2001, 12.
10 Gallup, Black/White Relations 2001, 15.
11 Gallup, Black/White Relations 2001, 13.
12 Gallup, Black/White Relations 2001, 14.
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